Civilian Agency Records
1. Davos was a Swiss health resort town near Austria that was turned into a Nazi economic enclave. In the town, besides a dozen German-owned sanatoria and some six dozen Geman-owned business interests, the Germans maintained a consulate. [Back to text]
2. German citizen resident in Switzerland who provided information to the Office of Strategic Services as Agent No. 476. [Back to text]
3. Note: The Bank for International Settlements is located in Basel; as is the headquarters for The Swiss Bank Corporation, one of the three largest banks in Switzerland. [Back to text]
4. Swiss city accidently bombed by the U.S. Army Air Force in April 1944. [Back to text]
5. During the war, Zurich was the headquarters of Credit Suisse [or Schweizerische Kreditsantstalt] and the Union Bank of Switzerland, two of the three largest Swiss banks. [Back to text]
6. Researchers may find useful Frank G. Weber, The Evasive Neutral: Germany, Britain and the Quest for a Turkish Alliance in the Second World War (Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 1979); Annette Baker Fox, The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959); Christopher Hollis, ed., Neutral War Aims (London: Burns & Oates, 1940); Roderick Ogley, The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1970); Arnold Toynbee and Veronica M. Toynbee, eds., The War & the Neutrals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956); L.C. Moyzisch, Operation Cicero, postscript by Franz von Papen (New York: Coward-McCann, 1950); Barry Rubin, Istanbul Intrigues (New York: McGraw Hill, 1989). [Back to text]
7. These units (attached to Amt IV of the RSHA [Reich Main Security Office]) were first employed in March 1938, and seven such units were used during the Polish campaign. Five Einsatzgruppen, totaling 3,000 men, took part in the Russian invasion, with orders to kill all Jews and Soviet political commissars. Between June and November 1941, they executed as many as 600,000 Jews. Together, with other Security Police, they were responsible for the deaths of 2 million people. Researchers may find useful Yitzhak Arad, et al., eds., The Einsatzgruppen Reports (New York: Holocaust Library, 1989). [Back to text]
8. Georgii Drozdov, et al., Russia at War, 1941–1945 (New York: Vendome Press, 1987); Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 1941–1945 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957); Allan Clark, Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict, 1941–1945 (New York: Quill/William Morrow, 1985); Theo J. Schulte, The German Army and Nazi Policies in Occupied Russia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Gerhard L. Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939–1941 (Leiden: Brill, 1972); Lucjan Dobroszycki and Jeffrey Gurock, eds., The Holocaust in the Soviet Union (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharp, 1993); Ihor Kamenetsky, Hitler's Occupation of Ukraine (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1956); John Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism 1939–1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955); Yury Boshyk, ed., Ukraine During World War II: History and its Aftermath (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, 1986); Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The Way They Waged War and the Peace They Sought (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957); Marshal D. Shulman, Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised (New York: Atheneum, 1969); Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., Stalin's Correspondence with Roosevelt and Truman 1941–1945 (New York: Capricorn Books, 1965); C. Beatrice Farnsworth, William Bullitt and the Soviet Union (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967); Nikolai Voznesensky, The Economy of the USSR During World War II (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1948); William Harrison Standley and Arthur A. Agerton, Admiral Ambassador to Russia (Chicago: R. Regnery, 1955); W. Averell Harriman, with Elie Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941–1945 (New York: Random House, 1975); Ivan Maisky, Memoirs of a Soviet Ambassador: The War 1939–1945 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968); Robert Beitzell, The Uneasy Alliance: America, Britain, and Russia, 1941–1943 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972). [Back to text]
9. Researchers may find useful Harriet Pass Freidenreich, The Jews of Yugoslavia (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1979); Zdenko Lowenthal, ed., The Crimes of the Fascist Occupants and Their Collaborators against Jews in Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Federation of Jewish Communities, 1957); Edmond Paris, Genocide in Satellite Croatia, 1941–1945 (Chicago: American Institute for Balkan Affairs, 1961); Lazo Kostich, Holocaust in the Independent State of Croatia (Chicago: Liberty Press, 1981); Jasa Romano, Jews of Yugoslavia, 1941–1945 (Belgrade: Federation of Jewish Communities of Yugoslavia, 1982); Walter Roberts, Tito, Mihailovic and the Allies: 1941–1945 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1973); Nora Beloff, Tito's Flawed Legacy: Yugoslavia and the West 1939–1984 (London: Gollanez, 1985); Kirk Ford, Jr., OSS and the Yugoslav Resistance, 1943–1945 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1992); Amy Schmidt, “World War II Yugoslav Materials in the National Archives,” Slovene Studies, vol. 16, no. 2 (1994): 13–30. [Back to text]
10. Subsequently, Italy, Poland, and Austria would adhere to the Paris Agreement. [Back to text]
11. Germany: Distribution of Reparation: Establishment of Inter-Allied Reparation Agency; Restitution of Monetary Gold: Agreement Between the United States of America and Other Governments, Department of State Publication 2966, Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1655, pp. 1–29. The agreement was opened for signature in Paris, January 14, 1946; it entered into force, January 24, 1946. [Back to text]
12. Dollfus Mieg et Compagnie S.A., a French textile company, that claimed to have had 64 bars of gold (which it had acquired in Switzerland) stolen by the Germans in 1944. [Back to text]
