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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

April 30, 1970

MEMORANDUM TO ALL BUREAU OFFICIALS AND SUPERVISORS

(A) COMMUNICATIONS TO FIELD OFFICES -- Communications of any type sending instructions to field offices should be short, clear and simple. Use telegraph type language. Reference prior communications to avoid needless repetition of previous instructions.

(B) UTILIZATION OF LIAISON SECTION -- A reduction in the number of Supervisors handling liaison with other Government agencies makes it necessary that the time of the remainder be utilized most efficiently to permit the productive handling of contacts with those agencies. It is desired that Supervisors refrain from designating mail for delivery by Liaison unless a reason exists for such designation. Mail should and will be delivered by Liaison if it requires discussion with or delivery to a high-ranking official of another agency, if its sensitivity requires special handling, or if its content requires some explanation or comment. In the absence of some such reason, mail should be designated for delivery by the Courier Service or by regular mail.

Dissemination of Bureau reports and memoranda to other Government agencies is the responsibility of the substantive Supervisor, and not of the Liaison Section. Transmittal form 0-14 should be used whether such dissemination is being made by Liaison, by Courier Service, or by regular mail. Transmittal forms in the 0-14 series, sometimes referred to as form routing slips, contain blocks to be checked which will inform the addressee that no further investigation is contemplated, that the other agency will be advised of pertinent developments, that the status of the case is complete or incomplete, and that the item or items are being furnished for the information of the addressee. The last notation is sometimes checked without any indication as to the status of the case or whether further material may be expected, resulting in later inquiry from the addressee. It is desired that when this form is utilized, it be fully executed.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

If a Liaison Supervisor is being asked to pass information orally to another agency, he should promptly be furnished an appropriate letter-head memorandum or other communication which will confirm his oral dissemination. Do not send serials to Liaison with a routing slip asking "please handle" or "please pass information to --."

Affirmative contacts are being discontinued with twenty-four agencies with which we have relatively few interests in common. Liaison Supervisors will, however, continue to handle urgent matters requiring personal liaison with those agencies. Supervisors should continue to designate for the Liaison Section tickler copies of memoranda discussing matters involving other Government agencies, and consideration should be given to discussion of such matters with the Liaison representative prior to preparation of memoranda in order that full facts concerning our relations with the other agency may be ascertained. Matters involving our relations with other agencies should be coordinated, wherever possible, with the Liaison Supervisor at the outset.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: DISCONTINUANCE OF LIAISON FUNCTIONS

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE:

The benefits of direct contact with the Internal Revenue Service are entirely in our favor. We secure confidential tax information from them based on a special arrangement under which we secure the written signature of an Assistant Attorney General, subsequently presenting this with our request to a designated point within the Internal Revenue Service. Obviously it is not feasible to get the necessary signatures by mail and, further, the Internal Revenue Service would not want to send tax returns by mail for review.

measured service would certainly be adequate. H

STATE DEPARTMENT:

Direct contact with State enables us to secure within the same day passports for Bureau officials or personnel who must travel abroad immediately. This could not be done by correspondence. Our sensitive espionage investigations involving diplomatic personnel are cleared in advance with State, and personal contact is necessary to clarify questions raised by State. State handles many of our investigations abroad in areas not covered by Legal Attaches. Here again, direct contact is vital in order to achieve expeditious responses.

Direct contact with State is essential for expeditious responses.
In summary, we have much to lose by dropping direct contact with these agencies. Our ability to get things done immediately in these critical areas requires direct liaison.

If the Director agrees with the thoughts set forth above, I would like to retain Special Agents Joseph Fitzgerald and Leon Schwartz, as well as Robert Hayes; in addition, it would be necessary for Section Chief D. J. Brennan and Number One Man G. A. Day to engage in active liaison assignments in order to share the work load involved in contact with the major agencies referred to above.

The supervision of the Bureau's foreign liaison operations, as well as the Bureau's Defense Plans, would continue to be part of the Section's responsibility, as would coordination and handling of the requests and information received from the foreign liaison representatives stationed in Washington, including the Canadians, British, French, Japanese, and Australians.

Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach
Re: DISCONTINUANCE OF LIAISON FUNCTIONS

In addition, in order to give better balance to this section, I would suggest transferring the responsibility for the handling of all security informants, domestic and foreign, to it. This means the transfer of three men from the Internal Security Section and one man from the Nationalities Intelligence Section. The reorganized section would have a complement of eleven men and would be known as the Informant-Liaison Section. As indicated, both the Section Chief and Number One Man would be handling liaison matters outside the office, as well as administration of the section.

Improve organization of this section and transfer all liaison functions to this section.

ACTION:

That the Director give consideration to the recommendations set forth above.



ADDENDUM BY MR. DELOACH, 7/15/70 (CDD:csh)

I thoroughly agree with Mr. Sullivan's recommendations and sincerely hope that the Director will give consideration to those recommendations.

Having been a liaison agent for a number of years, and having supervised such activities for a period of time, I am well aware of the fact that considerable respect for the Director and the FBI is engendered by the men on these assignments. The liaison men and their activities represent a strong defense for the FBI at all times. We have friends and close contacts in most all of the Government agencies-----but we also have many enemies who lurk on the sidelines waiting to shoot us down. The liaison men prevent this through the medium of developing close contacts and maintaining those contacts, so that our enemies cannot take advantage of us.

(continued - next page)

It is certainly desirable to have out of the way of the FBI's main operations.

Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach

Re: DISCONTINUANCE OF LIAISON FUNCTIONS

Addendum by Mr. DeLoach (continued)

The liaison men have been both the eyes and ears of the Director and the Bureau for many years. Many of them have spent personal funds in order to develop contacts. There will be times, of course, when enemies of the Bureau, despite effective liaison, will attempt to cause criticism of the FBI. The liaison men will always serve as good witnesses, however, to the fact that they have tried to set up effective liaison despite the deliberate hatred of our enemies.

For these reasons I respectfully hope that the Director will give consideration to Mr. Sullivan's recommendations.

C. D. DeLoach

DISCONTINUED AGENCIES

Agency for International Development
Agriculture (Department)
Credit Union Administration
Office of Public Safety (AID)
Library of Congress
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Federal Power Commission
Federal Reserve System
Food and Drug Administration
Health, Education and Welfare
International Police Academy
National Science Foundation
Office of Civil Defense (Army)
Office of Emergency Preparedness
Securities and Exchange Commission
Social Security Administration
Supreme Court
Atomic Energy Commission
Defense Atomic Support Agency
Defense Communications Agency
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
General Accounting Office
Marine Corps
Bureau of the Budget
General Services Administration
Treasury (except Secret Service and Internal Revenue Service)
Department of Housing and Urban Development
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
Interior
Labor
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Labor Relations Board
National Security Agency
Office of Economic Opportunity
Peace Corps
U. S. Information Agency
Office of Secretary of Defense
Defense Supply Agency
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
Civil Rights Commission
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Defense Intelligence Agency
Post Office
Veterans Administration

Civil Aeronautics Board
Coast Guard
Commerce Department
Export-Import Bank
Farm Credit Administration
Federal Aviation Administration
Federal Communications Commission
Federal Maritime Commission
Federal Trade Commission
Government Printing Office
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Public Health Service
Railroad Retirement Board
Renegotiation Board
Small Business Administration
Smithsonian Institute
Tariff Commission
Department of Transportation
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Following are typewritten clarifications of the handwritten comments of J. Edgar Hoover on the attached document:

Page 2 -- "I seriously question essential need for those I have marked. H"

Page 2, bottom of page, left to right - "I thought by closing out the substantial liaison operations I would gain at least 8 Agts but it seems Dom. Int are going to use these. H"

Handwritten comment of Clyde Tolson - "I suggest Felt look into this"

- "Yes. H"

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 7/16/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: DISCONTINUANCE OF LIAISON FUNCTIONS

Re my memorandum dated 7/15/70 in which I pointed out that liaison was being discontinued with 65 agencies and that six Agents from the Liaison Section are available for reassignment. I contemplate using five of the six Agents to fill some of the existing vacancies in the Domestic Intelligence Division which have been approved for filling. The sixth Agent will be used to staff the midnight to 8 a.m. Shift. This shift has previously been filled on a rotation basis by the Sections in the Division but the increased correspondence engendered by the reduction of liaison will not make it possible for the Sections to spare a man for this shift.

I certainly agree with the Director that contacts with the agencies with which we will continue liaison can in a great many instances be made by telephone and this was considered in my request for the retention of three Agents to perform liaison with the agencies indicated in my memorandum. Even then, because of the tremendous volume of business we have with these agencies, it will be necessary for the Section Chief and the Number One Man to both perform active liaison functions outside the office, visiting, as the other men do, the approved agencies.

These liaison contacts with whom we would be doing business by phone must be developed and maintained by personal contact and because of the substantial turnover in agencies, new contacts must be constantly developed on a personal basis. These remaining liaison men will also have to act as alternates for one another during periods of leave or illness and where emergency situations arise that require handling of an item when the regular liaison Agent is otherwise engaged. The liaison assignments will be as follows:

Leon F. Schwartz - Department of State
Air Force Office of Special
Investigations

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Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: DISCONTINUANCE OF LIAISON FUNCTIONS

Joseph M. Fitzgerald - Army and Navy Intelligence

Robert H. Haynes - White House
Vice President
National Security Council

Number One Man Graham A. Day - Secret Service
Civil Service Commission

Section Chief Daniel J. Brennan, Jr., - Internal Revenue
Service

When the Number One Man is working outside the office the Section Chief will be present to run the Section and when he is outside working the Number One Man will handle the Section.

The remainder of the Section will be comprised of two supervisors handling supervision of all foreign offices, visits to the U. S. of Legal Attache contacts, Foreign Police Cooperation matters, and coordination of the Bureau's defense planning; three Agents handling supervision of all security informant matters in the U. S.; and one Agent supervising foreign informants and contacts, and the border coverage program.

I believe strongly that this is the barest minimum number with which the Section can operate under the revised program because even as projected, the Number One Man and the Section Chief will be engaged in active liaison outside the office for substantial periods of time. Although the plan outlined above represents a drastic reduction in personnel, I am confident that by the concerted and extra efforts of those remaining, we can continue the suggested revised program of operation.

ACTION:

1. If approved, I will proceed as indicated above.

2. We are advising the discontinued agencies that our increased work and limited manpower requires utilization of the bulk of our liaison Agents in other areas and it will be necessary for them to transact future business with the Bureau in writing.

Handwritten notes:
- 2 -
suggest felt
look into this
give it
3
4

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: July 20, 1970

FROM : W. M. FELT

SUBJECT: DISCONTINUANCE OF LIAISON FUNCTIONS

Pursuant to the Director's instructions, I have carefully looked into discontinuance of liaison functions and resultant release of Agent Supervisory personnel for reassignment. I have reviewed the Director's instructions (pertinent memoranda attached) and have conferred with various Bureau officials.

The Director instructed liaison be restricted to White House, Vice President and National Security Council. Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) listed 65 agencies being eliminated from liaison contact but also respectfully suggested continued liaison with State, Air Force, Army, Navy, Secret Service, Internal Revenue and Civil Service. DID feels that some disadvantage or possible criticism could result from discontinuance of liaison with these key agencies.

At this point possible criticism or problems are anticipatory. Obviously we will be alert to such possibilities, and if problems arise, we will meet them and take such steps as are necessary to solve them. We can always modify our procedures when it is in the Bureau's interests to do so. Furthermore, there appear to be no question but that almost all business and necessary dissemination can be handled by teletypes, letters, dissemination memoranda, or by telephone with confirmation in writing if necessary. Emergency or unusually delicate situations can be handled by direct contact.

For above reasons, we should immediately ~~discontinue~~ discontinue liaison service with all agencies except White House, Vice President, and National Security Council. Our teletype network to key agencies and our regular courier service will provide expedite transmission. An emergency, such as a threat against the President, can be handled by phone with confirmation by letter. DID can prepare necessary instructions and guidelines to implement our new procedures. Nine Agent Supervisors; including a Section Chief, will be made available for other assignments.

Mr. Sullivan also proposed one of Agents released from liaison be designated permanent night supervisor on midnight to 8:00 AM ~~shift in DID~~ which is presently filled on rotation basis. Sullivan points out additional correspondence anticipated because of reduction in liaison, making it more difficult for various units to spare men for midnight shift on rotation basis. There may be an increase but it is impossible now to determine exact extent. DID should defer this request for 90 days to determine extent of increased work load and submit additional justification at that time.

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Memo for Mr. Tolson

Re: Discontinuance of Liaison Functions

Mr. Sullivan pointed out in his memorandum (attached) that there are 5 vacancies in DID (none at Section Chief or #1 Man level -- SA R. L. Shackelford was promoted to Chief of Internal Security Section from Unit Chief level). Vacancies are as follows: (1) Three in New Left Groups Unit, one caused by the promotion of SA Shackelford -- replacement requested but not yet approved -- and two based on request for additional personnel to handle sharply increased work load involving violence-oriented groups. Two from Inspection Staff have been ordered under transfer in. Transfers being held in abeyance. (2) One vacancy in Racial Intelligence Section based on request for additional supervisor to handle increased work load re black militant groups -- approved and Agent under transfer in from Los Angeles. (3) One vacancy in Subversive Individuals Unit caused by transfer of SA S. S. Czarnecki to the Inspection Staff. Replacement approved but transfer in not yet ordered.

In addition, there are 4 immediate vacancies in other Divisions at Seat of Government: two in Special Investigative Division and one in Crime Records Division (Inspection Division memoranda recommending replacements attached). In addition, there is Section Chief vacancy in Administrative Division.

OBSERVATIONS:

Remaining functions will be liaison with White House, Vice President and National Security Council, plus supervision of Legal Attache Offices and related matters. These duties are now being handled by three Agent Supervisors. This is not enough to justify continuance of Section; however, a new unit could be established for administrative control consisting of Unit Chief and three Agent Supervisors. Unit Chief would administer unit and also be responsible for irregular contacts with key agencies to maintain effective relations and to resolve and avert incipient problems.

These matters have been discussed with Mr. Sullivan. While he does not agree with extent of proposed cutbacks, feeling we should maintain liaison with certain key agencies as set out in his previous proposals, he advises DID will vigorously strive to effectively implement the new procedures.

If these proposals are approved, a total of nine Agent supervisors will be removed from liaison, thus reducing approved DID Agent complement from 124 to 115. Nine Agents being released from liaison assignment can be assigned as follows: 5 for existing vacancies in DID; 2 transferred to existing vacancies in Special Investigative Division; SA Bernard C. Rachner has been transferred to field; and Section Chief Brennan to Administrative Division at no change in grade or salary to replace Section Chief C. Q. Smith, who is retiring effective 7/31/70 (this has been coordinated with Mr. Mohr and Mr. Callahan).

Memo for Mr. Tolson
Re: Discontinuance of Liaison Functions

It is felt the vacancy in the Crime Records Division can best be filled by designation of SA John H. Campbell, currently on Inspection Staff (Campbell's transfer to DID has been held in abeyance) inasmuch as he has had previous experience in Crime Records Division.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That routine liaison contacts be discontinued with all agencies except White House, Vice President, and National Security Council.
2. That the ~~Liaison~~ Section be abolished.
3. That a new unit consisting of Unit Chief and three Agent Supervisors be established for administrative control of remaining liaison functions. If approved, to be handled by DID.
4. That nine Agent Supervisors now handling liaison be transferred to other duties. (SA Rachner has been transferred to Washington Field Office and SA Breman to be transferred to Administrative Division.) If approved, to be handled by Mr. Mohr's Office.
5. That appropriate instructions and guidelines for communicating with other Government agencies be drawn up. If approved, to be handled by DID.
6. That approved Agent complement of DID be reduced from 124 to 115.

Memo for Mr. Tolson
Re: Discontinuance of Liaison Functions

7. That SA John H. Campbell be transferred from the Inspection Staff to the Crime Records Division. If approved, to be handled by Mr. Mohr's Office.

8. That DID's request for a midnight to 8:00 AM supervisor not be approved at this time.

*I concur in
all of Galt's
recommendations.*

W

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. Brennan

DATE: July 21, 1970

FROM : Mr. J. A. Sizoo

SUBJECT: DISCONTINUANCE OF LIAISON FUNCTIONS

This memorandum is to indicate the manner in which it is contemplated Special Agent (SA) personnel of the former Liaison Section will be reassigned in view of the recommendations made in Mr. Felt's memorandum dated 7-20-70, copy attached.

Number One Man Graham Day as Supervisor-in-Charge, Robert A. Bermingham, Harvey C. Flemister and Robert H. Haynes will constitute a separate unit within the Nationalities Intelligence Section to handle supervision of the foreign liaison offices, Foreign Police Cooperation cases, and liaison with the White House, Vice President and the National Security Council.

The nine men to be reassigned, if approved, will be reassigned as follows:

Section Chief Daniel J. Brennan (1) has been reassigned to the Administrative Division and SA B. C. Racher (2) has been transferred to the Washington Field Office. It is understood that the Administrative Division desires Supervisor Joseph M. Fitzgerald (3), who formerly handled liaison with the Civil Service Commission, be transferred to that Division.

Supervisor William J. McDonnell (4) is being designated as a replacement for the former Supervisor-in-Charge of the New Left Unit of the Internal Security Section. Special Agents Fred J. Cassidy (5), Bowen F. Rose (6), and Leon F. Schwartz (7) will also be assigned to the Internal Security Section to fill vacancies in that Section. Special Agents William P. Dix (8) and D. R. Norie (9) will be reassigned to the Racial Intelligence Section to fill the vacancies in that Section for which James Ingram and Robert Ritzer were transferred to this Division. Ingram reported yesterday, 7-20-70, and he will be reassigned elsewhere at the Seat of Government (SOG). Ritzer, who is under transfer from Los Angeles, will temporarily remain in Los Angeles pending other vacancies at SOG.


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MEMORANDUM TO MR. C. D. BRENNAN
RE: DISCONTINUANCE OF LIAISON FUNCTIONS

An additional memorandum is being prepared outlining the manner in which other problems resulting from the discontinuance of the Liaison Section will be handled.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the SA personnel of the former Liaison Section be reassigned as indicated.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, likely of a person named James J. [unclear], is written over the lower portion of the recommendation text.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 7/21/70

FROM : Mr. C. D. Brennan

SUBJECT: DISCONTINUANCE OF LIAISON FUNCTIONS

Pursuant to the Director's instructions, we are discontinuing liaison contacts with all agencies except the White House, the Office of the Vice President, and the National Security Council. As a large volume of our work with other agencies has been handled by the Liaison Supervisors, we are recommending that those agencies be told that our increased work and limited manpower require the use of our Liaison Agents in other areas and it will be necessary for them to utilize other means for the transaction of their business with the Bureau.

We propose to advise the agencies that any requests for information from Bureau files be referred to the Name Check Section by telephone or mail and that requests dealing with matters of Bureau policy be addressed to the Director in writing. Telephonic inquiries in situations where time will not permit a written request and which involve Bureau policy or current operations will be referred to the Office of the interested Assistant Director.

Address cards have been prepared and circulated to all Bureau officials and stenographers covering those agencies to whom any volume of Bureau mail has been addressed in the past. It is not considered that address cards will be necessary for the small agencies with whom we have had infrequent contact as a proper mailing address can be secured either by telephone or from the Government Organization Manual.

We are carefully watching developments in the discontinuance of direct liaison and will make prompt recommendations concerning any problems which may be anticipated or arise.

Memo C. D. Brennan to Mr. Sullivan
Re: Discontinuance of Liaison Functions

ACTION:

(1) If approved, we will proceed with the discontinuance of Liaison as indicated above.

(2) Attached for approval is a proposed memorandum to All Bureau Officials and Supervisors informing them of the discontinuance of Liaison.

SK
H

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. Brennan

DATE: July 31, 1970

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: ORGANIZATION
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Reference your memorandum 7/27/70 "Liaison Section," addressed to all Division Chiefs, advising that a separate unit was to be set up in Nationalities Intelligence Section to handle foreign liaison, foreign police cooperation cases, and liaison with White House, Vice President, and National Security Council. Clerical personnel assigned to this work in the past were to be part of the new unit. In compliance with foregoing instructions, following reorganization accomplished within the Nationalities Intelligence Section:

The new unit, known as the Special Coordination Unit, will be headed by SA Graham A. Day as Supervisor-in-Charge and will include SAs Robert H. Haynes, Harvey C. Flemister, Jr., and Robert A. Bermingham. SA Day will be responsible for over-all supervision of the unit and will handle foreign liaison matters, telephonic inquiries received from other agencies and any special situations arising with respect to coordination of matters with other U. S. agencies.

SA Haynes will handle liaison with the White House, Vice President and National Security Council.

SAs Flemister and Bermingham will continue handling foreign police cooperation cases, coordination of Bureau Legat operations and visits of foreign officials who are contacts of our Legats. SA Flemister's area of responsibility in foregoing is the European area and SA Bermingham's is the remainder of the world.

With respect to clerical personnel assigned to the former Liaison Section, it should be noted that Edna Mae Jones and Margaret A. Zank, Clerk-Stenographers, GS-4, act as receptionists in the Division Front Office. Reception positions for other offices within the Division are handled on a rotating basis by Division pool personnel. For administrative purposes, therefore,

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum for Mr. Brennan
Re: ORGANIZATION
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION

Misses Jones and Zank are being assigned to the Division Steno Pool, which will assume responsibility in future of providing receptionists for Division Front Office space on a rotating basis.

Mrs. Mary L. Misiorek, Secretary (Stenography), GS-7, assigned heretofore as secretary to the Chief of Liaison Section, will be absorbed within the Division in a Secretary (Stenography), GS-7, position which is opening by reason of assignment of Secretary (Stenography), GS-8 (Mrs. Catherine H. Stone), to the office of Assistant to the Director Sullivan. Reassignment of Mrs. Misiorek will be handled separately.

Miss Dorothy B. Barnard, Clerk, GS-7, being transferred within the Division to Research Section along with her former responsibilities in connection with handling of Buplans matters.

Miss Leann M. Steele, Clerk-Stenographer, GS-3, has submitted her resignation effective 8/5/70 and no replacement being requested at this time.

All other clerical employees assigned to former Liaison Section being absorbed within the Special Coordination Unit, Nationalities Intelligence Section.

SA William J. McDonnell reported to the Section effective 7/30/70 as replacement for SA John T. Kelly, transferred to Internal Security Section. SA McDonnell will assume responsibilities for matters formerly handled by SA Kelly consisting of matters relating to Africa, the Near East and Far East, and the Pacific Islands. In addition, he will assume responsibility for special coverage relating to EPCE and Telex coverage heretofore assigned to SA F. X. O'Brien. In place of these matters, SA O'Brien will assume responsibility for legal research matters formerly assigned to SA Kelly.

The Special Coordination Unit will function from the Tenth Floor space formerly occupied by Liaison Section.

ACTION:

The Nationalities Intelligence Section will be fully operational under the above set-up as of beginning of business 8/3/70. Necessary revisions of Functional Statements, Organizational Charts and position descriptions are being handled separately.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. FELT

DATE: June 29, 1972

FROM : MR. KINLEY

SUBJECT: Liaison Section

I would appreciate your observations and recommendation on the following suggestion:

For many years, FBIHQ had a Liaison Section which maintained official liaison with the headquarters of other governmental departments and agencies in Washington, D. C. The discontinuance of that Liaison Section resulted in an attempt by the Washington Field Office to handle many inquiries of high-level officials of those departments and agencies. It should be noted, of course, that this office of necessity maintains liaison on a relatively low level with all governmental departments and agencies to insure the prompt referral of cases and to handle matters pertaining to the effective operation of this office in the District of Columbia. I feel that a reinstatement of the Liaison Section in FBIHQ would place the high level liaison with other agencies at the headquarters level where it would obviously be more effective.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. KINLEY

DATE: June 30, 1972

FROM : MR. FELT

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

SUBJECT: LIAISON SECTION

You requested my observations and recommendations with regard to the re-establishment of the Liaison Section.

The Liaison Section was broken up in July, 1970, and since that time necessary and desirable liaison with other Federal agencies has been handled by written communication as well as by direct contact with persons at various levels at the Bureau with their counterparts in the other Federal agencies. When the Liaison Section was discontinued it had grown too large and represented a waste of manpower. 10 Agents, not including a Section Chief, were engaged in handling domestic liaison with some 81 different agencies, many of which obviously were of minor importance to our operations. Since that time necessary liaison has not been handled as much by Washington Field Office as you indicated as by supervisors and officials in FBIHQ. Washington Field Office's liaison with other agencies relates almost entirely to the handling of leads and the Bureau's routine business with those agencies.

I believe we could more efficiently and effectively handle our business with the other major Federal agencies if we re-established a Liaison Unit of limited size to handle only those agencies with which we have the greatest amount of traffic. I propose we have a five-man Unit under the Chief of the existing Special Coordination Unit (L. F. Schwartz);

SA Robert H. Haynes is currently in that Unit handling liaison with the White House, the Vice President, and the National Security Council. To his assignments we should add Secret Service.

SA John E. Manning currently assists the Unit Chief in handling telephone inquiries. He could be assigned to handle liaison with the following:

- Military intelligence agencies
- Office of Special Investigations, Air Force
- Naval Investigative Service
- Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Army
- Coast Guard
- Office of Secretary of Defense

Memo for Mr. Kinley
Re: Liaison Section

SA B. C. Rachner currently in this Unit could handle liaison with:

Department of State
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Treasury Department and related agencies with exception of
Secret Service

A 4th Agent could handle Central Intelligence Agency and related committees:

U. S. Intelligence Board
Signal Intelligence Committee
Security Committee
Watch Committee
Technical Surveillances Countermeasures
Interagency Defector Committee

A 5th Agent could handle:

National Security Agency
Atomic Energy Commission
U. S. Postal Service
Department of Transportation

Under the above proposed arrangement we would have five Agents handling the major agencies with which we regularly need to resolve problems and handle the greater volume of our business relating to other agencies. This Unit could be effectively supervised by its present Chief (Schwartz) and would function under A. J. Decker, Jr., Chief and G. A. Day, Number One Man of the Nationalities Intelligence Section. Both Decker and Day are highly competent for this kind of supervision and administration, it being noted that Day is our top expert on liaison matters, having served as Number One Man in the old Liaison Section. Two other supervisors in the Unit (R. A. Birmingham and H. C. Flemister, Jr.) would continue to handle foreign liaison, to which they are presently assigned, including the supervision of Legat operations. A third Agent would need to be added for supervision of foreign liaison to replace Rachner, who is now engaged in these duties.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Special Coordination Unit be renamed Liaison Unit and organized along the lines indicated above with Unit Chief Schwartz; 5 Agents handling domestic liaison, and three Agents to handle foreign liaison. If approved, this would require the assignment of three additional Agents to this Unit.

DO-6 OFFICE OF ACTING DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

I do not know specifically the
duties of a Liaison Section or the
duties of a Special Coordination Unit.

lets spell those out first and
with specificity.

Then lets review current procedure
and prior procedure a comparative
review, such review to include costs
& other pertinent data to be found in
such a review.

J. 7-10
10:34 AM

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

12

7

TO : Mr. Felt

DATE: 7/14/72

FROM : E. S. Miller

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

SUBJECT: LIAISON SECTION

This memorandum is in response to Mr. Gray's comments concerning your memorandum to Mr. Kinley 6/30/72. Mr. Gray asked for a review of current and past liaison procedures.

The supervision of our foreign liaison representatives was not affected by the conversion in 7/70 of the Liaison Section to the Special Coordination Unit. That responsibility continues to be handled in the Special Coordination Unit in the same manner as it was handled in the former Liaison Section. This memorandum, therefore, is addressed to the question of the Bureau's domestic liaison operations.

Former Liaison Section

The objective of the Liaison Section was, through the development of high-level contacts in appropriate U. S. agencies, to insure that the Bureau's business with those agencies was accomplished promptly, effectively, economically, and with a minimum of jurisdictional or policy problems. By the establishment of effective liaison contacts, we sought to recognize and solve minor problems before they became major problems requiring protracted and expensive negotiations between the Bureau and other agencies.

Procedures under Liaison Section

The objectives cited above were achieved by placing seasoned Bureau representatives of broad experience in contact with officials at the highest levels of other agencies where the Bureau either needed help or had concurrent interests. In the former Liaison Section, ten Agents maintained liaison with approximately 81 U. S. agencies including major intelligence agencies, the military, other major departments, bureaus and commissions and many lesser agencies. They frequently visited the major agencies, developed a broad knowledge of

SEE ADDENDUM PAGE 7!

E. S. Miller to Mr. Felt
Re: LIAISON SECTION

their operations and established a close personal rapport with high-level officials in those agencies. For example, in matters of major importance the liaison Agent could make immediate personal contact with Cabinet officers, directors of bureaus and many other officials of the highest level. When our investigations required interviews of persons of this caliber, the interviews would be handled by the liaison Agents in order that the interviews could be accomplished without delay and with a minimum of inconvenience to the official involved. Many of these high-level contacts were the result of years of development by the Bureau liaison representatives and through them we were able to obtain assistance which might otherwise have been difficult or impossible to obtain. Some examples of this type of support are the following:

National Security Agency-One of the Bureau's secure telephone systems was provided and installed by this Agency at no cost to the Bureau, a savings of approximately \$150,000. Through high-level contacts in this Agency, we have also been able to secure the results of its technical research which might have been difficult or expensive to obtain through other sources.

Post Office-Our close association with the Chief Postal Inspector and his top officials has resulted in that agency providing support in some of our most delicate intelligence operations looking to the identification of illegal hostile intelligence activities in this country.

State Department-In addition to providing at no cost to the Bureau another secure telephone network and making available to the Bureau worldwide cable facilities of the State Department, our high-level contacts in this Department have on many occasions assisted in the speedy resolution of complicated investigative problems both in the criminal and security fields. An excellent example would be the support provided by the Passport Office of the State Department in identifying James Earl Ray as the assassin of Martin Luther King.

Memorandum E. S. Miller to Mr. Felt
Re: LIAISON SECTION

Military Agencies-The military intelligence agencies have consistently provided excellent support to the Bureau in both the security and criminal fields. Much of this is due to the high-level liaison contacts developed over the years with these agencies. In the Yablonsky murder case, the military provided, on very short notice at no cost to the Bureau, an expert diving team which was able to locate one of the weapons involved which was an essential piece of evidence in this crime. Likewise, the military has been able to provide a wealth of deceptive information to be used in our double agent operations directed against Soviet-bloc intelligence agencies.

Immigration and Naturalization Service-

Through high-level contacts with this Service, we have been able to arrange with a minimum of complicated paper work the speedy deportation of persons entering the United States who are considered to be threats to the internal security, such as Arab terrorists sent to the United States on assassination missions.

In many other instances, through close established liaison, we were able to avoid the development of situations in other agencies which could have resulted in operational problems for the Bureau. Our liaison, for example, with the President's Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence and the Commission on Civil Rights provided advance information concerning possible publications or statements by those commissions which could have reflected adversely on the Bureau.

Under these procedures, the Bureau liaison representative would be visiting the agencies assigned to him on a frequent basis so that officials of those agencies would be able to discuss potential policy problems with him before making them a matter of formal correspondence with the Bureau. In many of these situations, the Bureau liaison representative, being fully conversant with Bureau policies and procedures, would immediately resolve the question to the satisfaction of both the Bureau and the official of the other agency without the necessity of getting into expensive, drawn out, formal written negotiations between both agencies.

Memorandum E. S. Miller to Mr. Felt
Re: LIAISON SECTION

Special Coordination Unit

Objectives of the Special Coordination Unit, while similar to those previously stated for the former Liaison Section, are necessarily less broad and are directed more towards facilitating the resolution of problems raised by other agencies than producing effective action by other agencies on behalf of the FBI.

Procedures under Special Coordination Unit

Under the current setup, two Agents assigned to the Special Coordination Unit are handling our domestic liaison work. One of these is assigned to liaison with The White House, the Vice President, and the National Security Council. He is backed up by the other Agent who also attends meetings of various intelligence committees and assists the Unit Chief in handling inquiries from other agencies doing business with the Bureau.

We have been able in our current system to carry on an effective liaison operation primarily because of the quality and number of high-level contacts which had been developed under the previous Liaison Section system. Although effective, this has really been a holding operation largely dependent upon the existing reservoir of well developed contacts. Due to transfers and retirements in the most important agencies with which we do business, our established contacts have been deteriorating so that we are approaching the point of diminishing returns. This situation could be reversed if we had sufficient man power to visit the more important agencies, renew old contacts and establish new ones.

Currently, with the exception of our liaison with The White House, the Vice President and the National Security Council, our liaison with other agencies is primarily dependent upon those agencies contacting the Special Coordination Unit either telephonically or in person.

Memorandum E. S. Miller to Mr. Felt
Re: LIAISON SECTION

Costs

In measuring the cost of a domestic liaison operation, the only measurable cost is the total salary for personnel involved. Liaison Agents are normally selected from among Supervisors of GS-15 caliber (\$25,583-\$33,260); that is, men who have the ability and experience required to handle a Unit Chief's job or a job of similar responsibility. Based on current median salaries, there is set out below a comparison of the annual salary cost of the former Liaison Section and the current Special Coordination Unit. In considering these figures, it should be recognized that the Section Chief and Number One Man in the former Liaison Section, and the Unit Chief in the present Special Coordination Unit devoted only part of their time to domestic liaison, and also supervised the coordination of our offices abroad and the investigation of the many "Foreign Police Cooperation" cases handled in the United States in reciprocity for the work done for us abroad. The former Liaison Section also handled other matters, now absorbed elsewhere, such as emergency planning and the Bureau's participation in the NATO Special Committee.

Former Liaison Section

1 - GS-16 Section Chief	-	\$33,634
1 - GS-15 Number One Man	-	28,995
10 - GS-15 Liaison Agent positions		<u>289,950</u>
Total:		<u>\$352,579</u>

Special Coordination Unit

1 - GS-15 Unit Chief position	\$28,995
1 - GS-15 Liaison Agent	28,995
1 - GS-14 Supervisor	<u>24,888</u>
	<u>\$82,878</u>

If, as suggested, the current Special Coordination Unit were to be expanded to a liaison operation, the increased salary costs should be estimated at \$28,995 annually per additional Liaison Agent. Therefore, the proposed addition of three qualified Liaison Agents to the Unit would result in an increased annual expenditure of \$86,985.

We have previously cited examples of tangible monetary savings effected through liaison. In addition, there are considerable intangible savings which are difficult to measure.

Memorandum E. S. Miller to Mr. Felt
Re: LIAISON SECTION

such as savings in reduced paper work, savings in man hours of consultation, savings in the elimination of unnecessary or duplicative investigative effort and, of overriding importance, the increasing of our operational effectiveness through the establishment of good will with other agencies. These savings offset to a considerable degree the increased salary expenditure.

Conclusion

Although we enjoy a strong operational relationship with other agencies, including the intelligence agencies, wherein in many instances we have face-to-face meetings at the desk level with counterparts in other agencies, we believe that from the overall standpoint the Bureau can profit from the assignment of three additional Liaison Agents to this work. We are not recommending that we enter into liaison functions as broadly as we were engaged in the past as we believe such an expenditure would not be justified. What we are recommending is the assignment of one-half the personnel which had previously been assigned to direct liaison functions at less than one-half the previous cost.

ACTION:

. For information.

(OVER...)

ADDENDUM OF W. M. FELT 7-19-72

I recommend re-establishment of a Liaison Section on the restricted basis outlined above. The Liaison Section should maintain smooth and continuing contact with top officials in the intelligence community and related departments. We would not change in any way very effective liaison maintained by other divisions with Congress, Budget Bureau, Civil Service Commission, Department of Transportation in connection with hijackings and security matters, etc. This action would eliminate any remnants of criticism concerning our liaison. We would set up strict guidelines and carefully select our personnel to insure that we would get the type of liaison outlined above. We would guard against it becoming a mail courier operation.

I recommend the re-establishment of the Liaison Section and the adding of three additional agents to implement this.

*Agree.
JWH 9-3
8:22P*

You will recall this originated with a series of suggestions by SDC Kandel.
WJK

Yes, it did; however this matter I had under consideration at the inception. I was well aware of the disestablishment of the Liaison Section & the reasons therefore and had this matter on my list.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

13
3

TO : Mr. W. M. Felt

DATE: 9/7/72

FROM : E. S. Miller

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

SUBJECT: LIAISON SECTION

Mr. Gray's approval of the re-establishment of a liaison section included an instruction that the section not supervise offices overseas and in foreign countries. As this work is so basic to the responsibilities of a liaison section, I am respectfully presenting several points for Mr. Gray's consideration in the hope that he will reconsider this prohibition.

The supervision of the foreign offices is handled by three men who review the correspondence with our Legats, resolve their numerous problems, and handle their many contacts who visit Washington. The latter also visit other United States agencies while here, requiring coordination which can best be arranged by a domestic liaison supervisor familiar with the agency in question. In addition, some of the foreign agencies with which our Legats are deeply involved maintain representatives in Washington. These include RCMP, MI-5, MI-6, and the Australian Security Intelligence Organization. These foreign representatives regularly visit the Bureau to discuss the various requirements which have been made of them by their headquarters. The foreign liaison supervisors simply do not have the time to handle these persons in addition to their regular work, and this responsibility, which for many years was handled in the front office of the former liaison section, is now temporarily being handled in the front office of the section to which the foreign liaison supervisors are attached. The processing of the requests made by these men and the discussion of their problems with them is a matter of basic liaison and should logically be handled by whoever will be in charge of the new liaison section. The courtesy and attention which is given to the requests made by these foreign liaison representatives in Washington is reflected in the treatment which their headquarters affords the requests made by our Legal Attaches.

RCMP has specified that all requests from U. S. agencies for information from Canada must be made through FBI. We handle such requests as Foreign Police Cooperation matters, and the necessary coordination

Memorandum E. S. Miller to Mr. W. M. Felt
Re: LIAISON SECTION

with other agencies is handled by domestic liaison supervisors dealing with those agencies. In similar fashion the British will not furnish derogatory information directly to the Department of Defense in connection with its background-type investigations but require that such data be channeled through FBI. These are just two of the instances in which a foreign liaison matter becomes a domestic liaison matter and should be under the same supervision.

Our foreign offices are necessarily closely involved in the operations of several U. S. agencies and require domestic liaison with those agencies. Our many problems surrounding the establishment and maintenance of foreign offices have to be coordinated with the Department of State. It is essential that we know and have access to the proper official at State in order to solve problems faced by the Legats as without prodding State moves very slowly. Our foreign offices work closely with the Central Intelligence Agency(CIA) stations abroad. CIA Headquarters does not permit its overseas stations to disseminate information to other agencies overseas, including our Legats, except in unusual circumstances. They frequently, however, suggest to our Legats that CIA Headquarters be asked for particular items. These can most rapidly be secured by direct request from a domestic liaison supervisor. In a number of areas, our Legal Attaches work closely with local representatives of the U. S. military. Leads are passed to our Legat which are then followed up by liaison contacts in Washington with the appropriate military headquarters.


Liaison, or, in other terms, the establishment of a harmonious relationship, is basically the same whether practiced in Washington or Tokyo. I feel that it would be to the Bureau's advantage to have our liaison operations closely coordinated and directly supervised in the same area. This has proved to be an efficient and productive arrangement in the past, and we believe that the re-establishment of limited direct liaison in Washington should be handled by the same supervision which has been given to our posts abroad. The work in both areas is primarily intelligence oriented, yet does not fall within the normal responsibilities of the present operational sections. It is considered that we should not leave the foreign supervision in its present area, which is fully occupied with Arab terrorism, Chinese espionage, and Cuban, Arab, Chicano and Jewish extremists. A logical and economical step would be to make the present foreign liaison supervision an integral part of the new liaison section. Under this arrangement, the foreign liaison supervision would be handled as a separate and distinct unit composed of the three supervisors presently engaged in this work. This unit would be completely

Memorandum E. S. Miller to Mr. W. M. Felt
Re: LIAISON SECTION

separate from the domestic liaison supervisors although, under the same over-all supervision, the mutual problems of each side could be effectively and promptly coordinated.

ACTION:

It is respectfully requested that the Acting Director, in consideration of the factors outlined above, permit the foreign liaison supervisors to be made a part of the new liaison section.



Transfer the 3 foreign liaison supervisors to the newly formed liaison section. Let me see the organization chart after the transfer is made.

J. J. 9:24 9:34 P

Then schedule for discussion at a meeting of Executive Conference the proper location within the FBI of this newly formed

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO : Mr. L. Patrick Gray, III

DATE: 9/8/72

FROM : ^{DMA} Daniel M. Armstrong, III

SUBJECT: LIAISON SECTION

Since I think my recommendations to you may possibly be the source of the confusion that appears to have resulted from your order approving the reestablishment of the Liaison Section, this memorandum is written in an effort to dispel the confusion.

When the recommendation was made to you to reestablish a Liaison Section, I recommended you reestablish the Section but the Section as reestablished should not operate in the same way as the old Liaison Section had operated, according to my understanding.

Specifically, I recommended that the reconstituted Section should have responsibility only over liaison with other agencies and should not operate out of the Domestic Intelligence Division (DID). I suggested that the proper location within the Bureau for the new Section might be an appropriate topic for discussion at an Executives Conference meeting.

Supervision of foreign Legats, which supervision had been included among the responsibilities of the old Liaison Section, would, under my proposal, continue to be handled within the DID and thus would not be handled by the reconstituted Liaison Section.

This recommendation was based on the assumption that the foreign Legats have seen their responsibilities increased in recent years to include the collection of political intelligence information for dissemination to Dr. Kissinger and others. If they are going to do intelligence work, it seemed appropriate for them to be supervised by the FBI's intelligence division.

You ordered that the new Section not supervise offices overseas and in foreign countries. If this order was in any way based upon my recommendation to you, my recommendation should not have been accepted unless you were also prepared to order that the new Section would not operate out of the DID.

Classified by 6283
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum to Mr. L. Patrick Gray, III
RE: LIAISON SECTION

Your order reestablishing the Section appears to contemplate that the new Section will operate out of the DID. If this is your intention, then there is no reason why, in my opinion, the Section should not also be permitted to supervise foreign Legats. The only reason for my recommendation to you that the new Section not supervise foreign Legats was my parallel recommendation that the new Section be located elsewhere than the DID.

J
J III
9-24
9:38P

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DO-6
OFFICE OF ACTING DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Re: Liaison Section

1. Approval.
2. Section will not supervise offices overseas and in foreign countries.
3. Endeavor to assign to the Section SAs with previous Liaison Section experience. I will approve them, therefore let me have your recommendations.
4. In some selections will be made from Division I personnel; in any event, if SA's are selected from staff at FBIHQ, no replacements are to be ordered in from the Field Divisions.
5. Agree with your addendum of 7-19-72.

J. 9/3
8:32 P

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Felt

DATE: 9/27/72

FROM : Mr. E. S. Miller

SUBJECT: LIAISON SECTION

In accordance with Mr. Gray's approval, we have prepared and attached an organization chart of the new Liaison Section. As he requested, each Agent assigned to domestic liaison has had previous liaison experience and, with one exception, each was assigned to the former Liaison Section. Each of these men is currently assigned to this Division and no replacements are being requested. Each of the domestic liaison men has had at least twenty years' experience in the FBI, has had wide field experience, and is thoroughly seasoned in Bureau policy. ~~The following are~~ the personnel selected:

Section Chief - Graham A. Day, GS-15: I have carefully evaluated not only the supervisors in this Division but also those elsewhere in the Bureau who have had experience in liaison operations and I have concluded that Day is the best qualified for this position from the standpoint of experience and specialized background. Headquarters liaison is entirely different from field operations and requires a thorough knowledge both of the problems and policies of the domestic and foreign fields and of the operations of the major agencies here in Washington with which we have interests in common. Day has had extensive liaison experience, having served as Number One Man of the former Liaison Section and having handled top liaison assignments prior thereto. He is currently serving as Number One Man in the Nationalities Intelligence Section, in which Section the present Special Coordination Unit is located, and has continued to directly supervise both domestic and foreign liaison ever since discontinuance of the Liaison Section. Prior to his assignment to Headquarters, he was security coordinator in the Los Angeles Office, supervising more than 150 Agents assigned to five separate squads, a responsibility fully comparable with that of the SAC in most of our offices. Day is, as noted in your memorandum to Mr. Kinley of 6/30/72, our top expert on liaison matters.

Number One Man - Leon F. Schwartz, GS-15: Will assist with incoming calls and visits from other agencies, liaison with Washington representatives of RCMP, MI-5, MI-6, and ASIO, and overall coordination of Foreign Police Cooperation (FPC) matters. Schwartz is currently the Supervisor in Charge (SIC) of the Special Coordination Unit.

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CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Felt
Re: LIAISON SECTION

directly administering the present limited liaison, the foreign office supervision, and the FPC matters. Schwartz was assigned to the previous Liaison Section and has an unusually wide personal acquaintance with both top and working level personnel in other U. S. agencies as well as having represented the Bureau on several of the U. S. Intelligence Board Committees. Prior to dissolution of the Liaison Section, he was given a special citation by the U. S. Air Force in appreciation for the liaison which he was then maintaining with that service. Schwartz has recently been handling the numerous telephone calls from other areas of the Executive Branch and has thereby continued his relationship with other agencies. In addition to a highly successful and productive career at Headquarters, Schwartz directly supervised in the New York Office the then highly important investigation of the New York State Communist Party and its membership prior to his assignment in Washington.

Liaison Supervisor - Robert H. Haynes, GS-15: Will handle liaison with the White House, Office of the Vice President, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, National Security Council, and Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. He handled the Bureau's liaison with the White House, Office of the Vice President, and the National Security Council for a number of years in the old Liaison Section and was continued in this assignment by the former Director after the Liaison Section was dissolved. Haynes also has a wide range of contacts in many other agencies, both military and civilian. He, too, has represented the Bureau on a number of security-type committees. In addition to his experience in the Executive Branch, Haynes was selected for and served with the investigative staff of the House Committee on Appropriations, discharging his responsibilities in highly commendable fashion.

