

SECRET

29 October 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, Security Analysis Group
SUBJECT : Documents Relating to the Kennedy Assassination

1. In response to your request, the undersigned and Michael E. Schneeberger reviewed the eighteen volumes of covert security file #262 622 relating to the custodial handling of Yuriy Nosenko. In addition to the eighteen volumes, various unnumbered files relating to site plans for the various safe sites used in this case and administrative files relating to expenses incurred and other miscellaneous items were also reviewed.

2. As a result of these reviews, the attached documents were located which make mention of Nosenko's being debriefed concerning Lee Harvey Oswald. Additionally, a memorandum dated 11 March 1964 from the District Field Office (DFO) was also located which gives a summary of information which Nosenko provided to DFO personnel during casual conversation. One of the items in this memorandum is the lengthy discussion of Nosenko's knowledge of Oswald.

Raymond M. Reardon
Raymond M. Reardon
Security Analysis Group

Atts

Document Number 1355-1061
for FOIA Review on MAR 1977

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 063994

SECRET

F81-0351(xxi) e, entry no. 0700
F81-0351(xxi) g, entry no. 1218

SECRET

6 July 1964 Report

On 2 July Mssrs. NORIE, WESTRELL and BENNETT visited the site. The present air conditioning situation is satisfactory. Mr. McMAHON arrived at noon in a "panic", had to speak to Subject immediately and did so until 1345 hours, discussion a Norman Mihailevich BORODIN (phonetic) and his family. While McMAHON was there SR Division called and pressed the matter even harder. McMAHON then returned to Headquarters and came back to the site again at about 1645 hours. He expects to remain about 2 hours.

On 3 July an interrogation of Subject by RYAN took place from 1230 to 1530 hours. Discussion dealt with the OSWALD case.

On 4-5 July all custodial procedures were routine. Subject did try to "bum" a cigarette from a DFO man (Subject is getting smokes during interrogation sessions).

Division doesn't plan to visit Subject on 6 July according to latest reports.

8 July 1964 Report

No visitors at the site on 7 July. Subject ate all meals, was given a bath in the evening. All custodial procedures normal and routine.

13 July 1964 Report

Custodial procedures were routine during the weekend of 11-12 July.

14 July 1964 Report

On 13 July Case Officer McMAHON interrogated the Subject from 1530 hours to 1720 hours (subject's of discussion unknown). All custodial procedures routine and normal.

No case officer visits to the site are expected today.

SECRET

SECRET

27 July 1964 Report

No visitors to the site over the weekend. Subject has been avidly writing and reading, smoking about a pack of cigarettes per day. All custodial procedures routine.

On 27 July 1964, case officer RYAN interviewed Subject from 1330 to 1830 hours, discussing OSWALD case. Subject had written on many sheets of paper, mostly answers to questions put to him by the case officers. RYAN advised that one of these papers was a lengthy letter from Subject to Pete (BAGLEY), although the contents were not known to RYAN yet.

Subject was given a book entitled, "Democracy in Unions" yesterday. No visitors are expected on 28 July, although it is anticipated that both the Doctor and RYAN will come to the site tomorrow (29 July). Subject is in good spirits.

Custodial procedures are normal and routine.

At the request of OS/LOG, Tom RYAN was requested to initiate action with SR/DOB to provide some relief for the cook. Emma has been working a 6 day week since early April with Ed SANNER's wife filling in the seventh day. RYAN was requested to obtain the services of a cook and a helper to work at least 2 days a week and no more than 3 days. RYAN will advise.

29 July 1964 Report

No visitors to site on 28 July. Subject given bath in evening. All site custodial procedures routine.

30 July 1964 Report

On 29 July the Doctor visited Subject from 1015 to 1115 hours. He pronounced Subject to be in good condition, although Subject still claims we are taking pictures of him. The Doctor recommended no changes in routine.

SECRET

SECRET

30 July 1964 Report

Case Officer RYAN interrogated Subject from 1530 to 1800 hours, 29 July. The discussion concerned the OSWALD case, the method (s) by which private citizens in USSR get firearms and training and they talked about some Americans recruited in Paris for the KGB.

All custodial procedures routine and normal.

31 July 1964 Report

On 30 July 1964, all custodial procedures were routine and normal. Case officer is expected to come to the site on 31 July 1964.