13. A section of the Intelligence Division (MEW) was responsible for collecting evidence about firms and individuals suspected to have dealings with the enemy with a view to their being placed on the Statutory List or Black List. British firms were prohibited by the Trading with the Enemy Act operated by the Board of Trade and the Treasury from dealing with such firms and the lists were also used as evidence by the Contraband and Enemy Exports Committee. The placing of names on the lists was under the control of the Black List Committee which included representatives of the Admiralty, the Ministry of Shipping and, later on, of the United States. [Back to text]
14. For basic readings on the subject of cultural restitution see Kurtz, Nazi Contraband: American Policy on the Return of European Cultural Treasures, 1945–1955, op. cit.; Nicholas, The Rape of Europa: The Fate of Europe's Treasures in the Third Reich and the Second World War, op. cit.; Hector Feliciano, The Lost Museum: The Nazi Conspiracy to Steal the World's Greatest Works of Art, op. cit.; and, Elizabeth Simpson, ed., The Spoils of War: World War II and Its Aftermath: The Loss, Reappearance, and Recovery of Cultural Property, op. cit. [Back to text]
15. The American Harvard Defense Group was established by a group of Harvard faculty shortly after the fall of Paris in June 1940, to serve as a clearinghouse which could direct available resources to the most useful areas. [Back to text]
16. It established a committee in January 1943, to investigate cultural theft and restitution. [Back to text]
17. Hermann Bunjes served during the occupation of France as Referent für Kunstschutz und Kultur under the Germany military command in Paris and was Director of the Deutsche Kunsthistorische Forschungsstaette (German Fine Arts Institute) of Paris. He also acted as Göring's first personal art agent in France during the occupation and he was closely connected with the activities of the ERR. [Back to text]
18. Before the war he was a classics professor at Harvard. Once drafted, he worked with Air Force Intelligence. [Back to text]
19. See Report of the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas (Washington, DC, 1946). [Back to text]
20. The German Commission for the Protection of Works of Art in the Occupied Countries (under direction of the German Army High Command). [Back to text]
21. Researchers may find useful James S. Plaut, “Investigation of the Major Nazi Art-Confiscation Agencies,” in Elizabeth Simpson, ed., The Spoils of War, op. cit., pp. 124–125. [Back to text]
22. They were joined by Jan Vlug, a Dutch intelligence officer. [Back to text]
23. An FEA historian wrote in 1946, that “There is, so far as this writer knows, no record which names one man as the originator of the Safe Haven project idea. Internal evidence from the records, however, supports the testimony of many participants in the project's work that Samuel Klaus must be credited with formulating the concepts upon which the program was based.” She continues, “Klaus, an attorney, was employed in the Department of the Treasury [in 1944]. Records there were available to him, and on the basis of the data in those, against the background of his own understanding of the nature of the German problem, he became convinced that plans for counter-moves against the Germans should be made and integrated. By the spring of 1944, his own ideas were formulated. Two plans suggested themselves as means for preparing against German post-war economic and cultural aggression. First, data should be gathered from all available sources to discover the nature of German penetration and the methods by which it operated. Second, plans should be made to uncover German assets not only in this country but in other countries as well, and a program should be outlined for persuading the Allies and the neutral countries to assist in instrumenting a system of control of German assets.” Clarke, “Safehaven Study,” pp. 25–26. In l944, Klaus was borrowed by the FEA from Treasury, and by January 1945, he was Assistant General Counsel, FEA, assigned to the Special Areas Branch. Researchers should note that the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, New York, has material relating to Klaus and the Safehaven program in the Oscar Cox Papers and the Morgenthau Diaries. [Back to text]
24. The first head of the Office of Economic Programs was V. Frank Coe. When he resigned from FEA to take a position in the Office of Monetary Research in the Department of the Treasury, James W. Angell replaced him. [Back to text]
25. Fowler had been formerly General Counsel for the Office of Production Management and the War Production Board (September 1941–September 1944). In September 1944 he was assigned to the Mission on Economic Affairs in London. [Back to text]
26. Clarke, “Safehaven Study,” pp. 130–131. [Back to text]
27. Clarke, “Safehaven Study,” p. 131. [Back to text]
28. Clarke, “Safehaven Study,” pp. 132–134. [Back to text]
29. Clarke, “Safehaven Study,” p. 134. Max Amann served as Hitler's banker and oversaw his royalties from “Mein Kampf.” [Back to text]
30. Cited in Clarke, “Safehaven Study,” pp. 50–51. [Back to text]
31. In Argentina, the Legal Attaché of the American Embassy was an FBI agent. Regarding smuggling as a subversive activity, the FBI had primary jurisdiction. The Naval Attaché was in charge of stopping ships and searching for contraband. [Back to text]
32. In her “Safehaven Study,” Margaret Clarke observed “Objections have been made in some quarters that flaws in the intelligence system sometimes resulted in injustices to both neutral governments and neutral nationals. With respect to FEA's gathering of Safe Haven data it must be said that every effort was made to verify reports, and that the policy was to investigate every angle of a suspected case of collaboration before the case was submitted for action.” p.135. [Back to text]
33. This finding aid is applicable to the records of all the series of TRIFCOG records. [Back to text]
34. For additional records, see the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State (RG 84); records of the U.S. Embassy in Brussels. [Back to text]
35. Mr. Reinstein in 1945 was the Associate Chief, Division of Financial Affairs; Economic Adviser, U.S. Delegation, Council of Foreign Ministers, September 11–October 2, 1945. [Back to text]