Liaison Supervisor - Fred J. Cassidy, GS-15: Will handle liaison with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). He was one of the two Agents who handled the CIA liaison before it was cut off by the former Director. He is currently serving as SIC of a Soviet espionage unit and supervised Soviet espionage matters in Washington Field Office (WFO) before assignment to FBIHQ. His prior experience at CIA will permit him rapidly to redevelop the strong personal liaison we once enjoyed with that Agency and which is so essential to the harmonious and mutually advantageous relationship which we should enjoy with that Agency. Since so much of our business with CIA involves Soviet and other espionage matters, he is a natural selection for this assignment.

Liaison Supervisor - William J. McDonnell, GS-15: Will handle liaison with National Security Agency (NSA), Atomic Energy Commission, Transportation Department (including Federal Aviation Agency, Coast Guard), and U. S. Intelligence Board Signal Intelligence Committee.

Memorandum to Mr. Felt
Re: LIAISON SECTION

For a number of years, McDonnell handled our liaison with NSA and was directly responsible for some of the major contributions NSA has made to FBI work. He is widely known and respected at NSA and other agencies with which he has dealt. He is currently SIC of a unit within the Nationalities Intelligence Section. He had broad supervisory experience in New York Office prior to transfer to FBIHQ, serving as supervisor of the major case squad in the Criminal Section, and subsequently of the Satellite Section handling Soviet-bloc espionage matters. He later became Number One Man to the SAC of the Espionage Division of the New York Office.

Liaison Supervisor - Bernard C. Rachner, GS-14: Will handle liaison with State Department, Treasury (including Secret Service, Internal Revenue, Customs, and Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms). In the old Liaison Section, Rachner maintained liaison with State Department and Secret Service. He enjoys a first-name relationship with the Secret Service Director and has an encyclopedic knowledge of State, including contacts at all levels. He is currently assigned to the Foreign Liaison Desk where many State Department officials continue to telephone him to bring up matters of interest to the Bureau. Prior to assignment at FBIHQ, he handled some of the most sensitive and important investigations being conducted by WFO in the security field.

Liaison Supervisor - John E. Manning, GS-14: Will handle liaison with Defense (including Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines, DSA, DIA, OSD, DIS, and Watch Committee). Of the Agents named here, Manning is the only man who did not serve in the former Liaison Section. Since its dissolution, however, he has worked with SA Schwartz in handling the numerous telephone inquiries received from other agencies and has personally resolved special problems arising with other agencies, particularly the military. An example of his effectiveness in this area is the very commendable job he has done in developing a smooth working relationship between the Bureau and the Special Air Mission of the Air Force. Another of his responsibilities in his current assignment has been to represent the Bureau in a most important committee of the U. S. Intelligence Board. Prior to this assignment, Manning had extensive experience in three divisions at FBIHQ, preceded by supervisory experience in the New York Office.

It should be noted that no recommendation is included for designation of one of the above individuals to serve as a unit SIC of domestic liaison matters. It is not considered that such a designation.

Memorandum to Mr. Felt
Re: LIAISON SECTION

152:9
1/23/59
would be applicable here as each of the men recommended is of SIC caliber and, in fact, most have already served in that position. Further, liaison is not conducted inside the office and we believe that each of these men should report directly to the Section Chief and Number One Man rather than to an intermediate supervisory level. It is proposed that the men be designated liaison supervisors without a unit designation.

It should be observed that the newly constituted section will not interfere with the specialized liaison currently maintained by other divisions and will not attempt to handle liaison across the board with all other departments and agencies in the Executive Branch, but, rather, will concentrate on those agencies having the most matters of mutual interest with us and with which problems are most apt to arise. The earlier memorandum, which is attached, submitted concerning this matter outlined this in some detail. Specific guidelines will be prepared and submitted for approval as soon as the new section gets under way. *Submit these ASAP!*

In addition to the domestic liaison supervision, discussed in detail above, the balance of the Section will, as approved by Mr. Gray, be comprised of the present Foreign Liaison Desk consisting of three Supervisors plus the necessary clerical personnel. It is recommended that SA Harvey C. Flemister, Jr., who was formerly the SIC of the Foreign Liaison Unit in the discontinued Liaison Section and who has acted as Senior Supervisor on the Foreign Liaison Desk since that time, be again named as SIC of the Foreign Liaison Unit. Flemister is well known and admired by the many contacts of our foreign offices who visit Washington and he has a thorough knowledge of foreign liaison matters.

It is observed that each of the men selected has had broad experience in the security field and is currently assigned to the Domestic Intelligence Division. As an overwhelming percentage of the problems to be resolved with other agencies are of a security nature, it is considered that the personnel selected are thoroughly qualified for this assignment. In addition, each of these men, by virtue of his broad field experience, is completely competent to deal with the other matters of Bureau interest which are encountered in connection with both foreign and domestic liaison.

Memorandum to Mr. Felt
Re: LIAISON SECTION

ACTION:

(1) An organization chart of the new Liaison Section is attached. Upon Mr. Gray's approval, the Section will promptly commence operations.

(2) It is recommended that you schedule for discussion at a meeting of the Executives' Conference the proper location within the FBI of this newly-formed Section as requested by Mr. Gray.

EM

ORGANIZATION CHART

LIAISON SECTION

SECTION CHIEF - Graham A. Day

NUMBER ONE MAN - Leon F. Schwartz

Incoming calls and visitors from other agencies; liaison with Washington representatives of RCMP, MI-5, MI-6, ASIO; general supervision of both foreign and domestic liaison

LIAISON SUPERVISOR - Fred J. Cassidy
CIA

LIAISON SUPERVISOR - Robert H. Haynes
White House
Office of the Vice President
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
National Security Council
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs

LIAISON SUPERVISOR - John E. Manning
Department of Defense
(Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force,
other defense agencies)

LIAISON SUPERVISOR - William J. McDonnell
National Security Agency
Atomic Energy Commission
Department of Transportation

LIAISON SUPERVISOR - Bernard C. Rachner
Department of State
Department of the Treasury

FOREIGN LIAISON UNIT

SUPERVISOR IN CHARGE - Harvey C. Flemister, Jr.
Preparation of schedules and itineraries
for foreign visitors
Supervision of liaison operations in
following offices:

Bern
Bonn
Copenhagen
London
Paris
Rome
Singapore

LIAISON SUPERVISOR - Robert A. Bermingham
Latin American visitors
Supervision of liaison operations in
following offices:

Brasilia
Buenos Aires
Caracas
La Paz
Managua
Manila
Mexico City

LIAISON SUPERVISOR - - John F. Burns
Assist with foreign visitors
Supervision of liaison operations in
following offices:

Beirut
Hong Kong
Madrid
Ottawa
Tel Aviv
Tokyo

EMH

[Handwritten signature]

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : THE ACTING DIRECTOR

DATE: 10-12-72

FROM : W. M. FELT

SUBJECT: PERSONNEL CHANGES

You previously approved the establishment of a Liaison Section and the purpose of this memorandum therefore is to submit the names of candidates to fill the position of Chief of this Section.

On 10-11-72 available members of the Personnel Selection Board met in my office, consisting of myself and Messrs. Walters, Miller, Bishop, Callahan, Dalbey, Jenkins, Conrad, Baker and Bates. In view of the pending transfers of SACs Kunkel and McDermott, I did not invite them to attend the meeting; however, in the future I intend to utilize the services of nearby SACs.

With the exception of Assistant Director Baker, all members have recommended the following 3 employees and they are, in order of preference, SA Graham A. Day, ASAC James J. Dunn, and SA Homer A. Boynton. Mr. Baker recommended, in his order of preference, SA Boynton, ASAC Dunn and SA Day.

1. SA Graham A. Day, No. 1 Man, Nationalities Intelligence Section, DID. He entered on duty 1-4-43, is in Grade GS-15, age 60, married, 2 children. He reported to DID 11-11-54, served as No. 1 Man of the former Liaison Section from 3/61 until 7/70 when the section was disbanded and since 5/10/72 has served in his current position. Mr. Day's age, length of service at FBIHQ, were carefully considered during the meeting; nevertheless, with the exception of Mr. Baker, the others present, including me, feel that Day is without a doubt the most qualified employee to fill this particular position. He has had vast experience in liaison work and even in his current position has continued to directly supervise both domestic and foreign liaison functions. He has a thorough knowledge of the problems and policies of the domestic and foreign fields and of the operations of the major agencies here in Washington. He is without doubt the Bureau's top expert on liaison matters and he has many top-level contacts in Government. It was also pointed out that during the critical initial stages of re-establishing our liaison functions it is essential that the man heading the section be exceptionally strong in this field and Day certainly fulfills this requirement.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum to the Acting Director
Re: Personnel Changes

2. ASAC James J. Dunn, Jr., Baltimore Office. He entered on duty as an SA 6-28-54, is in Grade GS-15, age 43, married, 1 child. He served in 2 field offices prior to reporting to FBIHQ 3-25-58. He reported to Salt Lake City as an ASAC 2-15-70 and has been serving in this same capacity in the Baltimore Office since 8-12-71. Baltimore was last inspected 7/72 and received ratings of Very Good in 4 categories and Excellent in 1. For a period of time in 1965 Dunn was assigned to the Liaison Section, DID, and his work in this particular area was considered excellent.

3. SA Homer A. Boynton, Jr., New York Office. He entered on duty 6-30-52 and has continuously been assigned to the New York Office since 2-7-55. He is in Grade GS-15, age 45, married, 3 children. He has an excellent record and has served in a supervisory position in the New York Office since 11-7-66. Since 9-16-69 he has been serving as the No. 1 Man to the SAC, Administrative Division, New York. A portion of the duties involved in connection with this position has been the supervision of employees engaged in liaison type duties in the New York area.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you indicate your selection of the above-listed employees for designation as Section Chief of the Liaison Section.

J. J. J.
10/13
4:07 P

PERMANENT BRIEFS OF THE FILES OF SAs DAY, DUNN AND BOYNTON
ATTACHED.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Felt

FROM : E. S. Miller

SUBJECT: LIAISON SECTION

DATE: 10/19/72

Mr. Gray has approved the reconstitution of the Liaison Section and has appointed SA Homer Boynton of the New York Office as the Section Chief. In line with this and pursuant to Mr. Gray's request that Section personnel be selected who have had previous Liaison Section experience, I have prepared the attached organizational chart indicating the new personnel and their assignments. Each of the Domestic Liaison Supervisors, with one exception, was assigned to the former Liaison Section; each is currently assigned to this Division and no replacements are being requested; and each has had at least twenty years' experience in the FBI with wide experience both in the field and at FBI Headquarters. My memorandum 9/27/72 contained full details concerning these men and their assignments. The appointment of SA Boynton has necessitated some changes and the following is a summary of the anticipated assignments:

Number One Man - Graham A. Day, GS-15: It is essential that the new Section Chief be given the benefit of the most experienced assistant available to provide knowledge and background regarding the problems and policies of both the domestic and foreign fields and of the operations of the major agencies here in Washington with which the new Section will deal. SA Day was Number One Man of the former Liaison Section and supervised what remained of our domestic liaison after its dissolution. He has supervised the HILEV Program since its inception and is thoroughly knowledgeable in all aspects of both our work abroad and our liaison in Washington.

Liaison Supervisor - Leon F. Schwartz, GS-15: Will handle liaison with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Schwartz was assigned to the previous Liaison Section and has an unusually wide personal acquaintance with both top and working-level personnel in other U. S. agencies as well as having represented the Bureau on several of the U. S. Intelligence Board Committees. Due to the latter assignments, he is already known to many officials at CIA.

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Memorandum to Mr. Felt
Re: LIAISON SECTION

Liaison Supervisor - Robert H. Haynes, GS-15: Will handle liaison with the White House, Office of the Vice President, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, National Security Council, and Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Haynes handled this work in the former Liaison Section and has a wide range of contacts in many other agencies, both military and civilian.

Liaison Supervisor - William J. McDonnell, GS-15: Will handle liaison with National Security Agency (NSA), Atomic Energy Commission, Transportation Department (including Federal Aviation Agency, Coast Guard), and U. S. Intelligence Board Signal Intelligence Committee. For a number of years, McDonnell handled our liaison with NSA and was directly responsible for some of the major contributions NSA has made to FBI work. He is widely known and respected at NSA and other agencies with which he has dealt.

Liaison Supervisor - Bernard C. Rachner, GS-14: Will handle liaison with State Department, Treasury (including Secret Service, Internal Revenue, Customs, and Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms). In the old Liaison Section, Rachner maintained liaison with State Department and Secret Service. He enjoys a first-name relationship with the Secret Service Director and has an encyclopedic knowledge of State, including contacts at all levels.

Liaison Supervisor - John E. Manning, GS-14: Will handle liaison with Defense (including Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines, DSA, DIA, OSD, DIS, and Watch Committee). Of the Agents named here, Manning is the only man who did not serve in the former Liaison Section. Since its dissolution, however, he has assisted in handling the numerous telephone inquiries received from other agencies and has specialized in liaison with the military. An example of his effectiveness is his development of a smooth working relationship between the Bureau and the Special Air Mission of the Air Force.

As explained in my memorandum 9/27/72, no recommendation is included for designation of one of the Liaison Supervisors as a Unit Supervisor in Charge (SIC). It is not considered that such a designation would be applicable here as each of the men recommended is of SIC caliber and most have already served in that position. Liaison is not conducted inside the office and these men should report directly to the Section Chief and Number One Man rather than to an intermediate supervisory level.

Memorandum to Mr. Felt
Re: LIAISON SECTION

In addition to the domestic liaison supervision, discussed above, the balance of the Section will, as approved by Mr. Gray, be comprised of the present Foreign Liaison Desk consisting of three Supervisors plus the necessary clerical personnel. It is contemplated that SA Harvey C. Flemister, Jr., who was formerly the SIC of the Foreign Liaison Unit in the discontinued Liaison Section and who has acted as Senior Supervisor on the Foreign Liaison Desk since that time, be again named as SIC of the Foreign Liaison Unit. He is well known and admired by the many contacts of our foreign offices who visit Washington and has a thorough knowledge of foreign liaison matters.

ACTION:

For information. An organizational chart of the new Liaison Section is attached and I am moving promptly to further implement Mr. Gray's instructions in this regard.

Approved: J. J. 101
10/29
6:23 P

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

LIAISON SECTION

SECTION CHIEF - Homer Boynton

NUMBER ONE MAN - Graham A. Day.

Incoming calls and visitors from other agencies; liaison with Washington representatives of RCMP, MI-5, MI-6, ASIO; general supervision of both foreign and domestic liaison

LIAISON SUPERVISOR - Leon F. Schwartz
CIA

LIAISON SUPERVISOR - Robert H. Haynes
White House
Office of the Vice President
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
National Security Council
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs

LIAISON SUPERVISOR - John E. Manning
Department of Defense
(Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force,
other defense agencies)

LIAISON SUPERVISOR - William J. McDonnell
National Security Agency
Atomic Energy Commission
Department of Transportation

LIAISON SUPERVISOR - Bernard C. Rächner
Department of State
Department of the Treasury

FOREIGN LIAISON UNIT

SUPERVISOR IN CHARGE - Harvey C. Flemister, Jr.
Preparation of schedules and itineraries
for foreign visitors
Supervision of liaison operations in
following offices:

Bern
Bonn
Copenhagen
London
Paris
Rome
Singapore

LIAISON SUPERVISOR - Robert A. Bermingham
Latin American visitors
Supervision of liaison operations in
following offices:

Brasilia
Buenos Aires
Caracas
La Paz
Managua
Manila
Mexico City

LIAISON SUPERVISOR - John F. Burns
Assist with foreign visitors
Supervision of liaison operations in
following offices:

Beirut
Hong Kong
Madrid
Ottawa
Tel Aviv
Tokyo

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. M. Felt

DATE: 11/10/72

FROM : Mr. E. S. Miller

SUBJECT: LIAISON SECTION

In line with the re-establishment of the Liaison Section, as approved by Mr. Gray in my memorandum of 10/19/72, I am recommending that the 10 Supervisors assigned to this Section be given the title of Inspector with no change in pay for the duration of their liaison assignment and be authorized to use personal cards for official business as needed.

The men handling both our domestic and foreign liaison contacts for the Bureau have been carefully selected on the basis of their background and experience to effectively represent the Bureau at the highest levels of important foreign and domestic agencies. All of these men will be meeting frequently with U. S. and foreign officials of the highest rank, which will include Cabinet officers, Ambassadors and heads of important domestic and foreign agencies.

In order to carry out their assignments in the most effective manner, I believe that it is important that these men be recognized as much as possible by the officials they are contacting as key representatives of the FBI. This procedure has been followed in the past with regard to the two Bureau representatives handling our liaison with Congress and the American Bar Association, both of whom carry the title of Inspector. This has been found to be highly beneficial in assisting these individuals in fulfilling their important liaison responsibilities and I feel it should be equally helpful to the men of our new Liaison Section who have been selected to handle our domestic and foreign liaison assignments.

ACTION:

If approved, the Supervisors assigned to the Liaison Section will be given the temporary title of Inspector for the duration of their liaison assignment and will be authorized to use personal cards for official business as needed.

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SEE ADDENDUM ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION, PAGE 2

OVER

Memorandum E. S. Miller to W. M. Felt
Re: Liaison Section

ADDENDUM ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION .11/24/72

There are currently 36 Special Agents who have credentials with title of Inspector. Most are Number One Men to Assistant Directors or to Acting Associate Director or assigned to Inspection Division. About six or seven carry the title of Inspector so as to give them stature as Bureau representatives above the rank of Special Agent in keeping with their duties requiring them to represent the Bureau in significant contacts in the Congressional, diplomatic, Government agency, business, and private sectors. Although I feel the issuance of Inspector's credentials should be restricted as much as possible, the duties of our liaison agents are such as to qualify them for the temporary title of Inspector for the duration of their liaison assignment and at no change in grade or salary. Upon reassignment from liaison duties authority to carry Inspector's credentials should be automatically terminated.

OVER

I have carefully considered the information submitted by Domestic Intelligence and Administrative Divisions as to the conferring of the title Inspector on the 10 supervisors currently assigned to the Liaison Section. However, I do not feel that the best interests of the Bureau will be served in the long run by taking favorable action. I am convinced that to accede to this request would result in similar requests from other divisions, many of which would appear to be as justified as the issue currently in hand. In the long run therefore, we would, in a sense, be lessening the importance of the Inspector's title in the Bureau.

Moreover, I can also foresee problems in reassigning a man from such duties and removing the Inspector's title from him. Such action would be in the form of a demotion in accordance with the Veterans' Preference Act which specifically states 30 days' advance written notice must be furnished to an employee if he is reduced in grade, salary or rank. If we were to advise an employee that this title was temporary and would be in effect only for the duration of his current assignment we would still have to abide by the law in giving the employee 30 days' advance written notice. Therefore, in considering all ramifications of this matter, approval is not given to the recommendation.

1. Agree!

2. I do not want to
prejudicate the title.

J
11-29
11:02 A

144-2-14
July 21, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. SULLIVAN

I have given very careful consideration to your memoranda of June 7, 1971, and June 16, 1971, together with the memorandum of Mr. Wannall of May 27, 1971, which was initialled by you; Mr. Wannall's memorandum of May 28, 1971, initialled by you; my letter to the President dated September 21, 1970, initialled by you; your memorandum of September 22, 1970; Mr. Brennan's memorandum of September 21, 1970, initialled by you; and also Mr. Child's memorandum of May 23, 1969, analyzing the work and the accomplishments of our various foreign liaison offices and the problems incident thereto, together with the recommendations of Messrs. Dalbey, Felt, and Beaver upon the recommendation made in your memorandum of June 7, 1971, suggesting the closing down of a number of the foreign liaison offices, some of them recently established last December with your approval.

First and foremost, I want to clarify a point you have raised in your memoranda, namely that our foreign liaison offices, with the exception of Mexico City, are not operational and that we cannot develop "hard, high quality, positive intelligence by sending men to these countries only in a liaison capacity." We do not have the legal right to establish any foreign offices on an operational basis. The law specifically limits foreign intelligence operations to coverage by the CIA, and, therefore, we have known all along that our offices in foreign countries could not be in an operational status.

I cannot agree that establishing liaison offices in foreign countries without being operational prevents us from developing hard, high quality and positive intelligence. Certainly in all memoranda prior to your memorandum of June 7, 1971, you did not indicate any such reservation and, in fact, you specifically initialled the memorandum of Mr. Brennan addressed

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July 21, 1971

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Memorandum for Mr. Sullivan

July 21, 1971

to you under date of September 21, 1970, upon which I predicated my letter to the President of September 21, 1970. At that time I believed that by reason of your approval of the various memoranda dealing with the foreign liaison operations, you were in accord with the procedures which the Bureau had followed and, in fact, approved the establishment of additional liaison offices which I listed in my letter to the President of September 21, 1970, and which I indicated was predicated upon Mr. Brennan's memorandum of September 21, 1970.

I want to also point out that at no time, either in September or more recently, did I ever suggest to the President the idea that we should expand our foreign liaison operations. It was the President's idea expressed to me in September, 1970, that such expansion should take place, and, as a result thereof, I submitted my letter to him of September 21, 1970. The President I know in my presence directed Mr. Waldeman to present my letter to the President to the Secretary of State for prompt and immediate concurrence. Several months passed, and it was not until December, 1970, that Dr. Kissinger inquired of me as to what had happened to the expansion of our foreign liaison which the President had approved being expanded in September, 1970. When I told Dr. Kissinger that this matter had been delayed in the State Department and that I had been awaiting word for approval of the same by the Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger stated he would personally take this matter up with the President and that I would receive in a few days the State Department's approval of the expansion of our foreign liaison. Several days later in December, 1970, I received a telephone call from Secretary of State Rogers stating that the President had spoken to him about the expansion of our foreign liaison operations and that he was in full accord with the same with the exception of the opening of an office at Helsinki in view of the pending negotiations to be carried on there by representatives of the Russian Government and the United States Government concerning the limitation of arms. As I have previously indicated in my memorandum to you, I concurred with the suggestion of the Secretary of State and concurred with the recommendation that instead of opening an office at Helsinki, we open an office at Copenhagen, with which the Secretary agreed.

I heard nothing more about the expansion of foreign liaison from the President or Dr. Kissinger until June, 1971, when in a conference with the

Memorandum for Mr. Sullivan

July 31, 1971

President, he expressed his desire that we again expand our foreign liaison in view of the valuable information which had been procured by the Bureau in its operations abroad. I indicated to the President that I would confer with Dr. Kissinger when he would be available about this matter as to obtain any suggestions he might have. In the interim, the President left for San Clemente, California, and Dr. Kissinger left on a worldwide trip and both of them have just returned within the last few days from San Clemente, California.

I outlined the preceding to give you a chronological picture of what has taken place in this field. I do not understand the somewhat sudden change in your attitude to the value and importance of our foreign liaison operations in view of your concurrence of its expansion in December, 1970, and the various memoranda of Mr. Brennan and Mr. Wannall, who are in direct contact with the operations of the foreign liaison situation.

Therefore, in view of the what I consider objective review by Messrs. Felt, Salby, and Beaver together with the many letters and oral expressions from Dr. Kissinger as to the value of our foreign liaison program, I cannot agree with your memorandum of June 7, 1971.

This morning I received another memorandum from you transmitting a memorandum of Mr. Wannall upon the statistical accomplishments in the foreign liaison program in which you reach the conclusion that by juggling statistics, you can prove almost anything. I do not share this view, though I do think that statistics alone do not always prove or disprove a particular situation.

I have personally over the years reviewed all of the material which we have transmitted to Dr. Kissinger and much of the material which we have transmitted to the State Department and other Government agencies concerning our foreign liaison program, and I believe that we have made, as expressed by the President and Dr. Kissinger, a very valuable contribution to the necessary knowledge of the President and Dr. Kissinger in the foreign field. This has been accomplished without "operational" functions, which, I have previously indicated in this memorandum, we cannot embark upon in view of the law.

Memorandum for Mr. Sullivan

July 21, 1971

In order that I may be kept abreast of the operations of our foreign liaison posts, I have instructed Assistant Director Fonder in charge of inspections to arrange for an inspection of all of our FBI foreign liaison posts as soon as possible and to make such evaluations of them as are warranted.

Very truly yours,

J. J. EDGAR-HOOVER

John Edgar Hoover
Director



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

September 20, 1971

BY LIAISON

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

In confirmation of our discussion this morning, I am proceeding to make the necessary arrangements for the opening of additional liaison offices at Manila, Philippines; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic; Canberra, Australia; Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; and New Delhi, India. Each of these offices will be staffed by one Special Agent and one clerical employee, which will result in an increase in our overseas personnel from the present ceiling of 88 to a total of 100.

We consider that the new offices will be in a position to provide additional coverage in the important South Pacific and Southeast Asian areas as well as to strengthen our operations in Latin America.

I have today asked the Secretary of State to secure the necessary clearances, both for the increase in our personnel ceiling and for the opening of the new posts. I will inform you promptly when this has been accomplished.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, which appears to be "J. Edgar Hoover", is written below the typed name.

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September 21, 1971

BY LIAISON

21-
Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Attached is a copy of my letter of September 20, 1971,
to the President in confirmation of my discussion with the President
on that date.

I felt you should be informed of our readiness to establish
six additional liaison posts as indicated therein.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

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October 14, 1971

BY LIAISON

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

On October 12, 1971, Ambassador Wymberley Coerr, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, and Mr. R. Glynn Mays, also of the Department of State but assigned to the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee, requested additional information with reference to my letter of September 20, 1971, to Secretary Rogers requesting clearance for six new liaison posts abroad. The State representatives explained that various questions had been raised by the Ambassadors in the countries concerned, particularly in view of the current five percent reduction being effected by the Department of State in United States personnel overseas.

A copy of my letter of October 14, 1971, to Under Secretary of State John N. Irwin II is attached for your information. You will note that it sets forth general information concerning our activities abroad and our reasons for selection of the six proposed new posts.

The Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General have also been furnished a copy of this letter.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

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All memoranda and other materials reflecting meetings and contacts during 1971 between officials of the FBI and officials of the Department of State on the subject of "legal attaches":

23
September 13, 1971

BY COURIER SERVICE

Mr. G. Marvin Gentile
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Gentile:

This is to inform you of several changes which are being made in FBI personnel assigned overseas.

Legal Liaison Officer Daniel A. Grove, who has been assigned to Hong Kong, British Crown Colony, is returning to the United States for domestic assignment and will be replaced by Mr. Roderick V. Prechtl, Jr., presently serving as Assistant Legal Attache at Tokyo, Japan. Mr. Raymond N. Byers, concerning whom you will be further informed and who is presently assigned to the domestic field, is being transferred to Tokyo, Japan, to replace Mr. Prechtl.

Mr. James A. Miller, Legal Attache, Managua, Nicaragua, is returning to the domestic field for further assignment. Mr. Armand A. Cammarota, presently Assistant Legal Attache at Managua, is being named Acting Legal Attache. Mr. Miller is not being replaced at the present time. Miss Grace L. Eklof, presently assigned in Mexico City, Mexico, is returning to the domestic field for further assignment and is not being replaced.

By letter dated September 3, 1971, we informed Mr. Thomas Stern, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Organization and Management, of our desire to increase the staff of the Office of the Legal Attache, London, England, by an additional Assistant Legal Attache and of our intention to offset this increase by a decrease in the number of employees

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Mr. G. Marvin Gentile

assigned to the Legal Attache Office in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Upon concurrence, it is our intention to transfer Assistant Legal Attache Robert W. Scherrer from Buenos Aires to London in order to accomplish this.

It will be appreciated if you will notify the appropriate elements of the Department of State of these pending changes.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

24
9
BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: September 14, 1971
To: Presidential Appointments Staff
Department of State
Attention: Miss Betty L. Groves
Chief, Title and Rank
From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Subject: FBI PERSONNEL IN TOKYO, JAPAN, AND
HONG KONG, BRITISH CROWN COLONY

Mr. Raymond N. Byers, who has been employed by this Bureau since January 21, 1952, is being assigned to the United States Embassy at Tokyo, Japan, as an Assistant Legal Attache. He is replacing Assistant Legal Attache Roderick V. Prechtl, Jr., who is being assigned to the American Consulate General at Hong Kong, British Crown Colony, as Legal Liaison Officer. Mr. Prechtl is replacing Mr. Daniel A. Grove, the Legal Liaison Officer in Hong Kong, who is returning to the United States on domestic assignment.

Mr. Byers, who is serving in GS-14, was born on January 1, 1921, at Franklin, Indiana. He was graduated from the University of Indiana at Bloomington, Indiana, in 1951 and received a Bachelor of Science degree. He will be accompanied by his wife, Mildred, on this assignment and expects to depart for Tokyo on or before September 30, 1971.

Mr. Prechtl, who was born on July 11, 1926, at Elmira, New York, has been employed by this Bureau since November 16, 1953. He is currently serving in GS-15. He is

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Presidential Appointments Staff
Department of State

a graduate of Georgetown University and of Georgetown Law School, Washington, D. C. He will be accompanied to Hong Kong by his wife, Sharon, and his three daughters, Kimberly Marie, aged 12; Kelly Ann, aged 9; and Kiernan Kathleen, aged 3. Mr. Prechtl and his family plan to arrive in Hong Kong in early October, 1971.

The foregoing is furnished for your official use. You may wish to advise the Embassy of the United States in Tokyo and the American Consulate General in Hong Kong of this change in personnel. It will not be necessary to have anyone meet Mr. Byers or Mr. Prechtl when they arrive at their new posts since these arrangements will be handled by my representatives in Hong Kong and Tokyo.

25
BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: September 17, 1971

To: Mr. Thomas Stern
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Organization and Management
Department of State
Room 7810
New State Department Building
Washington, D. C. 20530

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: OFFICE OF LEGAL ATTACHE
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO;
REOPENING OF THE RESIDENT AGENCY
AT HERMOSILLO, SONORA

In order to handle the increased volume of work in the Office of the Legal Attache, Mexico City, Mexico, in a prompt and efficient manner, I have approved the reopening of a Resident Agency in Hermosillo, Sonora. This will involve no increase of personnel and the position will be filled by an employee already assigned to the Office of the Legal Attache, Mexico City, Mexico.

Accordingly, your concurrence is requested and your early attention to this matter will be appreciated.

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

September 20, 1971

BY COURIER SERVICE

Honorable William P. Rogers
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The President has today instructed me to increase further our liaison operations abroad, and I have indicated that we could station representatives at Manila, Philippines; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic; Canberra, Australia; Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; and New Delhi, India. I propose to station one Special Agent and one clerical employee in each of these posts, representing an increase of 12 in our present overseas personnel ceiling of 88.

In view of the President's instructions, it would be appreciated if the necessary arrangements could be made, both for the increase in our personnel ceiling and for the requisite clearances with the Ambassadors concerned. If you feel it desirable, one of my representatives will be available to discuss this matter in further detail with the appropriate official of your Department.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "J. Edgar Hoover", is written below the typed name.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. A. Rosen DATE: 10/12/71

FROM : E. S. Miller

SUBJECT: EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON

On 10/12/71 I met, at their request, with Ambassador Wymberley Coerr, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, and R. Glynn Mays, also of the Department of State but assigned to the National Security Council, Under Secretaries Committee. Also present was SA Graham A. Day of this Division.

The State representatives advised that the Director's letter of 9/20/71 to Secretary Rogers requesting clearance for six new liaison posts abroad had been referred to the Committee for clearance. As part of their normal procedure, the views of the affected Ambassadors were solicited with the result that a number of questions were raised. State is currently in the process of effecting a five per cent reduction in U.S. personnel overseas and each Ambassador was concerned with the proposed increase in the personnel complement with which he is charged. Several Ambassadors asked what information might be given to the host government and others inquired as to why their post had been selected.

Both Coerr and Mays appeared to be genuinely cooperative and indicated that they merely wanted our assistance in preparing brief material which might be forwarded to the Ambassadors as a general response to their inquiries. They were pleased to learn that a number of the new posts will be, in effect, acting as regional offices, covering more than one country. No question was raised, and of course no comment was made, concerning the development of high-level intelligence and it was explained that, as in the case with our other posts, our representatives will be establishing and maintaining liaison with the police and other investigative agencies of the countries visited in order to expedite and insure the thorough handling of leads abroad arising from the Bureau's domestic investigations.

It was explained that three of the new posts (Manila, Rio de Janeiro and Santo Domingo) represent a reopening of offices formerly in existence and that only one post (New Delhi) will be in a country not previously covered.

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CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum E. S. Miller to Mr. A. Rosen
RE: EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON

Both Coerr and Mays indicated that there was some pressure to resolve the problem and prepare a response to the Director's inquiry. They did not, however, indicate how much time this might involve.

In response to their inquiry we have prepared a letter, addressed to the Under Secretary of State at their request, noting the general objectives of our foreign liaison posts and explaining in general terms why each of the six new locations was chosen. We have also indicated the territory to be covered by each and have furnished general statistics concerning the substantial increase in the results obtained by our foreign offices during the past five years.

ACTION:

Attached for approval is the letter discussed above.

October 14, 1971

BY COURIER SERVICE

Honorable John N. Irwin II
Under Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Irwin:

Ambassador Wymberley Coerr and Mr. R. Glynn Mays of your Department have asked for additional details with reference to my letter of September 20, 1971, to Secretary Rogers. Specific questions were raised concerning the location of the proposed new posts and concerning our method of operation when they are established.

In general, our need for additional liaison abroad stems from the constantly increasing travel abroad of United States citizens under investigation in this country. For example, just five years ago in fiscal 1966, a total of 653 persons wanted in the United States were located through requests initiated by our Legal Attaches. In fiscal 1971, 2369 such persons were located. In fiscal 1966, slightly more than \$800,000 in property stolen in the United States was located abroad; while in fiscal 1971, nearly \$1,500,000 of such property was so located. In response to earlier programs aimed at reducing United States personnel abroad, I closed our posts at Manila, Rio de Janeiro and Santo Domingo and endeavored to cover those areas by road trip from other posts. This has resulted in inevitable delays and in materially increased travel costs. As a result, when the President asked that I increase our liaison activities abroad, I suggested the reopening of these three posts.

Our method of operation at each post will continue, as in the past, to include the development and maintenance of a close, cooperative relationship with the police and

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Honorable John N. Irwin II

other investigative agencies of the countries visited for the purpose of expediting and insuring the thorough coverage of leads abroad arising from the investigations being conducted by the FBI within the United States. My representatives are not operational, will conduct no investigations, and will secure the information and assistance they need by direct request of the appropriate foreign agency in the country concerned. As a matter of reciprocity, my representatives will accept requests from those agencies for information or assistance in the United States. Specific comments concerning the six proposed new offices follow:

CANBERRA, AUSTRALIA Australia and New Zealand were originally covered by road trip from Manila and subsequently, following the close of our post in Manila, from Hong Kong. The volume of work, particularly in Australia, has increased to the point that it can no longer be handled efficiently at such a distance, and it is expected that the establishment of a representative in Canberra will provide for the more rapid handling of our requests. In addition to the Commonwealth Police and the Australian Security Intelligence Organization, liaison would also be maintained with the state and territorial police agencies.

KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA The Agent stationed here would be responsible for liaison in Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, all currently being covered by road trip from Hong Kong, and would initiate coverage in Indonesia. Kuala Lumpur was chosen as a central location for the coverage of this large area which is increasingly visited by persons of interest to the FBI. My representatives in Hong Kong have been unable to visit this area with sufficient frequency to insure the prompt handling of our work.

Honorable John N. Irwin II

MANILA, PHILIPPINES Our liaison post was originally opened in Manila in August, 1961, and was closed on August 31, 1969, in an effort to reduce overseas costs. Although relatively close to Hong Kong, from which the area has since been covered, the volume of our work in the Philippines is such that it can best be handled by a man on the scene as we have encountered numerous delays in our efforts to secure information at long distance. The continued United States military presence in the Philippines, coupled with the large number of Philippine nationals who have become involved in difficulties in the United States and then returned to their home, has resulted in the continuation of a relatively large work load in this area.

NEW DELHI, INDIA This is an area in which we have not previously had regular coverage, and it has been necessary on a number of occasions to despatch representatives from Rome or Hong Kong to handle problems arising there. It is planned that our representative in New Delhi will cover not only India but also East and West Pakistan and Nepal. It is possible that additional territory may be assigned to this office in the future. It is noted that there are nine graduates of the FBI National Academy located in this area.

RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL This office, which was in operation from 1941 to 1967, was consolidated with our post in Buenos Aires, Argentina, as an economy measure. During the more than four years that it has been closed, it has become increasingly apparent that the loss in prompt and effective coverage is greater than the small saving justifies. A number of individuals of interest to the FBI have either moved or traveled to Brazil, and it

Honorable John N. Irwin II

has become apparent that prompt coverage can only be secured through direct and continuing liaison with the investigative agencies of this huge country.

SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

This office, originally opened May 21, 1965, was closed March 18, 1969, as an economy measure and coverage has been maintained by Agents assigned to the FBI office in San Juan, Puerto Rico. It is proposed that the Agent assigned to Santo Domingo will initiate coverage in Haiti. There is a considerable population of Dominican exiles residing in the United States who continue to be involved with the various political factions in the Dominican Republic, thereby creating problems of FBI interest in connection with the Neutrality Act, the Foreign Agents Registration Act and other matters affecting internal security interests. To a smaller extent, this is also true of Haiti.

Although my request for this limited expansion was made at the specific instruction of the President, I know that he would not sanction an operation which was not economically worthwhile. You may be assured that, as in the past, these new posts will be carefully supervised and prompt action taken should it be determined either that their continued existence is not warranted or that additional assistance is necessary. I hope that it will be possible for you to secure the requisite clearances in the near future.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Rosen

DATE: 11/2/71

FROM : E. S. Miller

SUBJECT: EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON

On 11/2/71 we called Mr. R. Glynn Mays, who is assigned by the Department of State to the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee, and inquired concerning when we could expect a response to our letters of 9/20/71 and 10/14/71 regarding the opening of six additional foreign liaison posts.

Mays stated that Bureau letter 9/20/71 had been referred to the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee as that group is responsible for the establishment and alteration of overseas personnel ceilings. Inasmuch as each U. S. Ambassador is a personal representative of the President and is not subservient to the Department of State, inquiries were sent to the six affected Ambassadors regarding their concurrence in our proposal. Each of the Ambassadors responded by raising various questions concerning such matters as what information might be given to the host government, FBI methods of operation overseas, and reasons as to why their particular post had been chosen. These inquiries resulted in the visit of Ambassador Wymberley Coerr, Deputy Director of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research; and Mr. Mays to the Bureau on 10/12/71 as reported in my memorandum of that date. As a result of that memorandum, a detailed letter dated 10/14/71 was forwarded to Under Secretary of State John N. Irwin II furnishing specifics concerning our overseas operations and our reasons for selection of the posts involved.

Mays stated that upon receipt of the second letter, individual responses were prepared and forwarded to each of the six Ambassadors who had raised questions. Replies are still pending, and Mays said he knew no way of hurrying the Ambassadors short of telephoning them. It was pointed out to him that nearly a month and a half had elapsed since the original request, which had been made at the instruction of the President. He was asked to communicate our concern at

E. S. Miller to Mr. Rosen
Re: EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON

the delay to whatever level in the Department of State that might be necessary in order to produce action.

ACTION:

State, as usual, is dragging its feet, and we are making no progress at the working level. If approved, the attached letter will communicate our concern to Secretary Rogers.

30
November 3, 1971

BY COURIER SERVICE

Honorable William P. Rogers
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Reference is made to my letter of September 20, 1971, requesting clearance for six additional liaison posts abroad.

As a result of specific inquiries received from the Ambassadors concerned, further details were furnished by letter of October 14, 1971, to Under Secretary John N. Irwin II.

As it has been some time since the President requested this increase, I would appreciate an indication from you as to when we can complete the necessary arrangements.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO: Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: 11/4/71

FROM: W. R. Wannall

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 31

SUBJECT: EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON

R. Glynn Mays of the Department of State who has been handling, on a working level, our request to expand our foreign liaison telephoned 11/4/71. He stated that the affected Ambassadors had been canvassed again for their concurrence and each had raised a number of additional questions. He explained that basically, the Ambassadors were chafing at a request for expansion at a time when the Government is in the throes of additional contraction in its overseas posts, and he indicated that a number of the Ambassadors had pointed out that there are existing arrangements under which FBI leads can be handled in their territory and they do not understand, based on the small volume of work they have witnessed in the past, why FBI wishes to station a man in the territory full time. With reference to our request to open in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, he said he would like us to authorize him to explore the possibility of opening in Singapore as an alternative. He stated an overwhelming percentage of the personnel in the American Embassy at Kuala Lumpur are actually Central Intelligence Agency representatives, and the Ambassadors felt there should be no further addition of security representatives.

Mays said that Ambassador Coerr, who had visited the Bureau with Mays 10/12/71 to discuss our request, had suggested that there be a further discussion at which the numerous questions raised by the Ambassadors could be discussed. Mays asked whether Assistant Director Miller and/or another Bureau representative could come to the Department of State on 11/8/71 so that other interested State officials could participate in the discussion. Mays was told that the request we had made was, as he has previously been informed, a Presidential instruction and that it had already been a

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URN

Memorandum W. R. Wannall to Mr. E. S. Miller
Re: EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON

month and a half without action. He was told that we felt no useful purpose would be served by further discussion of operational details but that if the Department of State had questions it desired answered, it should address them to us in writing and we would deal with them in an appropriate manner. We made no comment concerning the proposal to exchange Singapore for Kuala Lumpur (actually, the two points are very close and we see no objection to the change).

Mays said he understood our position and would relay it promptly to his superiors. He indicated that the United Nations Chinese problem and the Congressional action concerning foreign aid had occupied the full time of the top personnel at State with the result that they are not familiar with the latest developments surrounding our request. It is quite apparent that unless we call a halt as we have done in our discussion with Mays today, we could continue conferences and discussions endlessly without achieving our objective. With reference to the implied questioning of the volume of FBI work in the new areas, it should be noted that our selection of the locations for the new posts was based not on work load but on potential for production of high level intelligence of interest to the White House. This has not, of course, been included in either our letters to State or our discussion with its representatives.

ACTION:

For information. We will promptly analyze and make recommendations concerning any request received from State in writing.

Properly handled
H

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Rosen

DATE: 11-22-71

FROM : E. S. Miller

SUBJECT: EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON

In response to the telephone call to the Director this morning from Undersecretary of State John N. Irwin II, Irwin was promptly contacted in order to arrange the meeting he had requested. As a result of pressing congressional commitments, Mr. Irwin had no time available either today or tomorrow but arranged an appointment for 3:30 p.m., Wednesday, November 24, 1971.

Mr. Irwin stated that the meeting would be held in the office of William B. Macomber, Jr., Deputy Undersecretary of State for Management, but that he, Irwin, would also be present. It should be noted that it was Mr. Macomber with whom we dealt in arranging our 1970 expansion and it is under his direction that State participates in the National Security Council Undersecretaries Committee which must pass on all increases in U.S. personnel stationed abroad.

ACTION:

As instructed, I will attend the meeting scheduled for 3:30 p.m., 11/24/71, and will take with me SA Graham A. Day of this Division.

COPY - RETYPED FOR REASON OF LEGIBILITY

10:50 AM

November 22, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. FELT
MR. ROSEN
MR. MILLER
MR. BISHOP

Honorable John N. Irwin, II, Under Secretary of State, called. He said he was calling about the positions abroad (Legal Attaches) that I talked to the President about and the President authorized to be done, and Mr. Irwin said they, of course, want to work out how to do this. Mr. Irwin continued that after getting my letter in October they sent it to the embassies to get some comments back and they wanted to talk about these and how was the best way partly because of the situation overseas and a good part because of the recent Presidential order in connection with the new economic policy of reducing 5% overseas and this raises, from an internal point of view, problems as to how they take this and where and the amount of support they have to give overseas to the variety of agencies they support over and beyond themselves. Mr. Irwin said it would be helpful if they could talk about these with me or whomever I might designate. Mr. Irwin continued that he thought they had talked once and then the FBI officer said he would like to have it in writing rather than further discussion.

Mr. Irwin said he talked to Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Mr. Rogers thought it would be helpful if they could, rather than going back and forth in writing, try and work it out because they know this is what the President requested be done. I commented that the President is anxious. Mr. Irwin said they do want to try to fit it in with the miscellaneous political and administrative problems that exist rather than to just move without the opportunity for further discussion.

I told Mr. Irwin I thought Mr. Miller, Assistant Director in charge of the Domestic Intelligence Division and under whom the Legal Attaches operate, would be the one to talk to and if he, Mr. Irwin, would tell me what time was convenient for him, I could check with Mr. Miller. Mr. Irwin asked if they should call Mr. Miller direct and I told him I would call Mr. Miller and tell him that Mr. Irwin would be in touch with him. Mr. Irwin thanked me.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

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10:50 AM

November 22, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON

MR. FELT
MR. ROSEN
MR. MILLER
MR. BISHOP

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Very truly yours,

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Director

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Rosen

DATE: 11/26/71

FROM : E. S. Miller

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

SUBJECT: EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON

As instructed, I met on 11/24/71 with State Under Secretary John N. Irwin II; Deputy Under Secretary William B. Macomber, Jr.; his Executive Assistant, Samuel R. Gammon; Wymberley Coerr, Deputy Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research; and R. Glynn Mays of State's Methods and Systems Staff. I was accompanied by SA Graham A. Day of this Division. Mr. Irwin, who was unable to stay for the entire meeting, stated he was most appreciative of the Director's rapid and cooperative response to his request for further discussion. He pointed out that he has a tremendous respect for the Director and for the organization which he has built and has instructed his personnel at State to do everything in their power to fulfill the FBI request. He noted that the request did, however, represent a substantial problem for State and that he had asked for discussion because of the difficulties which State had encountered.