3 August 1964 Report

On 31 July 1964 case officer RYAN interrogated Subject from 1400 to 1600 hours. They discussed "Intourist", KGB personalities, USSR war plans and KGB activities during the "Cuban Crisis". Subject still believes we are taking pictures of him.

At 2015 Subject came to the door of his room, said he wanted to talk. In effect, he wanted to get something off his chest. He said he could talk because he knew the cameras and recorders were not operative at that hour. He launched into a monologue about his mother, father, sister, brother and uncle. Became very emotional, saying that he was misunderstood, that he really wants to remain in the US. Spoke of his KGB work, recruitment and techniques. Finally at 0045 hours, 1 August, he went to bed.

Remainder of 1 August was uneventful. Sunday 2 August also quiet.

All custodial procedures routine.

SECRET

SECRET

#262 622

5 August 1964

Week of 27 - 31 July 1964

Interrogation on 27 July 1964 ran from 1334 to 1828 hours. With the exception of social amenities and a review of the notes SUBJECT had made since his last interview with the Case Officer, the interrogation consisted of a review of the OSWALD case. It was based on a verbatim transcript the Case Officer had typed from the 3 July 1964 tape. The Case Officer (Thomas RYAN) questioned SUBJECT on why KGB did not do certain things such as run an investigation of OSWALD, check into his Marine experience, etc.

On 29 July 1964 (a.m.) the doctor made his weekly examination of the SUBJECT. SUBJECT gave a brief run-down of his personal life before his father died in 1958, said he was being kept in confinement because he is trying to help us and said we are still taking pictures of him but the clicking has become quieter.

On 29 July 1964 interrogation ran from 1530 hours to 1802 hours. The OSWALD case was discussed again and the Case Officer started a discussion on how people obtain and keep guns in their homes in Russia. He also wanted to reconcile the fact that SUBJECT at one time stated OSWALD was a poor shot but on another occasion said he was a good marksman.

The Case Officer then went into a discussion of a Paris based, American, U. S. Government employee who was recruited by the KGB. This individual was still in Paris in January 1964. He would make documents available to KGB so they could be photographed and returned to the vault on the same day. SUBJECT had no identifying data on this American. The discussion concerned the American's contacts, station location, travel routes, etc.

On 31 July 1964 interrogation started at 1416 hours. Questions and discussion concerned the Intourist Organization and the extent to which it serves as a cover for KGB people, KGB war emergency plans, and the extent to which these plans were activated at the time of the U. S./Cuban Crisis.

The last item discussed was the ODESSA case. ODESSA is the code name for an agent named CUPPA who was scheduled to go to Tokyo in April 1964.

Interrogation concluded at 1824 hours.

JJB:jms

SECRET

SECRET

#262 622

The Case Officer then started discussing the case of a Bulgarian, GIORGIEV, who was arrested by the Bulgarians in Moscow in 1963. SUBJECT obtained his information on this case from SHERAPIN and Alexander PAPOVICH in 1963.

SUBJECT said GIORGIEV was invited to Moscow in 1963 at the suggestion of the Bulgarian MVD. He was settled in the Metropole Hotel and kept under TV surveillance. While he was in Moscow his rooms in Bulgaria were searched and evidence was found (radio) which was sufficient for the Deputy Chief of the Bulgarian MVD to go to Moscow, arrest him and return him to Bulgaria for questioning and trial or court martial.

SUBJECT went to Bulgaria in 1961 to help them on American cases. He stated there was no suspicion of GIORGIEV at that time. GIORGIEV had worked in the United States and was believed to have been recruited at that time.

The Bulgarians, on confronting GIORGIEV in the Metropole Hotel, said, "George DUVAL, you're under arrest".

At this point the interview ended and SUBJECT asked the Case Officer to congratulate the boys and wish them all a good holiday for him. He did this when the Case Officer said he did not think he would be back on 3 July.

Friday, 3 July 1964 - The Case Officer wanted to discuss the KGB involvement in the OSWALD case.

SUBJECT said he did not know that OSWALD went to Moscow from Helsinki but that OSWALD's visa application was processed in the normal manner and KGB had a copy of the visa application. Russian Embassies, since 1960, have authority to issue visas in three to five days after application.