State is fully aware of President Nixon's instruction that FBI liaison activities be expanded. The President has also, however, instructed that the official profile of the United States be lowered abroad and that a five percent across-the-board reduction in United States overseas personnel be made. Coming as it does on the heels of President Johnson's fifteen percent reduction and President Nixon's earlier ten percent reduction, this has created serious staffing problems in each U. S. Embassy. As the Ambassador's concurrence is necessary before any new personnel can be sent abroad, each of those potentially affected by our expansion was consulted by State and each one raised serious objections. Some, as will be indicated below, questioned the necessity for an Agent to be stationed in their countries and several, pointing to the current expansion of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, which is also being strongly resisted, asked why one Justice representative could not represent both agencies. As a result, both Mr. Irwin and Mr. Macomber asked that we take a hard look at our proposals to see if some adjustments could be made which would result in a smaller overall increase in our overseas personnel.

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Memorandum E. S. Miller to Mr. Rosen
Re: EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON

I pointed out that there would be no possibility of our "doubling up" with Narcotics investigators, explaining that our functions and methods of operation are totally different and would actually be incompatible in some areas. I noted that our modest request had actually been scaled down before it was forwarded to State and that we had limited each office to a single Agent with only one Clerk-Stenographer. I referred to the detailed explanation for our request which had been furnished in our letter of 10/14/71 to Mr. Irwin and stated that we would not have made the request if we had not felt it fully justified and responsive to the President's instruction. I said that we would, however, carefully consider each part of the request once more to see if there was any way in which the total number of personnel involved might be reduced. It was agreed that following this review, we would meet again for further discussion during the week of November 29, 1971. Comments and recommendations concerning the specific areas follow:

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

The Agency for International Development Mission here has been withdrawn in the face of local criticism of U. S. efforts to influence the Brazilian Police. We have been covering this enormous country from our office in Argentina on a 2,500 mile round trip basis. No criticism has been made of our liaison contacts with the Brazilian Police or other agencies, and we feel we should insist on reopening our office here. By reducing our staff in Buenos Aires by one Agent and one clerk (which we intended to do anyway), reopening this office will result in no increase in personnel.

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

There is an abnormally large percentage of Central Intelligence Agency personnel here on both an overt and covert basis, and the addition of another investigative agency is feared by the Ambassador as objectionable to the Malaysian Government which is endeavoring to maintain a neutral position. State asks that we let them explore the possibility of opening in Singapore instead of Kuala Lumpur. Singapore is extremely close and is actually a better location from the standpoint of travelers both east and west as Singapore is a normal international aviation stop. We believe Singapore would be just as good a location as Kuala Lumpur and recommend that State be asked to make the necessary arrangements without further delay.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum E. S. Miller to Mr. Rosen
Re: EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON

Manila, Philippines

Although the Ambassador here has voiced objection, we feel that we should insist upon reopening this office. There are a number of National Academy graduates in the Philippines, and we have a ready reservoir of good will which we can tap both in our regular work and in our search for political intelligence.

Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic

The Ambassador here was most specific in pointing out that the present coverage from our office in nearby San Juan seemed to be fully adequate. He added that the precarious political situation could be worsened by the addition of U. S. law enforcement personnel. We believe we could forgo reopening Santo Domingo with no loss. The Agent in San Juan now covering the area (and who was scheduled to reopen the office) can be fully briefed concerning the collection of political intelligence and, by stepping up the frequency of his visits, can not only cover the Dominican Republic but also establish liaison in Haiti and Jamaica.

New Delhi, India

It was pointed out that, whereas we had planned to cover East and West Pakistan from this point, the current hostilities would make this unfeasible. India itself, however, is a huge country with an enormous population and is of great potential political significance. For the present, we could establish liaison from here with Iran and could await the resumption of better relations between India and Pakistan before visiting the latter. We feel we should insist upon opening this office.

Memorandum E. S. Miller to Mr. Rosen
Re: EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON

Canberra, Australia

We believe we could forgo opening an office here at this time as, of the various offices considered, this would probably be the least productive of political intelligence since it has a stable government and enjoys friendly relations with the U. S. From a cost standpoint, this would probably be the most expensive post to open merely because of the great distance and high transportation costs.

ACTION:

It is recommended that we inform State we have very carefully reconsidered our request and, in an effort to be fully cooperative, we have altered our request with the result that only six additional positions*abroad will be needed rather than the twelve originally requested. We will ask to open at Rio de Janeiro, Manila, New Delhi and Singapore, making other arrangements for the coverage we had requested from Santo Domingo and Canberra. We will press for an early meeting for the consideration of this proposal and ask that we be permitted to proceed at the earliest possible moment as there has already been so much delay.

* 3 Agents + 3 clerks

I concur.

H

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Rosen

DATE: 11/29/71

FROM : E. S. Miller

SUBJECT: EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON

As approved by the Director, we have pressed State for an early meeting at which we can present our altered proposal for expansion of our foreign liaison. Deputy Under Secretary of State William B. Macomber, Jr., has indicated that 3:30 p.m., Tuesday, 11/30/71, is the earliest moment he has available. We will, therefore, meet with State at that time and will urge that our proposal be approved promptly.

ACTION:

For information.

GMR.
H

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO: Mr. Rosen

DATE: 12/1/71

FROM: E. S. Miller ³⁰

SUBJECT: EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON

As indicated in memorandum 11/29/71, we had an appointment to discuss our expansion further with Deputy Under Secretary of State Macomber at 3:30 p.m., 11/30/71. At noon on 11/30/71, Mr. Macomber's office advised that he had been unexpectedly summoned by the Secretary of State to a meeting which would occupy the balance of the afternoon, and we were asked to postpone our discussion until 12/2/71. I stated that I was quite anxious to resolve this matter without further delay and asked to meet with other State representatives to discuss our proposal as originally planned. Accordingly, we met with Ambassador Wymberley Coerr, Deputy Director of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research; Samuel R. Gammon, Executive Assistant to Mr. Macomber; and R. Glynn Mays of State's Methods and Systems Staff. I was accompanied by SA Graham Day of this Division.

I stated that the staffing problems encountered by State had been explained to the Director and that, in an effort to cooperate, he had authorized us to materially reduce our initial request. I said that we would agree to Singapore in place of Kuala Lumpur as suggested by State, and we would cancel our request to open offices in Canberra and Santo Domingo. I pointed out that we would staff our office in Rio de Janeiro by reducing our present staff in Buenos Aires and that we were therefore requesting, in effect, only six additional positions abroad (3 Agents, 3 clerks) in place of the original 12, from which we would open offices in Manila, Rio de Janeiro, New Delhi, and either Singapore or Kuala Lumpur.

Ambassador Coerr said that he greatly appreciated the Director's cooperation and asked that his thanks be conveyed to the Director for this. He instructed Mr. Mays to immediately wire the Ambassador in Singapore to explore the possibility of our opening there in place of Kuala Lumpur. He then stated that our choice of Manila was especially troublesome because, at Presidential direction, a special reduction in U. S. personnel had been made there over and

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Memorandum E. S. Miller to Mr. Rosen
Re: EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON

above all of the over-all percentage decreases made in other posts. He said that the situation in Manila was so critical that he would ask that we discuss it further with the Director to see whether we might open in Canberra, Australia, in place of Manila, possibly covering the Philippines from Canberra. In addition, Mr. Mays said that the Ambassador in New Delhi had expressed doubt whether there was sufficient FBI work in India to justify stationing a man there. Mays asked for figures which State could use to support our request.

I stated that we were faced with a situation in which the President had, on September 20, 1971, asked the Director to expand his liaison operations abroad and that here we were more than two months later without having taken a single action in direct response to the President's instruction. I pointed out that it seemed to me that the President's instruction should take precedence over any Ambassadorial question and that I saw no point in becoming involved in quibbling with individual Ambassadors in efforts to justify doing what the President had asked. Ambassador Coerr said that he understood our position perfectly and State would proceed to correspond with the Ambassadors further. He did ask that we present the special problem of Manila for determination by the Director.

With respect to Manila, we have a fair volume of work there now which we do not have in Australia. Further, we do not feel it would be feasible to cover Manila from Australia because of the distance involved, and we want to leave our office in Hong Kong free to concentrate on the greatly enlarged Chinese problem. We feel, therefore, that despite the Ambassador's objection, we should insist upon reopening our office in Manila.

ACTION: If approved, we will inform Ambassador Coerr that his proposal that Canberra be substituted for Manila has been reviewed by the Director and that he feels, as he did when he approved the reduced proposal, that it is essential for us to reopen our office in Manila. We will also tell Ambassador Coerr again that too much time has already elapsed and that this matter should be resolved promptly.

Memorandum E. S. Miller to Mr. Rosen
Re: EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON

(2) We have considered a status letter to Dr. Kissinger concerning this but believe that this would be premature inasmuch as State Under Secretary Irwin has indicated his desire to cooperate and it appears that State is about to authorize part, if not all, of our amended request. We will watch this situation very closely, however, and will submit a proposed letter to Dr. Kissinger if it appears that State is continuing to drag its feet.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Rosen DATE: 12/3/71

FROM : E. S. Miller

SUBJECT: EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON

As approved by the Director, Ambassador Wymberley Coerr, Deputy Director of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, was advised 12/3/71 that we could not accept Canberra, Australia, as a substitute for Manila, Philippines, and that we felt that we had already done everything in our power to cooperate by reducing our request for additional positions overseas from 12 to 6 (3 Agents, 3 clerks). We pointed out that we made our original request on September 20, 1971, and that two and one half months have elapsed without action. Ambassador Coerr said he understood our position perfectly and that he expected to have some definite word for us in the very near future.

Within five minutes, Ambassador Coerr telephoned and said that he had been able to secure approval for us to go ahead with the four offices which we had discussed in his office 12-1-71. He has not yet had a final response from the Ambassador in Singapore, however, so he could not state whether our new post will be in Kuala Lumpur or Singapore. We have approval, however, to open new Legal Attache offices in New Delhi, Manila, Rio de Janeiro, and in either Singapore or Kuala Lumpur. Ambassador Coerr said he expected to be able to advise us which of the latter two would be approved within a very short time.

ACTION: (1) The Administrative Division should notify the Agent and clerical personnel selected for Rio de Janeiro, Manila and New Delhi that State Department clearance has been granted and they should proceed to apply for their passports and/or visas at once. The Administrative Division will be notified immediately as soon as we receive the final clearance for Singapore or Kuala Lumpur. Previously approved transfers of personnel to Santo Domingo and Canberra, Australia, are being cancelled.

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Memorandum Miller to Rosen
Re: EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON

(2) The Files and Communications, Laboratory and Administrative Divisions should be prepared to furnish the necessary communications equipment and supplies.

(3) A letter of confirmation addressed to Secretary Rogers is being prepared and will be submitted separately.

(4) Letters informing the Attorney General and Dr. Kissinger will be promptly prepared as soon as we hear from State regarding whether our office will be in Singapore or Kuala Lumpur.

December 6, 1971

BY COURIER SERVICE

Honorable William P. Rogers
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Following my letter of November 3, 1971, which inquired concerning our request for 6 additional liaison posts abroad, my representatives met on two occasions with officials of your Department. In order to cooperate with the current effort to reduce American personnel overseas, our request was reduced so that instead of 12 additional personnel, only 6 would be required.

On December 3, 1971, Ambassador Wymberley Coerr, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, advised that clearance was being granted for our reduced request. This will mean that new liaison posts will be established at New Delhi, India; Manila, Philippines; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; and in either Singapore, Republic of Singapore, or Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Your cooperation and assistance, which have enabled us to respond to the President's request, are indeed appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: 12/9/71

FROM : W. R. Wannall

SUBJECT: EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON

We are recommending that opening of our new office at New Delhi, India, be temporarily postponed in view of the present situation.

War was declared on India by Pakistan the same day that clearance was received from State for our office there. We have been watching the situation closely and it has deteriorated to the point where we believe it would be futile for us to station a man there right now. All commercial airplane flights to New Delhi have been cancelled by the Indian Government and State has advised us that they are considering the possibility of evacuation of American nationals as is currently being done in Pakistan. Our Legats are dependent upon developing friendly relations with the investigative agencies of the host country. Recent statements by President Nixon, Secretary Rogers and Ambassador Bush have tended to blame India for escalation of the situation with the result that considerable hostility has been developed in India against the United States. A very recent demonstration around the United States Embassy in New Delhi is evidence of this. This is just not the time for a new Legat to introduce himself as a United States representative to Indian agencies.

We checked with State on this and Glynn Mays, with whom we have dealt in connection with the expansion, said the situation is such that the Indian Government might even decline to issue a visa to our representative although he cannot say for sure. As our purpose in sending a man to India is to have him secure political intelligence items from his contacts, it would seem that he would be unable to do this until the situation eases and a less hostile attitude prevails.

ACTION:

It is recommended that we hold up on sending our personnel to New Delhi for a period of 30 days, on the expiration of which the situation will be reassessed and a further recommendation made for the Director's consideration.

Classified by 6283

Exempt from GDS, Category 3

Date of Declassification Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. E. S. Miller

12/17/71

W. H. Wannall

EXPANSION OF FOREIGN LIAISON

We have been pushing Glynn Mays, who is handling our expansion on the working level at State for a final decision on whether we can open an office in Singapore or Kuala Lumpur. On 12/17/71 he advised that nearly all the arrangements have been completed which will enable us to open in Singapore; however, a final response from the Singapore Government has not yet been received. He stated that he is making every effort, through the U. S. Ambassador in Singapore, to expedite this matter and that he will inform us at once when the final word is received.

With respect to our new office at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Mays noted that the U. S. Embassy had been formally moved from Rio to Brasilia about one month ago. This is a move which has been under way during the past four years and was anticipated by our Legal Attache in Buenos Aires who advised that our new office should be opened in Rio de Janeiro nevertheless as the bulk of our work is in Rio and adjacent Sao Paulo. The U. S. diplomatic establishment in Rio will henceforth be known as the Consulate General, and Mays indicated that, as in the case of the Consulate General at Hong Kong, our representative would be known as the Legal Liaison Officer, because no attache title is used in a Consulate General.

We anticipate no difficulty with this as we have had none in Hong Kong. Our representative will continue to be known within the Bureau as Legal Attache, and the title Legal Liaison Officer will be used only by our Mail Room in addressing pouches to him.

ACTION: Attached for approval is a cable reminding the Legat, Buenos Aires, of the change in status of the U. S. establishment in Rio de Janeiro and that our representative will use the title Legal Liaison Officer there.

Enclosure

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON
NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 28, 1971

Dear Mr. Hoover:

On behalf of Secretary Rogers, I wish to thank you for your letter of December 6. I share your satisfaction that, since our conversation of a few weeks ago, our staffs have reached agreement on increasing the FBI's liaison activities in certain overseas areas. I am particularly gratified that this has been accomplished so as to meet the President's general instruction to you and his earlier directives to the Under Secretaries Committee to keep a tight control on all overseas personnel, and to our ambassadors overseas to monitor and direct the operations of all elements assigned to their missions.

We have recently instructed our Ambassadors in Brasilia, Manila, and Singapore to consult with their respective host governments on this subject, and we expect to hear from them shortly. Once we receive formal clearance from those host governments and have resolved the remaining technical and administrative questions, your agents will be able to assume their new responsibilities in those areas.

Because of the current situation in South Asia, however, this is not the propitious moment to establish an office in New Delhi. We will keep in touch both with our Embassy and with your staff to determine when best to proceed.

The Honorable
J. Edgar Hoover,
Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

I particularly appreciate your strong personal interest and assistance in helping our two departments respond to Presidential guidance and direction. I am confident that through continued close effort, our respective staffs will shortly resolve the remaining questions at hand.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,


John N. Irwin II
Chairman

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

II. THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Boulder housewife sure she talked to Riha

By ALAN CONNORHAM

Rocky Mountain News Writer

A Boulder housewife is certain she talked to Thomas Riha on the telephone last March 17, the day he first showed up for his history classes at the University of Colorado.

That is even more remarkable than this, in the opinion of those who have been trying to pin down the exact date of Riha's disappearance, is the housewife's insistence that Riha was cheerful, relaxed and interested in chatting about a local municipal issue.

The woman, who asks that she not be identified by name, has been in the Rocky Mountain News since she was in the process of telephoning a list of Boulder citizens last March, asking support for a proposed referendum on whether the city should take over its public utilities.

While she had been involved in the issue for several weeks, she is sure it was on Monday, March 17, that she attempted to reach a dozen people whose names began with the letters "M" and "R." Among the three or four whom she was able to reach that day, she insists, was Thomas Riha. She says he answered the telephone at his home at 11:30 a.m.

The professor seemed calm, pleasant and quite interested in the municipal issue, according to the Boulder housewife. In fact, she explained, his name was on the list because he had been mentioned in a reader survey "plot" from a Boulder newspaper which related to the issue. As a result, Riha struck her as more informed on it than most others she had talked to in her telephone inquiries, and she believes the conversation lasted about 10 minutes, making it the longest in which she took part that day.

The date, if the Boulder housewife is correct, is significant, because Riha reportedly missed a dinner party to which he was invited the previous night, and could not be reached on Saturday, March 15, by a friend who tried to telephone him repeatedly.

Many people interested in the case have speculated that Riha was in Boulder, was kidnaped or

know the man, but recognized his name when a colleague of Riha's started discussing his disappearance at her home the following weekend. She checked, found his name on her calling list, and recalled details of their conversation.

While she didn't write down the date when she made her telephone calls, the woman says she has made detailed inquiries since then — some as recently as this week — to tie in the dates of related events with that of the crucial telephone call.

In Denver Tuesday, Dist.

Atty. James D. "Mike" McKevitt told the News he had received an official denial from a Washington source that any of the official agencies which have been named in connection with the case actually had any knowledge of where Riha is now.

The source, which he declined to identify, insisted further that Riha never was involved in espionage of any sort, and that none of these agencies had ever told anyone in Boulder, Denver or elsewhere that Riha was alive and well.

Most frequently mentioned agencies have been the FBI, the CIA, military intelligence agencies and the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.

McKevitt also reported no reply yet from former CU President Joseph Smiley in his request that Smiley divulge to McKevitt the exact source of a report to him last spring that Riha was alive.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

26 Rocky Mountain News
Denver, Colorado

Date: 2-11-70

Edition: Home

Author:

Editor: Jack Foster

Title:

THOMAS RIHA

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

DIRECTOR, F.B.I.

February 12, 1970

SAC, DENVER

THOMAS RIHA

SUBJECT:

On the late afternoon of February 10, 1970, I was called by MIKE TODOROVICH, who is in charge of the CIA office here in Denver. TODOROVICH stated he has instructions from his Washington Office to contact Denver District Attorney JAMES MC KEVITT and tell MC KEVITT that CIA Agent JOHN D. FRITZ, who is stationed in Boulder, Colorado, had told Dr. JOSEPH SMILEY, former President of the University of Colorado, that FRITZ had been told that THOMAS RIHA's disappearance was merely a marital matter and that RIHA was, in fact, all right. TODOROVICH then told me that FRITZ got this information from an FBI Agent in Boulder.

I told TODOROVICH to give me the name of the FBI Agent and he stated he would not do so. He then stated the FBI Agent told him, TODOROVICH the same thing. I again requested the name of the Agent. He again declined to give it to me. I very emphatically told TODOROVICH that until he gave me the name of the Agent who supposedly gave him and FRITZ this information, that I would not believe that either he or FRITZ had been given any information such as this by any Agent of this Bureau and this was based on the fact that no Agent would have any reason whatsoever to make such a statement since we had not conducted any investigation in this matter nor did we have any information concerning RIHA and, therefore, we would not be in a position to make such a statement as to whether or not RIHA was all right.

I then also pointed out to Mr. TODOROVICH that if he gave the information to Mr. MC KEVITT and advised Mr. MC KEVITT the information had come from an FBI Agent and if Mr. MC KEVITT contacted me I would certainly advise him that the information did not come from anyone in the FBI for the same reasons as set forth above.

I am enclosing, for the Bureau's information, an article which appeared in the February 11, 1970, issue of The Rocky Mountain News, a Denver newspaper. The article is captioned "Boulder housewife says she talked to Riha."

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Towards the end of the article it reports that MC KEVITT had received an official denial from "a Washington source" that any of the official agencies which have been named in connection with the RIHA case actually had any knowledge of where RIHA is now. The source, according to the article which MC KEVITT refused to identify, also said RIHA was not involved in espionage of any sort and that none of these agencies have ever told anyone in Boulder, Denver, or elsewhere that RIHA was alive and well.

The article points out the most frequently mentioned agencies have been the FBI, CIA, Military Intelligence agencies and the U. S. INS.

Also enclosed is an article which appeared in the Rocky Mountain News for February 12, 1970. This article is captioned "Riha case investigators' theories might be altered."

For the information of the Bureau, we only have two resident agents in Boulder, Colorado, and I have personally contacted each of them and each has assured me both verbally and by memorandum that they have not made such statements as were attributed to them by TODOROVICH. Not only that, neither of the two has ever had any contact personally or otherwise with JOHN D. FRITZ, the CIA representative in Boulder.

This information is being forwarded to the Bureau only for information in view of CIA's actions in connection with this matter.

1. Protest to CIA re Todorovich's actions
 2. Comments on CIA's handling of Todorovich.
- H

Following is typewritten clarification of the handwritten comment of J. Edgar Hoover on the attached document:

"I don't. I still want name of our agt which Todorovich gave to Dr. Smiley. H"

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Riha case investigators' theories might be altered

By ALAN CUNNINGHAM
Rocky Mountain News Writer

A Boulder woman's belief that she talked to Thomas Riha last March 17, as revealed Wednesday by the Rocky Mountain News, may have altered investigators' theories about what happened to the missing history professor and when it may have happened.

While avoiding specifics about their theories, Boulder police investigators expressed interest Wednesday in knowing more about the housewife's recollection that she telephoned Riha and carried on a 10-minute conversation with him shortly before noon that Monday, the day when he first failed to show up

for his classes at the University of Colorado.

When told this by the News Wednesday, the woman said she would telephone the police department and volunteer her information.

Apparently, the woman's story proved startling to the two investigators who have been assigned fulltime to the Riha case, just as it did to many friends and neighbors of the professor, most of whom have said their last contacts with Riha were no later than the previous Thursday or Friday.

Phone survey

There has been speculation that whatever happened to him happened as early as that Friday night.

But the Boulder housewife, who was making a telephone survey at the time, told the News she is certain she talked to Riha on Monday, March 17.

She further insisted he seemed calm, relaxed and cheerful at the time.

If the woman is correct, police investigators conceded, it could well force them to revise their current theories about the case.

CIA agent

In another development, a Denver-based agent of the Central Intelligence Agency insisted the CIA has never been involved in any way with the case since Riha disappeared.

The agent, Michael M. Todorovich, insisted it hadn't been he who gave assurances to former CU president Joseph Smiley, Denver police chief George Seaton or other officials last spring that Riha was alive and well.

Such reported assurances, coupled with great reluctance on the part of these officials to elaborate on how they got them, have become the center of a major mystery in the strange case.

Todorovich further denied, having discussed the matter with anyone, and stated emphatically that it "is entirely out of our jurisdiction."

Nevertheless, at least one official in the area is known reliably to have received his assurances from Todorovich himself.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

20 Rocky Mountain News
Denver, Colorado

Date: 2-12-70

Edition: Home

Author: Alan Cunningham

Editor: Jack Foster

Title:

THOMAS RIHA

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

DATE: 2-18-70

FROM : D. J. Brennan *DJB*

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

On 2/10/70, SAC Werner, Denver, demanded that Mike Todorovich, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) representative, Denver, identify Bureau Agent who allegedly told a CIA officer that the subject's disappearance was merely a marital matter and that subject, in fact, was alright. Todorovich refused to do so. The Director instructed that we protest to CIA, regarding Todorovich's actions.

On 2-17-70, Liaison Agent Papich vigorously protested Todorovich's actions to CIA, charging the Agency with impeding our inquiry. He pointed out that Todorovich's stubborn refusal to divulge the identity of the Bureau Agent involved was unacceptable because we had no information to support the statement attributed to our Agent. As a result of Papich's protest, a CIA official telephoned Todorovich and demanded that he divulge the identity of the Agent. Todorovich refused and stated that he considered this a matter of personal honor and that unless there was reason to believe Bureau operations were being adversely effected, he would not make the identification. CIA officials subsequently advised the Liaison Agent that they had reviewed the entire case and learned that District Attorney McKeivitt publicly stated on 2-14-70 that the statement attributed to Dr. Smiley (which allegedly came to him via Todorovich from our Agent) was based on an "honest mistake" and that McKeivitt felt this cleared the air and no further clarification was needed.

ACTION:

None. For information.

I don't. I still want names of our Agent which I will give to W. C. Sullivan.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 2-20-70

FROM : D. J. Brennan

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Reference is made to memorandum dated 2-18-70 from D. J. Brennan to Sullivan. The Director stated that he wants the name of the FBI Agent who had furnished certain information to Mike Todorovich, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) representative, Denver. The Liaison Agent met with Richard Helms, Director, CIA, on 2-20-70, repeating the background of this matter and reiterated the protest made earlier by the Bureau and asked that CIA obtain the identity of the FBI Agent.

Helms advised that he considered this a most serious development and fully recognizes the gravity of the situation since it has such a significant bearing on relations between the two agencies and the highly important work of both organizations. He stated that he does not have the identity of the FBI Agent and so far Todorovich has refused to disclose same. Helms advised that he is requesting Todorovich to proceed to Washington, D. C., immediately at which time he will be interviewed in detail by Helms. In the meantime, the CIA Director is requesting his subordinates to prepare for him a complete report covering all information in possession of CIA regarding the subject. He stated that he will communicate with the Bureau immediately after talking to Todorovich. He stated that it was absolutely necessary that he make certain that he has all the relevant facts so that he can accurately respond to the Director and take the proper and necessary administrative action within his own organization.

ACTION:

For information.

I shall await word.
H

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

47 2

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

DATE: February 25, 1970

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr. *DJB*

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

On February 24, 1970, James Angleton, CIA, advised the Liaison Agent that Richard Helms had instructed him to transmit the following message to the Director. *Q*

Pursuant to instructions from Helms, Mike Todorovich, CIA representative in Denver, arrived in Washington, D. C., on February 24, 1970, and Helms initiated his interview. Helms expects to complete the interview including an examination of various CIA records within two days, upon the completion of which he will be transmitting a personal letter to the Director.

ACTION:

For information.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Following are typewritten clarifications of the handwritten comments of J. Edgar Hoover on the attached document:

Page 2, left margin - "Werner acted properly. H"

Page 2, bottom of page - "I do not agree. Todorovich violated the third agency rule & refused to identify the alleged FBI agent who was the source of the information. H"

Page 3, end of 3rd paragraph - "Helms forgets it is a two way street. H"

Page 3, bottom of page - "This is not satisfactory. I want our Denver Office to have absolutely no contacts with CIA. I want direct liaison here with CIA to be terminated & any contact with CIA in the future to be by letter only. H"

~~SECRET~~



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

18
26 February 1970

~~Personal and Confidential~~

The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Mr. Papich has orally informed me that you wish to have the identity of the FBI agent who was the source of certain information communicated to an employee of this Agency, Mr. Michael Todorovich. This information regarding the disappearance of one Thomas Riha was in turn passed to Dr. Joseph Smiley, then President of Colorado University, Boulder, Colorado, now President of a university in El Paso, Texas, and to the District Attorney of Denver, Mr. James McKevitt. In view of your personal interest in this matter, I instructed Mr. Todorovich to report to me in person.

I have reviewed this complicated case in detail with Mr. Todorovich and have requested him to reveal the identity of his source. As a point of honor and personal integrity, Mr. Todorovich was adamant that he could not disclose the identity of his source. Under further pressure from me, Mr. Todorovich maintained his position, stating that in defense of it he was prepared to submit his resignation immediately.

Mr. Todorovich explained that the Riha/Galya Tannenbaum cases had been given extensive news coverage, much of it being sensational in nature. He stressed that there was embarrassing public speculation as to the possible involvement of the CIA and the FBI in Riha's disappearance.

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The purpose of Mr. Todorovich's conference with the District Attorney of Denver was to solicit his good offices to remove pressures and the possible serving of a subpoena on Dr. Joseph Smiley. He also sought to orient the District Attorney properly so that he would not continue to have an erroneous impression of the roles of the CIA and the FBI, thereby eliminating further adverse publicity.

Mr. Todorovich affirms that before going to District Attorney McKeivitt he called upon the FBI Special Agent in Charge, Mr. Scott Werner, and sought to coordinate with him our respective interests. He also solicited Mr. Werner to accompany him to the District Attorney.

Mr. Todorovich states that Mr. Werner refused absolutely to cooperate in this matter. Instead, Mr. Werner engaged in an oral exchange during which he remarked that our representative in Boulder was "lying" and then proceeded to challenge the veracity of Mr. Todorovich. Subsequently, Mr. Todorovich conferred with the District Attorney alone. He was successful in persuading the District Attorney to make a favorable public statement which had the effect of putting this issue regarding Dr. Smiley and other rumors to rest as far as the public was concerned.

Werner acted properly. HJD

I have carefully reviewed the statements of Mr. Todorovich. I feel that poor judgment was employed in passing the information in question to Dr. Smiley and later to the District Attorney. This should only have been done with specific FBI approval. I wish to assure you that I do not condone violations of the third agency rule, and I am taking steps to impress once again this elementary fact upon all Agency officials.

With regard to Mr. Todorovich, I have no reason to doubt that he has acted honestly. I believe that he has reported to me in good faith. He is sincerely interested in preserving a sound working relationship between the CIA and the FBI. Nevertheless, because a situation of this sort adversely affects the relationship between the two agencies, I am taking administrative action in this matter with regard to Mr. Todorovich.

~~SECRET~~

I do not agree. Todorovich violated the third agency rule by releasing the identity of the alleged CIA agent who is with the body...

While the following is not pertinent to your request, my review of this case suggests the advisability of a re-examination of Riha's disappearance and past activities and, necessarily, the Tannenbaum case. Briefly, since 1958 we have communicated to your Bureau significant information which relates to Riha's involvement with Czech and Soviet intelligence services, when he was behind the Iron Curtain. I attach for your information and convenience copies of pertinent reports regarding this aspect of the case.

I hope sincerely that this recent incident will not impair our mutual efforts in making certain that we have not overlooked factors possibly having a significant bearing on U.S. intelligence and internal security interests. I shall pursue this matter through our respective liaison offices.

In closing, Mr. Hoover, I wish to state that this Agency can only fully perform its duties in the furtherance of the national security when it has the closest coordination and teamwork with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Furthermore, it is necessary that we continue to conduct our business in an atmosphere of mutual respect. I trust that we can coordinate closely any future developments or actions in these cases, in order to prevent the airing in public of conflicts or differences between the two agencies. I feel strongly that there are representatives of the news media who are eager to exploit alleged differences on a national scale. Disturbing as this experience has been, I wish to thank you in the interests of our common cause for having communicated with me in such a forthright and candid manner.

It was forgotten in a two way street H V

Sincerely,

Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

This is not satisfactory. I want our Denver office to review absolutely all contracts with CIA. I would direct in Denver here with CIA to be terminated from contract with CIA in Denver to be deleted and.

~~SECRET~~

ATTACHMENT

SUBJECT: ~~RIHA~~, Thomas

1. The January 1970 receipt of information from your Bureau that Mrs. Ruth Ann COOK, Thomas RIHA's mother, had mentioned rumors of her son's work for CIA in letters to the SAC, Denver, caused us to verify the fact RIHA has never been employed or used operationally by this Agency.

2. In 1958 and 1959 you were provided information that RIHA, when transitting Prague en route to Moscow, was contacted by Czech Intelligence and asked to remain in the CSR. Later in 1958 Czech Intelligence introduced RIHA to the KGB in Moscow and our source reported RIHA accepted certain privileges from the KGB while asserting he would not become a spy for the Soviets. Details reported by our source about RIHA's KGB contacts did not emerge during a 1960 FBI interview of RIHA.

3. This indication that RIHA may not have been truthful in 1960, when added to our current knowledge about KGB interest in recruiting American exchange students and RIHA's 1968 trip to the USSR, suggests the circumstances of RIHA's disappearance might be re-evaluated. This Agency is reopening its file on this case in view of the information disclosed in the attachments.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

COPY

27 October 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of Security
Department of State

SUBJECT : RIHA, Thomas

1. The following report concerning an attempt by a member of Czech Intelligence to effect the repatriation of Subject, a naturalized American East-West Exchange student, to his country of origin was recently submitted by a source of this office.

2. Source first became acquainted with Subject during the past year at The Russian Research Center, Harvard University. On 10 September 1958 he ran into Subject by chance at the SAS office in Vienna as the two boarded a SAS flight to Copenhagen via Duesseldorf. During the trip Subject disclosed the following to source which has been supplemented from information from our files.

3. RIHA, who was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia 17 April 1929, is one of the twenty American students selected for the East-West Exchange Program and will be studying in the USSR for the 1958-59 academic year. Files in this Agency indicate that RIHA arrived in the U. S. on 15 July 1947 and became a citizen in 1952.

4. Our source informed us that RIHA had gone to Prague, June of this year, to see his father and other relatives. His father and mother are divorced and according to information in our files, his mother is listed as Mrs. Ruth A. COOK. address: 2023 Etna Street, Berkeley 4, California.

5. RIHA told our source that when he arrived in Prague he was put into a Government hotel for three days before he was allowed to stay with his relatives and friends. During this time, and perhaps later, RIHA was accompanied through the city by a guide whom he described as a "Government Official" name unknown, who attempted to effect Subject's repatriation to Czechoslovakia. RIHA told our source that this man has set up an appointment (date and address unknown) to meet him in Moscow to talk further.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

6. Subject told our source that this "Government Official" did not mention Czech Intelligence or Security Forces as such and that he (RIHA) is not too worried concerning this contact. RIHA apparently feels that it is the price he must pay in order to study in the Soviet Union and once he gets deeply into his studies in Moscow he feels that he can plead that he is too busy with his academic work to have contact with any officials. Our source also stated that RIHA is in some kind of correspondence with the Czech official. We have no description or name for the Czech official.

7. It is requested that no further dissemination be made of this information without prior clearance from this office, and that our source be fully protected in the event that contact is made with RIHA.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS

Signed: James Angleton

JAMES ANGLETON

CS CI 3/751,690

cc: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

COPY

21 April 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT : RIHA, Thomas

EO 3

1. Reference is made to our CS CI 3/751,690 of 27 October 1958 concerning an attempt by a member of Czech Intelligence to effect Subject's repatriation while the latter was in Prague in June of 1958 visiting relatives en route to study in Moscow during 1958-59 as an East-West Exchange Student. The following report describes further action taken by the KGB in Moscow to cultivate Subject, and was recently submitted by a sensitive and reliable source.

2. Sometime in December 1958, Subject again met the Czech Official who had tried to have Subject repatriate to the CSR in Prague last summer. According to our source, it was apparently an accidental meeting at a Moscow railroad station as the Czech was returning to Prague. The Czech was delighted to see Subject, and introduced him to a Soviet official. This Soviet identified himself only by a first name and a telephone number, both unknown to our source. The Soviet described his work as being in the American Section of the MVD.

3. This Soviet Official has been cultivating Subject (trying to see him as often as possible, sometimes twice a week) since their introduction in December, by offering such blandishments as trips in a chauffeured private limousine into forbidden areas outside Moscow, tickets to any entertainment, access to material from previously inaccessible archives, the use of private country villas and all the "beautiful, interesting and intelligent girls" he might want. Subject has further been promised the opportunity of returning to the Soviet Union for as long as he wants at any future date. He would have to pay only his way over there; his expenses and return trip to the US would be paid by the Soviets.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

4. Subject has taken advantage of this offer to take several trips for sightseeing into forbidden areas around Moscow in a private car with the Soviet Official, and has also taken up a few offers for entertainment. Subject visited one of these villas, but refused the girls on the ground that he wants a woman to like him for himself, and not because she has been told to do so. The Soviet answered that "some of them will really learn to like you for yourself, as well as work for us," but Subject still declined to get involved. However, Subject has recently been taken up by a Soviet girl who had previously tried to seduce another American student and subsequently blurted out that she was put onto the latter American by the MVD, which she has also told Subject. Subject is reported to be responding warmly to her approaches although he has flatly told her he doesn't trust her nor any Russian completely. He claims he enjoys her company but will not have a serious affair with her, and suspects she may be tied up with the other women offered him by the Soviet Official.

5. In his relationship with the Soviet Official, Subject is reportedly aware that he is playing a risky game, and is only utilizing the situation for the comfort and convenience it brings him. He has told the Soviet frankly that he cannot be won over ideologically. Subject says he feels that the Soviets' interest in him is to cultivate him as a scholar of possible future importance to insure that he will always be sympathetic to the Soviet Union. Subject has reportedly told several other American students of his relationship with the Soviet Official in order to cover himself "in case anything happened".

6. This Soviet Official has evinced an interest to Subject in many of the American Exchange students, with the explanation that some would undoubtedly be back in Moscow within two years as Diplomats and that since this is his area of responsibility, he wants to know as much as possible about them. The Soviet indicated that he was quite aware of the pattern of the American Exchange students' trips to the US Embassy and what they do in the university buildings, but is not so sure of their activities around the city. To demonstrate to Subject his knowledge about the American students, the Soviet Official mentioned an affair going on within the American group of which Subject had been unaware. The Soviet's information turned out to be true.

7. Subject was described by a reliable source, who knows him from group social gatherings at Harvard, as mature and socially vivacious with a warm personality. Subject is a clever and humorous conversationalist who likes to be surrounded by people, make new acquaintances, and develop friendships. Subject's patriotic motivation was not known to our source, but the latter felt that Subject was completely "Americanized" in manners and interests. Our source would guess that Subject has courage.

8. It is requested that no further dissemination be made of this information without prior clearance from this office. It is further requested that such clearance be obtained if Subject is to be contacted by you either before or after his return to the United States.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS

~~SECRET~~
JAMES ANGLETON

CS CI 3/754,303

COPY

~~SECRET~~

2 June 1959

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: RIHA, Thomas

1. Reference is made to our CSCI 3/751,690 of 27 October 1958, and our CSCI 3/754,303 of 14 April 1959 in which are reported the attempt by Czech Intelligence to induce Subject, a Czech-born naturalized American, to repatriate to Czechoslovakia, and the further cultivation of Subject by the KGB in Moscow where Subject is an Exchange Student during 1958-59. The following report describes further action by the KGB to recruit Subject, and his adamant refusal of any such offer. This latest information was recently received from RIHA by a sensitive and reliable source.

2. During April 1959, the Soviet Official who said he was from the American Section of the MVD (sic) and who had been cultivating Subject, allegedly asked the latter to make complete and regular reports on Michael Martin LUTHER, one of the other American Exchange Students at Moscow University. Subject was asked to spend as much time as possible with LUTHER, and to report where he goes, what he does and with whom he associates. If Subject were to do this reporting, the Soviet Official said he would make available certain material from Archives which Subject has been unable to get permission to use although research in this material is vital to his having a successful year academically in Moscow.

3. Subject alleges he flatly refused this "deal", saying that if he ever got mixed up in such a dirty business, it would be for his own side and not for the Communists. The Soviet Official then told Subject he should engage in such observation and reporting to the Soviets to lose some "naivete" about how the United States is exploiting the Cultural Exchange Program for intelligence purposes. To back up this assertion, the Soviet Official told Subject about a "spy nest where spies deposit things for one another" which he said had recently been uncovered near a university entrance frequented by still another American student, Walter CLEMENS, who, the Soviet implied, was not engaged in academic work only while studying at Moscow University.

~~SECRET~~

Class 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

Subject reportedly again adamantly refused to cooperate with the Soviet Official.

4. In paragraph 4 of CSCI 3/754,303, reference was made to a Soviet girl who had become interested in Subject, and whom Subject viewed with suspicion although continuing to see her for her companionship. Her name is Lida (Y)EGOROVA. Subject has now reportedly been alienated by her undependable personality and has pretty well broken up with her. This girl may have left, or soon be leaving, for Prague to join her husband.

5. It is requested that no further dissemination of this information be made without prior clearance from this office. It is further requested that such clearance be obtained if Subject is to be contacted by you.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

James Angleton

James Angleton

CSCI 3/754,373

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS* DATE: March 2, 1970

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr. *DJB*

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Reference is made to letter from Richard Helms, Director, CIA, dated February 26, 1970.

Pursuant to instructions the Liaison Agent advised Helms on February 27, 1970, that (1) the Bureau is discontinuing all contact with the CIA office in Denver and (2) that direct Liaison with CIA at headquarters is being terminated. Helms was further told that henceforth our communication with CIA will be by letter only.

ACTION:

Enclosed is a teletype to the Denver Office instructing that all contact with the local CIA office be discontinued.

*GIK-
103*

CODE

3/2/70

TELETYPE

URGENT

TO SAC DENVER

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

THOMAS RIHA, INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

IMMEDIATELY DISCONTINUE ALL CONTACT WITH THE LOCAL

CIA OFFICE.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 5-5-70

FROM : D. E. Moore *DEM/wkd
4-70*

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

At 4:35 p.m., today I telephonically contacted ASAC Morley, Denver, and advised him that an article concerning the Riha case had appeared in the Sunday News (New York) 4-3-70. This article was a general rehashing of the Riha case.

I told him that the Bureau desired that SAC Werner contact the District Attorney to determine the developments of his investigation in this case and also determine what conclusions had been reached. Morley said this would be done.

Morley was asked if Denver had information concerning a professor who had gone to El Paso, Texas, or New Orleans, Louisiana, and he advised this probably referred to Dr. Joseph Smiley, former President at Colorado University who was there when Riha disappeared. He said that Smiley is now President of the University of Texas, at El Paso, Texas. He said Denver had no information that Dr. Smiley has any current information concerning this matter.

SAC Werner called at 5:30 p.m., today to advise that he had been unable to get in touch with the District Attorney but also was following up on this and would contact the District Attorney today and get in a teletype tonight.

ACTION:

For record purposes.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

NR002 DN PLAIN

5:15 PM URGENT 5-5-70 DCM 3

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: DENVER

THOMAS RIHA

REBUTELCAL TODAY.

PURSUANT TO REQUEST IN REBUTELCAL, THIS IS TO ADVISE THE PROFESSOR WHO ALLEGEDLY WENT TO EL PASO OR NEW ORLEANS CONCERNING THOMAS RIHA ^{AND} HAD HIS DEISAPPEARANCE IS UNDOUBTEDLY DR. JOSEPH SMILEY , FORMER PRESIDENT, COLORADO UNIVERSITY, BOULDER, COLO., WHO IS NOW PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS IN EL PASO, TEXAS.

DR. SMILEY WAS ORIGINALLY CONTACTED BY CIA AND ADVISED BY CIA THAT RIHA WAS ALIVE AND WELL.

AS BUREAU HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY ADVISED, CIA ATTEMPTED TO ATTRIBUTE THE ABOVE INFORMATION CONCERNING RIHA TO THE FBI. HOWEVER, SINCE THERE WAS NO FEDERAL VIOLATION OVER WHICH THE BUREAU HAD INVESTIGATIVE INTEREST, ^{REC-25} NO FBI INVESTIGATION WAS

END PAGE ONE

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

PAGE TWO

CONDUCTED.

DENVER FILES CONTAIN NO FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING RIHA OTHER THAT THAT PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED TO THE BUREAU.

DENVER DISTRICT ATTORNEY JAMES MC KEVITT, GENERALLY KNOWN AS MIKE MC KEVITT, ADVISED TODAY THAT THE INVESTIGATION BY HIS OFFICE CONCERNING THE DISAPPEARANCE OF PROFESSOR RIHA IS AT A STANDSTILL SINCE ALL LEADS HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTED. MC KEVITT STATES THAT HE FEELS GALYA TANNENBAUM, FORMER CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF RIHA, MAY HAVE KILLED HIM IN VIEW OF FACT THAT MC KEVITT'S INVESTIGATION INDICATES THERE WAS A VERY BAD FEELING BETWEEN RIHA AND TANNENBAUM JUST PRIOR TO HIS DISAPPEARANCE DUE TO THE FACT THAT TANNENBAUM WAS FORGING CHECKS ON RIHA'S ACCOUNT.

FULL BACKGROUND CONCERNING TANNENBAUM PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED BUREAU UNDER CAPTION "GALYA TANNENBAUM, AKA, IMPERSONATION," BUFILE UNKNOWN, DENVER FILE FOUR SEVEN DASH THREE ONE NINE ZERO.

MC KEVITT SAID INVESTIGATION ALSO REVEALED THAT TANNENBAUM
END PAGE TWO

WAS PROBABLY A NYMPHOMANIAC AND THAT SHE AND RIHA HAD HAD CONSTANT SEXUAL AFFAIRS AND THAT SHE HELD THIS AS A CLUB OVER HIS HEAD IN CONNECTION WITH THE FORGERY OF THESE CHECKS.

IN ANY EVENT MC KEVITT STATES IT IS HIS OPINION THAT RIHA IS DEAD SINCE HIS INVESTIGATION ALSO REVEALS RIHA WAS VERY ATTACHED TO HIS FRIENDS AND MC KEVITT FEELS THAT HE WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH HIS FRIENDS IF HE WERE ALIVE. MC KEVITT ALSO ADVISES THAT INVESTIGATION BY HIS OFFICE INDICATES RIHA WAS VERY ABNORMAL IN HIS SEXUAL DESIRES AND PURSUITS AND THAT THIS WAS HIS GREAT WEAKNESS; THAT HE COULD NOT LEAVE WOMEN ALONE AND THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT ONE OF THESE INVOLVEMENTS MAY HAVE RESULTED IN HIS DEATH.

IN VIEW OF THE DETAILS AND FACTS SET FORTH ABOVE, ANY INTERVIEW WITH DR. JOSEPH SMILEY IS BEING LEFT TO THE DISCRETION OF THE BUREAU.

END

WJM FBI WA

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: May 6, 1970

FROM : A. W. Gray *AW*

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Pursuant to Director's request Denver District Attorney James "Mike" McKevitt interviewed 5/5/70 as to investigation of Riha, Czechoslovak-born, naturalized, former professor of Russian history at Colorado University, who departed Denver area 3/69 without notifying friends, associates or estranged wife. His disappearance has been glamorized and spiced up in newspaper articles by references to Galya Tannenbaum, his paramour. McKevitt stated investigation at standstill, all leads being exhausted. He feels Tannenbaum may have killed subject since bad feeling developed between them prior to his disappearance due to her forging checks on his account. Further, Tannenbaum probably a nymphomaniac who had constant sexual affairs with Riha and used this as a club over his head to prevent disclosure of forgeries. In McKevitt's opinion Riha is dead since he was close to his friends and if alive would contact them. Investigation indicates Riha abnormal in his sexual desires and could not leave women alone. Possibility exists one of these involvements may have resulted in his death.

Dr. Joseph Smiley, former President, Colorado University, where subject employed, is now President, University of Texas, El Paso, Texas. Smiley after subject's disappearance stated subject was alive and well. When challenged by McKevitt to disclose basis for statement he refused and appealed to CIA, his source, for help. Bureau vigorously refuted CIA's claim that Bureau Agent was original source for statement. As result McKevitt publicly announced statement was not true and resulted from "honest mistake." No indication Smiley has any facts to contribute concerning subject's current whereabouts or basis for his disappearance. Since Bureau has conducted no investigation into Riha's disappearance, interview of Smiley could result in impression Bureau entering case. However, if Director so desires, El Paso will be instructed to interview Dr. Smiley. Bureau files show subject attended Moscow University 9/58-9/59. Our files show CIA gave Riha a short briefing prior to his entry into USSR in 1958. In 1958-59 CIA advised Czech intelligence attempted to persuade Riha to repatriate and later introduced Riha to Soviet intelligence which attempted his recruitment. After subject's return to US in 1959 no information was developed as to continued interest in him by Soviet intelligence.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized persons.

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: THOMAS RIHA
105-78256

ACTION:

If the Director so desires, El Paso will be furnished background information regarding Riha and will be instructed to interview Dr. Smiley.

Yes.
H.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

DATE: 5/7/70

FROM : A. W. Gray *AWG*

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Rememo A. W. Gray to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, same caption, dated 5/6/70, by which the Director instructed we interview Dr. Joseph Smiley, President, University of Texas, El Paso, Texas.

At 1:40 p.m., 5/7/70, I telephoned ASAC Jay Cochran, Jr., El Paso, and furnished him background of this matter. I instructed him to have Dr. Smiley contacted immediately, to make it clear that the FBI was not investigating the Riha matter and to inquire of Smiley if he has any new information regarding Riha's disappearance or current whereabouts.

ASAC Cochran was told to send the results of this interview of Dr. Smiley immediately by teletype to the Bureau. He was also told that in the event Dr. Smiley is out of town or otherwise unavailable for interview, a teletype should be sent immediately to the Bureau advising as to when the interview would be conducted.

ACTION:

None. For record purposes.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 5/8/70

FROM : A. W. Gray

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Reference memorandum A. W. Gray to Mr. W. C. Sullivan 5/6/70, same caption, by which the Director instructed that Dr. Joseph Smiley, President, University of Texas at El Paso, Texas, be interviewed as to any knowledge he possessed concerning Riha's disappearance or current whereabouts.

Dr. Smiley was interviewed 5/7/70 and was most cooperative. Smiley stated since leaving the University of Colorado in 6/69 his knowledge of developments in this case has been derived from articles he has read in "The Denver Post." He speculated Riha may have been involved in intelligence work and based this comment on Riha's being a "loner" and having married a Czech girl. He said he had no evidence to support this speculation. He said that he was aware that one Mrs. Tannenbaum, a woman indicted in Colorado for a number of frauds and a suspect in two arsenic poisonings, is considered a suspect in the disappearance of Riha. He concluded that he had no further information concerning either Riha's disappearance or his whereabouts.

ACTION:

For information of the Director.

FBI

Date: 5/8/70

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, EL PASO
SUBJECT: THOMAS RIJA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING
SINO-SATELLITE SECTION

ReButel call to EP, 5/7/70;
EP tel call to Bureau, 5/7/70.

In accordance with the request of the Director, SA FRANCIS J. PRASEK interviewed Dr. JOSEPH SMILEY, President of UTEP. Dr. SMILEY was advised that the FBI has no jurisdiction in this matter, nor is it conducting any active investigation regarding RIJA, and that we were simply desirous of being advised of any new information he may have received regarding RIJA's disappearance and/or present whereabouts.

Dr. SMILEY, who was most gracious and pleasant, stated that he left the University of Colorado, Boulder Colorado, in 6/69, and has since that time followed the investigation of RIJA and his disappearance which is being conducted by the newspaper "The Denver Post".

SMILEY, in 4/69, approximately three weeks after the disappearance of RIJA, contacted RIJA's attorney for the purpose of determining whether the attorney had any information regarding RIJA, since it was necessary for SMILEY to know whether RIJA was alive and whether he intended to return to the University for the fall semester of 1969 to resume teaching in the History Department. SMILEY, who cannot now recall the name of the attorney, was furnished an address for RIJA in Montreal, Canada, and a letter was directed to this address by the History Department seeking information regarding RIJA and his intentions.

2 Bureau (RAM)
1 El Paso

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

After leaving Boulder, SMILEY was advised by Dean WILLIAM E. BRIGGS, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Colorado, Boulder, that a letter was received by the University purportedly written by RIJA in which he stated that he would not be returning to the University. BRIGGS advised SMILEY that in his opinion, the letter was a forgery, since the signature did not compare with that of RIJA.

After the disappearance, SMILEY began receiving a great many inquiries from the news media and he was pressed for a statement regarding his knowledge of RIJA and whether or not he was alive.

THE FOLLOWING WAS FURNISHED BY DR. SMILEY IN THE STRICTEST OF CONFIDENCE WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IT WAS FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE FBI AND NOT FOR DISSEMINATION TO ANY OUTSIDE AGENCY SINCE HE WAS BREAKING A CONFIDENCE WITH AN ASSOCIATE IN THE DENVER OFFICE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY:

Being hounded by the press for a statement, he contacted a source in the CIA Office at Denver since he, SMILEY, was formerly a member of the Office of Naval Intelligence, thinking that perhaps that agency could assist him off the record with any information it might possess. SMILEY was aware that the CIA had interviewed RIJA following a trip by RIJA to the Soviet Union. The CIA source subsequently told Dr. SMILEY to merely advise the press that he had information to the effect that RIJA was "alive and well". This information was subsequently released by Dr. SMILEY to the student press at the University of Colorado, and it appeared in print.

When the Office of the District Attorney in Denver instituted investigation into the disappearance of RIJA, SMILEY was contacted by the DA's Office regarding the source of his statement. Dr. SMILEY again contacted the Denver CIA Office source and was advised that he was to state nothing and that he would be recontacted.

Some days later, the CIA source recontacted him and told him that he would be receiving an inquiry from the Office of the DA in the form of a statement, and that he should agree with the statement even though it "was not quite the truth". SMILEY did not question

these instructions, since he felt that CIA knew what should be done in this type of case. He received a telephone call from the DA's Office and a statement was read to him to the effect that the information which he had received and made public to the effect that RIJA was alive and well was in error. SMILEY told the caller that he agreed with the statement and nothing further came of this.

Dr. SMILEY does not know what part, if any, the CIA has in this case, but since he, SMILEY, is himself a former intelligence agent he did not feel that he had the right to question something which might be of vital importance to his country.

DR. SMILEY REQUESTED THAT NO HINT OR INFERENCE BE GIVEN TO THE CIA WHICH WOULD INDICATE THAT HE HAS REVEALED TO THE FBI HIS CONTACTS REGARDING THIS MATTER WITH THE DENVER OFFICE OF THE CIA.

He stated that though he has no evidence to substantiate his belief, he cannot get it out of his mind that RIJA may have been a double agent for the Soviets or the Czechoslovaks. He is aware that one Mrs. TANNENBAUM, a woman indicted for a number of frauds and a suspect in two arsenic poisonings, is considered a suspect in the disappearance of RIJA. He never knew RIJA to be associated with any such woman, but stated that he was not acquainted with the personal life of RIJA who was somewhat of a "loner".

RIJA, when he joined the staff of the University of Colorado, was single but in 8/68, an individual came to visit RIJA ostensibly for the purpose of arranging a marriage between RIJA and the man's sister. The intended bride was a Czechoslovakian girl who was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia, and this "brother-in-law" was entertained by a member and colleague of RIJA in the History Department. This individual indicated to SMILEY that although the "brother-in-law" supposedly did not speak any English, and had RIJA translate every statement into Czech, it was apparent from the gestures and expressions of the "brother-in-law" that he understood more than he let on. Three weeks after the visit of this man, the woman who became Mrs. RIJA came to Boulder, Colorado, where she and RIJA were married. The marriage resulted in divorce a short time later and the girl reportedly returned to the East Coast from whence she came.

Dr. SMILEY indicated that he has no further information regarding this matter, but that Dean WILLIAM E. BRIGGS, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Colorado, Boulder, should be in possession of the letter purportedly written from Canada by RIJA, and may be in a position to assist in answering any question the Bureau might have regarding RIJA's association with the University of Colorado, since BRIGGS would have possession of these records. He stated BRIGGS is a trusted confidant of his and Dr. SMILEY's name should be used as an introduction should the Bureau desire any information of BRIGGS.

III

III. COLONEL ALEXANDER M. HAIG
TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUEST



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

May 12, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: COLONEL ALEXANDER M. HAIG
TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUEST

On May 10, 1969, Colonel Alexander M. Haig, who is assigned to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger's staff, came to this Bureau to advise that a request was being made on the highest authority which involves a matter of most grave and serious consequence to our national security. He stressed that it is so sensitive it demands handling on a need-to-know basis, with no record maintained. He requested that telephone surveillance be placed on the following individuals to determine if a serious security problem exists: Daniel Ira Davidson; Morton H. Halperin; Colonel Robert Pursley; and Helmut Sonnenfeldt.

Davidson is aged 32 and is Department of State employee who has been on detail to the National Security Council since December, 1968. He was assigned to the Paris peace conference between May and November, 1968. Applicant-type investigation by this Bureau indicated, while in Paris, he reportedly leaked information to newspaper concerning happenings at the peace conference. This apparently was at the beginning of his assignment, and after being warned he discontinued his reported leaks.

Halperin, aged 30, was detailed from the Department of Defense to the National Security Council as a senior staff member on January 21, 1969. He was the subject of an applicant-type investigation by this Bureau. While admittedly he has had contact with Soviet nationals the investigation did not disclose at that time any pertinent derogatory information.

The files of this Bureau contain no identifiable information concerning Colonel Robert Pursley.

Sonnenfeldt, aged 42, was detailed to the National Security Council on January 21, 1969, from the Department of State, where he had been employed in various administrative capacities since 1947. An applicant-type investigation disclosed that during mid 1950's and early 1960's he was suspected of

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Auto. Declass. Guide
4/15/2013 F67M83K21

Group 1

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~TOP SECRET~~

Memorandum for the Attorney General
RE: COLONEL ALEXANDER M. HAIG

leaking classified information to unauthorized sources. Thorough investigations were conducted by Department of State; however, no information was developed indicating he was responsible for leaks.

Colonel Haig is Military Assistant to the Assistant to the President for national security affairs. He was the subject of an applicant-type investigation and no derogatory information was developed concerning him.

This Bureau is in a position to conduct the necessary telephone surveillances requested by Colonel Haig.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED

J. N. Mitchell
_____ →

John N. Mitchell

DATE

5/12/69
_____ →

5/12/69



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

May 20, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL. 61

RE: COLONEL ALEXANDER M. HAIG 2
TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUEST

My memorandum of May 12, 1969, reported that Colonel Alexander M. Haig, who is assigned to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger's staff, advised this Bureau that a request for telephone surveillances was being made on the highest authority which involved a matter of most grave and serious consequence to our national security. He stressed that because of its sensitive nature, it should be handled on a need-to-know basis, with no record maintained. In response to his request, you authorized telephone surveillances on Daniel Y. Davidson, Morton H. Halberin, Colonel Robert Pursley, and Helmut Sonnenfeldt.

On May 20, 1969, Colonel Haig presented an additional request advising that it was also being made on the highest authority in connection with the same sensitive matter. He requested that telephone surveillances be placed on Richard M. Moose and Richard Lee Sneider, both of whom are on the staff of the National Security Council.

Mr. Moose is aged 37 and served as a staff member with the National Security Council, Washington, D. C., from August, 1966, to March, 1968. From March, 1968, to January, 1969, he was a member of the research staff of the Institute for Defense Analysis, Arlington, Virginia. Since January, 1969, he has again been serving as a staff member of the National Security Council. Applicant-type investigations by this Bureau in 1966 and in 1969 disclosed no unfavorable information of a security nature concerning him.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Downgraded to Secret~~
Per Auto Declass Guide
4/15/2013 F67M83K21

Group 1
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Memorandum for the Attorney General
RE: COLONEL ALEXANDER M. HAIG

Mr. Sneider is aged 46 and was employed from 1948 to January, 1969, by the Department of State. He is currently on the staff of the National Security Council. Applicant-type investigations were conducted by this Bureau concerning him in 1951, 1961, and in 1969. The investigations disclosed no pertinent derogatory information of a security nature.

Mr. Moose resides at 2313 Glasgow Road, Alexandria, Virginia, and Mr. Sneider resides at 10701 Weymouth Street, Garrett Park, Maryland.

This Bureau is in a position to conduct the necessary telephone surveillances requested by Colonel Haig.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED

J. N. Mitchell

John N. Mitchell

DATE

5/20/69

5/20/69

6 P.M. - 5/20

Court Jones, WFO, was advised Bur desired confi coverage of Sneider and Moose to be installed as soon as possible

JAS



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

May 29, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: COLONEL ALEXANDER M. HAIG
TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUEST

My memoranda of May 12, 1969, and May 20, 1969, reported that Colonel Alexander M. Haig, who is assigned to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger's staff, advised this Bureau that a request for telephone surveillances was being made on the highest authority which involved a matter of most grave and serious consequence to our national security. He stressed that because of its sensitive nature, it should be handled on a need-to-know basis, with no record maintained. In response to his request, you authorized the requested telephone surveillances.

On May 28, 1969, Colonel Haig presented an additional request in connection with the same sensitive matter. He requested that a telephone surveillance be placed on Henry Brandon.

Brandon resides at 3501 Rodman Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., and is with "The London Sunday Times." Recently he has been telephonically in contact with Morton H. Halperin, on whom you authorized a telephone surveillance in captioned case. Brandon is a naturalized British citizen of Czechoslovakian descent and was stationed in Moscow. He is extremely active in Washington and has developed very sensitive high level contacts. From World War II, when he served in the United States, to the present, he has reportedly been associated WITH A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. It has been learned by this Bureau THAT THIS FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY has been and reportedly still is penetrated by the Soviets.

If you approve, a telephone surveillance will be placed by this Bureau on Brandon.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED

→ John N. Mitchell

DATE

→ 5/29/69

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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4/15/013 F67M83K21

~~TOP SECRET~~

Unauthorized Disclosure

GROUP 1

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

June 4, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: COLONEL ALEXANDER M. HAIG
TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUEST

63

My memorandum of May 29, 1969, as did two previous memoranda, reported that Colonel Alexander M. Haig, who is assigned to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger's staff; advised this Bureau that a request for telephone surveillances was being made on the highest authority which involved a matter of most grave and serious consequence to our national security. He stressed that because of its sensitive nature, it should be handled on a need-to-know basis, with no record maintained. You authorized the requested telephone surveillances.

On this date Dr. Kissinger has requested that a telephone surveillance be placed on Hedrick L. Smith, who is also known as Rick Smith. He is a correspondent with "The New York Times" and has been in contact with the individuals on whom telephone surveillances have been placed. He resides at 3409 Patterson Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., and has telephone number 363-7530. The files of this Bureau contain no pertinent information of an internal security nature concerning him.

Upon your approval, a telephone surveillance will be placed on Hedrick L. Smith at his residence.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED _____ → John N. Mitchell

DATE 6/11/69 → 6/4/69

Downgraded to Secret per
Auto Declass Guide
4/15/2013 F67M83Ka1

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
~~TOP SECRET~~ Unauthorized Disclosure
GROUP 1 Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Excluded from automatic
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declassification



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

July 23, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: JOHN PATRICK SEARS
TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUEST

This will confirm your conversation with Assistant to the Director Cartha D. DeLoach on July 22, 1969, during which you advised that a telephone surveillance was desired on Sears who resides in Apartment 10, 8001 Chanute Place, Falls Church, Virginia.

A survey is being conducted to determine the feasibility of instituting a telephone surveillance on Sears. If you approve, a telephone surveillance will be placed by this Bureau on him.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED

John N. Mitchell

John N. Mitchell

DATE

7/23/69 → 7/23/69

Higher Authority has requested that this be done immediately for use prior to Thursday.

Downgraded to Secret per
Auto Declass Guide
4/15/2013
FL7M83K21

~~TOP SECRET~~
GROUP 1

Higher authority has requested that this be done immediately for use prior to Thursday.

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

65

August 4, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: COLONEL ALEXANDER M. HAIG
TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUEST

Previous memoranda have requested and you have approved telephone surveillances requested by Colonel Alexander M. Haig, who is assigned to the staff of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger of the White House.

Colonel Haig has now presented an additional request advising that it is being made on the highest authority in connection with the same sensitive matter. He requested that a telephone surveillance be placed on William L. Safire of the White House staff.

Safire resides at 6200 Elmwood Road, Kenwood, Maryland, and has unlisted telephone number 652-7374.

Recently, Safire was in contact with Henry Brandon, correspondent for the "London Sunday Times," on whom you previously authorized a telephone surveillance in this case. Safire agreed to advise Brandon in advance of the contents of a speech to be made in the future by the President.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED:

J. N. Mitchell → John N. Mitchell

DATE:

8/4/69 → ~~TOP SECRET~~ → 8/4/69

Downgraded to secret
Per Auto Declass. Guide
4/15/2013 F67M83K21

GROUP 1 NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Excluded from automatic downgrading and
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Subject to Criminal Sanctions



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

September 10, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: MARVIN LEONARD KALB

Pursuant to your request, a telephone surveillance will be placed on captioned individual upon receipt of your written approval.

Kalb is a correspondent in Washington, D. C., for the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS). He has previously worked abroad for CBS in several countries, including the Soviet Union. During April, 1967, a Hungarian defector advised that Kalb was a contact for recruitment by Hungarian Intelligence Service; however, contacts with him were discontinued when it was determined that the Soviets had special interest in him and planned to recruit him.

During interview in October, 1967, by Agents of this Bureau, he readily volunteered information concerning his contacts with Soviet-bloc personnel, but indicated he was not aware that any of them might have had intelligence significance, but if such should occur he would promptly contact the FBI.

Available information indicates that Kalb resides at 3155 Upland Terrace, N. W., Washington, D. C. This Bureau will place a telephone surveillance at his residence upon receipt of your written approval. In view of the sensitive nature of this investigation, no record is being made concerning the coverage and it is requested that this memorandum be returned upon approval.

Respectfully,


J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED _____ → John N. Mitchell

DATE _____ → 9/11/69

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~TOP SECRET~~



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

May 4, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM H. SULLIVAN
BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUEST

On the evening of May 2, 1970, Brigadier General Alexander M. Haig, of the National Security Council Staff, advised that a serious security leak had occurred concerning United States involvement in Cambodia. He requested that as soon as possible a telephone surveillance be instituted, if feasible, on the residence and office of Ambassador William H. Sullivan.

A survey is being conducted to determine if it is feasible to install a telephone surveillance on him. If it is determined to be feasible and you approve, this installation will be placed by this Bureau.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Approved:

John A. Butcher

Date:

5/4/70

Downgraded to ~~Secret~~ per
Auto Declass Guide
4/15/2013
FG7M83K21


~~TOP SECRET~~

Group 1

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declassification

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions



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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

May 4, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: WILLIAM BEECHER
"THE NEW YORK TIMES"
TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUEST

On the evening of May 2, 1970, Brigadier General Alexander M. Haig, of the National Security Council Staff, advised that a serious security leak had occurred concerning United States involvement in Cambodia. He requested that as soon as possible a telephone surveillance be instituted, if feasible, on the residence and office of Mr. William Beecher.

A survey is being conducted to determine if it is feasible to install a telephone surveillance on him. If it is determined to be feasible and you approve, this installation will be placed by this Bureau.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

Approved: *John A. Anderson*

Date: 5/4/70

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4/15/2013
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

May 4, 1970

b7

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: AMBASSADOR RICHARD F. PEDERSEN
COUNSELOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUEST

On the evening of May 2, 1970, Brigadier General Alexander M. Haig, of the National Security Council Staff, advised that a serious security leak had occurred concerning United States involvement in Cambodia. He requested that as soon as possible a telephone surveillance be instituted, if feasible, on the residence and office of Ambassador Richard F. Pedersen.

A survey is being conducted to determine if it is feasible to install a telephone surveillance on him. If it is determined to be feasible and you approve, this installation will be placed by this Bureau.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

Approved:

John Mitchell

Date:

5/4/70


~~TOP SECRET~~

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Downgraded to secret per
Auto Declass Guide
4/15/2013
F67M83K21

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

10
May 4, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT E. PURSLEY
MILITARY ASSISTANT TO THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUEST

On the evening of May 2, 1970, Brigadier General Alexander M. Haig, of the National Security Council Staff, advised that a serious security leak had occurred concerning United States involvement in Cambodia. He requested that as soon as possible a telephone surveillance be instituted, if feasible, on the residence and office of Brigadier General Robert E. Pursley.

A survey is being conducted to determine if it is feasible to install a telephone surveillance on him. If it is determined to be feasible and you approve, this installation will be placed by this Bureau.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

Approved: *J. L. [Signature]*

Date: 5/4/70

~~TOP SECRET~~

Group 1

Excluded from automatic
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declassification

Downgraded to secret per
Auto Declass Guide
4/15/2013
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

May 13, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: WILLIAM ANTHONY K. LAKE
TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUEST

On May 12, 1970, Brigadier General Alexander M. Haig of the National Security Council Staff, advised that Dr. Henry A. Kissinger of the White House staff, had requested that as soon as possible a telephone surveillance be instituted on the home of William Anthony K. Lake of the National Security Council Staff.

A survey has been conducted and it has determined that the installation of this telephone surveillance is feasible. If you approve, this installation will be placed by this Bureau.

Respectfully,

[Handwritten signature]
John Edgar Hoover
Director


APPROVED *[Handwritten signature]*
DATE 5/13/70

~~TOP SECRET~~

Group 1
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downgrading and
declassification

*Downgraded to Secret per
Auto Declass Guide
4/16/2013
F67M83K21*

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions



18

October 16, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: SPECIAL COVERAGE AT THE
REQUEST OF THE WHITE HOUSE

The Honorable H. R. Haldeman, Assistant to the President, has requested that the telephone surveillance on Helmut Sonnenfeldt be reinstated.

Sonnenfeldt is an employee of the U. S. Department of State. You previously approved a telephone surveillance of him on May 12, 1969, which was discontinued on June 20, 1969.

This Bureau is in a position to conduct the necessary telephone surveillance requested by Mr. Haldeman.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED

John A. ...
10/19/70

DATE

~~TOP SECRET~~

GROUP 1

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downgrading and
declassification

*Downgraded to Secret Per
Auto Declass. Guide
4/15/2013
FL7M8SK21*

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

13

December 14, 1970

14

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: SPECIAL COVERAGE AT THE REQUEST OF THE WHITE HOUSE

The Honorable H. R. Haldeman, Assistant to the President, has requested that the Bureau institute a telephone surveillance on the home telephone of Jamie W. McLane, 5605 Overlea Road, Sumner, Maryland.

This Bureau is in a position to conduct the necessary telephone surveillance requested by Mr. Haldeman.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED *J. A. [Signature]*
DATE 12/14/70

Downgraded to ~~Secret~~ per
Auto Declass Guide
4/15/2013
F67M83K21

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Group 1

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declassification

Dissemination of Material From the Surveillance
Known as the "Kissinger 17"

Set out below is a listing of letters addressed to persons outside the FBI and intra-Bureau communications recommending such dissemination of the letters outside the FBI. The list also contains the dates of the letter or communication in question as well as the author of the letter or communication.

The purpose of each of the communications to persons outside the FBI was to inform the addressee of information from the electronic surveillance deemed pertinent to the objective of the surveillance.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ADDRESSEE</u>	<u>AUTHOR</u>
5/28/69	Henry A. Kissinger	Bernard A. Wells (BAW)
5/28/69	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	William C. Sullivan (WCS)
5/29/69	Henry A. Kissinger	BAW
5/29/69	Richard M. Nixon	BAW
5/29/69	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
7/10/69	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	BAW
7/10/69	Richard M. Nixon	BAW
7/10/69	Henry A. Kissinger	BAW
7/14/69	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	BAW
7/14/69	Richard M. Nixon	BAW

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized persons without the express approval of the FBI.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ADDRESSEE</u>	<u>AUTHOR</u>
7/14/69	Henry A. Kissinger	BAW
7/15/69	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
7/15/69	Richard M. Nixon	WCS
7/15/69	Henry A. Kissinger	WCS
7/15/69	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
7/15/69	Richard M. Nixon	WCS
7/15/69	Henry A. Kissinger	WCS
7/18/69	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
7/18/69	Richard M. Nixon	WCS
7/18/69	Henry A. Kissinger	WCS
7/25/69	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
7/25/69	Henry A. Kissinger	WCS
7/25/69	The Attorney General	Joseph A. Sizoo (JAS)
7/25/69	John D. Ehrlichman	JAS
7/25/69	Richard M. Nixon	WCS
7/28/69	John D. Ehrlichman	JAS
7/28/69	The Attorney General	JAS
7/28/69	John D. Ehrlichman	JAS
7/28/69	The Attorney General	JAS

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ADDRESSEE</u>	<u>AUTHOR</u>
7/29/69	John D. Ehrlichman	JAS
7/29/69	The Attorney General	JAS
7/31/69	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
7/31/69	Richard M. Nixon	WCS
7/31/69	Henry A. Kissinger	WCS
7/31/69	John D. Ehrlichman	JAS
7/31/69	The Attorney General	JAS
8/1/69	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
8/1/69	Henry A. Kissinger	WCS
8/1/69	Richard N. Nixon	WCS
8/1/69	John D. Ehrlichman	JAS
8/1/69	The Attorney General	JAS
8/4/69	John D. Ehrlichman	JAS
8/4/69	The Attorney General	JAS
8/6/69	The Attorney General	JAS
8/6/69	The Attorney General	JAS
8/6/69	John D. Ehrlichman	JAS
8/7/69	John D. Ehrlichman	JAS
8/7/69	The Attorney General	JAS

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ADDRESSEE</u>	<u>AUTHOR</u>
8/8/69	John D. Ehrlichman	JAS
8/8/69	The Attorney General	JAS
8/13/69	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
8/13/69	Richard M. Nixon	WCS
8/13/69	Henry A. Kissinger	WCS
8/14/69	John D. Ehrlichman	JAS
8/14/69	The Attorney General	JAS
8/22/69	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
8/22/69	Richard M. Nixon	WCS
8/22/69	Henry A. Kissinger	WCS
8/25/69	John D. Ehrlichman	JAS
8/25/69	The Attorney General	JAS
9/3/69	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
9/3/69	Richard M. Nixon	WCS
9/3/69	Henry A. Kissinger	WCS
9/5/69	John D. Ehrlichman	JAS

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ADDRESSEE</u>	<u>AUTHOR</u>
9/5/69	The Attorney General	JAS
9/8/69	The Attorney General	JAS
9/18/69	John D. Ehrlichman ..	JAS
9/18/69	The Attorney General	JAS
9/22/69	John D. Ehrlichman	JAS
9/22/69	The Attorney General	JAS
9/30/69	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	JAS
9/30/69	Henry A. Kissinger	JAS
9/30/69	Richard M. Nixon	JAS
10/9/69	Henry A. Kissinger	WCS
10/9/69	Richard M. Nixon	WCS
10/9/69	The Attorney General	JAS
10/10/69	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
10/10/69	Richard M. Nixon	WCS
10/10/69	Henry A. Kissinger	WCS
10/13/69	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
10/13/69	Henry A. Kissinger	WCS

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ADDRESSEE</u>	<u>AUTHOR</u>
10/13/69	Richard M. Nixon	WCS
10/13/69	The Attorney General	WCS
10/24/69	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
10/24/69	Richard M. Nixon	WCS
10/24/69	Henry A. Kissinger	WCS
10/28/69	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
10/28/69	Richard M. Nixon	WCS
10/28/69	Henry A. Kissinger	WCS
11/4/69	The Attorney General	JAS
11/6/69	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
11/6/69	Richard M. Nixon	WCS
11/6/69	Henry A. Kissinger	WCS
11/7/69	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
11/7/69	Henry A. Kissinger	WCS
11/7/69	Richard M. Nixon	WCS
11/14/69	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
11/14/69	Richard M. Nixon	WCS
11/14/69	Henry A. Kissinger	WCS

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ADDRESSEE</u>	<u>AUTHOR</u>
11/17/69	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
11/17/69	Richard M. Nixon	WCS
11/17/69	Henry A. Kissinger	WCS
12/2/69	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
12/2/69	Henry A. Kissinger	WCS
12/2/69	Richard M. Nixon	WCS
12/2/69	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
12/3/69	Henry A. Kissinger	WCS
12/3/69	Richard M. Nixon	WCS
12/18/69	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
12/18/69	Richard M. Nixon	WCS
12/18/69	Henry A. Kissinger	WCS
12/29/69	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	JAS
12/29/69	Henry A. Kissinger	JAS
12/29/69	Richard M. Nixon	JAS
12/29/69	The Attorney General	JAS
12/30/69	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
12/31/69	Richard M. Nixon	WCS

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ADDRESSEE</u>	<u>AUTHOR</u>
12/31/69	Henry A. Kissinger	WCS
1/15/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
1/15/70	Henry A. Kissinger	WCS
1/15/70	Richard M. Nixon	WCS
1/21/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
1/21/70	Henry A. Kissinger	WCS
1/21/70	Richard M. Nixon	WCS
2/2/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
2/2/70	Richard M. Nixon	WCS
2/2/70	Henry A. Kissinger	WCS
2/17/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
2/17/70	Henry A. Kissinger	WCS
2/17/70	The President	WCS
2/26/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
2/27/70	Henry A. Kissinger	WCS
2/27/70	The President	WCS
5/4/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
5/4/70	The Attorney General	WCS

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ADDRESSEE</u>	<u>AUTHOR</u>
5/4/70	The President	WCS
5/4/70	Henry A. Kissinger	WCS
5/8/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
5/8/70	The President	WCS
5/8/70	Henry A. Kissinger	WCS
5/11/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
5/11/70	The President	WCS
5/11/70	Henry A. Kissinger	WCS
5/12/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
5/12/70	Henry A. Kissinger	WCS
5/12/70	The President	WCS
5/14/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
5/14/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
5/18/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
5/18/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
5/18/70	H. R. Haldeman	John Edgar Hoover
5/18/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
5/18/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ADDRESSEE</u>	<u>AUTHOR</u>
5/21/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
5/21/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
5/26/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	JAS
5/26/70	H. R. Haldeman	JAS
5/28/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
5/28/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
5/2/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
5/2/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
5/9/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
5/9/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
6/11/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
6/11/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
6/15/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
6/15/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
6/18/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
6/19/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
6/22/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ADDRESSEE</u>	<u>AUTHOR</u>
6/23/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
6/25/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
6/25/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
6/25/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	WCS
6/25/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
6/29/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	C. D. Brennan(CDB)
6/29/70	H. R. Haldeman	CDB
7/2/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	CDB
7/6/70	H. R. Haldeman	CDB
7/7/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	JAS
7/7/70	H. R. Haldeman	
7/8/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	JAS
7/8/70	H. R. Haldeman	JAS
7/10/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach	JAS
7/10/70	H. R. Haldeman	JAS
8/13/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. Tolson	WCS
8/13/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
9/3/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. Tolson	WCS

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ADDRESSEE</u>	<u>AUTHOR</u>
9/4/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
9/11/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. Tolson	WCS
9/11/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
9/22/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. Tolson	WCS
9/22/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
9/25/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. Tolson	WCS
9/28/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
10/13/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. Tolson	WCS
10/14/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
10/19/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. Tolson	WCS
10/20/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
10/23/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. Tolson	WCS
10/23/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
10/28/70	Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. Tolson	WCS
10/29/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
11/3/70	Henry A. Kissinger	WCS
11/13/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
11/19/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ADDRESSEE</u>	<u>AUTHOR</u>
11/24/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
12/11/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
12/15/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
12/15/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
12/16/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
12/17/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
12/17/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
12/17/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
12/18/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
12/19/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
12/22/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
12/28/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
12/30/70	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
1/5/71	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
1/7/71	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
1/12/71	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
1/18/71	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
1 /19/71	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
1/22/71	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
1/27/71	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
1/29/71	H. R. Haldeman	WCS
2/10/71	H. R. Haldeman	WCS

IV. DEMONSTRATION AT FEDERAL BUILDING
AKRON, OHIO, JANUARY 27, 1975

May 1, 1975

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

RE: DEMONSTRATION AT FEDERAL BUILDING,
AKRON, OHIO, JANUARY 27, 1975

Reference is made to letter dated April 10, 1975, to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned subcommittee. Item two on page two of this letter refers to an attachment setting forth questions to which Congressman John F. Seiberling requested responses concerning FBI participation in the demonstration referenced above.

Prior to the actual questions, a description of events surrounding this demonstration was set forth, which had been provided by Congressman Seiberling during questions asked of FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley during the hearing on the oversight of the FBI held on February 27, 1975. Congressman Seiberling's summary as set forth is considered accurate, with the following exceptions:

In connection with the statement, "At some point during January, 1975, there was a bomb threat against the new Federal Office Building in Akron," the Cleveland Office of the FBI, which is the headquarters office of the FBI Resident Agency at Akron, Ohio, has advised a review of its records fails to indicate that any information concerning a bomb threat against the Federal Building in Akron was received during January, 1975, and no action taken by the FBI regarding this demonstration was related to any bomb threat.

Concerning the statement, "On January 27, a group of six to eight people demonstrated outside the building against continued U. S. assistance to South Vietnam," it is noted that FBI records indicate approximately 15 persons participated in the demonstration.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

**Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights
of the House Committee on the Judiciary**

Responses to the aforementioned questions are set forth below and appear in the same order as posed.

1. The FBI conducts surveillances of demonstrations occurring on or near Federal property; at other locations when facts indicate a violation of Federal statutes over which the FBI has investigative jurisdiction may occur; or at a site where individuals of investigative interest to the FBI are present or the demonstration is sponsored by an organization of investigative interest. In this instance, the FBI had received information from a source, who has provided reliable information in the past, that an organization of investigative interest to the FBI would be attempting to gain publicity by entering the Federal Building in Akron, creating disturbances and defacing Federal property. This organization has been determined to be influenced by a separate organization which espouses a basic Marxist-Leninist-Maoist revolutionary ideology. Investigation of both of these organizations is based on information which indicates they may be engaged in activities which could involve violations of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2383 (Rebellion or Insurrection), 2384 (Seditious Conspiracy), 2385 (Advocating Overthrow of Government), and 2387 (Sedition). In addition, inasmuch as the possibility existed individuals present at the demonstration would attempt to deface Federal property, there was reason to believe a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1361 (Destruction of Government Property) could occur. At a later date, additional information was received from a second source, who has provided reliable information in the past, that the demonstration at the Federal Building in Akron would be to protest United States involvement in Southeast Asia, and leaflets urging support of this demonstration were being distributed in the Akron-Kent, Ohio, area. In keeping with existing FBI policy, the Akron Police Department and the General Services Administration Building Manager in charge of the Akron Federal Building were notified of the impending demonstration and of information received indicating a possibility that disruptive activity would occur during the demonstration.

Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights
of the House Committee on the Judiciary

Surveillance in this case was not related to any bomb threat; however, based on the information stated above, there was reason for the FBI to suspect that there might be violations of Federal statutes over which the FBI has investigative jurisdiction. In the event such violations did occur, it would be necessary that Agents be present to gather the necessary evidence.

The FBI did have an interest relating to the identities of the particular individuals who were involved in organizing the demonstration. One such individual, who played a key role in plans to cause disruptive activity and in organizing the demonstration, has been arrested and convicted for abuse to a police officer, resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, trespassing, and disrupting lawful assembly in the past and has been described by a source, who has provided reliable information in the past, to have indicated in the past a desire to "get something going with the police." This same individual is also considered by the source to be unstable and violence-prone. In addition, the individuals planning the demonstration, as previously mentioned, were affiliated with an organization which follows a revolutionary ideology.

2. There were no known violations of Federal or local statutes during the demonstration; there was no violence; and there were no arrests as a result of the demonstration. Both visual and photographic surveillances were conducted by the FBI during the demonstration. Current FBI instructions state that photographic surveillances should be considered on a selective basis when circumstances indicate they may be productive. The decision-making authority in such a matter is vested in the Special Agent in Charge of the particular headquarters field office of the FBI, his assistant in his absence, or the Agent supervisor acting on their behalf in the absence of both. In the event unusual circumstances exist, the Special Agent in Charge of a particular field office would request authority from FBI Headquarters in Washington, D. C., to conduct a photographic surveillance. Photographs were taken for the possible evidentiary purpose of recording anticipated events leading to the perpetration of an act by one or more demonstrators in violation of the Federal statute concerning destruction of Government property, as well as recording on film any overt act. FBI Agents observed the demonstration for the same reason and for the additional purpose of effecting, if necessary, the arrests of individuals violating Federal statutes.

**Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights
of the House Committee on the Judiciary**

Both prints and negatives of photographs taken by the FBI have been maintained, from the time processed, as exhibits in records of the FBI's Cleveland Office. The film was developed because, among the approximately 15 demonstrators present outside the Akron Federal Building, Agents recognized five individuals known to be affiliated with the organization in which the FBI had investigative interest. In the event photographs depicting these individuals were of better quality than existing photographs, the improved ones would be, in accordance with FBI policy and in line with an agreement between the FBI and the Secret Service concerning Presidential protection, forwarded to the Secret Service for possible future use by that agency in connection with its responsibilities. The photographs obtained, however, were not suitable for this purpose.

Prints of these photographs were not made available to the Akron Police Department, were not forwarded to FBI Headquarters in Washington, D. C., and were not made available to anyone else. These prints were not retained at the Akron FBI Resident Agency, but were sent to the Cleveland FBI Office and are maintained in the files of that office.

3. The Akron FBI Resident Agency did make an attempt to identify the unknown participants in the demonstration from the photographs taken during the demonstration. Information concerning the identities of some of the demonstrators was provided by the Akron Resident Agency to the Intelligence Division, Akron Police Department, for the purpose of bringing to their attention the identities of those individual participants who have been involved in disruptive activities in the past and who may become so involved again in the future. One of the individuals so identified to the Akron Police Department has reportedly urged "spontaneous violence" at a demonstration in the past.

Files of the FBI are not maintained at the Resident Agency level; therefore, information concerning the identities of some of the demonstrators has been placed and is being maintained in the files of the Cleveland FBI Office.

Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights
of the House Committee on the Judiciary

4. It is believed the FBI should retain photographs and information gathered concerning the identities of demonstrators following a demonstration in which the presence of the FBI is justified, even though such demonstration ends peacefully with no arrests and no violations of either Federal or local statutes. In the few selective instances in which demonstrations have been photographed, a substantive reason has existed justifying the use of photography. In this instance, photography was utilized in anticipation of commission of a Federal offense and in connection with the investigation of an organization, and individuals affiliated therewith, on whom the FBI was conducting investigation under the statutes mentioned herein.

Additionally, information of this nature is maintained in accordance with the records retention plan furnished the FBI by the National Archives and Records Service during 1959. This plan identified categories of records which were considered to have a permanent value and which should be retained indefinitely by the FBI. Included were those records involving crimes of treason, insurrection or rebellion, sedition, subversion, sabotage, espionage, counterintelligence and related internal security functions.

V. ELECTRONIC DEVICES

Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: SEP 27 1966

FROM : *W* Fred M. Vinson, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

75

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SUBJECT: ~~X~~ Electronic Devices

In recent months the Department has been confronted with serious problems concerning the prospective or continued prosecution of individuals who have been the subject of prior electronic surveillance. These problems have sometimes arisen comparatively late in the investigative or prosecutive process. For example, we recently were forced to close an important investigation involving major gambling figures in Miami because we were advised that the evidence necessary to obtain a conviction was tainted. In other cases the problem arose after indictment (United States v. Davis, United States v. John Drew) or in the appellate stage after trial (United States v. Black; United States v. Kolod).

In view of these experiences, it appears necessary and desirable that the Department have full knowledge of the extent of any device problem at as early a stage of preparation for prosecution as possible in order to determine whether a particular case may or may not be tainted or what responses will be necessary with respect to a motion under Rule 16 to produce statements.

Accordingly, I feel it is imperative for us to establish between the Bureau and the Department (and perhaps United States Attorneys in cases of direct referral) some sort of "early warning" system. This may require the Bureau to set up and maintain appropriate indices with respect to electronic surveillance and the materials derived therefrom.

I have discussed this suggestion with the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General. Both feel that the establishment of such indices is necessary. They have suggested that I discuss the details of their establishment with representatives of the Bureau. I should therefore appreciate your designating an individual for this purpose at your earliest convenience.

*Since it is already operating...
The insister demand...
CONFIDENTIAL
This item is already
has been done & all
it is a meticulous
checked.*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. DeLoach

DATE: September 27, 1966

FROM : J. H. Gale

SUBJECT: ELECTRONIC DEVICES

In the attached memorandum from Fred M. Vinson, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, dated September 27, 1966, Vinson suggests it may be necessary and desirable for the Bureau to setup indices of individuals who may have been covered by electronic devices and who may be under consideration for prosecutive action.

The Director has instructed that Vinson be told that such an indices is already in operation and that if he feels the need to consult with any Bureau officials, Mr. DeLoach has been designated to handle the contact. The Director also inquired as to whether the statements in Vinson's letter to the effect that a gambling case had been closed because of prior electronic coverage were correct.

[EXCISONS MADE DUE TO PRIVACY CONSIDERATIONS]

With reference to other statements made in Vinson's letter, we have made available to the Department, wherever requested, pertinent logs of our former confidential coverage. Our indices are adequate to handle any further contact by the Department in this regard. We are so advising Vinson in the attached letter to the Attorney General.

ACTION:

There is attached for approval a letter to the Attorney General with copies to Vinson and to the Deputy Attorney General pointing out we have appropriate indices in operation; indicating

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Memorandum to Mr. DeLoach
Re: Electronic Devices

that we are not always aware of cases in which the Department may have a prosecutive interest; suggesting that the Department should check with us whenever they contemplate prosecutive activity, particularly in tax cases involving organized crime figures and informing the Department that if they desire to further discuss this matter, Mr. DeLoach of the Bureau will be in a position to handle such contacts.

The Attorney General

September 23, 1966

Director, FBI

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ELECTRONIC DEVICES

This will acknowledge receipt of the letter from Assistant Attorney General Vinson dated September 27, 1966, wherein he suggests that it may be advisable for this Bureau to maintain appropriate indices with respect to electronic surveillances and materials derived therefrom. Such indices are already in existence.

With reference to the observation concerning early advice of any electronic device in cases being prepared for prosecution, it should be noted that we are not aware at all times of all cases falling into this category. It would appear, therefore, incumbent on the Department, particularly in tax cases involving organized crime figures, to notify us of those matters which may be under consideration as to prosecution. If, in such matters, you will notify us of any intent as to prosecution, we will be happy to immediately furnish you with any pertinent information.

In the event you desire a Departmental representative to contact the Bureau concerning this matter, please feel free to communicate with Mr. DeLoach who is in a position to discuss this matter.

[EXCISION MADE DUE TO PRIVACY CONSIDERATION]

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Memorandum~~CONFIDENTIAL~~TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: SEP 30 1965

FROM *N*: Fred M. Vinson, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal DivisionSUBJECT: Electronic Devices

This is in reference to your memorandum of September 28 to the Attorney General concerning information developed through electronic surveillance devices. I am pleased to learn that the Bureau maintains indices on such information which will be available to Department attorneys. However, to make effective use of such records, I believe we should know how any such index is constituted. Specifically, it would be helpful to know whether or not there is a central index which will permit a rapid determination as to whether any given person was overheard, present, or referred to in the course of a conversation.

I assume that in all cases investigated by the Bureau you will advise the appropriate Division of the Department as early as possible concerning information derived from an electronic surveillance bearing on the case or any person involved in that case. We would, of course, propose to set up machinery to advise the Bureau promptly of our interest in any case which is being investigated by another agency.

We look forward to a discussion of the general problem with Mr. DeLoach, but feel that such a discussion will be more fruitful after we understand the nature and extent of your index system and can evaluate its impact on our operations.

Thank you for your cooperation.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Attorney General

October 3, 1966

Director, FBI

71
ELECTRONIC DEVICES

This will acknowledge Assistant Attorney General Vinson's memorandum of September 30, 1966, wherein he requested information with respect to the maintenance of Bureau indices which will permit a determination as to whether persons of interest to the Department were subject of the Bureau's electronic coverage.

With respect to Mr. Vinson's inquiry, it is pointed out that the maintenance of these indices is a mechanical and clerical function which it is not felt is particularly germane to the Department's purposes. It is believed sufficient to know that upon receiving a request, the Bureau will in a reasonable length of time be able to provide the Department with information as to whether or not a given person was overheard, was present or was referred to in any conversation covered by one of the Bureau's devices.

May I again suggest that Mr. Vinson feel free to contact Mr. DeLoach in the event any discussion is desired relative to this matter.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

1 - Mr. Fred M. Vinson, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 10/4/66

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: MICROPHONE AND TELEPHONE
SURVEILLANCES

In accordance with the Director's instructions, there is attached a teletype to all field offices which have had microphone and telephone surveillances at any time since January, 1960.

The teletype instructs that by 10/31/66, each office is to transmit to the Bureau names of all individuals whose voices have been monitored through a microphone installation or through a telephone surveillance operated by the office at any time since 1/1/60. These include all types of electronic devices such as those carried on a person or in a car. The review is not to be limited to subjects of instant surveillance but is to include any and all individuals whose conversations, however slight, were monitored.