OSWALD applied orally, and later in writing, for Soviet citizenship. A copy of the written request went to KGB. A copy of this request was sent to the Supreme Soviet after OSWALD slashed his wrists.

KGB studied reports on OSWALD prepared by Case Officer KRUZNOF and decided OSWALD was not normal so he was of no interest to KGB and was not considered desirable for Soviet citizenship. His file was sent to Minsk because he was to live and work in Minsk.

SECRET

SECRET

#262 622

The American Embassy was not informed of his suicide attempt because he was going to leave the country and he was not an important person.

While OSWALD was in Minsk he received a stipend from the Red Cross.

KGB had information on Marina OSWALD only after she announced her intention to marry him. A record check, neighborhood, and employment check on her showed that she was a simple, normal, not clever person, and she was not in the Young Communist League because she did not pay her dues. Some investigative reports said she was stupid.

KGB did not consider using her in any capacity.

She has an uncle who is a Lieutenant Colonel in the Minsk militia.

She must be illegitimate because she does not use or know her father's name.

The only surveillance ever put on OSWALD was an agent and there was never any on Marina.

After their marriage her pay was increased to impress the foreigner she married.

She was not asked to stay in Russia after marriage because he was to leave and Russians believe a husband and wife should be together (unless one is a high level person).

Neither of the OSWALDs got any briefing or instructions before leaving Moscow.

In addition to KRUZNOF and the SUBJECT, DUBAS and MUSHKOV were the KGB Agents in Moscow who knew of the OSWALD case before the assassination. A Department Chief, JOMOKOV, and five other KGB Case Officers knew of the case after the assassination.

KGB considered OSWALD an American citizen because he had been denied Soviet citizenship.

KGB did not know any of OSWALD's personal contacts in Russia.

Some of the Intourist people OSWALD dealt with were KGB Agents or contacts.

SECRET

SECRET

#262 622

OSWALD's case was not the same as other Americans in Russia because he was considered not normal and he was not considered a defector as were MARTIN and MITCHELL.

SUBJECT heard that OSWALD applied in Mexico for return to Russia. Word went from Mexico to the First Main Directorate to the Second Main Directorate. Second Main Directorate told First Main Directorate that he had tried suicide in Russia, married a Soviet citizen, departed Russia and was considered not normal so the request should be rejected.

SUBJECT was then shown some photographs and he said he had seen a picture of Marina OSWALD in a magazine.

A long list of names was read and shown to SUBJECT but he failed to identify any of them. Many of the names were of people in Minsk.

JJB:jms

SECRET

SECRET

TO BE OPENED BY ADDRESSEE ONLY

District Field Office
11 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Headquarters

SUBJECT : LEKNIK, George M. (A)
#262 622 C SD/1

1. Reference is made to Headquarters letter of assignment in this case dated 4 March 1964.

2. During the period 20-28 February 1964, while SUBJECT was under the protective custody of Special Agents Stanley C. LACH, George R. BREWER and Alfred B. McCARRAGHY, SUBJECT voluntarily furnished information concerning his background and activities, as well as other information of operational interest, the substance of which is set forth in the succeeding paragraphs. It is to be noted that at no time did any of the above-named agents solicit any of this information or make inquiries of the SUBJECT regarding any of the matters discussed by him. SUBJECT spontaneously related these incidents in casual conversation during leisure periods and while enroute with the agents to and from places of entertainment etc. In most cases newspapers, magazines and TV programs prompted the SUBJECT to make comments relative to these matters. Following is a summarization of this information:

SPORTS, HOBBIES

(a) On 20 February 1964 SUBJECT disclosed that he enjoys the following sports: football, hockey and billiards.

FOREIGN TRAVEL

(b) He also revealed that he has previously been in the United States while enroute to Cuba, Venezuela and other Latin American countries. He has at one time or another during his service with the KGB visited and worked on operational projects for the Soviet Union in practically all of the countries of Europe; however, he has never

vicinity of the

SECRET

SECRET

JUBNIK, George M. (A)
#262 622 C SD/1

traveled to the Far East, except while handling an agent who was active against the Japanese. He (SUBJECT) stayed in the Kurile Islands which are within sight of Japan. This was in 1949. He said that he was active in the picking up of agents by plane and ship in this area.