In order to make certain that every individual's name is submitted to the Bureau, field offices are being instructed to review all microphone and telephone surveillance logs and records. Thereafter, a 3 by 5 card must be prepared on each person whose voice was monitored. The cards will show the name of the individual monitored, the initial date of monitoring, and the identity of the subject on whom the installation was placed, plus identity of the office.

If a voice was monitored through a particular installation on more than one occasion, only one card need be submitted; however, if the voice was monitored through more than one installation, a separate card must be submitted identifying each installation. Those pertaining to criminal investigations will be sent to the attention of Assistant Director J. H. Gale and all others to me.

Each office is to advise the Bureau by airtel every Friday the progress being made and the estimated time of

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Memorandum to Mr. DeLoach
Re: MICROPHONE AND TELEPHONE
SURVEILLANCES

completion. Thereafter, offices having current telephone and microphone surveillances will submit to the Bureau each Friday names of additional individuals monitored.

This matter will be closely followed and you will be advised of progress being made to complete this project by 10/31/66.

RECOMMENDATION:

The attached teletype be sent to all offices having had microphone or telephone surveillances since 1/1/60.

10/5/66

CODE

TELETYPE

DEFERRED

TO ALL SACS EXCEPT ANCHORAGE MEMPHIS
EL PASO MOBILE
COLUMBIA OMAHA
EL PASO PORTLAND
HONOLULU SALT LAKE CITY

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

MICROPHONE AND TELEPHONE SURVEILLANCES

EACH OFFICE SUBMIT TO BUREAU BY OCTOBER THIRTY-ONE, NEXT, NAMES OF ALL INDIVIDUALS WHOSE VOICES HAVE BEEN MONITORED THROUGH A MICROPHONE INSTALLATION OR A TELEPHONE SURVEILLANCE OPERATED BY THE OFFICE ANYTIME SINCE JANUARY ONE, ONE NINE SIX ZERO. THESE INCLUDE MONITORING BY ALL TYPES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES SUCH AS THOSE CARRIED ON A PERSON OR IN A CAR. NAMES ARE NOT TO BE LIMITED TO SUBJECTS OF INSTANT SURVEILLANCE BUT ARE TO INCLUDE ANY AND ALL INDIVIDUALS WHOSE CONVERSATIONS, HOWEVER SLIGHT, WERE MONITORED.

IN ORDER TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT EVERY INDIVIDUAL'S NAME IS SUBMITTED TO THE BUREAU, A REVIEW OF ALL SUCH MICROPHONE

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

TELETYPE TO ALL BACS EXCEPT AN, BT, CO, EP, HF, HX, LO, OH,
PD, AND SU
MICROPHONE AND TELEPHONE SURVEILLANCES

AND TELEPHONE SURVEILLANCE LOGS AND RECORDS MUST BE MADE.

HEREAFTER, A THREE BY FIVE CARD MUST BE PREPARED ON EACH
INDIVIDUAL WHOSE VOICE WAS MONITORED. IN ADDITION TO THE NAME
OF THE INDIVIDUAL, THE CARD MUST SHOW, BEGINNING WITH JANUARY ONE,
ONE NINE SIX ZERO, THE INITIAL DATE HIS VOICE WAS MONITORED AND
THE IDENTITY OF THE SUBJECT ON WHOM THE INSTALLATION WAS PLACED ^{BY} OFFICE
IF AN INDIVIDUAL'S VOICE WAS MONITORED ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION
THROUGH A PARTICULAR INSTALLATION, ONLY ONE CARD NEED BE SUBMITTED
IDENTIFYING THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE INSTALLATION. HOWEVER, IF HIS
VOICE WAS MONITORED THROUGH MORE THAN ONE INSTALLATION, A SEPARATE
CARD MUST BE SUBMITTED IDENTIFYING EACH SEPARATE INSTALLATION.
THOSE CARDS PERTAINING TO CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS SHOULD BE SENT
ATTENTION OF ASSISTANT DIRECTOR J. H. GALE AND ALL OTHERS TO
ATTENTION OF ASSISTANT DIRECTOR W. C. SULLIVAN.

ADVISE BUREAU BY AIRTEL ON EACH FRIDAY PROGRESS BEING MADE
AND ESTIMATE OF TIME TO COMPLETE. HEREAFTER, OFFICES HAVING
CURRENT TELEPHONE AND MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCES, SUBMIT TO THE
BUREAU EACH FRIDAY NAMES OF ADDITIONAL INDIVIDUALS MONITORED.

10/21/66

Airtel

82

To: All SACs

From: Director FBI,

MICROPHONE AND TELEPHONE SURVEILLANCES

ReButel of 10/5/66 instructing that the Bureau be furnished index cards containing certain information, such as names of all individuals whose voices have been monitored since 1/1/60 through microphone installations or telephone surveillances.

It has been noted that several of the offices which have submitted cards failed to set forth on the card the name of the office involved. Offices receiving this communication make certain that the office is identified on each card.

In the event you find that retention of a duplicate card may be of value to your office, you are authorized to establish an indices of such cards. It is to be noted such an indices would be a means of ready reference to those offices which have currently in use telephone surveillances, since names of individuals monitored in the future can be checked against cards in your possession to determine if the Bureau has been previously furnished a card.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. DeLoach

DATE: November 10, 1966

FROM : J. H. Gale

SUBJECT: MICROPHONE AND TELEPHONE SURVEILLANCES

In connection with problems arising out of past electronic surveillance coverage of individuals now under prosecution, or against whom prosecution is being contemplated, the Department, as you know, made a general request that we establish an "early warning system" in the form of an index or other administrative device to enable a check to be made to determine if we have so monitored the voices of such individuals. The Department was advised that we had such a system in operation.

In line with the Department's requirements, this index, which is now in operation, is made up of names of individuals whose voices were monitored by microphone surveillances, technical surveillances, or other similar electronic listening devices since January, 1960.

As you know, the Department has recently forwarded a list of 151 names of individuals currently of prosecutive interest in the Tax Division, with a request that these names be checked through our index to determine if they were the subjects of direct electronic surveillance coverage; whether an individual in question appears on any records, logs, notes, memoranda, et cetera, either as a participant in conversations overheard, or as a person mentioned or discussed.

This new and belated category introduced by the Tax Division will require additional work on the part of the field in order that references in this category can be added to the names already included in the index so as to answer any future inquiries from the Tax Division. It should be noted that the Criminal Division has never required any information concerning the names of persons mentioned in microphone logs and has always satisfied themselves with information concerning those whose conversations were actually recorded. This new request appears to

Enc.

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CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. DeLoach
Re: Microphone and Telephone Surveillances

be an additional example of the Tax Division going far beyond what is required by the courts or even by another division of the Department. Nevertheless, in order to answer any inquiries along this line with the dispatch desired, it will be necessary to include in our index the names of persons mentioned in microphone logs.

Attached is a communication to the field divisions involved, alerting those offices to this additional requirement on the part of the Tax Division and instructing those offices to prepare index cards on individuals who are mentioned in monitored conversations.

The field is being instructed to use a certain amount of common sense in recording names in this category inasmuch as there are literally thousands of instances in which a subject covered engages in completely inconsequential conversations in which he may mention the name of a third party. Examples of this would be instructions to a maid or servant to get in touch with a particular merchant or serviceman to handle menial errands such as handling dry cleaning, getting a car washed and like situations. Where a name is mentioned in this way, no purpose is served by including it in this index. We are, of course, following the Director's instructions in connection with furnishing everything of possible pertinence to the Department and allowing Department personnel, not FBI personnel, determine if it is relevant.

ACTION:

Attached for your approval is an airtel to offices involved in the compilation of this index, instructing that cards also be prepared on all individuals who are mentioned or discussed in monitored conversations, except those in the completely inconsequential category cited above, in addition to names of individuals already being included as those whose voices have been monitored.

11/10/66

Airtel

84 2

To: SACs, Albany	Denver	Miami	Richmond
Albuquerque	Detroit	Milwaukee	St. Louis
Atlanta	Houston	Minneapolis	San Antonio
Baltimore	Indianapolis	Newark	San Diego
Birmingham	Jackson	New Haven	San Francisco
Boston	Jacksonville	New Orleans	San Juan
Buffalo	Kansas City	New York City	Savannah
Charlotte	Las Vegas	Norfolk	Seattle
Chicago	Little Rock	Oklahoma City	Springfield
Cincinnati	Los Angeles	Philadelphia	Tampa
Cleveland	Louisville	Phoenix	Washington Field
Dallas	Memphis	Pittsburgh	

From: Director, FBI

MICROPHONE AND TELEPHONE SURVEILLANCES

ReButel 10/5/66 and Buairtel 10/21/66.

In connection with problems arising out of past electronic surveillance coverage of individuals now under prosecution, or against whom prosecution is being contemplated, the Department made a general request that we establish a means of quickly enabling a check to determine if we have monitored the voices of an individual in question by electronic surveillance. In line with the Department's requirements, appropriate instructions were issued in referenced communications.

Since the issuance of the original instructions, the Department has broadened its request for a review of this index and now desires to know also if the individual of prosecutive interest in question appears in our records as a person mentioned or discussed in monitored conversations, though not himself necessarily a participant in such conversations. Therefore, it

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Airtel to Albany

Re: Microphone and Telephone Surveillances

will be necessary that you submit cards also on all individuals in this latter category, that is, those individuals who are mentioned or discussed in monitored conversations, though such individuals may never have appeared personally before any of our electronic surveillances.

In completing this phase of the project, offices must use a certain amount of common sense in recording names in this category inasmuch as there are literally thousands of instances in which a subject covered engages in completely inconsequential conversations in which he may mention the name of a third party. Examples of this would be a subject engaging in conversations in which he mentions the name of a merchant or a serviceman with regard to handling his dry cleaning, running an errand, or getting his car washed. Where a name is mentioned in this way, no purpose is served by including it in this index. Where any doubt arises, it should be resolved in favor of including the name in question in the index.

This additional phase of the project should be completed by 12/15/66.

11/15/66
SAC LETTER 66-72

(G) TECHNICAL AND MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCES -- USE OF INFORMATION FROM ELECTRONIC DEVICES IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS -- The Acting Attorney General by memorandum 493 dated November 3, 1966, has transmitted to all United States Attorneys instructions to be alert as to each prosecutive case for evidence that might be tainted because of the use of electronic devices during the investigation. The instructions require that in the event the United States Attorney believes that there has been wire tapping or other electronic surveillance touching a particular case, he is required to

11/15/66
SAC LETTER 66-72

- 6 -

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

immediately notify Mr. J. Waller Yeagley, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division.

With reference to this subject matter the Bureau is currently handling numerous requests from the Department to check the names of various subjects against the special indices set up at the Bureau on all persons who have been subject of any FBI electronic surveillance. It is expected that any cases questioned by the United States Attorneys and referred to Mr. Yeagley will be given the same examination on the request of the Department.

Although instructions to the United States Attorneys by the Acting Attorney General do not specifically require contact with the various investigative agencies at the field level, it is quite likely that some of our field offices will receive inquiries from the United States Attorneys. In case such inquiries are received by field offices requesting that information obtained from electronic surveillances be furnished, the Bureau should be immediately advised of the request and all pertinent details. No response should be made to the United States Attorneys in such instances without prior Bureau authorization. This procedure is necessary in view of the possibility that the subject of a case may have been in some way covered by an electronic surveillance in a field office not participating in investigation of the prosecutive case in question.

The instructions issued to the United States Attorneys by the Acting Attorney General are as follows:

"You will recall that in May 1966 the Department advised the Supreme Court of facts relating to the case of Black v. United States, October Term, 1965, No. 1029. Its memorandum in that case stated in pertinent part:

'Notwithstanding the Department of Justice's conclusion that the monitoring of conversations between petitioner and his attorney had no effect upon his conviction or the fairness of his trial, we have no doubt that in the circumstances outlined above petitioner is entitled to a judicial determination. We also recognize that petitioner has standing to raise, in a district court, the question whether other conversations (i. e., conversations not involving an attorney-client relationship)

which were overheard as a result of the listening device installed in his suite furnished any leads or evidence in his case. At an appropriate hearing, the government proposes to submit all of the facts upon which a full judicial determination can be made.'

"This Department must never proceed with any investigation or case which includes evidence illegally obtained or the fruits of that evidence. No investigation or case of that character shall go forward until such evidence and all of its fruits have been purged and we are in a position to assure ourselves and the court that there is no taint or unfairness. We must, also, scrupulously avoid any situation in which an intrusion into a confidential relationship would deny a fair hearing to a defendant or person under investigation.

"For this reason we are in the process of requesting each investigative agency concerned to review its files in order to determine whether there has been wiretapping or electronic surveillance touching a particular case or matter. We are making a similar review of cases and matters pending in the Department. You will be informed immediately whenever a case or matter in your office is found to fall in this category.

"Many matters are referred directly to your offices by the investigating agencies. Special attention must be given to these. But, it is imperative that you and your assistants make every effort to ascertain whether any cases, now pending or hereafter received, present the problem of wiretapping or electronic surveillance. No single means of checking is infallible but you should keep in mind that the same person or matter may have been investigated by several Federal or State agencies and the information supplied to you may in fact come from more than one source. You should be particularly attentive to those cases which involve, directly or indirectly, hard core elements of organized crime.

"It is, of course, the very rare case--one out of thousands-- in which you will encounter the problem to which this memorandum is addressed. The problem will arise in cases in which some investigation was conducted prior to July, 1965. Present practice, adopted in July 1965 in confirmity with the policies declared by President Johnson on

June 30, 1965, for the entire Federal establishment, prohibits the installation of listening devices in private areas (as well as the interception of telephone and other wire communications) in all instances other than those involving the collection of intelligence affecting the national security. The specific authorization of the Attorney General must be obtained in each instance when this exception is invoked. Intelligence data so collected will not be available for investigative or litigative purposes.

"If you have any reason whatever to believe that there has been wiretapping or electronic surveillance touching a particular case, you should immediately notify Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, so that further inquiry may be pursued by the Department."

8 = 1
RE - HOUSTUDY 62-116464-54X

OR

SENSTUDY 62-116395-

NOTE: THIS IS A PERMANENT CHARGE OUT FOR A XEROX COPY/COPIES OF "JUNE" MAIL THAT WAS INCLUDED IN COPIES OF FBI DOCUMENTS FURNISHED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY MEMO/LETTER DATED 9-11-75 IN RESPONSE TO REQUEST(S) MADE BY EITHER THE U. S. SENATE OR HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES ON INTELLIGENCE. THE COPY/COPIES OF THE "JUNE" MAIL DATED AS INDICATED BELOW HAS/HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS ENCLOSURE MATERIAL TO BE FILED IN THE APPROPRIATE HOUSTUDY OR SENSTUDY "JUNE" FILE INDICATED ABOVE, LOCATED IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF THE RECORDS SECTION.

DATE(S) OF MAIL: 1-11-67REMOVED BY: Wardlaw DATE REMOVED: 7-14-76

1/12/67

Airtel

To: SACs, Albany - Enc. (2) Birmingham - Enc. (2)
Albuquerque - Enc. (2) Boston - Enc. (2)
Anchorage - Enc. (2) Buffalo - Enc. (2)
Atlanta - Enc. (2) Butte - Enc. (2)
Baltimore - Enc. (2) Charlotte - Enc. (2)

From: Director, FBI

DEPARTMENT INQUIRIES CONCERNING
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE

The Department of Justice, pursuant to their program to check names of individuals under prosecution or being considered for prosecution, or already convicted and incarcerated after Federal prosecution, to determine if those individuals were involved in any electronic surveillance conducted by this Bureau, is submitting requests to the Bureau by letter.

These requests are being received primarily from the Department's Tax Division and Criminal Division, and each require answers to guidelines previously submitted that differ in the nature of response necessary. Guidelines for response to inquiries from the Tax Division are set forth in Department letter dated 10/23/66, captioned, "Organized Crime and Smuggling Cases Pending in The Tax Division," a copy of which is enclosed and will hereafter be referred to as Exhibit A.

The inquiries originating in the Criminal Division are to be answered in accordance with the guidelines as set forth in Department letter dated 12/2/66 captioned, "Electronic Surveillance Information Requests," and its attachment dated 11/2/66, copies of which are enclosed and will hereafter be referred to as Exhibit B.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Airtel to Albany

Re: Department Inquiries Concerning
Electronic Surveillance Coverage

Instructions emanating from the Bureau in seeking response to future Department inquiries pertaining to this subject matter will direct the field to respond in accordance with the guidelines of either Exhibit A or Exhibit B. Your response must be in accordance with instructions to facilitate the Bureau's response to the Department and to insure compliance with their specific inquiry.

Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: October 24, 1966

FROM: Mitchell Rogovin
Assistant Attorney General
Tax Division

SUBJECT: Organized Crime and Racketeering cases
pending in the Tax Division.

As has been discussed with Mr. DeLoach, we are anxious to obtain information regarding the possibility that tainted evidence has inadvertently been used by us in the prosecution of criminal tax cases, or exists in cases currently being considered by us for prosecution. Under the assumption that if this exists at all, Organized Crime and Racketeering cases are the most likely source, the attached list relates to criminal cases pending in the Tax Division which appear to be Organized Crime Drive matters. Some of these matters are currently under consideration as to whether prosecution should be undertaken; some have been referred to the United States Attorneys for prosecutive action; some are the subjects of indictments, and a few are pending on appeal.

It is requested that the names on the attached list be checked against the indices which you have set up in relation to electronic listening devices and you advise this office as soon as possible whether any name on this list appears on your indices.

I. We wish to know:

- a) whether the named defendant shows up in your indices;
- b) whether he was the direct subject of electronic surveillance; and
- c) whether he appears on any recordings, transcripts, logs, notes, memoranda, or other records as a participant in conversations overheard or as a person mentioned or discussed.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

2

II. If an individual's name on our list is found in your indices, we would like to be advised:

- a) if a record, transcript, log, notes, memoranda, or report of the conversation exists;
- b) the nature of the surveillance involved, the duration of the surveillance, and
- c) if any of such records are in existence that they all be made available to us.


III. If any information was obtained from electronic surveillance, to your knowledge was such information communicated in any manner to the Internal Revenue Service?

- a) If so, to whom was the communication made; when was it made, and what is the nature of the information communicated?

These matters are under the jurisdiction of the Criminal Section of the Tax Division and any questions relating to the foregoing requests can be directed to me, to Mr. Richard M. Roberts, Second Assistant, Tax Division, or Mr. Fred G. Folsom, Chief of our Criminal Section. Mr. Roberts and Mr. Folsom are designated as attorneys who may receive the information and records requested in this memorandum.

Attachments

Approved: .



Ramsey Clark
Acting Attorney General

The Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

December 2, 1968

Fred M. Vinson, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

Electronic Surveillance Information Requests

It will become necessary to direct an increasing number of requests to your Bureau to determine whether named subjects and defendants participated in or were present at conversations overheard by any electronic devices. Our previous memoranda have repeated the categories of information requested. In order to obviate the necessity of repeating this list of categories in the future I am enclosing a sample memorandum setting forth the items of information required in all such requests. Henceforth all future memoranda from this Division will refer to this sample memorandum to describe the scope of the information requested.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. It is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ENCLOSURE

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

November 2, 1966

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
(Commissioner, Bureau of Narcotics, etc.)

FROM : Fred M. Vinson, Jr. 90
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division 2

SUBJECT : John Doe, 123 Fourth Street, Jersey City, New Jersey,
FBI #123456 (any other appropriate identifying data)

We anticipate that John Doe will be indicted in the near future on a charge of _____

Would you please advise us:

- (a) Whether the above-named individual was subject to electronic surveillance by your agency.
- (b) If he was, did the electronic surveillance consist of wiretapping or an electronic eavesdropping device.
- (c) If the latter, please advise us of the method of entry utilized in the placement of the device.
- (d) When, by date, did the electronic eavesdropping take place and where did it occur, that is, at his home, office or other location.
- (e) Whether the named individual appears to be present at, or a participant in, conversations overheard by any electronic device which are reflected in any recordings, transcripts, logs, notes, memoranda or other records of any such device.
- (f) If so, and if such recordings, transcripts, logs, notes, memoranda or other records still exist, would you please make them available to us.
- (g) Did the information from any such device appear directly or indirectly in reports made in reference to the above individual by your agency. If so, would you please advise us of the reports in which such information appeared and furnish us with copies of these reports if you have not already done so.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. It is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ENCLOSURE

- (h) [To the FBI in reference to an IRS case] If any information was obtained from electronic surveillance, to your knowledge was such information communicated in any manner to the Internal Revenue Service.
- (i) [same as (h) above] If so, to whom was the communication made, when was it made, and what is the nature of the information communicated.

[Naturally, if you are aware that there is evidence in the case obtained by a Goldman or Rathbun type eavesdropping device, you should make reference to your knowledge of it and except it from the inquiry.]

91
RE - HOUSTUDY 62-116464- 54X

OR

SENSTUDY 62-116395-

NOTE: THIS IS A PERMANENT CHARGE OUT FOR A XEROX COPY/COPIES OF "JUNE" MAIL THAT WAS INCLUDED IN COPIES OF FBI DOCUMENTS FURNISHED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY MEMO/LETTER DATED 9-11-75 IN RESPONSE TO REQUEST(S) MADE BY EITHER THE U. S. SENATE OR HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES ON INTELLIGENCE. THE COPY/COPIES OF THE "JUNE" MAIL DATED AS INDICATED BELOW HAS/HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS ENCLOSURE MATERIAL TO BE FILED IN THE APPROPRIATE HOUSTUDY OR SENSTUDY "JUNE" FILE INDICATED ABOVE, LOCATED IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF THE RECORDS SECTION.

DATE(S) OF MAIL: 2-9-67

REMOVED BY: Wardlaw DATE REMOVED: 7-14-76

March 13, 1967

Airtel

To: SAC, Albany
From: Director, FBI

DEPARTMENT INQUIRIES
CONCERNING ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE

Re Bureau airtel January 12, 1967.

To save transcription time and communications costs, all communications handling captioned inquiries, necessitating review of special electronic indices and other appropriate records, are to be captioned with code word "JUNE," and carry Bureau file 62-313, the control file in this project. In addition, you are to insure that any communication under a substantive or intelligence case caption, dealing with captioned inquiries, has a copy designated for Bureau file 62-313.

In view of questions which have arisen regarding the use of the "June" classification in connection with these communications, the following guidelines are being furnished:

Communications which merely make inquiry to determine whether certain individuals have been covered by electronic surveillance, and contain no positive data identifying the individual with an electronic surveillance, or discuss the results thereof, will not be designated "June." Communications which reply to Bureau inquiries regarding such coverage, where the response is negative, would fall in this category.

Any communication which identifies an individual or individuals with electronic coverage by this Bureau, or which discusses the results of an electronic surveillance, or the circumstances under which such a surveillance was established, maintained or discontinued, are to carry the "June" designation.

2-All Other Offices

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. It is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

March 29, 1957

Airtel

To: SAC, Albany

From: Director, FBI

ELSUR

In order to expedite handling of mail with regard to ELSUR matters, all offices are requested in future communications to the Bureau to mention the name of one individual about whom the Attorney General has inquired, in their replies.

2 - All Other Offices

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. It is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Memorandum

June 3 1968

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE:

FROM : Fred M. Vinson, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

SUBJECT: ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
December 2, 1966 Memorandum

Reference is made to my memorandum of December 2, 1966, concerning electronic surveillance. It is requested that in lieu of paragraph (h) the following be substituted:

If any information was obtained from electronic surveillance, to your knowledge was such information communicated in any manner to any other agency.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

6-12-68

Airtel

To: SAC, Albany

From: Director, FBI

DEPARTMENT INQUIRIES CONCERNING
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE

ReBuairtel to SAC, Albany, 1-12-67 with Exhibits A and B which were guidelines for conducting electronic surveillance checks furnished by the Tax and Criminal Divisions of the Department.

The guidelines furnished by the Criminal Division were contained in Department letter dated 12-2-66 which is Exhibit B to referenced Bureau airtel. The Criminal Division of the Department has requested that paragraph H of their December 2, 1966, letter be deleted, and the following substituted therefore:

"If any information was obtained from electronic surveillance, to your knowledge was such information communicated in any manner to any other agency."

In all future requests received by each office to conduct an electronic surveillance check for the Criminal Division of the Department, you must insure the review of records is conducted to encompass the information set forth above. Insure the appropriate correction is made in the Criminal Division guidelines as furnished by Bureau airtel dated January 12, 1967, as described above.

2 - All Other Offices

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. It is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

5/2/39

Airtel

To: SAC, Albany - Enc. 90

From: Director, FBI

**DEPARTMENT INQUIRIES CONCERNING
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE**

Duairtel to SAC, Albany, January 12, 1967, with Exhibits A and B furnished guidelines for conducting electronic surveillance checks for the Tax and Criminal Divisions of the Department.

In view of the Supreme Court decision on _____ in the _____ case, the Criminal Division of the Department has revised some of the questions referred to the Bureau relative to individuals to be checked in our records for electronic surveillance coverage. A copy of a memorandum from the Criminal Division dated April 16, 1969, captioned "Electronic Surveillance, _____ is enclosed for each office containing a brief explanation of what will be required in future electronic surveillance checks. The significant change is contained in question (b) of the enclosed memorandum.

In future electronic surveillance requests from the Criminal Division in line with the April 16, 1969, memorandum, each office will be referred to this airtel and its enclosure as containing the guidelines to follow for the electronic surveillance check.

Each request for electronic surveillance information received by your office must be carefully searched through existing records to insure complete accuracy as to the coverage and related material.

Also, in each reply to the Bureau containing details of electronic surveillance coverage on individuals checked, the identity of the monitoring microphone must be included.

2 - All Offices - Enclosure

This document is prepared in response to your request and is for dissemination only to officials of your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: April 13, 1968

FROM : Will Wilson
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

SUBJECT: ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

As you know, the decision of the Supreme Court in United States expanded the concept of standing with respect to electronic surveillance and held that an individual has standing not only with respect to his own overheard conversations but also with respect to overhearings on premises in which he has a proprietary interest, even though he was not present at the time of the conversations. Because of this decision, it will be necessary in future requests for electronic surveillance information to ascertain whether or not there was coverage on premises in which the subject had a proprietary interest. Accordingly, it is requested that you advise as to each of the individuals on the attached list:

(a) Whether the named individual appears to be present at, or a participant in, conversations overheard in any electronic surveillance by your agency.

(b) Whether an electronic surveillance was conducted on any premises of which the named individual was the owner, lessee or licensee.

(c) If the individual or the premises of which the individual was owner, lessee or licensee was the subject of an electronic surveillance, did the surveillance consist of wiretapping or an electronic eavesdropping device.

(d) If the latter, please advise us of the method of entry utilized in the placement of the device.

(e) Was the information from any such device disseminated in any manner to any other agency. If so, when and to whom

(f) Did the information from any such device appear directly or indirectly in any reports made in reference to the individual by your agency. If so, would you please advise us of the reports in which such information appeared and if the information was attributed to a "T" symbol, the designation of that symbol in the pertinent report.

If your records indicate that the individuals have used names other than those indicated, please check your electronic surveillance indices with respect to the additional names.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. It is not to be disclosed to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized persons without the express approval of the FBI.

(E) ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES (ELSUR) -- In connection with electronic surveillances, you are reminded of the absolute necessity that true copies of the original logs be made in connection with the program of furnishing logs to the Department for possible use in court proceedings. There must be no deletions whatsoever of any type markings which appear on the original logs.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

This document is prepared in response to your request and is for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

7-1-69

SAC LETTER 69-36

- 4 -

FBI

Date: 7/2/69 *ovf*

Transmit the following in _____

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via Airtel _____

(Priority)

To: SAC, Albany - Enc.

From: Director, FBI

**ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
UNDER TITLE III OF THE
OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND
SAFE STREETS ACT OF 1968**

Reference is made to previous correspondence to all field offices concerning the maintenance of special indices containing names of individuals who were monitored or mentioned by our electronic surveillances.

In view of the contemplated activity under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 with regard to electronic surveillance, certain instructions are being set forth with regard to inclusion in special indices the names of individuals monitored, etc., by court approved orders for electronic surveillance under the above legislation.

It is desired that, during the tenure of any electronic surveillance approved under the new legislation referred to above, that the name of each individual who was directly covered, monitored or mentioned is to be included in the special indices at the Bureau and each field office maintaining the electronic surveillance. This is to be accomplished through the medium of a 3" X 5" plain blue index size card containing the information as set forth in the sample card attached to this communication.

2 - All Offices - Enc.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Sent Via _____

M

Per _____

Airtel to SAC Albany
Re: Electronic Surveillance

This system will enable each office to determine electronic surveillance coverage of individuals; as in the past, and the blue card will be easily recognizable as coverage under a court approved electronic surveillance. These cards are to be submitted to the attention of the Special Investigative Division, Criminal Intelligence and Organized Crime Section, each Friday in line with existing instructions.

You will note that, as to each individual on whom a card is prepared, the card must indicate whether or not the individual was the subject of direct coverage, a participant in conversation or mentioned by others who were monitored. Only one of the last three items on the index cards should be utilized.

The Bureau requires only one card in the special indices for an individual monitored or mentioned in conversation covered by an installation. If the individual was monitored or mentioned in conversation by more than one installation, a separate card must be submitted on each individual for each installation.

In the event an index card is forwarded, disclosing an individual was mentioned in a conversation covered by an electronic device and subsequently the individual is monitored by the same device, an appropriate index card revealing this coverage must be forwarded. It is not necessary to list all dates on which he was monitored by a particular source, only the first date.

Each source will be identified as to judicial district where the court order was approved followed by a number starting with number 1 for the first order, and each subsequent order receiving one number larger. In addition, the abbreviation for the office which obtained the court order should be utilized to identify the source (for example: AL NDNY 1).

You are reminded of the necessity to handle these sources on a strictly need-to-know basis in order to afford maximum security to this type of surveillance. Insure that appropriate administrative procedures are established for such handling.

Keep in mind that all electronic surveillance logs must be properly indexed in accordance with the instructions set forth in Part II, Section 3, page 4, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

NAME (LAST NAME FIRST)

Source

Bufile:

Direct Coverage - (Date)

Participant - (Date)

Mentioned - (Date)

PERSONAL ATTENTION
SAC LETTER 69-37



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

79

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

July 8, 1969

(A) INDEX SYSTEMS -- In an important case with great public interest, an individual was not identified because of the failure of an office to properly index a nickname.

Recent court decisions have resulted in the public disclosure of electronic surveillance logs and related material which heretofore were confidential. The information in these surveillance matters is being afforded close scrutiny by the news media, the general public, Federal, state, and local officials; therefore, the importance of proper indexing has become increasingly significant.

Each Special Agent in Charge will be held strictly responsible for insuring that all names, nicknames, and aliases appearing in electronic surveillance logs and related material are properly indexed in accordance with the instructions set forth in Part II, Section 3, page 4, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

The Attorney General

July 25, 1969

Director, FBI

100

ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE DISCLOSURE MATTERS

This Bureau is presently conducting electronic surveillance checks for the Department in accordance with guidelines furnished by the Criminal and Tax Divisions of the Department.

The Criminal Division and Tax Division guidelines with respect to monitored conversations require that the FBI furnish instances where the individual being checked appears to be present at, or a participant in, conversation overheard in any electronic surveillance conducted by the FBI. Additionally, the Tax Division guidelines require instances where the individual was "mentioned or discussed" by others who were monitored by electronic surveillance.

If the present requirements of the ~~Committee~~ and related decisions do not require the disclosure of "mentioned or discussed" references to subjects in electronic surveillance logs, it would appear that unnecessary time and effort are being utilized in compiling such information for the Tax Division.

In view of recent court decisions, the Criminal Division furnished amended guidelines requiring a check of our records to also determine if the individual being checked had proprietary interest in premises where our electronic surveillance coverage was maintained.

In order to establish uniformity in the matter of electronic surveillance checks being made for the Department, it is requested that the Department advise whether the "mentioned or discussed" references not now required by the Criminal Division should continue to receive consideration for Tax Division electronic surveillance checks. Further, please advise if this Bureau should also determine proprietary interest for requests received from the Tax Division as is done in Criminal Division requests.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

7/31/69

Airtel

To: SAC, Newark (66-1356)

From: Director, FBI

ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
UNDER TITLE III OF THE
OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND
SAFE STREETS ACT OF 1968

Reurairtel 7/15/69.

Your assumption to not include in the electronic surveillance indices fragments of names is correct since it would be virtually impossible to identify these names with the subjects of an electronic surveillance check.

The preparation of logs should include the names overheard by the monitoring personnel. These names should be indexed in the electronic surveillance indices and in the general office indices. In those instances where only a partial name such as "John" is recorded the forwarding of an index card should be held in abeyance until additional identifying data is developed.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: AUG 2 1969

FROM : Johnnie M. Walters
Assistant Attorney General
Tax Division

SUBJECT: Electronic Surveillance Disclosure Matters

Reference is made to your July 25, 1969, memorandum to the Attorney General noting that, in view of recent court decisions, the Criminal Division has amended its guidelines for use in checking the Bureau's electronic surveillance indices. You note that the Tax Division guidelines require checks of "mentioned or discussed" references whereas they are not required by the Criminal Division.

The Tax Division has reviewed this and determined that it no longer will require the "mentioned or discussed" references. We would like to have the information submitted in response to our future surveillance check requests conform to the guidelines of the Criminal Division, including the information relating to whether the individual checked had a proprietary interest in the premises surveilled.

We appreciate your calling this difference in procedure to our attention and we are happy to conform procedures in this way.

cc: The Attorney General

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. It is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

103.
8/13/69

Airtel

To: SAC, Albany

From: Director, FBI

DEPARTMENT INQUIRIES CONCERNING
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE

ReBuairtel to SAC, Albany dated May 2, 1969, which furnished new guidelines for electronic surveillance checks conducted for the Criminal Division of the Department.

In view of a recent procedural change to create uniformity in electronic surveillance checks conducted for the Department, the Tax Division of the Department no longer requires "mentioned or discussed" references resulting from electronic surveillance checks. Effective immediately all electronic surveillance checks conducted at the request of the Tax Division will be in accordance with the guidelines set forth in Criminal Division memorandum dated April 16, 1969. This memorandum was furnished to all offices as an enclosure with Bureau airtel to SAC, Albany dated May 2, 1969.

Insure that all employees in your office handling electronic surveillance checks are made aware of this change.

2 - All Offices

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

8/15/69.

Airtel

16

To: SAC, Albany

From: Director, FBI

MICROPHONE AND TELEPHONE SURVEILLANCES

ReButel 10/5/66, and Buairtel 11/10/66, both captioned as above.

Recent procedural changes to create uniformity in electronic surveillance checks for the Department have eliminated "mentioned or discussed" references. This was the subject of discussion in Buairtel to all offices dated 8/13/69, captioned "Department Inquiries Concerning Electronic Surveillance Coverage."

In view of this it will no longer be necessary to submit cards for the Bureau's special indices containing names of individuals who were "mentioned or discussed" by others in the presence of our electronic surveillance sources.

This change does not in any way relieve your office of the responsibility to index electronic surveillance material in accordance with existing instructions.

2 - All Offices

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Cleveland

DATE: October 23, 1974

FROM : J. Keith

SUBJECT: MICROPHONE AND
TELEPHONE SURVEILLANCES

The attached airtel to all field offices contains instructions which will supersede previous instructions set forth concerning the maintenance of the special indices containing the names of individuals who were subject of direct electronic surveillance coverage or monitored by an electronic surveillance.

This airtel instructs that henceforth all offices who use microphone and/or telephone surveillances in criminal and national security investigations will submit to FBIHQ, as well as maintain in their own office special indices, the names of all individuals who are the subject of direct electronic surveillance coverage or monitored by an electronic surveillance by Friday of each week.

A 3x5 white index card will be used in the maintenance of this special indices in national security investigations and a 3x5 blue index card in criminal cases. These cards will show the name of the individual identified, identity of source, and date of direct or monitored coverage. The cards will be submitted to the attention of the Special Investigative Division, Criminal Intelligence and Organized Crime Section. The cards will be submitted by airtel each Friday under the caption "Microphone and Telephone Surveillances." The name on each card enclosed with the airtel should be listed in the body of the airtel.

We require only one card in the special indices for an individual who was subject of direct electronic surveillance coverage or monitored in a conversation by an installation. If the individual was monitored in a conversation by more than one installation, a separate card must be submitted on each individual on each installation.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum to Mr. Cleveland
Re: Microphone and Telephone Surveillance

Henceforth, when an application for court-approved electronic surveillance is being prepared by a field office for a telephone and/or microphone surveillance, a blue card should also be prepared and submitted on each individual on whom the application is being prepared, that is to say, the principals, along with the initial submission of the application to FBIHQ for filing in the special indices at FBIHQ.

Each field office is also being requested to review their prior court-approved electronic surveillances and promptly furnish FBIHQ a 3x5 blue card on each principal for filing in the special indices.

Each office is reminded of the necessity to comply with existing Bureau policy and request a search of the FBIHQ special indices regarding all the principals in their application for a court-approved electronic surveillance prior to the submission of same to FBIHQ.

FBIHQ is also receiving an increasing number of requests from the Department for electronic surveillance information on individuals appearing before Federal Grand Juries or defendants in criminal prosecutions. Therefore, it is imperative the special indices at FBIHQ contain the names of individuals who were monitored in conversations covered by our electronic surveillances and be current.

All SAC's are reminded of the necessity to handle the sources on a need-to-know basis in order to afford maximum security for this type of surveillance. Compliance with these instructions must be closely followed.

This matter was coordinated with
Intelligence Division.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached airtel to all offices be sent.

airtel

10/25/74

To: SAC, Albany

From: Director, FBI

**MICROPHONE AND
TELEPHONE SURVEILLANCES**

This airtel supersedes all previous instructions set forth by FBIHQ concerning the maintenance of the special indices containing names of individuals who were subject of direct electronic surveillance coverage or monitored by an electronic surveillance.

All offices who currently or will in the future use microphones and telephone surveillances in criminal and national security investigations, will submit to FBIHQ, as well as maintain in their own office special indices, the names of all individuals who are subject of direct electronic surveillance coverage or monitored by an electronic surveillance by Friday of each week.

A 3x5 white index card will be utilized in the maintenance of this special indices in national security investigations using the authority of the Attorney General of the United States. A 3x5 blue index card will be utilized in criminal cases involving the authority in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Both these cards should have the name of the individual identified, identity of source, and date of direct or monitored coverage. See the attached samples of both special indices cards. The use of a blue card in court-approved electronic surveillances makes for easy recognition in the special indices

Enclosure

2 - All Offices (Enclosure)

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Airtel to Albany
Re: Microphone and Telephone Surveillances

at FBIHQ and each field office. All cards are to be submitted to the attention of the Special Investigative Division, Criminal Intelligence and Organized Crime Section. The cards will be submitted by airtel each Friday under the caption "Microphone and Telephone Surveillances." The name on each card enclosed with the airtel should be listed in the body of the airtel.

On each individual on whom a card is prepared, the card must indicate whether or not the individual was the subject of direct coverage or monitored. Only one of the last two items on the index cards should be used.

We require only one card in the special indices for an individual who was subject of direct electronic surveillance coverage or monitored in a conversation by an installation. If the individual was monitored in a conversation by more than one installation, a separate card must be submitted on each individual for each installation.

Henceforth, when an application for a court-approved electronic surveillance is being prepared by a field office for a telephone and/or microphone surveillance, a blue card should also be prepared and submitted on each individual on whom the application is being prepared, i.e., the principals, along with your initial submission of the application to FBIHQ for filing in the special indices at FBIHQ. See the attached sample of this blue card.

In addition, each field office having had a prior court-approved electronic surveillance or surveillances should immediately review each individual application and submit a 3x5 blue card on each principal. Promptly forward these cards by airtel to FBIHQ under the individual case caption listing the names of the principals in the body of the airtel.

You are also reminded that Bureau policy requires a search of the FBIHQ special indices regarding all the principals in your application for a court-approved electronic surveillance prior to the submission of same to FBIHQ. A statement is required in your application showing the results of this search.

Airtel to Albany

Re: Microphone and Telephone Surveillances

FBIHQ is also receiving an increasing number of requests from the Department for electronic surveillance information on individuals appearing before Federal Grand Juries or defendants in criminal prosecutions. Therefore, it is imperative that the special indices at FBIHQ contain names of individuals who were monitored in conversations covered by our electronic surveillances and be current.

You are reminded of the necessity to handle these sources on a strictly need-to-know basis in order to afford maximum security to this type of surveillance. Insure that appropriate administrative procedures are established in these matters. Your submission of special indices cards to FBIHQ will be closely followed.

Accordingly, all electronic surveillance logs must be properly indexed in accordance with instructions set forth in Part II, Section 3, Page 4 of the Manual of Rules and Regulations.

NAME (LAST NAME FIRST)

(Blue Card)

Source: AL NDNY 1

Bufile:

Direct Coverage - (Date)

Participant - (Date)

NAME (LAST NAME FIRST)

(Blue Card)

Principal Title III

Source: AL NDNY 1

NAME (LAST NAME FIRST)

(White Card)

Source: AL 1000 - S or R

Bufile:

Direct Coverage - (Date)

Participant - (Date)

Mr. W. R. Wannall

12/4/74

A. B. Fulton

MICROPHONE AND TELEPHONE
SURVEILLANCES

Memorandum J. Keith to Mr. Cleveland, captioned as above, dated 10/23/74 recommended an airtel to all offices which instructed each field division maintaining a Title III or a national security electronic surveillance to submit by close of business each Friday an index card on each person who was the subject of direct electronic surveillance coverage and each individual monitored by such coverage.

Pursuant to instructions by the Bureau, these cards are submitted by cover airtel which lists the names of the individuals contained on the cards.

INTD feels the transmission of this list in open Bureau mail could compromise security of certain sensitive investigations and that the above procedure should be amended to prevent the listing of those persons surveilled and those persons overheard in an open communication.

INTD recommends that as a security measure, current instructions be amended and that the inventory of the names of persons overheard or subjected to electronic surveillance be included in the enclosure with the index cards and the cards and inventory list be submitted by cover airtel merely stating that the enclosures are being forwarded pursuant to Bureau instructions.

Enclosure

RRH:rfk
(19)

CONTINUED - OVER

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ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Microphone and Telephone
Surveillances

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached amendment to existing instructions be approved and reproduced for transmission to all field offices.

VELOPE

119

RE - HOUSTUDY

62-116464-27A

OR

Bulky copy

SENSTUDY

62-116395-

NOTE: THIS IS A PERMANENT CHARGE OUT FOR A XEROX COPY/COPIES OF "JUNE" MAIL THAT WAS INCLUDED IN COPIES OF FBI DOCUMENTS FURNISHED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY MEMO/LETTER DATED 9-11-75 IN RESPONSE TO REQUEST(S) MADE BY EITHER THE U. S. SENATE OR HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES ON INTELLIGENCE. THE COPY/COPIES OF THE "JUNE" MAIL DATED AS INDICATED BELOW HAS/HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS ENCLOSURE MATERIAL TO BE FILED IN THE APPROPRIATE HOUSTUDY OR SENSTUDY "JUNE" FILE INDICATED ABOVE, LOCATED IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF THE RECORDS SECTION.

DATE(S) OF MAIL: 12-6-74

REMOVED BY: Wardlaw DATE REMOVED: 7-19-76

VI. INVESTIGATION OF KU KLUX KLAN
AND OTHER HATE GROUPS

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: July 30, 1964

FROM : J. H. GALE *JHG*

SUBJECT: INVESTIGATION OF KU KLUX KLAN AND OTHER HATE GROUPS

has proposed that the development of informants in the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and other hate groups as well as the investigation and penetration of these organizations from an intelligence standpoint be transferred from the General Investigative Division to the Domestic Intelligence Division (DID). He bases his recommendations on the premise that organizations like the KKK and supporting groups are essentially subversive in that they hold principles and recommend courses of action that are inimical to the Constitution as are the viewpoints of the Communist Party. He does not maintain that the actions of the hate groups constitute the same menace as the Communist Party inasmuch as they are not controlled by a foreign power.

He feels that the DID over the years has developed wide experience in the penetration of subversive organizations through informants, anonymous sources, sophisticated microphone and technical surveillances, interview programs of a highly specialized nature, etc., and that his division could put this experience to excellent use in penetrating the Klan and other hate groups.

-feels that the DID would be in a position to launch a disruptive counter-intelligence program against the Klan and other hate groups with the same effectiveness that they are now doing insofar as the Communist Party is concerned. He also proposes an immediate series of regional conferences to instruct pertinent field personnel and to devise imaginative, aggressive and highly specialized programs to carry out the responsibilities in question. He states the Communist Party is increasing its activities in the field of racial matters and civil rights, directing more and more of its fire against the KKK and similar organizations to confuse the issue. He feels that because of the stepped up activities of the Communist Party in this area it would help prevent marked confusion from developing in the areas of activities being handled by the General Investigative and Domestic Intelligence Divisions if the DID assumes these responsibilities.

The functions in question were formerly handled by the DID up until 1953 when they were transferred to the General Investigative Division. This matter was considered by the Executives Conference 10/1/53 and the transfer recommended.

memo for Mr. Tolson

Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups

One of the prime factors in the decision to transfer these responsibilities from the DID in 1958 was the almost complete absence of Communist Party activity in the racial area although at that time the Communist Party sought to capitalize on such incidents after their occurrence.

_____ was opposed to the transfer of the functions in question to the General Investigative Division in 1958 and his present position is consistent in that _____ maintains that the development of informants and the penetration of the Klan and other hate groups are primarily intelligence functions which should be handled by the DID as suggested by _____. _____ feels that the Bureau can best keep abreast of the whole field by having all angles of the racial field united in one division as suggested by _____. _____ points out that the development, supervision and administrative handling of racial and security informants are analogous.

_____ feels that there is a tendency toward oversimplification in blaming all racial murders on Klansmen and hate groups. He points out that the murders of Medgar Evers, Postman Moore and even the assassination of President Kennedy were initially and generally attributed to Klan and hate group members whereas investigation showed that the individuals charged with the murders of Evers and Moore were without organization affiliation and the President was slain by an avowed Marxist who was active in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

_____ and _____ both agree that the investigation of individual cases, i. e. bombings, murders, police brutality, etc., should be handled by the General Investigative Division. _____ feels that whether subject or victims are Klan members, Communist Party members or completely without organizational affiliation has no more bearing on our supervision of the substantive civil rights violation than it would have if the violation involved were Theft from Interstate Shipment, Bank Robbery or White Slave Traffic Act.

_____ disagrees with _____ and _____ and feels that while the proposed transfer of functions from the General Investigative Division to the Domestic Intelligence Division is theoretically appealing, it is not a practical answer to our problem. He states that at the time of the 1958 transfer of functions in question the basis was the close inter-relationship between the activities of the Klan and hate groups and the entire civil rights field of investigation. _____ feels this argument has even more strength today than in 1958, because, overwhelmingly, our interest in Klan and hate groups today is their relationship with integration and civil rights. _____ believes the transfer of functions would create an undesirable division of authority and responsibility; that our best chance to break major civil rights cases such as bombings, murders, etc., is through information developed from the inside as a result of coverage established in the

Memo for Mr. Tolson

Re: Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups

community where the crime occurred; i. e. informants and sources in the Klan, hate groups, subversive organizations, but also sources not connected with any group, who will report potential violence and individuals prone to violence. We are following the policy of aggressively seeking out persons addicted to violence even though they have not violated a Federal law as yet. He feels that the Division that is going to investigate these cases should forge the necessary tools to use for this purpose.

does not feel that the transfer of this responsibility will be helpful to the Bureau from an investigative standpoint nor in meeting the heavy responsibilities we now have in this area.

VIEWS OF THE INSPECTION DIVISION:

feels there is certainly some merit and logic in reasoning and it is felt instant issue is not one that is completely black or white.

Under the present setup there is coordination and daily exchange of information between Domestic Intelligence and General Investigative Divisions in that both Divisions insure that communications and other matters of information are brought to the attention of each other as they arise from matters for which each Division is primarily responsible. However, it seems the real issue today just as in 1958, is where does the weight of the interest lie in the racial question. In 1958 it clearly lay in the General Investigative Division because, according to information available to the Bureau at that time, in practically no instances had racial incidents been caused or inspired by Communist Party elements although the Party naturally sought to capitalize on incidents after they occurred. Also, in 1958, it was felt that consolidation would streamline certain operations.

Today it seems clear from information developed by Domestic Intelligence Division that the Communist Party now has evidenced a definite interest in the racial problem, is becoming deeply enmeshed therein, and appears to be exploiting it to an ever-increasing extent. Although prosecution for civil rights and other criminal violations is still an ultimate objective, there is definite need for an intelligence type penetration of these racial and hate groups so as to keep abreast of and ahead of their plans and activities. This seems more properly the function of the Domestic Intelligence Division.

Analysis was made by relative to coverage of the Klan and other hate groups. The General Investigative Division has been putting a great deal of pressure on the field to increase informant coverage. They have recently instructed the field to conduct surveys relative to instituting technical coverage on certain key Klan figures, have interviewed at least once all known Klan members, all Klan leaders have been investigated from intelligence standpoint and recommendations have been made that intelligence type cases be opened on each Klan member. A weekly progress airtel is being obtained from field concerning informant development. However, undoubtedly additional coverage is needed particularly in the Klaverns that have been formed since the civil rights bill passed. There is no question about

Memo for Mr. Tolson

Re: Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups

the fact that the DID has had broad experience in the penetration of subversive organizations and has achieved noteworthy results in infiltrating the Communist Party and Soviet intelligence operations. It is felt that unquestionably this experience and know-how could be put to good advantage in penetrating the Klan and other hate groups.

The Inspection Division feels that the advantages in having the direction of all informant and intelligence matters in the racial field in one division as outlined by _____ and _____ outweigh the advantages of having the hate group informants and intelligence functions with the substantive civil rights cases. Under the proposed transfer of phases of the racial problem to Domestic Intelligence Division there will still be definite responsibility in both divisions, to retain responsibility for supervision of substantive civil rights violations and other criminal violations. This dual responsibility, however, should pose no problem because there are numerous examples of it successfully being handled in the Bureau today. In this regard it will be noted that the administrative handling of the entire criminal informant program is handled by the Special Investigative Division which includes the informants being utilized on General Investigative Division cases. It will also be noted that the Special Investigative Division handles the informant and intelligence aspects of organized crime. However, the General Investigative Division handles key substantive violations such as Bankruptcy, Extortion, Assaulting a Federal Officer, and Theft from Interstate Shipment violations committed by members of the organized criminal syndicate utilizing Criminal Intelligence informants. It is understood that there have been no insoluble problems in this regard and it is felt that there should be no insoluble problems in the coordination of racial intelligence and informant information between the General Investigative Division and the DID.

In any event there will certainly be no lessening of pressure and supervision on the field if these functions are transferred. The same Agents in the field will be working the cases and developing the informants. However, it is felt that the DID should be given a chance to demonstrate whether their broad knowledge of and experience in penetration techniques and infiltration tactics can possibly increase our penetration of these hate groups. It is felt that a study of counter-intelligence and disruption tactics against the Klan certainly merits further consideration. It is also felt that the proposed series of field conferences on this problem should be favorably considered.

Memo for Mr. Tolson

Re: Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the responsibility for development of informants and gathering of intelligence on the KKK and other hate groups be transferred from the General Investigative Division to the DID. (If approved, appropriate memorandum will be submitted by Inspection Division concerning realignment and distribution of personnel from the General Investigative Division to the DID.)

JH

OK
H

2. That a series of regional field conferences be held by appropriate Bureau official to instruct personnel and attempt to develop further imaginative and aggressive highly specialized programs to carry out desired penetration. (If approved, to be coordinated by.)

JH

OK
H

3. That counter-intelligence and disruption tactics be given further study by DID and appropriate recommendations made.

JH

PM

Key 1/28

OK
H

This document is prepared in respect to the above and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

VII. SUGGESTED NAME CHANGE
CRIME RECORDS DIVISION

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Bishop

DATE: 10-16-72

FROM : M. A. Jones

SUBJECT: SUGGESTED NAME CHANGE
CRIME RECORDS DIVISION

By memorandum dated 10-4-72, attached, it was indicated that _____ has suggested a name change for the Crime Records Division to Office of Public Information or some other more meaningful designation.

It was pointed out that _____ suggestion was in line with informal discussions you (Mr. Bishop) have had with members of your staff concerning a possible name change for the Division.

In this connection, Mr. Gray has noted that he "can think of many reasons for changing the name. What have been the nature of the reasons for change discussed?"

With the formation of the Computer Systems Division and the resultant reassignment of the personnel and the work of the Uniform Crime Reporting Section, including the National Crime Information Center/Computerized Criminal Histories file from Crime Records to Computer Systems, the title "Crime Records," as _____ has indicated, is no longer meaningful insofar as the work of this Division is concerned.

"Office of Public Information," which was suggested by _____ would inaccurately reflect the activities and responsibilities of this Division and could result in confusion with the Office of Public Information in the Department of Justice. This, of course, would be undesirable.

Enclosures

M. A. Jones to Mr. Bishop Memo
RE: SUGGESTED NAME CHANGE, CRIME RECORDS DIVISION

It is noted that this Division, which is presently comprised of the Crime Research Section, and the Correspondence and Tours Section, is primarily responsible for conducting extensive research pertaining to crime, crime prevention, and other related matters in the law enforcement field. This Division is involved in the review and preparation of replies to correspondence regarding FBI Jurisdiction and operations received from law enforcement, other Government agencies, and the general public in those instances where the Bureau has a responsibility to disseminate such information.

"The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin," which is the official publication of the FBI, is prepared and distributed by Crime Records, as well as numerous pamphlets for the instruction and information of Bureau employees, the law enforcement profession and the general public. This Division is responsible for supervision of tours of Bureau facilities for Government officials, law enforcement authorities, and the general public; directs the program of distributing informative and illustrative material on Bureau fugitives to various media for the purpose of effecting the location and apprehension of these criminals with the help of citizen cooperation; and coordinates and supervises the Bureau's interests in the utilization of radio, television, and publication outlets to enhance the discharge of our responsibilities in the law enforcement field by acquainting the public with the FBI's operations and activities.

In addition, this Division has the custody of a number of research and reference files which are maintained in a current status and which are essential to the Division in the fulfillment of its responsibilities to the Bureau.

Further, this Division supervises the "Ten-Most-Wanted Fugitives" Program, as well as "The FBI" television series, both of which involve research for their sustenance and success.

While it is recognized, based on the foregoing, that this Division is not completely absorbed in research to the exclusion of other activities, "Crime Research"

CONTINUED - OVER

M. A. Jones to Mr. Bishop Memo

RE: SUGGESTED NAME CHANGE, CRIME RECORDS DIVISION

more accurately describes our responsibilities, it is felt, than any other title suggested. It is noted the more likely alternatives discussed were "Research and Information Division" and "Research and Correspondence Division."

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That Mr. Gray approve the renaming of the Crime Records Division to Crime Research Division.

Approved. J. 10/22

11:02A

2. That in line with the foregoing, the attached letter to * be approved and sent.

J. 10/22
11:02A



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

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(Typed October 27, 1972)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Memorandum to All Special Agents in Charge:

RE: NAME CHANGE OF CRIME RECORDS DIVISION
TO CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

In view of the transfer of the record functions of the Crime Records Division to the Computer Systems Division, I have approved changing the name of the Crime Records Division to the Crime Research Division effective immediately. The Section formerly known as the Crime Research Section has been renamed Research and Service Section. Manual changes are forthcoming.

L. Patrick Gray, III
Acting Director

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized persons without the express approval of the FBI.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : THE ACTING DIRECTOR

DATE: 12-1-72

FROM : W. M. FELT ¹¹³

SUBJECT: REORGANIZATION - CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

Pursuant to your instructions, Assistant Director Bishop is being temporarily attached to the Training Division at Quantico for special assignment until the effective date of his retirement, 2-1-73.

Mr. Bishop will be assigned to the research and development of a major case practical problem for use in the National Academy. This is extremely important because our experience indicates that most of the officers attending the Academy are unable to understand and handle the ramifications of major cases. Mr. Bishop, with his extensive field background, plus his familiarity with news media problems, is ideally suited to handle this assignment.

If he has time, Mr. Bishop will also analyze and develop meaningful practical cases which will enable new agents to meet present-day needs.

I have arranged with Mr. Jenkins for suitable office facilities to be used by Mr. Bishop at Quantico and have instructed Bishop to report to Mr. Jenkins on Monday, 12-4-72.

is being diverted from his current inspection assignment in the Office of Legal Counsel to begin an immediate survey of the Crime Research Division to determine the feasibility of the transfer of its functions to other divisions or to your office.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the copy may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum

TO : MR. FELT

DATE: 12/6/72

FROM : L. M. WALTERS

SUBJECT: SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF
FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL;
CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

PURPOSE: To recommend immediate supervisory reorganization and transfer of all functions and personnel of the Crime Research Division based on survey and analysis conducted by Inspection Division.

Recommended transfer of functions and related responsibilities together with appropriate personnel as follows:

OFFICE OF ACTING DIRECTOR

To assume supervision of contacts with the Congress, press and other news media formerly handled by Assistant Director Bishop, his front office Agent personnel and the Administrative Review Unit (Congressional liaison).

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Congressional liaison; Congressional correspondence; Congressional telephone calls; progress of legislation of interest to or affecting the FBI; review of bills and resolutions introduced into both Houses of Congress and all public and private laws enacted; and review and analysis of the Congressional Record.

Press, radio, television and motion picture contacts; field matters concerning press, radio and television; correspondence relating to an editorial or to a comment; liaison with the White House and Department press offices; review of editorials and articles; review of magazines, newspaper clippings and Washington News Service ticker items; news releases and press inquiries; SAC calls regarding press releases; press contact program; coordinate press matters of possible future use from FBIHQ Divisions.

Review statements and speeches by Director or matters affecting major public relations; invitations for speeches by the Director; assignment of speeches to FBIHQ speakers; review speech manuscripts.

Review material for publication, first-name salutation mail, matters critical of and complaints regarding FBI; letters enclosing autographed photographs;

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CONTINUED - OVER

special photographs in Director's Office; American Legion and veteran liaison matters.

Recommended Agent Transfer:

OFFICE OF ACTING ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

To assume [review and analysis of correspondence received by the Director and the FBI and preparation of replies to the correspondence.] Formerly handled by the Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence of special importance to Director and Nation) and the Non-Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence from the public and requests for publications).

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Replies to correspondence regarding subversive activities and field divisions; file reviews and necessary research to determine identity and pertinent background of the correspondent; file review and research necessary to reply to inquiries and requests from private citizens, law enforcement, Government representatives on local, state and national level; initiate instructions to field offices in connection with correspondence; processing of letters dealing with public relations, general news media; requests and inquiries from law enforcement officials, Government representatives and others in foreign countries; chronic mail; and requests for publications.

Recommended Agent Transfer:

OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

To assume formal liaison with the American Bar Association, National District Attorneys Association, National Association of Attorneys General, Federal Bar Association, and the American Law Institute. These functions formerly handled by the Administrative Review Unit. Also research and preparation of legal briefs in connection with urgent policy matters (formerly handled by Research Unit).

Recommended Agent Transfer:

TRAINING DIVISION

To assume operations and maintenance of the FBI Library; preparation and dissemination of pamphlets, reprints and related material of special interest in law enforcement and the crime problem; coordination and compilation material for presenting FBI operations and jurisdiction to law enforcement and the public through movies, television and other news media; and specialized research and preparation of material in connection with memoranda requested by the Director and other Bureau officials, research for speeches and policy statements of the Director and analysis of articles and statements made concerning the FBI. These functions were formerly handled by the Library Unit, Publications Unit, Special Productions Unit and Research Unit.

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Reference service to FBI officials, employees, and authorities from other Government agencies and individuals authorized; maintenance of out-of-town telephone directories covering United States; preparation of memoranda for Director and other officials based on review of current periodicals, police journals and scientific magazines; purchase and sale of books to Bureau employees and the maintenance of the inventory and financial records pertinent to this project and operation of a lending library to Bureau employees.

Liaison with the Government Printing Office; preparation and dissemination of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (LEB); research for the Director's monthly announcement on an important phase of law enforcement or crime for each issue of the LEB; requesting and coordinating material from the field, editing, preparation and distribution of "The Investigator"; preparation of "FBI Notes"; preparation of Interesting Case Memoranda and maintenance of related indices; and correlation and usage of FBI human interest items.

Monitoring movies and television for proper portrayal of FBI and maintenance of a running brief on developments pertinent to Bureau operations; surveys and evaluations of matters for presentment to the public by information media; day-to-day surveys of the media for consideration of the Director and Bureau officials; custody and maintenance of recordings of the Director in connection with policy statements or interviews with law enforcement or other Government agencies; custody and maintenance of the general and official Bureau photograph file together with indices; writing of radio and television scripts involving FBI fugitives and matters of FBI jurisdiction; distribution of Uniform Crime Reports Bulletin; maintenance of cartoon file, illustrations depicting FBI and reference file on mis-quotes of Director in news media releases; monthly review of FBI dissemination of information to the public, law enforcement and authorized individuals and organizations.

Memo for Mr. Felt
Re: Supervisory Reorganization of Functions and
Personnel; Crime Research Division

Research and coordination of materials in connection with speeches, by-line articles and feature stories made or published by the Director; preparation of memoranda concerning books on law enforcement; review and analysis of magazine and newspaper manuscripts concerning FBI prepared by outside authors who request FBI review for accuracy; compilation of data and narrative form of material presented in the FBI's Annual Reports; outlines and research for speech data requested by Bureau officials; maintenance of indices on research materials.

Supervision of Public Law 670 concerning misuse of the name of the FBI; analysis of Young American Medals Awards; maintenance of reference files pertinent to FBI jurisdiction and law enforcement policies; reference files on sex offenders, parole and probation violators, pornographic literature; supervision and statistics concerning FBI speech program; and supervision and direction of Bureau juvenile project.

Recommended Agent Transfer:

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

To assume supervision for special visitors on tours of Bureau facilities, meetings and photographs with the Director and all other tours conducted for visitors to the Bureau. Preparation of data on Bureau employees for publication in home-town newspapers as recruitment aids. These functions formerly handled among the Fugitive Publicity Unit, Special Productions Unit, Research Unit and Tour Unit.

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Handling and processing photographs and other matters for personal autograph of the Director; interviews, testing, lectures, classroom demonstrations, on-the-job training and supervision of tour leaders; fingerprinting individuals requesting to be fingerprinted in connection with Government employment, security clearances or personal identification; telephone inquiries relating to law enforcement, National Academy, services and responsibilities of the FBI and background data regarding the Director; maintain tour statistics of visitors and security of all tour areas; prepare data on background and work functions of Bureau employees for arranging publication in their home-town newspapers.

for Mr. Felt

Supervisory Reorganization of Functions and
Personnel; Crime Research Division

Recommended Agent Transfer:

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

To assume White House name checks and appropriate correspondence, compilation of data and preparation of memoranda on individuals requesting special tours or meetings with the Director; compilation of data and preparation of background memoranda for dissemination to authorized individuals; and preparation of informative memoranda pertaining to organizations asking for data. These functions formerly handled by the Summary Memoranda Unit. (In past years these functions were performed in Name Check Section of General Investigative Division.)

Recommended Agent Transfer:

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

To assume overall responsibility for publicizing FBI fugitives through all available media, prepare narrative and illustrative data for Top Ten Fugitive Program, research and preparation of feature fugitive articles; preparation and dissemination of material concerning fugitives; maintenance of special indices concerning distribution and cancellation of fugitive material to media; and conduct interviews with persons making telephonic or personal calls to FBIHQ concerning matters within the jurisdiction of the FBI or of interest to the Bureau. These functions were formerly handled by the Fugitive Publicity Unit.

Recommended Agent Transfer:

OBSERVATIONS

Agent personnel and supervisory functions have been analyzed and dealt with in the foregoing proposed reallocations; clerical functions have not. It is suggested that clerical functions and personnel now simply move with the Agent desks and units to which they are attached. Questions of space also have not been covered and it is readily apparent that a substantial portion of the functions and personnel suggested for transfer to Training Division might feasibly operate at Quantico (e.g. Library, Special Productions and Publications Unit). Five units of Training Division are now located at Headquarters and the Research Unit of Research and Service Section proposed herein for transfer to Training Division, likewise should remain at Headquarters. Accordingly, _____ formerly in the Front Office of Crime Research Division, has been proposed for transfer to Training Division in order to act, during this transition period, as a special coordinator of functions that may be divided between Headquarters and Quantico. No!

The questions of adequacy of clerical personnel, space reallocation, and relocation of units and functions to Quantico demand greater study and inasmuch

For Mr. Felt

Supervisory Reorganization of Functions and Personnel
Crime Research Division

As Training Division is scheduled for regular annual inspection next week, these matters will be gone into in depth in connection with that inspection and coordinated in consultation with Administrative Division. It is the purpose of this memorandum to promptly effect the desired transfers of functions among affected Divisions in order to provide for immediate routing of mail and upper level review and supervision of the work product of all units previously composing Crime Research Division.

RECOMMENDATION:

That transfers as outlined herein be approved.

J. Edgar Hoover
4:30 P

Proposition of W.M. Felt

This office is not feasible. If some elements we can realign. I am
that the Research & Service functions, which will be transferred
should be assigned to the Training Division. I do not believe that
this Division should be transferred to Training because there will
be a need for access to files & other material at Headquarters & occasional
contacts with the public. I will assume there is no available space
in the 9th & D Building. Accordingly, I recommend
that the FBIHQ Library be removed to the Library Building at 5
and would need to remain at FBIHQ the reference materials are
encyclopedias which are used on a daily basis by all the divisions
The space in the 9th & D Building can be used and in fact is being used
in the 9th & D Building can be used and in fact is being used
by the Domestic Intelligence Division which is now located
I recommend that you approve now the transfer
of functions and that any necessary reassignment of personnel be carried
by separate memoranda.

ENT
R?

Agree
Change Administrative Review Unit to Congressional
Services Unit
JMF
4:30 P

ADDENDUM OF W. M. FELT 12-6-72 WMF:crt

This appears logical and feasible. If snags develop we can readjust. I agree that the Research and Service functions, which will remain under [redacted] should be reassigned to the Training Division. I do not believe that this Section should be transferred to Quantico, however, because there is daily need for access to files and other material at Headquarters and occasional contacts with the public. Furthermore, there is no available space at Quantico except in the Library Building. Accordingly, I recommend that the FBIHQ Library be moved into the Library Building at Quantico. We would need to retain at FBIHQ the telephone directories and encyclopedias which are used on a daily basis by other Divisions. The space into which the FBIHQ Library was to have been moved in the 9th and D Building can be used and in fact is badly needed by the Domestic Intelligence Division which is very crowded.

I recommend that you approve now the transfer of functions and that any necessary realignment of personnel be considered by separate memoranda.

- 6 -

Memorandum

MR. FELT

DATE: December 14, 1972

FROM: L. M. WALTERS

SUBJECT: SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF
FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL;
CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

per prior approval of Mr. Gray
Effective immediately, all functions and personnel formerly assigned to the Crime Research Division are reassigned as indicated below. Recipient Inspectors, Section and Unit Chiefs promptly report to respective offices of assignment.

Agent personnel are set forth together with assigned functions. Clerical personnel utilized in handling these assignments are to transfer with listed Agents in accordance with the functions formerly handled by them.

OFFICE OF ACTING DIRECTOR

To assume supervision of contacts with the Congress, press and other news media formerly handled in the Front Office of the Crime Research Division as well as the Administrative Review Unit which has been redesignated as the Congressional Services Unit and will be handled by

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Congressional liaison: Congressional correspondence; Congressional telephone calls; progress of legislation of interest to or affecting the FBI; review of bills and resolutions introduced into both Houses of Congress and all public and private laws enacted; and review and analysis of the Congressional Record.

Press, radio, television and motion picture contacts: field matters concern press, radio and television; correspondence relating to an editorial or to a commentator; liaison with the White House and Department press offices; review of editorials and articles; review of magazines, newspaper clippings and Washington News Service ticker items; news releases and press inquiries; SAC calls regarding press releases; press contact program; coordinate press matters of possible future use from FBIHQ Divisions.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. It is limited to official proceedings by name. Confidential news and information may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

• Memo for Mr. Felt
• Re: Reorganization of ()

Review statements and speeches by Director or matters affecting major public relations; invitations for speeches by the Director; assignment of speeches to FBIHQ speakers; review speech manuscripts.

Review material for publication, first-name salutation mail, matters critical of and complaints regarding FBI; letters enclosing autographed photographs; special photographs in Director's Office; American Legion and veteran liaison matters.

OFFICE OF ACTING ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

To assume review and analysis of correspondence received by the Director and the FBI and preparation of replies to the correspondence. Formerly handled by the Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence of special importance to Director and Nation) and the Non-Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence from the public and requests for publications).

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Replies to correspondence regarding subversive activities and field divisions; file reviews and necessary research to determine identity and pertinent background of the correspondent; file review and research necessary to reply to inquiries and requests from private citizens, law enforcement, Government representatives on local, state and national level; initiate instructions to field offices in connection with correspondence; processing of letters dealing with public relations, general news media; requests and inquiries from law enforcement officials, Government representatives and others in foreign countries; chronic mail; and requests for publications.

OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

To assume formal liaison with the American Bar Association, National District Attorneys Association, National Association of Attorneys General, Federal Bar Association, and the American Law Institute. These functions formerly handled by the Administrative Review Unit. Also research and preparation of legal briefs in connection with urgent policy matters (formerly handled by Research Unit).

TRAINING DIVISION

To assume operations and maintenance of the FBI Library; preparation and dissemination of pamphlets, reprints and related material of special interest in law enforcement and the crime problem; coordination and compilation of material for presenting FBI operations and jurisdiction to law enforcement and the public through movies, television and other news media; and specialized research and preparation of material in connection with memoranda requested by the Director and other Bureau officials, research for speeches and policy statements of the Director and analysis of articles and statements made concerning the FBI. These functions were formerly handled by the Library Unit, Publications Unit, Special Productions Unit and Research Unit.

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Reference service to FBI officials, employees, and authorities from other Government agencies and individuals authorized; maintenance of out-of-town telephone directories covering United States; preparation of memoranda for Director and other officials based on review of current periodicals, police journals and scientific magazines; purchase and sale of books to Bureau employees and the maintenance of the inventory and financial records pertinent to this project and operation of a lending library to Bureau employees.

Liaison with the Government Printing Office; preparation and dissemination of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (LEB); research for the Director's monthly announcement on an important phase of law enforcement or crime for each issue of the LEB; requesting and coordinating material from the field, editing, preparation and distribution of "The Investigator"; preparation of "FBI Notes"; preparation of Interesting Case Memoranda and maintenance of related indices; and correlation and usage of FBI human interest items.

Monitoring movies and television for proper portrayal of FBI and maintenance of a running brief on developments pertinent to Bureau operations; surveys and evaluations of matters for presentation to the public by information media; day-to-day surveys of the media for consideration of the Director and Bureau officials; custody and maintenance of recordings of the Director in connection with policy statements or interviews with law enforcement or other Government agencies; custody and maintenance of the general and official Bureau photograph file together with indices; writing of radio and television scripts involving FBI fugitives and

matters of FBI jurisdiction; distribution of Uniform Crime Reports Bulletin; maintenance of cartoon file, illustrations depicting FBI and reference file on mis-quotes of Director in news media releases; monthly review of FBI dissemination of information to the public, law enforcement and authorized individuals and organizations.

Research and coordination of materials in connection with speeches, by-line articles and feature stories made or published by the Director; preparation of memoranda concerning books on law enforcement; review and analysis of magazine and newspaper manuscripts concerning FBI prepared by outside authors who request FBI review for accuracy; compilation of data and narrative form of material presented in the FBI's Annual Reports; outlines and research for speech data requested by Bureau officials; maintenance of indices on research materials.

Supervision of Public Law 670 concerning misuse of the name of the FBI; analysis of Young American Medals Awards; maintenance of reference files pertinent to FBI jurisdiction and law enforcement policies; reference files on sex offenders, parole and probation violators, pornographic literature; supervision and statistics concerning FBI speech program; and supervision and direction of Bureau juvenile project.

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

To assume supervision for special visitors on tours of Bureau facilities, meetings, and photographs with the Director and all other tours conducted for visitors to the Bureau. Preparation of data on Bureau employees for publication in home-town newspapers as recruitment aids. These functions formerly handled among the Fugitive Publicity Unit, Special Productions Unit, Research Unit and Tour Unit.

Functions and Related Responsibilities:

Handling and processing photographs and other matters for personal autographs of the Director; interviews, testing, lectures, classroom demonstrations, on-the-job training and supervision of tour leaders; fingerprinting individuals requesting to be fingerprinted in connection with Government employment, security clearances or personal identification; telephone inquiries relating to law enforcement, National Academy, services and responsibilities of the FBI and background data regarding the Director; maintain tour statistics of visitors and security of all tour areas; prepare data on background and work functions of Bureau employees for arranging publication in their home-town newspapers.

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

To assume White House name checks and appropriate correspondence, compilation of data and preparation of memoranda on individuals requesting special tours or meetings with the Director; compilation of data and preparation of background memoranda for dissemination to authorized individuals; and preparation of information memoranda pertaining to organizations asking for data. These functions formerly handled by the Summary Memoranda Unit,

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

To assume overall responsibility for publicizing FBI fugitives through all available media, prepare narrative and illustrative data for Top Ten Fugitive Program, research and preparation of feature fugitive articles; preparation and dissemination of material concerning fugitives; maintenance of special indices concerning distribution and cancellation of fugitive material to media; and conduct interviews with persons making telephonic or personal calls to FBIHQ concerning matters within the jurisdiction of the FBI or of interest to the Bureau. These functions were formerly handled by the Fugitive Publicity Unit.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Administrative Division arrange any necessary realignment of space and handle memoranda instructing transfers.
2. That recipient offices promptly survey clerical functions and responsibilities and submit appropriate recommendations in connection with any needed realignment of clerical personnel; also prepare updated organizational charts.
3. That attached airtel to all offices be approved.

airtel

December 15, 1972

To: SAC, Albany

From: For the Acting Director, FBI
W. Mark Felt
Acting Associate Director

SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF
FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL;
CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION 1

For information of all offices, the functions and personnel formerly assigned to the Crime Research Division have been realigned at FBIHQ.

Mr. Gray has assumed supervision of contacts with the Congress, press and other news media.

Remaining functions of the Crime Research Division have been reorganized and assigned as follows:

OFFICE OF ACTING ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

Review and analysis of correspondence received by the Director and the FBI and preparation of replies to correspondence.

OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

Formal liaison with the American Bar Association and other legal organizations.

TRAINING DIVISION

Operation and maintenance of the FBI Library; preparation and dissemination of pamphlets, reprints and related material of special interest

2 - All Offices

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

*W. Mark Felt
2-1
6:05P*

Airtel to Albany
Supervisory Reorganization of
Functions and Personnel;
Crime Research Division

In law enforcement and the crime problem; coordination and compilation of material for presenting FBI operations and jurisdiction to law enforcement and the public through movies, television and other news media; and specialized research and preparation of material in connection with memoranda requested by the Director and other Bureau officials; research for speeches and policy statements of the Director and analysis of articles and statements made concerning the FBI.

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

Special visitors on tours of Bureau facilities, meetings and photographs with the Director and all other tours conducted for visitors to the Bureau.

GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

White House name checks and appropriate correspondence; compilation of data and preparation of memoranda on individuals requesting special tours or meetings with the Director; compilation of data and preparation of background memoranda for dissemination to authorized individuals; and preparation of informative memoranda pertaining to organizations asking for data.

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

Overall responsibility for publicizing FBI fugitives through all available media; prepare narrative and illustrative data for Top Ten Fugitive Program, research and preparation of feature fugitive articles; preparation and dissemination of material concerning fugitives.

Above furnished for guidance in routing communications to FBIHQ.

Memorandum

TO : MR. FELT

DATE: 12/18/72

FROM : N. P. CALLAHAN *msc*

117

SUBJECT: SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF
FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL;
CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

By memo dated 12/14/72 from Mr. Walters to Mr. Felt the reassignment of Special Agent personnel of the former Crime Research Division to other Offices and Divisions at Headquarters was set forth. The purpose of this memo is to establish what clerical personnel will be assigned to each Office or Division. This information is necessary to effect changes in appropriate records.

For control purposes, each of the listed individuals should advise of the clerical personnel needed to carry out the functions and related responsibilities reassigned to the respective Office or Division. All clerical personnel assigned to the former Crime Research Division must be accounted for. Accordingly, the listed individuals should consult with each other if there is any question concerning assignment, excessive or needed clerical personnel, coordinating information with appropriate Office representative or Division head. Identities, positions and grades should be set forth under the respective Office or Division.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the reassignment of the clerical personnel of the former Crime Research Division be accomplished as set forth above with results furnished to the Administrative Division so that appropriate records can be adjusted.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Felt

DATE: December 21, 1972

FROM : T. J. Jenkins

SUBJECT: SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF
FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL
CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

Reference is made to memorandum L. M. Walters to Mr. Felt, dated December 14, 1972, in captioned matter.

Bureau Library at FBI Headquarters

A survey has been made of the library, its books, facility and personnel. At the present time, the library is housed in six rooms in the 4200 corridor at FBI Headquarters and has a staff of the following:

From a survey of the books, all books can be removed from the library to the library at Quantico with exception to certain reference books and out-of-town telephone directories which are necessary to be maintained at FBI Headquarters for ready-reference purposes by the Bureau staff at Headquarters. From the survey, it was determined these books can be maintained in two rooms presently occupied by the library, thus freeing four rooms as surplus space.

In the library is a lending library which has about 100 members. These members pay \$1 every six months for membership dues and have the privilege of using the library. Because of the minor use of this lending library, I am proposing that we phase out this part of the library during the next six months, removing the books at the end of that period to Quantico.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum T. J. Jenkins to Mr. Felt
Re: Supervisory Reorganization of
Functions and Personnel
Crime Research Division

From the survey, I believe that the two library technicians, who are presently assigned to the library, can handle the remaining reference books and telephone directories and that when [redacted] returns to work a decision can be made as to what can be done with her.

Since practically all of the library will be transferred to Quantico, it will be necessary to transfer certain employees of the library unit.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That all the books with the exception of the reference books, lending library, and out-of-town telephone directories be transferred to the Academy at Quantico.

(2) That authority be granted to gradually phase out the lending library over the next six-month period.

(3) That [redacted] be transferred to Quantico as Assistant Librarian and for lecture purposes at the Academy.

(4) That [redacted] be transferred to the Academy at Quantico.

(5) That the position of secretary be abolished and that [redacted] be reassigned.

Memorandum T. J. Jenkins to Mr. Felt
Re: Supervisory Reorganization of
Functions and Personnel
Crime Research Division

(6) That the two library technicians,
, be retained to handle the reference books and telephone directories
remaining at FBI Headquarters.

(7) If above transfers are approved, Administrative Division will
handle.

Approved. L
JW
12/27
1:18P

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Felt

DATE: January 3, 1973

FROM : T. J. Jenkins

SUBJECT: SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF
FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL
CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION

Reference is made to the memorandum of Mr. Walters to Mr. Felt, dated 12/14/72, in captioned matter. A review has been made of the units assigned to the Training Division from the former Crime Research Division, particularly the Research and Service Section. As you know, [redacted], has retired. I believe we can consolidate the Training Programs Processing Section and the Research and Service Section at FBI Headquarters into one section, calling it the Training Programs Processing and Research Section. This would eliminate one section chief.

As you know, we have recommended and it has been approved that the Library in the Crime Research Section be moved to Quantico. It is my proposal that the former Library Unit, what is left of it here at FBI Headquarters, be merged with the Research Unit leaving three units from the former Research and Service Section; namely, the Research Unit; Special Productions Unit and Publications Unit.

I have discussed with Mr. Callahan the transferring of the Suggestions, Forms, Reports Management, Manuals and Chief Clerk Matters to the Administrative Division and he is agreeable. This would mean an addition to his division of one Special Agent and seven clerical staff. The remaining units presently in the Training Division would remain as is.

This would give the Section Chief of the Training Division stationed at FBI Headquarters a total of 18 Agents and 53 clerks under his supervision. I believe that current Section Chief [redacted] is capable of handling this assignment as Section Chief, particularly if [redacted] is retained as Number One Man of the Section. [redacted] has served as Number One Man in the former Research and Service Section of the Crime Research Division.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum T. J. Jenkins to Mr. Felt
Re: Supervisory Reorganization of
Functions and Personnel
Crime Research Division

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the old Research and Service Section of the former Crime Research Division be combined with the Training Programs Processing Section of the Training Division and be given the name Training Programs Processing and Research Section.

(2) That the Suggestions, Forms, Reports Management, Manuals and Chief Clerk Matters be transferred from the Training Division to the Administrative Division.

(3) That ~~be retained~~ *DESIGNATED* current Section Chief in the Training Division be retained as Section Chief. *OF THIS NEW SECTION*

(4) That ~~be retained~~ *DESIGNATED* _____ be retained as Number One Man of this new Section in the Training Division.

ADDENDUM OF W. M. FELT 1-4-73

I am in agreement with the above except for the proposed new name Training Programs Processing and Research Section. I think this sounds pompous and cumbersome. I suggest and Mr. Jenkins has agreed to naming the new section Police Training and Research Section. I recommend approval with this modification.

Approved.
Jill
1-4
9:40 P

VIII. CIA'S CONTACT WITH HOODLUMS REGARDING
CASTRO ASSASSINATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED ^{702fa}
DATE 3/16/81 BY SP4-jms/Kaw #22,330

CIA info unclassified per
John E. Bacon 8/27/80

VIIA

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. **GMB**
4-22-91

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 6, 1967

FROM : W. R. Wannall

CIA INFO UNCLASSIFIED per
JOHN E. BACON 8/27/80
1

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S
INTENTIONS TO SEND HOODLUMS TO
CUBA TO ASSASSINATE CASTRO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/2/81 BY SP8 JSM/KSR
SP8 MAC/KSR 4-25-94
FOIA part 22, 230

In accordance with instructions, attached letter has been prepared for Attorney General setting forth all data in our files concerning captioned matter. Briefly, information being furnished is as follows:

Matter first came to our attention in Spring of 1961 in connection with our investigation of violation of Unauthorized Publication or Use of Communications Statute on the part of Arthur James Balletti, arrested in Las Vegas, Nevada, by local authorities on wire tapping charge. Wire tap involved was on telephone of Dan Rowan, member of Rowan and Martin comedy team. Rowan at the time reportedly was engaged to Phyllis McGuire, girl friend of top hoodlum Sam Giancana and member of McGuire Sisters singing trio.

Through our investigation we determined involvement of Robert A. Maheu, private detective, who stated coverage on Rowan instituted in behalf of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) efforts to obtain Cuban intelligence data through hoodlum element, including Sam Giancana. Maheu was in contact with Giancana through services of John Roselli, another hoodlum, and Maheu authorized wiring of Rowan's room.

We checked matter with CIA on 5/3/61 and learned CIA was utilizing Maheu as intermediary with Sam Giancana relative to CIA's "dirty business" anti-Castro activities. CIA insisted it did not give Maheu any instructions relative to use of technical installations. By letter 5/22/61 we furnished former Attorney General Kennedy a memorandum containing a rundown on CIA's involvement in this. The originals of the letter and memorandum were returned to us for filing purposes. A copy of that memorandum is being attached to instant letter being sent to Attorney General.

On 5/9/62 Kennedy discussed with the Director a number of matters, including admission by CIA that Robert Maheu had been

Memorandum for Mr. Sullivan
Re: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S
INTENTIONS TO SEND HOODLUMS TO
CUBA TO ASSASSINATE CASTRO

hired by that Agency to approach Sam Giancana to have Castro assassinated at a cost of \$150,000. Kennedy stated he had issued orders that CIA should never undertake such steps again without first checking with Department of Justice and stated because of this matter it would be difficult to prosecute Giancana or Maheu then or in the future.

We learned on 6/20/63 from CIA that its contacts with John Roselli (Maheu's link with Giancana) had continued up until that time, when they were reportedly cut off.

It appears Roselli is using his prior connections with CIA to his best advantage. In May, 1966, when Bureau Agents endeavored to interview him he immediately flew to Washington and informed his former CIA intermediary. The current Director of Security, CIA, has advised through liaison channels that Roselli has CIA in an unusually vulnerable position and Roselli would have no qualms about embarrassing CIA to serve his own interests. In furnishing this information we were asked that it be held within this Bureau on a strictly need-to-know basis. We have, however, included it in the attached proposed letter to the Attorney General noting this CIA specific restriction.

We have two other references in our files to the over-all above information which we have included in the letter. One relates to a statement by Giancana in October, 1960, that he had met with an individual who was to assassinate Castro in November, 1960. The other is an article in the 8/16/63 issue of the "Chicago Sun Times" reporting that CIA agents had contacted Giancana to obtain Cuban intelligence.

ACTION:

If approved, attached letter will be sent to the Attorney General, with a copy for the Deputy Attorney General.

*The Attorney General
asked for this information
on Friday, 2/3/67 -
✓ [Signature]*



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

~~TOP SECRET~~

May 22, 1961

RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT: *SBH/2-10-93*

ARTHUR JAMES BALLETTI, et al.

On May 3, 1961, Colonel Sheffield Edwards,
Director of Security, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
furnished the following information.

Colonel Edwards advised that in connection with
CIA's operation against Castro he personally contacted Robert
Maheu during the Fall of 1960 for the purpose of using Maheu
as a "cut-out" in contacts with Sam Giancana, a known hoodlum
in the Chicago area. Colonel Edwards said that since the
underworld controlled gambling activities in Cuba under the
Batista government, it was assumed that this element would
still continue to have sources and contacts in Cuba which
perhaps could be utilized successfully in connection with
CIA's clandestine efforts against the Castro government.
As a result, Maheu's services were solicited as a "cut-out"
because of his possible entree into underworld circles.
Maheu obtained Sam Giancana's assistance in this regard and
according to Edwards, Giancana gave every indication of
cooperating through Maheu in attempting to accomplish several
clandestine efforts in Cuba. Edwards added that none of
Giancana's efforts have materialized to date and that several
of the plans still are working and may eventually "pay off."

Colonel Edwards related that he had no direct
contact with Giancana; that Giancana's activities were
completely "back stopped" by Maheu and that Maheu would
frequently report Giancana's action and information to
Edwards. No details or methods used by Maheu or Giancana
in accomplishing their missions were ever reported to
Edwards. Colonel Edwards said that since this is "dirty
business" he could not afford to have knowledge of the actions
of Maheu and Giancana in pursuit of any mission for CIA.
Colonel Edwards added that he has neither given Maheu any
instruction to use technical installations of any type nor has
the subject of technical installations ever come up between
Edwards and Maheu in connection with Giancana's activity.

DECLASSIFIED BY *SP4 Gmm/Kca*
ON *3/9/81* *FBI PA # 22,330*
CIA Info declassified per
John E. Bacon 8/27/80

~~TOP SECRET~~ *53*

ENCLOSURE

~~TOP SECRET~~


Colonel Edwards related that Maheu did come to him concerning the arrest in Las Vegas of Balletti for "wire tapping." Maheu cautioned Edwards that the Balletti arrest could cause CIA some embarrassment since Balletti was in Las Vegas attempting to obtain coverage on some "Hollywood people" in connection with Giancana's efforts for CIA. Edwards said that he did not know the facts of the Balletti case and Maheu claims "Balletti went too far" in his efforts to obtain information. Edwards added that he was unaware of any reason for this activity of Maheu or Giancana in Las Vegas and that Giancana's activity in furtherance of the anti-Castro activity was left completely in Maheu's hands.

Colonel Edwards advised that only Mr. Bissell (Deputy Director of Plans, CIA) and two others in CIA were aware of the Giancana - Maheu activity in behalf of CIA's program and that Allen Dulles was completely unaware of Edwards' contact with Maheu in this connection. He added that Mr. Bissell, during his recent briefings of General Taylor and the Attorney General in connection with their inquiries into CIA relating to the Cuban situation, told the Attorney General that some of CIA's associated planning included the use of Giancana and the underworld against Castro.

"Property of FBI
This report and its contents are
loaned to you by the FBI, and
neither it nor its contents are
to be distributed outside the agency
to which loaned."

- 2 -

~~TOP SECRET~~



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

~~TOP SECRET~~

May 22, 1961

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT *JBH 12-10-93*

ARTHUR JAMES BALLETTI, et al.

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the subject of technical installations ever come up between
Edwards and Maheu in connection with Giancana's activity.

DECLASSIFIED BY *SPE-9mm/K*
ON *3/9/81* *FOT Part 2, 330*
CIA Info declassified per
John E. Bacon 8/27/80

~~TOP SECRET~~

53

ENCLOSURE

~~TOP SECRET~~

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loaned to you by the FBI, and
neither it nor its contents are
to be distributed outside the agency
to which loaned."

- 2 -

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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE
DATE 4-25-94 BY SP8 MAC/BSL
(JFK)

1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

The Attorney General
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
ALL INFORMATION AND/OR,
Director, FBI
IN THIS DOCUMENT.

March 6, 1967

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S
INTENTIONS TO SEND HOODLUMS TO
CUBA TO ASSASSINATE CASTRO

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4-Jmk/Kee
ON 3/2/87 70100 22,330
CIA Info Declassified per
John E. Bacon 8/27/80

Our files contain the following information concerning the captioned matter, much of which has been furnished by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on a strictly highly confidential "need-to-know" basis. In view of this, it is requested that it be handled on a most restrictive basis.

This matter first came to our attention in the Spring of 1961 in connection with our investigation of a violation of the Unauthorized Publication or Use of Communications Statute on the part of Arthur Joseph Balletti, who had been arrested by local authorities in Las Vegas, Nevada, on a local wire tapping charge. Balletti and another unidentified individual in October, 1960, had reportedly placed a wire tap on the telephone of Dan Rowan, a member of the comedy team of Rowan and Martin. Rowan at the time reportedly was engaged to Phyllis McGuire of the well-known McGuire Sisters singing trio who was also known to be a girl friend of Sam Giancana, a top hoodlum.

During the course of the Balletti investigation it was ascertained that Robert A. Mahou, a private detective, was involved. Mahou during interview claimed he ordered coverage of Rowan in behalf of CIA's efforts to obtain intelligence information in Cuba through the hoodlum element, including Sam Giancana, which had interests there. Mahou said he was put in contact with Giancana in connection with these intelligence activities through John Roselli, a Los Angeles hoodlum. Mahou stated also that he authorized the wiring of Rowan's room and had discussed the matter with Roselli.

The essence of the above was furnished to former Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy by letter dated May 22, 1961 which enclosed a memorandum of the same date containing data made available on May 3, 1961, by Colonel Sheffield Edwards, who at that time was Director of Security at CIA, regarding his utilization of Mahou in connection with anti-Castro activities. Since our files show that Mr. Kennedy returned the original of our letter and its enclosed memorandum dated May 22, 1961,

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DATE 4-25-94 BY SP8 MAC/BSL
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downgrading and
declassification

The Attorney General

to us for filing purposes, a copy of the May 22, 1961, memorandum is attached hereto for your information.

You will note that Colonel Edwards advised he personally contacted Robert Mahou during the fall of 1960 for the purpose of using Mahou as a "cutout" in contacts with Sam Giancana in connection with CIA's clandestine efforts against Castro. Colonel Edwards stated that Giancana's activities were completely "backstopped" by Mahou, who would frequently report Giancana's actions and information to Edwards. No details or methods used by Mahou or Giancana in accomplishing their missions were reported to him, according to Edwards, as such involved "dirty business," of which Colonel Edwards could not afford to have knowledge. Accordingly, he said he had no prior knowledge of the above-mentioned wire tapping by Ballotti.