FAMILY BACKGROUND

(c) In the latter part of the evening on this same date, 20 February 1964, the SUBJECT stated that his father was a member of the Communist Central Committee, one of the first members of the Communist Party, and that he had great respect for his father. The SUBJECT also indicated that his father was a shipbuilder and later became one of the first to organize and set up the Russian Atomic Energy Plant. It was during this latter activity that he (the SUBJECT's father) and three other officials came in contact with radiation, which affected his father's liver and a few years later at the age of 54 his father died of cancer. The SUBJECT went on to state that his father, being a very prominent Communist, was given treatment for this cancer in a special hospital which is located in the hills outside of the city of Moscow, and during his tenure in this hospital the family resided with his father. They had five room living quarters beside the room in which his father was confined. This privilege, he said, is only given to the especially prominent VIPs of the Communist Party, indicating that his father was one of the top men in the Communist Party.

MILITARY ACTIVITY

(d) The SUBJECT revealed that in 1949, at the age of 16, he was a Naval Cadet. He was called into the service before graduating from what is our equivalent of a high school. He had taken part in the fighting in the Black Sea Area where he described hand-to-hand combat with Germans, claimed he was wounded, and because of his bravery he was awarded the Soviet Order Medal and the Order of Stalin. The SUBJECT stated this was unusual for a person of his age and gained him great respect. At the end of the war he had no more desire for military life although his superiors tried to keep him in the military. Instead, he went for four years to the Institute of Foreign Relations and learned the English language. Upon graduation, a man came to him and told him that he had a job lined up for him. He stated that this actually was more like being ordered to take this particular job which turned out

SECRET

SECRET

LESHNIK, George M. (A)
#262 622 C SD/1

to be with the Naval Intelligence. He claimed that there were two military intelligence organizations at the time, the Naval and the Ground Force military type.

LEE OSWALD IN RUSSIA

(c) On 23 February 1964, as SUBJECT approached the table for the evening meal, he noted that the Time magazine lying on the coffee table in the living room had a picture of Marie OSWALD. As he sat down he hit the table with his fist and said, "I feel that I could have stopped OSWALD". At this point Special Agent Stanley C. IACH asked him "how?". He proceeded to state that he (SUBJECT) was head of the KGB Tourist and Visitors Section which kept control over the activities of OSWALD while he was in the Soviet Union. He said at the time, OSWALD was of no special concern or interest to the KGB because he lacked intelligence background. Therefore, when he applied for permission to leave Russia, they (KGB) under his (SUBJECT) direction informed OSWALD that he would have to make his application through the appropriate channels of the State Department, who in turn would request his release from the Russian counterparts in handling of visas. This he said was all done for propaganda and show purposes. He went on to state that if they really wanted to release OSWALD, it could have been done on the spur of the moment, but since OSWALD had nothing and was not worth anything, they decided that this was an opportunity to show the American State Department that they did not mind releasing individuals if they applied for release through the appropriate channels. Prior to this application for release of OSWALD, the SUBJECT stated that since he was of no particular interest to them and there was nothing in Moscow that they could use him for or place him into, they decided that they would send OSWALD to Minsk where he would be placed in a factory working on radios in the hope that some training in the electrical and electronic field might result in his development into an electronics engineer; however, he showed no capability in this field. The SUBJECT then stated that it was just at this period, before sending OSWALD to Minsk, that a very strange thing happened.

OSWALD was supposed to have a meeting with a travel agent in regard to preparations for his going to Minsk at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. At 6 o'clock he still did not report to the travel agent, so the travel agent decided to go to the hotel where OSWALD was staying to see if he could locate him. When he got to the hotel he asked the clerk if OSWALD