Further with respect to this matter, I was informed of the following on a highly confidential basis by former Attorney General Kennedy during a conference in my office on May 9, 1962:

He indicated that a few days prior thereto he had been advised by CIA that Robert A. Mahou had been hired by CIA to approach Sam Giancana with a proposition of paying \$150,000 to hire some gunmen to go into Cuba and kill Castro. He further stated CIA admitted having assisted Mahou in making the "bugging" installation in Las Vegas (referred to above) which uncovered this clandestine operation and for this reason CIA could not afford to have any action taken against Giancana or Mahou. Mr. Kennedy stated that upon learning CIA had not cleared its action in hiring Mahou and Giancana with the Department of Justice he issued orders that CIA should never again take such steps without first checking with the Department of Justice.

Mr. Kennedy further advised that because of this matter it would be very difficult to initiate any prosecution against Giancana, as Giancana could immediately bring out the fact the United States Government had approached him to arrange for the assassination of Castro. He stated the same was true concerning any action we might take against Mahou for any violation in which he might become involved.

On June 20, 1962, Mr. William Harvey, an official of CIA, advised that he had held a meeting with John Rosolli (referred to above as Mahou's link with Giancana) for the purpose of closing out the entire matter with which Rosolli had been involved. In this connection, Harvey stated that CIA had

The Attorney General

established contact with Roselli in "early 1961" with respect to a sensitive operation against Castro. Harvey said that for all intents and purposes the operation was discontinued and canceled after the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion in April, 1961, but Roselli had not been completely cut off, as he periodically indicated he was in a position to be of assistance.

It appears Roselli has since that time, nevertheless, used his prior connections with CIA to his best advantage. For example, in May, 1963, when contacted by Agents of this Bureau in connection with our current investigation of his activities he refused to talk and immediately flew to Washington, D. C., and consulted with Colonel Sheffield Edwards, who is now retired from CIA. Colonel Edwards in turn advised CIA, which told us, Mr. Howard J. Osborn, the present Director of Security, CIA, freely has admitted to us that Roselli has CIA in an unusually vulnerable position and that he would have no qualms about embarrassing CIA if it served his own interests. In furnishing this information, Mr. Osborn asked that it be held within this Bureau on a strictly need-to-know basis.

In light of the above information furnished us by CIA and former Attorney General Kennedy, it appears that data which came to our attention in October, 1960, possibly pertains to the captioned matter. At that time a source close to Giancana advised that during a conversation with several friends Giancana stated that Fidel Castro was "to be done away with very shortly." Giancana reportedly assured those present that Castro's assassination would occur in November, 1960, and that he had already met with the assassin-to-be on three occasions, the last meeting having taken place on a boat docked at the Fontainebleau Hotel, Miami Beach, Florida. Reportedly, Giancana claimed that everything had been perfected for the killing and the "assassin" had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a "pill" in Castro's drink or food.

Also of possible interest is a news article carried in the August 16, 1963, issue of the "Chicago Sun Times." This article carried the headline, "CIA Sought Giancana's Help For Cuba Spying," and it was reported therein that CIA agents had contacted Giancana in an effort to obtain Cuban intelligence after Castro came into power.

Enclosure

1 - The Deputy Attorney General (Enclosure)

18 May 1966

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

GMB 4-22-94

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ATTENTION : Mr. Samuel Papich

SUBJECT : Report of Meeting Between Colonel
Sheffield Edwards and "Johnny" Roselli

In confirmation of our oral discussion on 17 May 1966, this memorandum reports on a meeting between "Johnny" Roselli and Colonel Sheffield Edwards in Washington on 12 May 1966. Colonel Edwards, as you know, is a former Director of Security of this Agency who is now retired and heads the firm, Sheffield Edwards Associates, 1815 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. Colonel Edwards met with the undersigned on 13 May 1966 and related the following:

"Johnny" had called Colonel Edwards at 11:30 a. m., on 12 May 1966. He said that he wanted five minutes with Colonel Edwards and that he had something to tell him. Colonel Edwards agreed and made arrangements to meet him at the Cocktail Lounge of the Lawyers Club at 5:00 p. m.

"According to Colonel Edwards, "Johnny" arrived promptly at the agreed time. The Lounge at that hour is usually deserted except for the bar waiter. They ordered drinks. It is Colonel Edwards impression that "Johnny" has aged a lot since he saw him last. Colonel Edwards got the distinct impression that although he was trying to put on a good front, he looked worried and somewhat distraught. Colonel Edwards opened with some light

Edward Olson, CIA orally
Briefed me re this new development.

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DATE 4-25-94 BY SP8 mac/csr

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FOIPA # 22,330

CIA retained classification
Per John E. Bacon 8/27/80

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~~TOP SECRET~~

conversation but "Johnny", although friendly, was anxious to get to the point of his visit. The following is the essence of "Johnny's" story as he told it to Colonel Edwards.

Colonel Edwards let him talk freely and asked only a few questions since he did not consider it wise to interrogate him or press him for further details.

"Johnny" said that he had been approached on the street in Los Angeles by an FBI agent named Dodge, who said he wanted to talk to him. He said that he told the agent that he did not want to talk to him and kept on walking. Another agent, named Hill joined "Johnny" and Dodge as they walked down the street. The agents told him that the interview had nothing to do with him personally and that they had nothing against him. They tried to give him an envelope and a card. "Johnny" said he told them that if they had a legal document (such as a summons or subpoena) he would comply with the law, but they would have to deal with his attorney or have his attorney present. The agents said they wanted to talk to him alone and said it had nothing to do with him personally. They proposed that they meet him in a suburb in Los Angeles, which "Johnny" said was about forty miles away (either at this point, or later through his attorney) they told him they wanted to talk to him on a matter they knew he did not want an attorney to know. They said it was a matter of National Security. He still refused and they left him.

"They left him and when he got back to his apartment the envelope was there. He said he did not open it but called his attorney and had him open it. The envelope contained a picture of a woman and a child about four years old.

"Johnny" said the child was himself at that age (Colonel Edwards tried to get a little more detail on the envelope and the woman, but "Johnny" was very touchy on this).

"The attorney, Jimmy Calimonte, has talked to the FBI but has gotten nowhere except that they want to talk to "Johnny" alone. "Johnny" (who has had considerable

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experience in these matters) felt at the time and still feels that this is not the orthodox approach of the FBI and he is puzzled. He said to Colonel Edwards that if he did talk to the FBI, he was not going to tell them anything relating to National Security (this was volunteered and Colonel Edwards did not advise on this point either pro or con).

"After "Johnny" had finished his tale, Colonel Edwards asked him if he were being told this in confidence. "Johnny" said no, that Colonel Edwards could tell anyone he wished. In this regard, Colonel Edwards gave no advice and made no commitment. He did tell him that he might tell his successor (the undersigned) as a matter of information.

9/11.
"Colonel Edwards' estimate of this development is that "Johnny" is in some kind of "bind" personally. Colonel Edwards referred to an article in the Saturday Evening Post on the Mafia and Sam Giancana, who is now in jail in Chicago. Colonel Edwards thinks that "Johnny" believes that if he talks to the FBI alone, Sam or Sam's friends will believe he is "talking" which would be fatal for "Johnny" - he knows a lot about Sam. On the other hand, Colonel Edwards believes that "Johnny" wants to keep square with the Bureau.

"Colonel Edwards noted that "Johnny" barely finished one drink, which is unusual for him. He left, saying he was meeting his attorney, who was flying down from New York City on the shuttle (they had flown from Los Angeles to New York together)."

Although "Johnny" did not say so, Colonel Edwards is of the opinion that "Johnny" wanted this Agency to inform your Bureau of these developments and is using this channel for this purpose. This information is passed to you with the request that it not be released outside of your Bureau without prior coordination with this Office.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

In addition, it would be appreciated if you would not inform "Johnny" that we have passed this information to you without giving us an opportunity to consider its implications to this Agency. Colonel Edwards has indicated to the undersigned that he would be more than willing to be interviewed by representatives of your Bureau should you consider it necessary or desirable. Further, this Office is willing to provide whatever support or assistance you may consider desirable in any further action the Bureau may wish to take.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:


Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

27 MAY 1966

GMB 4-22-94

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ATTENTION : Mr. William O. Cregar *WOC*

SUBJECT : Report of Telephone Contact by
"Johnny" ROSELLI

1. Reference is made to our memorandum of 18 May 1966, which forwarded to you a report on a meeting between Colonel Sheffield Edwards and "Johnny" ROSELLI in Washington on 12 May 1966.

2. This memorandum is related to the same subject and is forwarded to your Bureau in confirmation of an oral conversation with Mr. William O. Cregar on 27 May 1966.

3. Mr. James P. O'Connell of this Office was at a meeting with Colonel Sheffield Edwards and Mr. Robert Maheu in the Madison Hotel at 4:00 P.M. on 26 May 1966. The purpose of this meeting has no direct relationship to the subject of this memorandum. During this meeting, Mr. Maheu received a call from "Johnny", who said that he had been trying to get in touch with Colonel Edwards or James P. O'Connell, unsuccessfully, through Joe Shimon, former Inspector of the Washington Metropolitan Police Department. "Johnny" went on to say that he had been in touch with the FBI on the matter he had discussed with Colonel Edwards, and had determined that it had nothing to do with the Agency and he wanted Maheu to inform Colonel Edwards and Mr. O'Connell to forget the whole matter.

4. James P. O'Connell of this Office was the individual used by Colonel Edwards to handle "Johnny" during this Agency's earlier involvement with him in activities known to you. After the meeting, Mr. O'Connell informed the undersigned that when he returned home he learned that an unidentified caller had called his home in an effort to locate him at 9:00 a.m. on the morning of 26 May 1966. On the

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DATE 4-25-94 BY SP8 MAC/ISK

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For part 22, 320
CIA Retained Classification
Per. John E. Bacon 8/27/80

evening of 26 May 1966, Mr. O'Connell received a call from Joe Shimon, who indicated that "Johnny" had been trying to get in touch with him. Mr. O'Connell informed Mr. Shimon that he had received the information that "Johnny" wanted to get to him.

5. This information is passed to you with the request that it not be released outside of your Bureau without prior consultation with this Office. As indicated in my memorandum of 18 May 1966, we will continue to report to you any information or attempted contacts made by "Johnny" with this Agency, through any means.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Howard J. Osborn
Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

*Shimon was
not to be
discussed
with
this office
without
prior
consultation
with
this office
5/27/66
WOB*

IX. FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY
PROTEST MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

IX

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. DeLoach

DATE: June 18, 1969

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY—
IS - SDS

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division of the Department, called me late this afternoon and said he had received an inquiry from Mr. Thomas Huston, a White House Staff Assistant. In that capacity Huston is interested in developing information for the President concerning the New Left movement. Huston said he wanted to talk to Yeagley about the New Left.

Yeagley told me he told Huston he felt he would be better off and would get more accurate information if he talked to FBI representatives in the Domestic Intelligence Division. Yeagley said Huston was coming over tomorrow, June 19th, at 3:00 p.m. to this Division to discuss the matter.

We will talk to him, of course, and see what he wants without making any commitments to him and advise you promptly as to the nature of his interest.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

WCS:pen/cbs

(4)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach *DL*

FROM : W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

SUBJECT: MR. TOM CHARLES HUSTON
STAFF ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT

DATE: June 20, 1969

Reference is made to the enclosed memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach dated June 18, 1969.

Mr. Huston did come in yesterday. The first thing he said was that he had made a mistake in going to Mr. J. Walter Yeagley as Yeagley did not seem to know anything about the New Left. Mr. Huston then went on to say that President Nixon called him in and discussed with him in some detail the need for the President to know in greater depth the details concerning the revolutionary activities stemming from the New Left. In particular, said Mr. Huston, President Nixon is interested in all information possible relating to foreign influences and the financing of the New Left. He said he was requested by the President to also go to other members of the intelligence community to develop whatever materials they may have within their jurisdiction.

Mr. Huston said that on completing his work, it will be presented to the President for his use.

I told Mr. Huston that I was not in any position to make commitments in this matter, that if he had such a request to make it would be necessary for him to put it in writing and address his letter to the Director who made the decisions in such areas. Mr. Huston said that he would do this.

RECOMMENDATION:

REC-71

~~For the information of the Director.~~

Enclosure

WCS:lm1 (5)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 6/23/69

FROM : C. D. Brennan

127

SUBJECT: FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY
PROTEST MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

Mr. Tom Charles Huston, Staff Assistant to the President, the White House, has submitted the attached memorandum requesting us to set forth our coverage of foreign communist support of revolutionary youth activities in the United States, its effectiveness and what steps can be taken to provide maximum possible coverage of these activities. He has also made the same request of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

The United States is the ultimate target of all revolutionary movements and support of revolutionary activities in this country comes from all strata of international communism whether they be pro-Russian, pro-Chinese or pro-Cuban oriented. This request by Mr. Huston requires a comprehensive, in-depth review of our coverage of all subversive groups in which we have an interest. We have started a division-wide research and analysis project and a detailed report to the White House will be prepared as requested to be submitted to the White House on June 30, 1969.

Mr. Huston has also indicated a desire to discuss this matter with us after evaluating our report. This will be coordinated by the Domestic Intelligence Division and, of course, no commitments will be made without securing the specific approval of the Director.

ACTION:

Attached for your approval is a letter to Mr. Huston acknowledging his memorandum and advising him our report will be forthcoming as requested.

Enclosures - 2

100-446997-84

FBG:djb

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 20, 1969

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FROM: Tom Charles Huston
Staff Assistant to the President

The President has directed that a report on foreign Communist support of revolutionary protest movements in this country be prepared for his study. He has specifically requested that the report draw upon all the resources available to the intelligence community and that it be as detailed as possible.

"Support" should be liberally construed to include all activities by foreign Communists designed to encourage or assist revolutionary protest movements in the United States.

On the basis of earlier reports submitted to the President on a more limited aspect of this problem, it appears that our present intelligence collection capabilities in this area may be inadequate. The President would like to know what resources we presently have targeted toward monitoring foreign Communist support of revolutionary youth activities in this country, how effective they are, what gaps in our intelligence exist because of either inadequate resources or a low priority of attention, and what steps could be taken, if he directed, to provide the maximum possible coverage of these activities.

I have asked CIA, NSA, and DIA to submit their contributions to me by Monday, June 30th. I would appreciate it if the Bureau would provide their response to the President's request by that date.

Since the Bureau has primary responsibility in this area, I would like to discuss the matter further with your staff after I have had an opportunity to evaluate the initial contributions. The President has assigned a high priority to this project, and I want to insure that he receives the most complete report that it is possible to assemble.


Tom Charles Huston

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

127
June 24, 1969

BY LIAISON

Mr. Tom Charles Huston
Staff Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Huston:

I have received your memorandum of June 20, 1969, requesting a report on foreign communist support of revolutionary protest movements in the United States.

In compliance with your request, a comprehensive, in-depth review of our coverage in this field is presently being conducted and you will be furnished the results on June 30, 1969. This analysis will cover foreign support of revolutionary youth activities in the United States emanating from all strata of international communism, whether they be pro-Russian, pro-Chinese or pro-Cuban oriented.

When you have had sufficient opportunity to evaluate this material, I will be happy to make a member of my staff available to you for further discussion at your convenience.

Sincerely yours,

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: June 30, 1969

FROM : C. D. Brennan

SUBJECT: FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY PROTEST
MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

The Director approved my memorandum of 6/23/69 which advised we were preparing a report for Mr. Tom Charles Huston, Staff Assistant to the President, at his request regarding our coverage of foreign communist support of revolutionary youth activities in the United States to reach him by 6/30/69. We advised Mr. Huston such a report would be forthcoming.

Our report sets forth the traditional channel for communist support of revolutionary activity in this country by the established basic revolutionary groups under foreign domination such as the Communist Party, USA, and the Socialist Workers Party. We also cover the capabilities of hostile intelligence operations directed at the United States by the Soviet Union, Cuba and Communist China.

Next we show the newer, bolder avenues of support and direction being utilized by revolutionaries, often without any attempt to conceal their purpose. These include international conferences which in this period of history are ostensibly for peace in Vietnam but which also have the usual underlying goal of destroying United States prestige in world affairs. The ease of international travel and communication with revolutionary intent by New Left and black extremist adherents from the United States and abroad is then set forth.

The section dealing with our coverage of the above threats to our internal security clearly shows our strong reliance upon the use of live informants and physical surveillance techniques contrasted by the highly selective and limited use of electronic coverage.

Enclosures (2).

FEG:pab

(11)

CONTINUED - OVER

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY PROTEST
MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

Our report shows that the FBI has been aware from the inception of the New Left and black extremist movements that they pose new and unique threats to our internal security. It shows we have readjusted our investigative intelligence efforts to cope with the new problems created. It stresses the fact that these movements are developing increasingly into hard-core revolutionary elements which will demand still greater attention in the form of increased coverage as it appears there will be increasingly closer links between these movements and foreign communists in the future.

We have prepared a transmittal letter to Mr. Huston submitting our report. Inasmuch as this document is not going directly to the President, no copy is being forwarded to the Attorney General at this time.

ACTION:

With your approval, the attached report and letter will be forwarded to Mr. Huston.

130
July .1, 1969

BY LIAISON

Mr. Tom Charles Huston
Staff Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Huston:

Pursuant to your request of June 20, 1969,
there is enclosed a report concerning foreign communist
support of revolutionary protest groups in the
United States.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure
FBG:pab/djb


~~TOP SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

Downgraded to secret per
Auto Declass Guide

4/15/2013
F67M83K21

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



SUBJECT: FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY
PROTEST MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

DATE: June 30, 1969

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

*Downgraded to Secret per
Auto declass Guide
4/15/2013 FL7M83K21*

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FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY
PROTEST MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

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INTRODUCTION

Although the term "revolutionary protest movement" cannot be precisely defined because of the amorphous nature of such movements, it can be said that revolutionary protest movements existing within the United States fall into two broad categories, i.e. the New Left movement and the black extremist movement.

The New Left movement, which grew out of the civil rights struggle of the 1950s, is a loose-knit, undisciplined group of individuals who view our system of government as irredeemably corrupt and oppressive. Their stated aims and objectives are simple; they are dedicated to the total destruction of our traditional values and democratic system of government.

The New Left movement in this country is clearly an integral part of a world-wide revolutionary movement of students and young intellectuals. There is a definite similarity of goals, a uniformity of action from country to country, and a rapport among leftist organizations and individuals in this and foreign countries.

Like the New Left movement, the black extremist movement in the United States can be traced to the civil rights movement of the early 1960s and the violent response to civil rights agitation. This is best seen in the history of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), formed in 1960 in Atlanta, Georgia. SNCC was one of the moving forces behind the Freedom Riders of the early 1960s and was the target of Ku Klux Klan violence. In May, [redacted], [redacted] was elected chairman of SNCC. The lack of progress toward integration since the 1954 school desegregation decision helped [redacted] to change SNCC from a nonviolent group to a full-blown black revolutionary organization. Other black nationalists took up [redacted] cry for a "bloody revolution" and a proliferation of black extremist groups seized the initiative for change from established civil rights organizations and now advocate outright revolution and destruction of our form of government.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Foreign communist support of revolutionary protest movements in the United States can be manifested in a number of ways. Since the Communist Party, USA, is under the domination and control of the Soviet Union, it can be used more and more as a vehicle to support these movements. Similarly, the Progressive Labor Party and other pro-Chinese Communist groups can be utilized by Communist China as a channel for rendering support to protest movements in the United States. Other traditional channels which can be used more are the communist-bloc diplomatic establishments and the clandestine intelligence services operated by the communists within the United States.

In addition to the channels of communication open to foreign communists within the confines of the United States, leaders of United States-based protest movements have in recent years begun to reach out beyond the continental limits of the United States to solicit support of foreign communists and revolutionary protest movements abroad. New Leftists and black extremists travel abroad extensively and participate freely in various international conferences which are invariably attended by and sometimes even sponsored by communists. New Left and black extremist leaders frequently confer with representatives of foreign communist governments. At the same time, revolutionaries frequently travel to the United States and confer with leaders of protest movements in this country.

All of these "channels of communication" are treated in this study which is designed to show the extent to which revolutionary protest movements in the United States are receiving foreign communist support.

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I. FOREIGN COMMUNIST SUPPORT OF REVOLUTIONARY PROTEST
MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

A. Influence of Domestic Communist Left

1. Communist Party, USA

Since it was founded in September, 1919, the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA) has been unswerving in its allegiance to the Soviet Union. Over the years the Soviets have utilized the CPUSA as a trusted vehicle to influence revolutionary activity within the United States. Accordingly, FBI investigations of CPUSA activities have included the objective of determining the extent to which the Soviets may have been using the CPUSA as a possible channel for Soviet support of the current revolutionary protest movements in this country. All available information derived from these investigations to date indicates that while the CPUSA has made overtures to the revolutionary protest groups there has been limited acceptance of the CPUSA by such groups.

In recognition of its lack of support among youthful activists on college campuses, the CPUSA is currently making plans to establish a new youth group directed toward youth in industry. Party leaders, on the other hand, have criticized New Left groups such as the Students for a Democratic Society as petty bourgeois radicals. Party youth who have attempted to have the CPUSA relate more clearly with such groups have been isolated and silenced. The CPUSA theoretical organ, "Political Affairs," in its March and April, 1969, issues, contained a two-part article entitled "The Student Rebellion," which clearly set out CPUSA opposition to the anti-Soviet, anti-CPUSA line of student protest groups.

Within the past year leaders of the CPUSA in the Midwest met with leaders of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) to discuss closer cooperation or possible recruitment of these individuals into the CPUSA. These overtures were completely rebuffed by the SDS people who stated that while there were no disagreements with CPUSA philosophy

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it is most doubtful the CPUSA is relevant today. When it was proposed that there be some form of collectivity between the SDS and the CPUSA, the SDS leaders replied that the CPUSA is not involved in SDS collectives because the CPUSA has nothing to contribute.

Subsequently, a leader of the SDS in conversation with leaders of the CP of Illinois stated that the "Establishment" as it exists today must be changed, even if this change must be through force. He added that the "Establishment" must be replaced by a communist government. He further stated that there has to be a communist party and there has to be a communist revolution and that SDS is the only group to organize the youth, thus rejecting the CPUSA as a possible vehicle for bringing about this revolution.

Available information discloses Soviet theoreticians now recognize their lack of status in the revolutionary student movement in the United States and the need to become influential in the current ideological struggle in order to orient it to Soviet style communism.

With regard to the activists in black extremist groups, the CPUSA is under a severe strain in attempting to develop a program to attract these individuals while at the same time adhering to its pro-Soviet and Marxist-Leninist ideology. The fight within the CPUSA on the way in which to handle the black question is a bitter one and no clear-cut policy has been established. An attempt by black nationalists within the CPUSA to pass a resolution recommending that Negroes arm themselves for self-defense was overwhelmingly defeated at the recent 19th National Convention. In addition, the pro-Maoist stance of the extremist Black Panther Party (BPP) is anathema to the pro-Soviet CPUSA.

CPUSA leaders have stated that the Black Panther Party may be a vehicle to stimulate revolutionary ferment among Negro youth if the Panthers can be taught a true Marxist-Leninist approach. Leaders of the CPUSA in California have been in contact with the Black Panther Party and have assisted in the setting up of a defense committee for Panthers who have been arrested. However, CPUSA leaders admit that it is not possible to talk to Black Panthers as communists. One CPUSA member was instructed to penetrate the Black Panther Party and to try to put over the CPUSA program. He did join the Black Panther Party but when he was exposed as a CPUSA member as a result of

attempting to advance CPUSA policies he was expelled from the Black Panther Party.

This does not mean that the CPUSA is not striving to play a more effective role in its relationship with activists of both New Left and black extremist groups. Individual Party members do play a role in demonstrations, activities, and workings of these groups. Party publications trumpet in support of all demonstrations which stir up discord in the United States whether it be economic, social, or against the war in Vietnam.

2. Pro-Chinese Communist Groups

a. Progressive Labor Party

Recent years have witnessed the formation of a myriad of extremist organizations enunciating the tenets of Communist China and Mao Tse-tung. The majority have been ineffectual paper organizations and not viable operations. However, one group, the Progressive Labor Party (PLP), is making significant organizational strides in major American cities and on a number of college campuses.

The PLP was founded in 1962, by extremist elements of the CPUSA who were dissatisfied with CPUSA's "revisionism" and who advocated the following of the Chinese communist line in all areas of policy. It is headed by such devoted revolutionaries as [REDACTED], [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] Communist Party; who was expelled from the CPUSA for extremist views; and [REDACTED], who, [REDACTED] was found guilty of conspiracy to riot, conspiracy to advocate criminal anarchy, and advocating criminal anarchy.

Headquartered in New York City, the PLP has established active branches in a number of major metropolitan areas including Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Newark, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and San Francisco. During recent months, it has made a concerted effort to establish PLP branches throughout the United States. Spearheading this drive has been [REDACTED].

[redacted] of the PLP and an expert on organization. The PLP is particularly interested in expanding its membership on the West Coast as evidenced by the recent assignment of [redacted], [redacted], [redacted], to Los Angeles, for that purpose.

The PLP maintains close contact with pro-Chinese Communist groups abroad and its publications consistently follow the Chinese Communist line. For example, during early 1968, the PLP issued a pamphlet in which it proclaimed that the PLP is among groups which "proudly make common cause with each other and with the Chinese for world revolution" and boasted of its support of the Viet Cong in defeat of our "common enemy, the United States ruling class."

Propos of the strong rapport existing between the PLP and the Communist Party of China, the latter informed top-level PLP members in 1967 that it considered the PLP to be the only revolutionary Marxist-Leninist party in the United States.

As evidence of Chinese Communist support of the PLP, information has been developed which revealed that during 1967 and 1968 the PLP received a total of more than \$13,000 from a European bank where an organ of the Chinese Communist Government maintains an account. During 1968, the PLP received more than \$2,000 from Hong Kong, believed to have emanated from Chinese Communist sources.

PLP leaders have been in periodic contact with Chinese Communist agencies and have on occasion visited the Chinese mainland. [redacted] and [redacted], members of PLP [redacted], travelled to the Red Chinese mainland in March, 1969.

Of equal significance is the PLP's stepped-up efforts to extend its influence on college campuses. The PLP's ability to seize upon situations ripe for violence was revealed by its role within Students for a Democratic Society.

(SDS) during the Columbia University riots, the turmoil at San Francisco State College, and participation in the student unrest at the University of California at Berkeley California.

The PLP has been particularly successful in its attempts to play a major role in the activities of SDS. During the SDS National Convention, which ended on June 22, 1969, at Chicago, the PLP element succeeded in splitting the organization into two separate groups, each electing national officers and claiming their respective groups to be in control of SDS.

b. Revolutionary Union

The Revolutionary Union (RU) was formed in the San Francisco area in early 1968 as the nucleus of a proposed new militant national Marxist-Leninist organization with allegiance to the thought of Mao Tse-tung and the Communist Party of China. After operating for over a year in an underground fashion, the RU partially surfaced in April, 1969.

Since its formation, the RU has organized into a number of "collectives" in the San Francisco area. Its members are old-time militant renegades from the CPUSA, former leaders of the PLP, and young high school and college militants who have gained some notoriety as activists in local campus and related disorders. RU members reportedly are accumulating weapons and engaging in firearms and guerrilla warfare training. They have played a prominent role in disorders at Stanford; at the University of California at Berkeley; at San Francisco State College; and in connection with the strike of the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers Union, which has resulted in violence in the Richmond, California, area.

At the present time, RU leaders are seeking to establish rapport with other militant "collectives" and increase their influence in the SDS. The RU is in competition with the PLP and is seeking to discredit PLP in the eyes of the Chinese Communists and neutralize PLP influence in SDS.

One of the [redacted] founders of the RU is [redacted], a long-time communist who turned first against the CPUSA and then dropped out of his leadership role in the PLP. In 1965, [redacted] clandestinely travelled to Communist China where he resided for approximately two years utilizing a pseudonym.

Shortly after his return to the United States in August, 1967, he advised reliable sources that he had returned "to do a job" for the Chinese communists. He outlined a three-fold mission: (1) to form a national coalition of domestic Marxist-Leninists sympathetic to Mao Tse-tung thought and the Communist Party of China; (2) to develop and forward information of interest to the Chinese communists; and (3) to recruit politically trusted youth who would travel to Communist China for an indeterminate period of cadre training after which they would return to this country and operate in behalf of Communist China in a nonpublic or submerged fashion. There is a strong presumption these latter individuals would be utilized as recruited intelligence agents operating clandestinely in behalf of Communist China.

In late 1967, [redacted] indicated a desire to obtain intelligence relating to the Soviet Union which he would forward to China. He provided funds for this intelligence-gathering effort and also to support the operations of a domestic pro-Communist China organization. He claimed to have a secret line of communication with Communist China. After completing diversionary travel to Los Angeles, [redacted] flew to London in early 1969 and while there contacted the Communist Chinese diplomatic establishment on two occasions. Thereafter, he flew to Paris and contacted the Chinese Embassy in Paris on two occasions. While in Paris, he dispatched a letter to an address in China. Significantly, the letter was directed to the name he used as a pseudonym while residing in China. He has stated he is able to communicate with them, but he is unable to receive adequate responses. [redacted] also indicates he is suffering from a lack of funds.

c. Miscellaneous Pro-Chinese Groups

Since the development of the Sino-Soviet ideological split, many factions have evolved from the American communist movement which to various degrees have lent allegiance to the Communist Party of China. Two are worthy of mention.

Communist Party, USA (Marxist-Leninist)

The Communist Party, USA (Marxist-Leninist) (CPUSA-ML) was created in late 1965 primarily as a vehicle for anti-United States propaganda and activity of its leader

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[redacted], a former member of the [redacted]. The CPUSA-ML in its initial stage proposed to conduct guerrilla warfare training, including the use of firearms; to organize cells in the South to exploit the racial situation; to agitate the population and to create situations which would require the use of Federal troops.

For a time the CPUSA-ML operated in California the Workers International Bookstore, an outlet for propaganda material originating in Communist China. The organization has been plagued by factionalism based upon the egotism of its leadership. [redacted] and a key aide, [redacted], split into two separate groups. In November, 1967, [redacted] and another member of the CPUSA-ML traveled to England where they made contact and sought liaison with a number of British pro-Communist China groups. Thereafter, they traveled to Paris where [redacted] was in contact with the Albanian Legation and the Chinese Embassy seeking funds; literature for his organization and extension of his travel to Communist China. Available information indicates [redacted] was rebuffed by both the Chinese and Albanians.

Committee of Correspondence

The Committee of Correspondence was organized in 1967 by [redacted] of Seattle, a former leader of [redacted]. This Committee, which has ties in California, publishes "The Voice," an anti-Soviet and pro-Chinese periodical. [redacted] group is in contact with other pro-Chinese groups and is seeking to establish influence and contacts within the domestic Negro nationalist and New Left movements. [redacted] was in attendance at the recent SDS National Convention as an observer and he has engaged in teaching informal classes in Marxism-Leninism. He is a frequent author of articles in "New Left Notes," a publication of the National Office of the SDS.

3. Trotskyite Groups

The Socialist Workers Party (SWP), founded in 1938, is a militant revolutionary group based on the theories of Marx, Engels, and Lenin as interpreted by Leon Trotsky rather than Joseph Stalin.

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In addition to its avowed aim to eventually overthrow our form of Government, the SWP's most immediate aim and objective is to hold together the coalition of antiwar groups prevalent in the country today. It also seeks public acceptability by running candidates for political office on local, state and national levels. SWP candidates for President and Vice President of the United States were successful in having their names placed on some 19 state ballots during the 1968 elections. They also traveled to South Vietnam where they engaged in discussions with United States servicemen.

The Trotskyite Fourth International (FI), self-styled as the World Party of the Socialist Revolution, is headquartered in Paris, France, and claims to be fighting for the realization of Leon Trotsky's ideas. The SWP was forced by the limitations of the Vorchis Act of 1940 to withdraw its official affiliation with the FI. Nevertheless, the SWP maintains "fraternal ties" with the FI and continually has "observers" in attendance at its international meetings.

The Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), SWP youth affiliate, also headquartered in New York City, was originally formed in 1957 by former members of socialist and communist youth organizations. One of its primary purposes is to recruit youth into the socialist camp who ultimately will become members of the SWP. The entire National Executive Committee of the YSA is composed of individuals who are also members of the SWP. Most of the YSA chapters are located on or near college campuses.

In addition to acting as a recruiting mechanism for ultimate SWP membership, the YSA's current main objective is to organize, dominate, control and perpetuate the antiwar movement in the country. The YSA, together with the SWP, credit themselves with organizing a number of massive antiwar demonstrations.

The YSA National Convention, held in Chicago, Illinois, from November 28 to December 1, 1968, was attended by 791 registered individuals, including 405 current active members representing 29 states and 128 cities. Guests came from Canada, Mexico, France and Germany. During the four days of the Convention, the YSA recruited approximately 60 new members.

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Because the YSA is a youth group consisting in the main of college students, most of its activities take place on or near college campuses. Its members have participated in many of the campus disorders which have recently swept the country. For the past several years, [redacted], [redacted] member and former national officer of the YSA, has been the dominant leader of the campus disorders and police confrontations on the campus of the University of California at Berkeley.

The foreign affiliations of the YSA are the same as those of the SWP.

After the French student uprising in the Spring of 1968, a leader of the SWP stated that for years the SWP has afforded financial and theoretical assistance and material assistance to maintain the Trotskyist cadre in France and that this assistance was paying off.

In 1968, a leader of the SWP noted that the role of the student youth in France was a new element injected into the spring uprising in that country and that the young militants of the Trotskyite Jeunesse Communiste Revolutionnaire played a key role in spite of its small force. He related that the role that American youth will play in the building of the American revolution must be similar.

In December, 1968, fourteen YSA and/or SWP members traveled to Cuba as guests of the Cuban Government to join in the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Cuban Revolution. Since returning from their one-month stay in Cuba, these individuals have participated in numerous lectures and discussions on college campuses throughout the United States supporting Fidel Castro's revolutionary views.

B. Role of Communist-Bloc Intelligence

Undoubtedly, as the number one target of communist intelligence agencies throughout the world, the United States is faced with the reality of skilled communist agents acting against the interests of our Nation. For years, the communist bloc of nations, including the Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Outer Mongolia, Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia, have had diplomatic, official and quasi-official representatives stationed in their establishments in this country.

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Currently, these establishments exist in New York City; Washington, D. C.; Pittsburgh; and Chicago with a total complement of over 1,000 communist nationals and about 1,400 dependents. Our investigations have disclosed there are over 350 known or highly suspected intelligence officers or agents among them, of whom about 220 are Soviet nationals.

In addition to this open or "legal" channel of intelligence operations, the communist-bloc nations utilize highly clandestine "illegal" networks which have no observable contact with the communist official establishments. The members of these networks who are sent here from abroad with fraudulent documents and fictitious cover stories perform intelligence collection tasks as do the communist intelligence agents operating under diplomatic or official cover. In time of emergency or war involving the United States and communist countries, the "illegal" networks would assume the primary collection role for communist countries whose diplomats and officials would be interned or expelled.

In spite of the extensive nature of communist-bloc intelligence operations to penetrate and subvert the United States, there is little evidence that these intelligence-gathering services are acting as channels for communist support of the revolutionary protest movements here. A significant exception to this statement is the known activity of certain Cuban intelligence agents acting under the cover of official assignment to the Cuban Mission to the United Nations (CMUN) in New York City.

C. Cuban Intelligence Service

Export of the Cuban revolution is the fundamental principle of Cuba's foreign policy. We have determined that in the United States such policy is manifested by clandestine support of Puerto Rican independence groups and the fomenting of racial strife and student disorders throughout the United States.

In September, 1967, two officers of the Cuban Intelligence Service (CIS) assigned to the CMUN told a representative of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico (NPPR) in New York City that Cuba was prepared to offer Puerto Rican independentists weapons and material. In April, 1968, a CIS officer at the CMUN delivered to a representative of the

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Puerto Rican Independence Movement (Movimiento Pro-Independencia de Puerto Rico - MPIPR) a message from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba (CPC). The message expressed CPC solidarity with and support of the MPIPR in the latter's struggle for independence. Cuban support has included guerrilla training for some leaders of current violence in Puerto Rico.

With reference to the fomenting of racial strife and student disorders in the United States by Cuba, our investigation of [REDACTED] is a case in point. He arrived in the United States in August, 1967, to assume duties [REDACTED] at the CMUN. He left the United States on February 20, 1969, at the State Department's request based upon the results of our investigation of him. At the time of his departure, he held the rank of Counselor, second in order of diplomatic precedence at the CMUN.

Our investigation of [REDACTED] determined that he was a principal link between the Cuban Government and leaders of black extremist and New Left student groups in the United States. He gave advice and counsel to such leaders, including [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], then affiliated with the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC); furnished Cuban propaganda materials to them; and arranged visits to Cuba for unknown purposes by many of them.

During early May, 1968, while in Washington, D. C., ostensibly as a representative of the Cuban Government to the Pan American Health Organization, [REDACTED] instructed [REDACTED] to "continue to follow Plan A-5." [REDACTED] was then agitating in Washington, D. C., following the serious racial disorders here of the preceding month. The significance of [REDACTED]'s instructions to [REDACTED] is unknown; however, an SDS plan of similar terminology resulted in an undisciplined mass protest and violence at Columbia University, also during April, 1968.

The intelligence functions of [REDACTED] at the CMUN appear to have been taken over by [REDACTED], lower in diplomatic rank ([REDACTED]), but superior to [REDACTED] in the CIS hierarchy ([REDACTED]).

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[redacted] arrived in the United States on September 6, 1968. Our investigation of him has determined that he acts as a clearing agent for American citizens of various backgrounds who travel to Cuba, associates with individuals who are affiliated with black extremist and New Left groups, and has been operationally associated in New York City with Soviet intelligence personnel. He acted as interpreter for [redacted] during a visit of the latter in Cuba.

D. Chinese Support

Communist China, while having no diplomatic or official establishments in the United States, is posing an intelligence threat constantly through individuals residing in or visiting this country. Various residents or citizens of our Nation who have Chinese origins or background have come to occupy prominent or significant positions in fields of science, education, industry, defense, and government. Some of these individuals in the past have acted in a manner hostile to our national interests, apparently motivated by fear or sympathy with the communist regime in mainland China.

The Chinese Communists have in the past mounted a propaganda attack against the United States Government with the intention of aggravating the racial situation in this country. On April 16, 1968, for instance, the New China News Agency (NCNA) broadcasted a statement by Chairman Mao Tse-tung in support of the Afro-American struggle "against" violence. Mao described this struggle as "waged by the exploited and oppressed black people for freedom and emancipation. . . ." and stated it represented a call for the "oppressed people of the United States to fight against the barbarous rule of the monopoly capitalist class." This was Mao's first major statement on this subject subsequent to 1963.

Hong Kong newspapers, on April 18, 1968, reported that Peking was transformed on the previous day into a camp of militant support for American Negroes whose "certain victory" over imperialism was proclaimed by hundreds of thousands of marching Chinese. A parade supporting Mao's message was reported to have lasted from seven in the morning until eight-thirty in the evening.

For several years, the NCNA has been forwarding large quantities of anti-United States propaganda material to Negro publications and pro-Chinese communist groups in the United States. Information was received in May, 1968, which disclosed the NCNA had commenced circulating photographs in this country depicting racial riots, arsonist activity, and other civil disorders participated in by the American Negro.

Data was received on May 3, 1968, revealing a news release had been sent from China Features, Peking, China, to the Black Organization of Students, Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey. The news release contained a statement by Mao Tse-tung in which mention was made of support of the Afro-American struggle against violent repression.

The BPP makes widespread use of the "Red Book" in instructing its members. The "Red Book" is a collection of quotations by Mao Tse-tung. Sections of it have been incorporated into the BPP "Political Education Kit." One such section advocates the abolition of war through war and states that in order to get rid of the gun it "is necessary to pick up the gun."

During January, 1969, a BPP leader in Los Angeles had a poster in his possession which had been published by the Peoples Fine Arts Press, Shanghai, China. It was captioned "Support the Peoples of the World in Their Anti-Imperialist Struggle."

E. International Conferences

Numerous conferences throughout the world during the past few years have evidenced both the international character of the revolutionary protest movement and the desire of foreign elements to influence the conduct of that movement within the United States. The majority of these meetings have focused on opposition to the United States position in Vietnam. As active participants in these gatherings, representatives of militant groups within the United States have joined with their foreign counterparts in efforts to undermine the United States. A representative sampling of such conferences will illustrate this point, and, in addition, give some indication as to the disruptive, anti-United States proposals made at them.

1. International Conference on Vietnam

Stockholm was the scene of the International Conference on Vietnam held from July 6 through July 9, 1967. The World Peace Council, an international communist front organization, was one of the principal organizers of this conference. Among the 452 persons who attended the conference were delegates from communist countries. Among those present from the United States were [redacted]; CPUSA National Committee member [redacted]; the [redacted]; [redacted], of Women's International League for Peace and Freedom; and [redacted], then an official of the National Conference of New Politics.

The conference made plans for a world "Peace in Vietnam Day" to coincide with the antiwar demonstration in Washington, D. C., on October 21-22, 1967. Our investigation of this matter disclosed that a massive demonstration of approximately 35,000 people demonstrated in Washington, D. C., which demonstration culminated with an assault on the Pentagon. Demonstrations were also held in various other cities, both inside and outside of the United States.

2. Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) Conference

In July and early August, 1967, [redacted], of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, was a guest of the Cuban Government and an "honorary delegate" to the conference of the LASO held in Cuba. He sought to tie in the Negro extremist activities in the United States with the anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle which was the basic theme of the conference. With headquarters in Havana, Cuba, LASO was formed by communist, revolutionary and terrorist groups from various Latin American countries dedicated to the violent overthrow of imperialism, particularly United States imperialism.

3. Bratislava Conference

Another so-called peace conference was held at Bratislava, Czechoslovakia, from September 6 through September 13, 1967. Among the 41 persons from the United States who attended the conference were: [redacted] who led the

delegation from the United States; SDS leaders [redacted], [redacted], and [redacted], who headed an SDS delegation of nine; [redacted] and [redacted], both of SNCC; [redacted], of the Student Mobilization Committee; [redacted], a writer for the "New Republic" magazine; [redacted] and [redacted], both of the American Friends Service Committee; [redacted], a professor at [redacted] University; and [redacted], an editor of [redacted] magazine.

Both North Vietnam and the NLF sent delegations to the conference.

The delegates from the United States to the Bratislava conference were furnished free lodging and meals while at the conference but were required to pay their own transportation expenses. They were thoroughly briefed by [redacted] well in advance of their departure and were instructed to be prepared to give reports and participate in discussions on various topics, including the antiwar, student and civil rights movements and an analysis of the current American political situation. [redacted] told the delegates that the purpose of the conference was to create solidarity and mutual understanding between revolutionaries from Vietnam and their supporters in the United States and that the delegates were chosen on the basis of their experience in radical activity.

4. International Cultural Congress

In January, 1968, an International Cultural Congress, attended by more than 500 delegates and observers from all over the world, was held in Cuba. Some 25 individuals from the United States were present; including [redacted] and SDS leaders [redacted], [redacted] and [redacted]. Five members of SNCC reportedly traveled to Havana to attend this conference. This travel was handled through the Cuban Mission to the United Nations (CMUN). The announced purpose of this conference was to obtain unity of action in Cuban anti-imperialism fights.

5. Japanese Conference on Vietnam

An international meeting sponsored by Beheiren, a Japanese peace group, was held in Kyoto, Japan, August 11-14, 1968. Approximately 250 antiwar activists including 23

from the United States were in attendance at this conference. Discussion centered on such subjects as how to wage a campaign against war and for social change throughout the world, how to deal with the Okinawa issue and the United States - Japan Security Pact, how to assist United States deserters and draft evaders and how to coordinate antiwar movements around the world.

6. International Assembly

Columbia University was the site of an International Assembly held in September, 1968. This Assembly was sponsored by the Columbia University chapter of SDS and representatives from many foreign countries were in attendance. Much of the activity of the Assembly centered around revolutionary tactics to be employed by students.

7. Budapest Conference

A group of 20 American antiwar activists including SDS members traveled to Budapest, Hungary, in September, 1968, to meet with representatives of North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front. Nine of the group from the United States had taken part in the demonstrations at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago a few weeks before this trip. The meetings were arranged by ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ and centered on the Paris Peace Talks, on prospects for further student unrest in the United States and on furthering unrest among American servicemen.

8. Hemispheric Conference to End the War in Vietnam

From November 28 to December 1, 1968, the Hemispheric Conference to End the War in Vietnam was held in Montreal, Canada, hosted by the Communist Party of Canada. It was attended by approximately 1,700 delegates and observers, including a 5-man delegation from North Vietnam, headed by Hoang Binh Giam, Minister of Culture, and a 2-man delegation from the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. Others in attendance included extremists, communists, pacifists and student radicals from North and South America.

The approximately 25 BPP members in attendance, with the aid of white radicals, took over control of the conference following a series of fights and scuffles. Together with other extremists they attacked the "solidarity with the

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Vietnamese" theme, wanted to assist North Vietnam and the Viet Cong and wanted to denounce American imperialism. A participant at the conference described the BPP members as "black storm troopers" and said that no decision was made at the conference without consideration of the Panthers' reactions.

BPP leader [redacted] addressed the conference on December 1, 1968, and called for the overthrow of colonial powers. [redacted] also had a series of conferences with the North Vietnamese and National Liberation Front delegations.

9. Stockholm Conference on Vietnam

The Stockholm Conference on Vietnam was held May 16 through 18, 1969. Approximately 350 to 400 individuals from 52 countries representing a myriad of peace and antiwar groups were present. About 25 individuals from the United States attended.

This conference was requested jointly by the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF) and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) delegations to the Paris Peace Conference. The basic theme was to promote acceptance among the world's intellectuals of the 10-Point Program advanced by the NLF and DRV at the Paris Peace Conference. They felt that if they could convince the conference participants that this program was the only legitimate answer to the Vietnam situation, the influence these individuals had in their respective countries would be sufficient to build world opinion in support of the 10-Point Program.

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A report of the Working Group on Action of this conference set forth seven proposals to be used to undermine support of the United States position in Vietnam. These were:

a. Collection of signatures of prominent people to be publicized in newspapers.

b. National and international demonstrations on July 4 in the form best suited to the organizations and the movement in each country. Specific suggestions called for vigils outside United States Embassies on July 4 and the reading aloud of names of Americans killed in Vietnam.

c. Boycott of United States firms providing goods for the war in Vietnam or engaged in the transporting of such goods.

d. Increased international support for draft resistance in the United States and by Americans abroad; encouragement of defection from the United States armed forces; and, opposition within the Army.

e. Increased support of the 10-Point Program of the NLF and exposure of "the weaknesses" of President Nixon's Eight-Point Program.

f. A campaign for recognition of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by more world governments.

g. The issues of the war in Vietnam, particularly the unconditional withdrawal of United States troops and the 10-Point Program of the NLF, should be stressed as widely as possible at all national and international conferences.

With regard to proposal number one enumerated above, the June 25, 1969, edition of "The Washington Post" carried a three-quarter page advertisement calling for the President to end the war in Vietnam now. Specifically, the signers of this advertisement, many of whom have had communist affiliation, called for a halt to offensive military operations and the withdrawal of all United States troops within one year to begin immediately.

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10. World Congress of Women and World Peace
Council Conferences

In June, 1969, delegations from the United States attended conferences of the World Congress of Women in Helsinki; Finland, and the World Peace Council in East Berlin, Germany. Both of these are international front groups controlled by the Soviet Union. These conferences served as forums for propaganda against the United States' position in Vietnam.

We have determined that the World Peace Council Conference in East Berlin, June 21-23, 1969, was concerned with the following points:

- a. Unceasing denouncement of United States imperialism.
- b. Recognition of the government of the German Democratic Republic by the United States and other countries within its sphere of influence.
- c. Encouragement to the Vietnamese to continue fighting inasmuch as they are fighting the battle of all emerging nations and this will give the latter the courage to fight their own wars of liberation.
- d. Support of provisional revolutionary governments wherever they occur.

The American delegation to this conference included communists, members of SNCC, and the various peace groups,

F. Visits to the United States by Foreign Revolutionaries

The virtual lack of travel restrictions by the United States, coupled with the comparative ease in obtaining a United States visa, practically eliminates any problems foreign leftists have in travelling to the United States. There have been numerous such individuals who have travelled here in the past for varying reasons. Notable among these are [redacted] from Belgium and [redacted] from Germany.

[redacted] is a leading member of the Trotskyite Secretariat of the Fourth International. He is also an activist in the New Left movement throughout Western Europe. His wife, [redacted], was active in founding the anarchistic Socialist German Students Federation (German SDS) in Berlin, Germany, and is friendly with leaders of various radical youth groups in Western Europe. [redacted] trip was arranged by the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) while the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) organized the tour of [redacted]. These two individuals, during September and October, 1968, made separate tours which took them to some 50 college and university campuses from coast to coast and border to border. Each appearance made by these two individuals was marked by their espousing the revolutionary doctrine of the New Left before United States college students.

[redacted], a former national chairman of the German SDS, entered the United States on February 25, 1969, reportedly to engage in a speaking and fund raising tour arranged for him by SDS. He appeared at some 16 colleges throughout the country and did not miss any opportunity to spread seeds of discontent and anarchy. He cited examples of harrassment and disruption and announced the need to build an international revolutionary alliance adding that a victory for the movement in one country is a victory for the movement in another.

[redacted] was subpoenaed to appear before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee and during his testimony expressed support for the regimes in Cuba and North Vietnam, the Viet Cong, and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.

A BPP rally in Los Angeles, California, on November 6, 1968, was addressed by a Mexican student who was reportedly associated with the Student Strike Committee of Mexico City, Mexico, which organization had been involved in violent clashes with Mexican police and military units. During a subsequent meeting, it was agreed that Mexican student leaders would come to Los Angeles to instruct the BPP in disruptive tactics and that BPP members would go to Mexico for training.

G. Contact Between Leaders of United States Protest Groups and Representatives of Foreign Communist Groups

1. New Left Movement

Cuba and North Vietnam have been particularly strong magnets for New Left protest groups. Much of the strength of these organizations derives from their ability to maintain close relationships and dialogues with foreign establishments. For instance, the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC) maintains a foreign contact list of over 300 individuals and organizations throughout the world. Its [redacted], [redacted], has travelled to the Soviet Union, North Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, Cuba and Sweden in furtherance of opposition to the war in Vietnam. The NMC and [redacted] maintain almost constant contact with the Governments of Cuba and North Vietnam and representatives of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. [redacted] feels such contacts give the NMC and himself notoriety and build their image in the movement.

One of the most highly publicized visits to North Vietnam was a ten-day trip made in December, 1965, by [redacted], a former member of the American Youth for Democracy, a defunct communist youth group; [redacted], a member [redacted] of the CPUSA and [redacted], one of the founders of SDS. Their trip was not authorized by the State Department. It was described by the three travellers as a "fact-finding" mission.

Following the Bratislava Conference held in September, 1967, [redacted] and two other SDS members travelled to North Vietnam.

In February, 1968, 20 SDS members visited Cuba and, while there, held conferences with representatives of the National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Viet Cong, and with individuals from North Korea.

In March, 1968, [redacted], an SDS national officer, visited Cuba where he met with representatives of Communist China, North Korea and North Vietnam. [redacted], another SDS activist, visited North Vietnam in April, 1968.

A group of 34 SDS members travelled to Cuba by way of Mexico in late August, 1968. Part of this group met with a representative of the National Liberation Front who stated that the New Left in the United States should conduct more and more demonstrations against the war in Vietnam.

In November, 1968, four women representing the Women Strike for Peace travelled to the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet Women's Committee. En route, they met with Madame Phan Thi Binh, head of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in Paris, France. In the Soviet Union, the delegation was hosted by various women in influential positions throughout the Soviet Union. A representative of the group planned to return via Prague, Czechoslovakia, and made contacts there.

On June 20, 1969, a delegation of 20 individuals under the sponsorship of the Committee of Returned Volunteers (CRV) travelled to Cuba by way of Mexico City. This trip was organized with the full knowledge that it is contrary to State Department regulations; however, a statement adopted by the group indicates that the travel would be made without such approval as a further demonstration of the CRV opposition to United States policies. Available information indicated that all expenses over and above transportation was to be borne by the Cuban Government. In addition, the CRV is currently planning a similar trip to Cuba in July, 1969.

Also, in July, 1969, a group of women affiliated with the WSP plans to travel to Cuba at the invitation of the Federation of Cuban Women.

An example of the ability of the subversive New Left movement to reach a wide audience is probably best illustrated by "Ramparts" magazine and its ~~_____~~.

"Ramparts" magazine espouses a line of opposition to United States domestic and foreign policy from a left-oriented position, utilizing sensationalist muckraking to draw the reader's attention to its attacks on various Government agencies.

The political orientation of "Ramparts" magazine is a reflection of the activities and ideology of its [redacted]. [redacted] has been extremely active in this country in a leadership capacity in a broad range of New Left protest activities and openly espouses support of Fidel Castro and the Vietnam National Liberation Front. His foreign travels include a trip to Cambodia, Thailand and South Vietnam in February, 1966. In January, 1968, he attended the Cultural Congress held in Havana, Cuba, traveling to Cuba via Mexico City as an accredited correspondent. He stated he traveled with the approval of the State Department. He was again in Cuba from April 23, 1968, to May 10, 1968, and from December 31, 1968, to January 13, 1969, during which time he attended the celebration on January 2, 1969, of the 10th anniversary of the Cuban revolution.

Demonstrative of [redacted] political ideology is the following statement made by [redacted] in 1965, "The Viet Cong is a party of peace, and if I was in Vietnam, I would be on the side of the Viet Cong."

2. Black Extremist Movement

The obvious objective of communist incursions into the black extremist movement is to bring about a Negro revolution in the United States. The presence of trained intelligence agents in Cuban Embassies and Missions together with the interest expressed by Cuban officers in the black extremist movement in this country accentuate the possibility of involvement of Cubans in this movement.

Travel by numerous black extremists to Cuba has been extensive. As previously indicated, [redacted] and such SNCC members as [redacted] and [redacted] traveled to Cuba in July, 1967, where [redacted] was successful in extracting a promise from Fidel Castro to support the black extremist movement.

From Cuba [redacted] traveled extensively to other countries in search of support for his militant movement in the United States. His itinerary included North Vietnam, Algeria and Egypt. As a SNCC representative, he attended portions of the second session of the Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal held in Copenhagen, Denmark, in late November, 1967.

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During 1967, [redacted] traveled to Hanoi, North Vietnam, as a member of the International Affairs Department of SNCC. His trip was sponsored and paid for by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, London, England.

[redacted], who resides in Denmark, was designated as the Northern European Field Secretary for SNCC as of January 1, 1968. His functions include fund raising, public relations and coordination with other groups in northern Europe.

A group known as the Friends of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee is active in Paris, France. The leader of this group is [redacted], who is aided by a female group of American SNCC-adherents. They are attached to the International Office of SNCC in New York City. This group has been engaged in raising funds for SNCC.

[redacted], an employee of the French Press Agency in Paris, France, resided until 1951 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where he was actively associated with the Philadelphia branch of the Socialist Workers Party.

[redacted] of SNCC, has had many contacts with representatives of foreign countries. On December 27, 1967, [redacted] was advised the Cuban United Nations Mission was holding money for his organization and arrangements were made on that date for him to visit a Cuban intelligence agent, [redacted]. On January 18, 1968, [redacted] and an unidentified Negro were observed entering the Mission empty-handed. A few minutes later each departed the Mission carrying a package wrapped in plain brown paper.

While he was in Sweden during 1968, [redacted] was part of a group which met with individuals representing the North Vietnamese and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.

In June, 1968, [redacted] Republic of New Africa (RNA) leaders, including [redacted], visited Africa to determine what kind of assistance RNA could obtain from Tanzania and what type of assistance they could

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render Tanzania in return. Prior to their visit it was believed that hundreds of acres had been set aside in Tanzania for the RMA to set up a commune and that Red China had land-clearing equipment and farm machinery to be utilized on this property.

After their visit they indicated that the president of the country would make some agreements with [redacted] concerning commitments and foreign aid to the RMA; however, these commitments would not be made public. The [redacted] stated that as a contribution and to show good faith, RMA would obtain medicine and books and send them to Tanzania. In addition, the RMA would assist in organizing the United Liberation Front in Africa which would attempt to unite all black African nations.

[redacted], the RMA's [redacted] in exile, is a black extremist who fled the United States in 1961 following his indictment on a kidnaping charge in North Carolina. He resided in Cuba until 1966 at which time he went to Peking, China, where he has since resided.

[redacted] has indicated that he wants to send Negro militants to Tanzania to establish a cadre for the proposed RMA commune. The purpose of this cadre will be to begin training blacks of the African continent in guerrilla warfare.

In October, 1968, a group of American Negroes were in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, where they were allegedly recruiting an army to eventually fight against the United States and take over RMA's rightful title to portions of the United States. These troops allegedly would be equipped with Chinese weapons. [redacted] and [redacted] are actively recruiting for this army, and 17 American Negroes are reportedly now active in the affairs of RMA in Tanzania.

In September, 1968, [redacted] discussed the negotiations to establish a Chinese Consulate in Quebec. If it is established, [redacted] states, RMA will be able to legally purchase equipment through the consulate. [redacted], speaking before the National Black Economic Conference in Detroit, Michigan, in April, 1969, stated that the black nation of RMA means developing relations with friendly powers, namely, Red China and Cuba.

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[redacted] of the RNA [redacted], returned to New Orleans, Louisiana, on [redacted] 1969, from New York City. [redacted] advised a source of this Bureau that she had traveled to Cuba through Mexico City this Spring with the flight to Cuba being paid for by the Cuban Government.

[redacted] attended a rally in Cuba which was addressed by Fidel Castro and following the rally met with Castro. In the conversation with him, he said that he was unhappy with the dissension among black extremist organizations in Los Angeles, California. Castro added that when the black people in the United States move forward in their revolution, they will receive assistance from Cuba and other countries.

Castro presented [redacted] with literature which he stated concerned the revolution and which would be applicable to the black man's struggle in the United States. He promised to send [redacted] revolutionary literature in the near future which would be of assistance.

In December, 1968, two leaders of SNCC departed from the United States for Cuba, via Mexico, allegedly to attend a Cultural Congress. When they returned to the United States, they were intercepted at the Canadian border by Customs and Immigration officials. They had in their possession a large quantity of North Korean, Soviet and Cuban propaganda and souvenirs. Included in their personal effects were a five-band portable radio of Soviet manufacture, adaptable for receiving intelligence communications and a revealing notebook and diary.

Analysis of the notes and diary indicates the two Negro nationalists were on a "mission" on behalf of SNCC and that this mission had been well planned in advance. Their effects also indicated they were placed in contact with the North Koreans in Havana by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba; on February 24, 1969, they flew from Moscow for Korea under the cover of pseudonyms; in March, 1969, in North Korea they received detailed training in revolutionary theory and political and military intelligence; and they spent considerable time in the Soviet Union and Cuba prior to their return. Among their notes were instructions for organizing a committee which would propagandize for the withdrawal of allied forces from Korea and seek the support of the New Left and domestic Negro nationalist movements, as well as domestic

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Koreans, to discredit the United States position in Korea. It was indicated this proposed committee would be supported by the North Koreans through contacts in Cuba.

Additionally, it was indicated the subjects had received training in a likely assignment to accumulate intelligence in behalf of the North Koreans relating to "latest plans, newest weapons, blueprints, actual weapons, if possible." According to the notes, these should be secretly transmitted to the North Koreans through the Soviet Union, the Tanzanian Embassy, Cuban consulates in Mexico or France, or the Korean Embassy in Prague. One of the individuals described the assignment as "We will be their (North Koreans) eyes and ears as we wage armed struggle."

On August 19, 1968, [redacted], BPP national official, and [redacted], then the BPP leader in [redacted], arrived in Havana, Cuba. Assistance for their trip was rendered by an official of the Cuban Mission to the United Nations.

Following his return to the United States, [redacted] talked of his trip during a BPP rally in Oakland, California, on September 5, 1968. He indicated that on their arrival in Havana they were met by representatives of the Communist Party of Cuba and revolutionary guerrilla organizations from Asia and Africa. In a subsequent speech on December 23, 1968, [redacted] stated that during his trip to Cuba he had been personally assured by Fidel Castro that the Cuban Government would give all-out support to Negroes in the United States.

While in Cuba on August 24, 1968, [redacted] voiced his appreciation to the "Revolutionary Government of Cuba" in a radio broadcast made from Havana.

On September 11, 1968, a Havana, Cuba, radio station broadcasted telephone interviews with BPP leaders [redacted] and [redacted]. [redacted] stated that Oakland, California, was under military occupation following the voluntary manslaughter conviction of BPP leader [redacted]. [redacted] stated that "they" will answer counterrevolutionary violence with revolutionary violence.

In September, 1968, [redacted], a SNCC leader in New York City, traveled to Cuba via France. On October 2, 1968, an interview with [redacted] was broadcast on Radio Havana. In answering a question regarding urban guerrilla warfare, [redacted] said it is going to become more and more a method that will have to be employed by people not only in America but also throughout the world as they struggle for liberation. In answering a question about the full independence of Afro-American people, [redacted] stated that the Afro-American people cannot achieve their liberation without the liquidation of United States imperialism.

When [redacted] was in Atlanta, Georgia, during December, 1968, he mentioned that he had received limited training while in Cuba in firing automatic and semiautomatic weapons.

Representatives of the Cuban Government allegedly told [redacted] that Cuba was ready to assist SNCC with financial and other means of support in its struggle in the United States. Before aid was to be given, however, SNCC was to give concrete evidence of revolutionary activity in the next six months. [redacted] claimed Cuban officials told him Cuba would grant asylum to any black political refugee from the United States. [redacted] also claimed his trip to Cuba was financed by money provided him by the Cuban Government through its United Nations Mission in New York City.

During November, 1968, two BPP members traveled to Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, to attempt to organize a BPP group in that area. During a news conference, one of the BPP members stated that the only thing whites could give to the BPP was money or guns.

During the period from March 9 to March 24, 1969, BPP leaders [redacted] and [redacted] traveled to Sweden, Denmark and Norway to obtain financial backing for the BPP. The visit was sponsored by the Socialist Workers Party of Denmark and the Solidarity Committee for Black Liberation, which reportedly has offices in Copenhagen, Denmark, and Stockholm, Sweden. Prior to departing on the trip, [redacted] stated that the Socialist Workers Party of Denmark had sent two round-trip tickets for the trip in addition to a total of four thousand dollars for bail and defense funds of the BPP.

While traveling through the Scandinavian countries, [redacted] made a number of speeches and held several press conferences in which he claimed that the BPP was the "political proletariat" and that it was engaged in a class struggle and not in a racial struggle.

II RESOURCES NOW TARGETED TOWARD MONITORING FOREIGN COMMUNIST SUPPORT OF REVOLUTIONARY PROTEST MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

A. Domestic Communist Groups

1. Communist Party, USA (CPUSA)

Coverage of foreign support of the CPUSA is very effectively achieved at present through live informant coverage at a high level, supplemented by selective electronic and physical surveillances.

2. Pro-Chinese Communist Groups

a. Progressive Labor Party (PLP)

PLP investigations utilize live informants, the monitoring of bank accounts, selective electronic surveillances and, where necessary, physical surveillances.

b. Revolutionary Union (RU)

RU is covered with high-level informants. We also utilize selective electronic surveillances on RU leaders and physical surveillances to identify contacts. Physical surveillances are also conducted on RU activities and on individual leaders.

3. Trotskyite Groups

a. Socialist Workers Party (SWP)

The SWP and its youth group, the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), have been actively penetrated by informants. We also utilize physical surveillances and [redacted] to supplement this coverage.

B. Diplomatic Establishments and Intelligence Operations

1. Soviet and Satellite

Our coverage aimed at penetration of Soviet and Satellite intelligence activities in the United States includes a wide variety of techniques. We use fixed lockouts on certain communist-bloc establishments which lockouts in most cases are equipped with photographic surveillance equipment. We also conduct physical surveillances on selected individual intelligence officers and maintain electronic surveillances on communist-bloc official establishments.

We operate a program to identify individuals in contact with communist-bloc officials and establishments to determine the purpose of the contact and to assess the potential risk to internal security posed by the contact. At the same time, we explore the informant potential of the individual concerned.

Sources and informants regularly in contact with communist-bloc intelligence personnel perform an important role in our coverage as do the double agents we operate against them.

We have conducted selected operations in the past aimed at the direct defection of communist-bloc intelligence agents.

2. Chinese

Current resources directed against Chinese intelligence activities include the use of informants and electronic surveillances on selected subjects. We also have devised and operated programs aimed at specific problem areas such as Chinese scientists in the United States, Chinese aliens entering the United States and Chinese seamen who may have a port of call in this country.

Excised as information deals with sensitive technique

3. Cuban Intelligence Service

We also use physical surveillances on a selected basis and periodically review pertinent bank records. Through the use of informants and double agents we have been successful in penetrating Cuban Intelligence Service operations in the United States.

C. International Conferences

Whenever possible, we attempt to have informants or sources under our control participate in international conferences as representatives of the particular groups with which they are affiliated. We have been successful in penetrating several of these conferences in this fashion and have materially benefited from on-the-scene coverage.

D. Contacts Between Revolutionary Leaders and Leaders of Foreign Communist Governments

This is a difficult area to cover as we do not always have informants in a position to accompany individual revolutionary leaders on their official and private trips to foreign countries. We rely on other established informants whom we have targeted against these revolutionary leaders and who have access to them upon their return. In some cases, we are able to determine the result of foreign contacts through our domestic electronic surveillances.

E. Travel of Foreign Leaders to the United States

Coverage of foreign leaders to the United States is effected through the coordination of our informant coverage of the organization sponsoring the trip and physical and selective electronic surveillances, where applicable.

III. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Historically, the United States has been the target for subversive activities emanating from and directed by the international communist movement in regard to efforts to foment disorder and disruption in a revolutionary vein. The change from the monolithic nature of the movement to polycentrism only served to magnify the problem in that it diversified the subversive attack.

Regardless of the diversification, the basic nature of the attack remained the same. It emanated from communist forces abroad and was channeled into this country through communist-bloc diplomatic establishments and old-line communist groups and organizations working to advance international communist objectives.

From the standpoint of the FBI's responsibilities in regard to countering these subversive thrusts, there were two significant factors which enabled us to mount effective counterintelligence operations.

The first factor was that the activities themselves, took place for the most part within our borders. It was a situation which lent itself to effective utilization of manpower for coverage and counterintelligence purposes.

The second factor was that the activities were engaged in by organizations, such as the CPUSA, which were tightly structured organizationally in the traditional pattern of communist parties throughout the world. As such, they presented clear-cut targets for informant penetration.

Because these old-line organizations also followed the traditional pattern of operating under the concept of democratic centralism with an insistence on rigid discipline throughout party ranks, high-level informant penetration provided an insight into strategy and tactics being considered at all levels. Here, too, it was possible to effectively negate their thrusts.

The emergence of the New Left and black-extremist movements in our society drastically altered the situation. They evolved mostly out of social reform movements which increasingly have been transformed into hard-core revolutionary movements dedicated to the total destruction of our democratic traditions and our society.

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They produced a new breed of revolutionaries whose main preoccupation with communism is that it has produced men like Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh, and Che Guevarra, whom they hope to emulate in the overthrow of a system they deem oppressive.

From the inception of these movements, the FBI has been aware of the fact that their increasingly revolutionary communist imprint posed new and unique problems for the internal security of this nation.

As these forces of revolutionary protest hardened in their resolve to accomplish their purpose, more and more they reached out to join hands with and seek support from old-line communists not only inside our country but also communists and anarchists abroad.

In effect, the picture has changed from one in which international communist forces sought out supporters within our country to carry out their objectives to one in which domestic revolutionaries are reaching out seeking the support of anyone, including communists, throughout the world who will help and support them in their own destructive aims.

Since the objectives of both so clearly coincide, it is inevitable that they will join forces in common cause. The willingness of the Soviets, Chinese communists, and Cubans to support the efforts of domestic revolutionaries here already has been demonstrated. In addition, the movement of the New Left and black extremist revolutionary protestors toward increasingly centralized, more tightly disciplined organizations will facilitate the inevitable linkings.

It is essential that we bring together and intensify the intelligence capabilities of our country to meet this growing threat. It is imperative that we penetrate all the channels of communication between foreign communist forces

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and domestic revolutionaries; that we take all possible additional investigative steps to safeguard the security of this Nation in a time of multiplying and expanding crises. This has become mandatory because of increasing problems which may be anticipated in the future by reason of the growing alliances with foreign communist elements.

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ORGANIZATION APPENDIX

Black Panther Party (BPP)

The Black Panther Party was formed in 1966 at Oakland, California. Its stated purpose is to organize black people so they can "take control of the life, politics, and the destiny of black communities." The BPP advocates the use of guns and guerrilla tactics in its revolutionary program and encourages Negroes to arm themselves against the police. Its publications contain quotations from the writings of the leader of Communist China and feature his statement that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." It is headquartered at Berkeley, California.

Committee of Returned Volunteers (CRV)

The Committee of Returned Volunteers was established in 1966 at New York City and is composed of individuals who have worked abroad in such programs as the American Friends Service Committee and Peace Corps. It has a membership of approximately 3,000 individuals and 12 chapters throughout the United States. It has been active in demonstrations protesting United States policy, particularly the draft and the war in Vietnam. Its leaders have discussed establishing contact with revolutionary groups, aiding guerrillas, destruction of existing governments and the transmission of information to Soviet-bloc countries. The CRV has declared that it seeks radical changes in United States policy towards Asia, Africa, Latin America and emerging communities in the United States.

National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC)

The NMC was founded in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1966. It is a coalition of over 100 antiwar, antidraft, black extremist and pacifist groups. Among the organizations which participated in NMC activities are the CPUSA, SWP, SNCC and the American Friends Service Committee. The NMC has organized major protest demonstrations including the march on the Pentagon in October, 1967; the disruptive demonstrations

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during the Democratic National Convention at Chicago in August, 1968; and the demonstrations during the Presidential Inauguration ceremonies in January, 1969. Its officers include [redacted], who has travelled to the Soviet Union, North Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, Cuba and Sweden in furtherance of opposition to the war in Vietnam.

Republic of New Africa (RNA)

The Republic of New Africa is headquartered at Detroit, Michigan. It is a black extremist separatist organization whose stated purpose is the formation of a black nation within the United States. It advocates the formation of a black army to defend this black nation and to attack its enemies.

Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)

SDS, which is headquartered in Chicago, Illinois, was formed in 1962 and is an outgrowth of the Student League for Industrial Democracy, the youth affiliate of the League for Industrial Democracy, an old-line labor-oriented Fabian Socialist organization.

The founding convention of SDS held at Port Huron, Michigan, in 1962, produced the "Port Huron Statement" which in effect provided the ideological framework for SDS, established the line of "participatory democracy," and set the direction for much of the subsequent activity of the organization.

In the ensuing years SDS has increasingly entered into the mainstream of revolutionary politics particularly with regard to its opposition to the American form of government. At its National Council meeting held in Austin, Texas, in March, 1969, SDS [redacted] stated, "Our primary task is to build a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movement." The central appeal of SDS has been to the student. It currently has approximately 250 chapters located mainly on college campuses.

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Student Mobilization Committee (SMC)

The SMC is headquartered at New York City. It is dominated by members of the SWP and/or members of the YSA. The SMC has been active in demonstrations against United States policy. Its aims are to bring about the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, to end university "complicity" with the war, and to establish self-determination for Vietnam and "black America." It currently publishes the "Student Mobilizer."

Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)

SNCC was formed in 1960 at Atlanta, Georgia, as a nonmembership civil rights organization. It took part in voter registration work in the South and was one of the moving forces behind the Freedom Riders of the early 1960s. In 1966 [redacted] was elected [redacted] of SNCC. He moved this group from the civil rights field to a full-blown revolutionary group. [redacted] urged Negroes to prepare for a "bloody revolution."

[redacted] was succeeded as [redacted] in 1967 by [redacted], who continued [redacted] policy of denouncing United States' intervention in Vietnam, calling for rebellion by any means, and massive civil disobedience.

SNCC is a nonmembership organization which is headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia. It is composed of 50 staff members and a 15-member Central Committee.

Women's International League
for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)

WILPF, an international pacifist group, has its United States headquarters in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and has a current membership of 11,000 in 154 branches in the United States.


The WILPF advocates the right to self-determination, support of the United Nations, enforcement of civil rights laws and new approaches to the entire social welfare system. The organization is currently urging abolition of the Anti-Ballistic Missile System, withdrawal of United States troops from Vietnam, and the elimination of racial discrimination.

Women Strike for Peace (WSP)

WSP is a national nonmembership women's pacifist group which maintains a national office at Washington, D. C. It has engaged in numerous protests against the draft, the war in Vietnam, nuclear tests, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile System. Representatives of WSP have been in contact with the National Liberation Front and have travelled to various countries including Cuba.

X. DEPARTMENTAL LETTERS CONCERNING
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES

X



4/27/75
Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

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May 12, 1975

The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy
Chairman, Subcommittee on Adminis-
trative Practice & Procedure
Committee on the Judiciary
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Kennedy:

In response to your letter of April 24, 1975, I am presently able to provide you with most of the information you have requested concerning the electronic surveillance activities of federal departments and agencies. The information contained in this letter and the enclosed material relates mainly to electronic surveillance conducted within the United States pursuant to the criminal law enforcement responsibilities of the federal government. It does not include electronic surveillance that may be conducted either in the interests of national security, or outside the United States by federal departments and agencies other than the Department of Justice. As to these latter areas, the Department is still in the process of assembling and reviewing the materials relevant to your request, and we are thus unable at this time to determine what information we may be able to provide. I should note that in several instances your letter requests information that is either not in the possession of this Department or pertains to areas outside its proper jurisdiction. Since I understand that you have sent similar letters to other federal departments and agencies, I expect that you will receive responses from them. Nevertheless, I believe the information contained in this letter and the enclosed material will answer in substantial part the questions you have raised concerning electronic surveillance.

Apart from the area of national security, electronic surveillance conducted within the United States by federal departments and agencies may be divided into two broad

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May 12, 1975

categories: consensual and non-consensual. Consensual electronic surveillance refers to those instances in which one or more parties to the communication is a federal agent, is cooperating with a federal agent, or has consented to the surveillance. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment does not apply to consensual surveillance. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Lopez v. White, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). Congress has also excepted consensual electronic surveillance from the provisions of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, including the requirement of a court order. Thus, sections 2511(a)(c) and (d) of Title 18 of the United States Code provide:

(c) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire or oral communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception.

(d) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire or oral communication where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State or for the purpose of committing any other injurious act.

Although consensual electronic surveillance may thus be conducted without a court order, its use by federal agents has been subject to regulations issued by the Attorney General since 1967. The current regulations are specified in Attorney General Kleindienst's memorandum of October 16, 1972 entitled "Memorandum to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies,

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May 12, 1975

Re: Monitoring Private Conversations with the Consent of a Party," and in a subsequent amending order issued by Attorney General Saxbe. Copies of the memorandum and order are enclosed herein.

In general, all federal agencies and departments are required to obtain advance authorization from either the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division, or Deputy Assistant Attorney General of that Division before any electronic device may be used to overhear, transmit, or record a private conversation, other than a telephone conversation, without the consent of all the parties to that conversation. In exigent circumstances precluding a prior request for authorization -- such as imminent loss of essential evidence or a threat to the immediate safety of an agent or informant -- emergency monitoring may be instituted with the authorization of the head of the responsible department or agency or his designee. The Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division, however, must be notified promptly of any such monitoring and of the specific conditions that precluded obtaining prior approval.

The above procedures do not apply to consensual monitoring of telephone conversations. Because they involve the transmission of a participant's voice through a complex and far-reaching network of wires, the common use of party lines and extension telephones, and the possibility of an unseen participant permitting another person to listen on the same extension, telephone conversations have long been thought not to enjoy the same expectation of privacy as face-to-face conversations. For this reason, supervision and control over consensual monitoring of telephone conversations are vested instead in the head of each federal department and agency, who is required to adopt appropriate regulations and procedures on the subject. These regulations usually do not restrict consensual monitoring of telephone conversations in any significant respect. The relevant regulations of the Drug Enforcement Administration are enclosed herein.

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The current regulations issued by the Attorney General also require the head of each federal department and agency to exercise responsibility for the security of all consensual monitoring devices, including the maintenance of current inventories as to amounts, storage, and users of such equipment, and to submit to the Attorney General during July of each year a report containing an inventory of all electronic and mechanical equipment designed for the monitoring of conversations and a brief statement of the results obtained from their use during the prior fiscal year.

All federal departments and agencies having criminal investigative responsibilities are authorized to conduct consensual electronic surveillance. These agencies include, *inter-alia*, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the Bureau of Customs, the Department of Agriculture, the Internal Revenue Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Postal Service, the Secret Service, the Department of Defense, the Naval Investigative Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Department of Interior. The number of consensual uses of electronic surveillance devices authorized by the Department of Justice between 1970 and 1974 is set forth in the attached memoranda. The total annual authorizations were as follows: 1970, 512; 1971, 840; 1972, 1272; 1973, 1484; 1974, 2518. In the first quarter of 1975, the total number of authorizations was 1,125. In March 1975, the total authorized was 461. The above figures, of course, do not include consensual monitoring of telephone conversations. Nor do they include consensual electronic surveillance that may be conducted either outside the United States or in the interests of national security.

Apart from the area of national security and foreign intelligence, non-consensual electronic surveillance within the United States is conducted pursuant to a court order. Under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, the Attorney General may authorize an application to a federal judge of a competent jurisdiction, who may grant an order approving the interception of wire or oral

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Re: Monitoring Private Conversations with the Consent of a Party," and in a subsequent amending order issued by Attorney General Szabo. Copies of the memorandum and order are enclosed herein.

In general, all federal agencies and departments are required to obtain advance authorization from either the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division, or Deputy Assistant Attorney General of that Division before any electronic device may be used to overhear, transmit, or record a private conversation, other than a telephone conversation, without the consent of all the parties to that conversation. In exigent circumstances precluding a prior request for authorization -- such as imminent loss of essential evidence or a threat to the immediate safety of an agent or informant -- emergency monitoring may be instituted with the authorization of the head of the responsible department or agency or his designee. The Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division, however, must be notified promptly of any such monitoring and of the specific conditions that precluded obtaining prior approval.

The above procedures do not apply to consensual monitoring of telephone conversations. Because they involve the transmission of a participant's voice through a complex and far-reaching network of wires, the common use of party lines and extension telephones, and the possibility of an unseen participant permitting another person to listen on the same extension, telephone conversations have long been thought not to enjoy the same expectation of privacy as face-to-face conversations. For this reason, supervision and control over consensual monitoring of telephone conversations are vested instead in the head of each federal department and agency, who is required to adopt appropriate regulations and procedures on the subject. Those regulations usually do not restrict consensual monitoring of telephone conversations in any significant respect. The relevant regulations of the Drug Enforcement Administration are enclosed herein.

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ment of Justice. With the exception of the Drug Enforcement Administration, no division, bureau, or agency of this Department conducts electronic surveillance outside the United States for any purpose, including national security. The Drug Enforcement Administration does conduct electronic surveillance outside the United States in certain limited circumstances. This surveillance is presently undertaken only on a bilateral basis, that is, with the approval and participation of the foreign country involved. It is my understanding, however, that a predecessor organization of DEA did conduct non-consensual electronic surveillance unilaterally in at least one instance occurring in 1973. The surveillance was initiated in connection with that organization's criminal law enforcement responsibilities and was designed to obtain information concerning international drug traffickers. The subject of the surveillance was a foreign national, and not an American citizen or an alien resident of the United States.

Under its current policy, DEA does not conduct any non-consensual electronic surveillance abroad without the approval and participation of the foreign country. In almost all cases, the surveillance is actually conducted by law enforcement officials of the foreign country, rather than by DEA, and is not initiated as the result of a request by DEA. I am informed that the instances in which DEA has been responsible in any way for electronic surveillance conducted abroad are exceedingly few, and that in none of these was the subject of the surveillance an American citizen or an alien resident of the United States.

Under existing regulations, the approval of the U.S. Chief of Mission in the host country is required before DEA may conduct, or request a foreign country to conduct, non-consensual electronic surveillance outside the United States. In addition, I have ordered that henceforth DEA shall obtain the prior approval of the Attorney General before conducting, or requesting anyone else to conduct, non-consensual electronic surveillance outside the United States where the subject of the surveillance is an American citizen or alien resi-

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dent of the United States. Although the approval of the Attorney General has not been required previously, as indicated above there have apparently been no instances in which an American citizen or resident has been the subject of non-consensual electronic surveillance conducted abroad by DEA or initiated at its request.

On occasion DEA has also conducted consensual electronic surveillance outside the United States, usually involving the use of a voice transmitter concealed on an informant, a DEA agent, or a law enforcement officer of the host country. Under DEA's current policy, this transmitter device is used with the specific approval and participation of the foreign country. Again, in almost all cases, the surveillance is actually conducted by a law enforcement official of the foreign country, rather than by DEA, and DEA's involvement is in general limited to supplying the equipment necessary to conduct the surveillance. So far as DEA can determine, no American citizen or alien resident of the United States has been the subject of consensual electronic surveillance conducted abroad through use of this device by DEA, or by a foreign country at DEA's request.

I have ordered that whenever practicable DEA shall obtain the advance approval of the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division, or Deputy Assistant Attorney General of that Division, before conducting, or requesting anyone else to conduct, consensual electronic surveillance outside the United States where the subject of the surveillance is an American citizen or alien resident of the United States. Where circumstances preclude a prior request for authorization, DEA may conduct the surveillance, but shall notify promptly the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division of the surveillance and the specific conditions that precluded obtaining prior approval. This procedure parallels that outlined in Attorney General Kleindienst's memorandum of October 16, 1972 governing consensual electronic surveillance within the United States by federal departments and agencies. It applies, of course, only to

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private conversations, other than telephone conversations, that are sought to be monitored without the consent of all the parties to that conversation. For the reasons mentioned earlier, prior approval for consensual monitoring of telephone conversations is not required.


DEA has also used certain electronic devices abroad in order to track the location of drug shipments. These devices do not transmit, overhear, or record private conversations, but rather merely emit signals which indicate the location of the device.


DEA's policy concerning electronic surveillance has also been described in its response to your letter of April 24 to Mr. Bartels. The remaining divisions, bureaus, and agencies within the Department do not conduct electronic surveillance of any kind outside the United States.

I trust that the information I have furnished will assist your subcommittee in its inquiry concerning the practices and procedures of the federal agencies in the area of electronic surveillance.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,


Edward H. Levi
Attorney General



Office of the Attorney General

Washington, D. C. 20530

June 24, 1975

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The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy
Chairman, Subcommittee on Administrative
Practice and Procedure
Committee on the Judiciary
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Kennedy:

In my letter to you of May 12, I stated that the Department was in the process of assembling the materials relevant to your inquiry regarding electronic surveillance conducted within the United States in the interests of national security and foreign intelligence. Pursuant to a review of this matter, I am able to provide you with the following information.

Since 1940 by directives of the President, the Attorney General has been vested with responsibility over electronic surveillance conducted within the United States in the interests of national security and foreign intelligence. This surveillance is authorized pursuant to the personal approval of the Attorney General, rather than by court order. Based on an examination of the relevant precedents, it is the position of the Department of Justice that the Executive may conduct electronic surveillance in the interests of national security and foreign intelligence, and in aid of his conduct of the nation's foreign affairs, without obtaining a judicial warrant. This has been the position of the Department of Justice for more than three decades and is supported by historical practice as well as judicial decision. The only two Courts of Appeals to address the issue, the Third Circuit and the Fifth Circuit, have held that the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment does not apply in the area of national security and foreign intelligence and that under the Constitution the President has the authority to conduct electronic surveillance without a court order as part of his diplomatic and military or commander-in-chief functions. See United States v. Butenko (Appeal of Ivanov), 494 F.2d 593 (3rd Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom.

Ivanov v. United States 419 U.S. 881 (1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974). In Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Congress also explicitly disclaimed any attempt to place limitations on the President's authority in this area. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3). The Supreme Court has, of course, expressly left open the question whether the warrant requirement applies to electronic surveillance conducted for national security and foreign intelligence purposes. In United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 308-9 (1973), however, the Court, while holding that the domestic security area was subject to the warrant requirement, was careful to note that "the instant case requires no judgment with respect to the activities of foreign powers, within or without this country. . . . There is no evidence of any involvement, directly or indirectly, of a foreign power." Moreover, in the Butenko case, although the United States prevailed in the Third Circuit, the Department acquiesced in the petition for certiorari. Nevertheless, the Court denied certiorari, thus leaving undisturbed the Third Circuit's decision upholding the authority of the Executive to conduct electronic surveillance without a court order where national security and foreign intelligence is involved.

Under the standards and procedures established by the President, the personal approval of the Attorney General is required before any non-consensual electronic surveillance may be instituted within the United States without a judicial warrant. All requests for surveillance must be made in writing by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and must set forth the relevant factual circumstances that justify the proposed surveillance. Both the agency and the Presidential appointee initiating the request must be identified. Requests from the Director are examined by a special review group which I have established within the Office of the Attorney General. Authorization will not be granted unless the Attorney General has satisfied himself that the requested electronic surveillance is necessary for national security or foreign intelligence purposes important to national security.

In addition, the Attorney General must be satisfied that the subject of the surveillance is either assisting a foreign

power or foreign-based political group, or plans unlawful activity directed against a foreign power or foreign-based political group. Finally, he must be satisfied that the minimum physical intrusion necessary to obtain the information will be used.

All authorizations are for a period of ninety days or less, and the specific approval of the Attorney General is again required for continuation of the surveillance beyond that period. The Attorney General has also been directed to review all electronic surveillance on a regular basis to ensure that the aforementioned criteria are satisfied. Pursuant to the mandate of United States v. United States District Court, electronic surveillance without a judicial warrant is not conducted where there is no foreign involvement.

All electronic surveillance related to national security and foreign intelligence within the United States is conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Bureau has established strict internal review procedures with regard to all electronic surveillance activities.

The extent of telephone and microphone surveillance conducted within the United States in the interests of national security and foreign intelligence was last disclosed in 1973. On a comparable basis, the extent of such surveillance between 1969 and May 1975 is set forth in the attached memoranda. The total number of subjects of telephone surveillance during that period is as follows: 1969, 113; 1970, 90; 1971, 87; 1972, 102; 1973, 116; 1974, 148. These figures do not, of course, indicate the number of persons whose conversations were intercepted, but rather only the number of subjects to whom the surveillance was directed. The total number of subjects of microphone surveillance during that period was as follows: 1969, 14; 1970, 19; 1971, 16; 1972, 31; 1973, 38; 1974, 32. Again, these figures do not indicate the number of persons whose conversations were intercepted, but rather the number of subjects to whom the surveillance was directed. Moreover, I should further note that the above figures are duplicative to an extent since in several cases the same subject was under both telephone and microphone surveillance.

The total installations of telephone and microphone surveillances during the above periods would, of course, exceed


these figures by varying margins. On occasion, the subject under surveillance moved to a new location, thus necessitating a re-installation of the surveillance at the new address. On other occasions, the surveillance was discontinued because the subject left the premises for an extended period, but was later re-instituted when the subject returned. In still other cases, the surveillance was discontinued for a period as part of the Department's continuing review and re-evaluation of all electronic surveillance activities. The subsequent re-institution of the surveillance pursuant to a new approval by the Attorney General would be counted as an additional installation. For the above reasons, the number of installations of telephone and microphone surveillances is greater than the number of subjects of such surveillance, and would thus not provide an accurate basis for evaluating the extent of electronic surveillance. Nevertheless, pursuant to your inquiry, I am including in the attached memoranda the total number of installations of electronic surveillance devices for both telephone and microphones.

I am also enclosing the maximum and minimum number of telephone and microphone surveillances installed and in operation for each month between November 1972 and April 1975. These figures are based on data compiled on a daily basis and reflect installations and discontinuances of electronic surveillance devices. The records of daily counts were initiated in November 1972. Comparable information is not available for prior periods. As these figures indicate, the maximum number of telephone surveillances in operation at any time during 1973 was 93; the minimum number in operation that year was 65. The maximum number of microphone surveillances in operation during 1973 was 22; the minimum was 10. In 1974, the maximum number of telephone surveillances in operation was 106; the minimum number in operation was 75. Microphone surveillances in operation during that period ranged from a maximum of 21 to a minimum of 10. During the first four and a half months of 1975, the maximum number of telephone surveillances in operation at any time was 91; the minimum was 67. The maximum number of microphone surveillances in operation at any time during that period was 20; the minimum was 9. On April 1, 1975, there were 75 telephone and 15 microphone surveillances in operation.

I trust that the information supplied to date is of assistance to your subcommittee in its inquiry into the prac-

ces of federal agencies in this area. I am also providing
e above information to Congressman Rodino, as Chairman of
e House Committee on the Judiciary, and to Senator Church,
Chairman of the Senate Select Committee to Study Govern-
mental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities.

Sincerely,


Edward H. Levi
Attorney General

Electronic Surveillance Conducted in the Interests
of National Security and Foreign Intelligence

Total Subjects and Installations of
Telephone and Microphone Surveillances --
1969-1974

	<u>Telephone</u>	<u>Microphone</u>
<u>1969</u>		
Subjects under Surveillance	113	14
Total Installations	123	14
<u>1970</u>		
Subjects under Surveillance	90	19
Total Installations	102	19
<u>1971</u>		
Subjects under Surveillance	87	16
Total Installations	101	16
<u>1972</u>		
Subjects under Surveillance	102	31
Total Installations	108	32
<u>1973</u>		
Subjects under Surveillance	116	38
Total Installations	123	40
<u>1974</u>		
Subjects under Surveillance	148	32
Total Installations	190	42

Electronic Surveillance Conducted in the
Interests of National Security and Foreign Intelligence

Highest and Lowest Number of
Telephone and Microphone Surveillances
Installed and in Operation Within the
United States per month from November
1972 through April 1975

		<u>1972</u>	
	<u>Telephone</u>		<u>Microphone</u>
November 1972	HIGH	74	15
	LOW	70	14
December 1972	HIGH	73	17
	LOW	68	15
		<u>1973</u>	
January 1973	HIGH	70	17
	LOW	65	16
February 1973	HIGH	71	19
	LOW	67	17
March 1973	HIGH	73	20
	LOW	70	16
April 1973	HIGH	90	17
	LOW	73	14
May 1973	HIGH	93	16
	LOW	89	13
June 1973	HIGH	91	13
	LOW	82	11
July 1973	HIGH	83	12
	LOW	80	11
August 1973	HIGH	84	14
	LOW	80	10
September 1973	HIGH	86	16
	LOW	83	14

	<u>Telephone</u>	<u>Microphone</u>
October 1973	HIGH 92 LOW 87	18 16
November 1973	HIGH 92 LOW 90	21 18
December 1973	HIGH 90 LOW 84	22 21
		<u>1974</u>
January 1974	HIGH 85 LOW 83	21 19
February 1974	HIGH 87 LOW 84	20 20
March 1974	HIGH 97 LOW 87	20 19
April 1974	HIGH 93 LOW 91	19 16
May 1974	HIGH 94 LOW 91	16 14
June 1974	HIGH 97 LOW 93	15 13
July 1974	HIGH 93 LOW 90	13 12
August 1974	HIGH 98 LOW 91	12 10
September 1974	HIGH 99 LOW 98	15 12
October 1974	HIGH 106 LOW 98	17 15
November 1974	HIGH 100 LOW 78	16 11
December 1974	HIGH 88 LOW 75	13 10

Telephone

Microphone

January 1975

HIGH 89
LOW 78

15
9

February 1975

HIGH 91
LOW 85

18
15

March 1975

HIGH 88
LOW 67

18
15

April 1975

HIGH 82
LOW 75

16
12