SECRET

SECRET**LESNIK, George M. (A)**
#262 622 C SD/1

was in his room, the clerk nodded affirmatively, and the travel agent proceeded to OSWALD's room. He tried the door, but the door was locked. He knocked, got no response, and then with the assistance of the clerk they broke into the room and found OSWALD lying across the bed with both of his wrists slashed. The travel agent and the clerk responded immediately by taking OSWALD to the near-by medical facility where he was given blood transfusions and after a period of time regained his strength. During the investigation the following day the SUBJECT stated that the doctor indicated that had OSWALD not been found for approximately ten more minutes, he would have been dead. It is here that the SUBJECT again pounded the table and said if the travel agent had not broken into the room, but had instead contacted the KGB office like they are instructed to when they do not get any response from people with whom they have appointments, that he (SUBJECT) would have most likely directed the travel agent to forget about him, and on the following day or later that evening he would have sent one of the KGB agents to check on OSWALD, at which time he would have been found dead. This, he went on to state, is what hurts him when he realizes that he could have been instrumental in disposing of OSWALD without any special inquiry or serious investigation, OSWALD being nothing, and at the same time today the President of the United States, President KENNEDY, would be alive. The SUBJECT then went on to state that after OSWALD was sent to Minsk it was there that he met Marie. Like himself (OSWALD), Marie was a girl from a peasant family with no special background and somewhat illiterate. It was because of her poor background that she was given permission to marry OSWALD and return to the United States as his wife.

The SUBJECT then went on to describe what took place on the day that President KENNEDY was assassinated. He said that this was actually on Saturday in Moscow, the 22nd of November. He was home at the time and happened to have the radio on, when he heard that the President of the United States had been assassinated. Approximately one hour later, the radio informed him that the assassin was Lee OSWALD. This announcement, he said, really stunned him. He grabbed his coat and dashed to his office. Immediately upon his arrival he searched for the OSWALD file. When he found the file he reviewed it and found that OSWALD had not been used or even approached for use by the Russian Intelligence. He put in a long distance call to the Chief of the KGB Section in Minsk and inquired whether they had used, trained or prepared OSWALD in any way for intelligence activity. The Chief informed him that according to what he could recall, they had not made any use of OSWALD. Just about this time, he (SUBJECT) stated that his superior walked into the office and directed

SECRET

SECRET

LISNIK, George M. (A)
#262 622 C SD/1

the SUBJECT to get all the information available on OSWALD and prepare a summary to be furnished the top officials of the Communist Party. The SUBJECT then directed the KGB agent in Minsk to likewise prepare a summary of his file on OSWALD and informed him that within twenty minutes a KGB agent would arrive by special military plane to pick up the summary for return to Moscow. He said this was accomplished, and within one hour they were preparing a detailed report on OSWALD's activity in Russia. This, concluded the SUBJECT, is the story of OSWALD in Russia.

C. P. AFFILIATION

(f) The SUBJECT also indicated that he did not join the Communist Party until he was 27 years old, and he did this out of respect to his father, who at the time was on his death bed and asked him (SUBJECT) whether he would do him one more favor before he died. That is how the SUBJECT stated he joined the Communist Party. Otherwise, he probably would not have been a member to this day.

DIPLOMATS AND INTELLIGENCE TYPES

(g) The SUBJECT stated that the KGB are able to differentiate between Americans who are assigned to Moscow and are actually the State Department type, from those who have an intelligence background, by the fact that the intelligence type of people do not associate with the Russian girls, that is they will not go out with them alone, whereas the State Department type will. Also, over a period of a month or two, they invariably are able to find evidence that the intelligence types have been masturbating. This is usually detected through close examination of the individual's towels and bed sheets.

RUSSIAN U-1 AIRCRAFT

(h) On 25 February 1964 during the evening meal, a discussion was had regarding the recent airplane crashes noted in the newspapers and on TV in the United States. The SUBJECT commented that he has a lot of friends who are test pilots and who are now engaged in testing what he referred to as a U-1 type of aircraft that is faster than any other aircraft in the world. He added that these friends are highly paid but they have very dangerous jobs.

SECRET

SECRETLESNIK, George M. (A)
#262 622 C SD/1SUBJECT'S FATHER

(i) The SUBJECT also made reference to his father during this meal, describing him as a very tall and extremely well-built individual, and one who was extremely intelligent and a self-made, self-educated man. He learned the shipbuilding trade mostly through his own research and study, and also from the SUBJECT's grandfather, who was one of the first shipbuilders in Russia. The SUBJECT added that his grandfather died at the age of 94. He also stated that after the death of his father, a memorial was built in his memory since he was considered a very capable director of the government shipping industry. That was about the last time he saw his mother and brother and sister, as they all went to this ceremony in honor of his father. He also indicated that there was a periodical which gave a complete run-down on his family background, including that of his grandfather and his father, and it was well publicized; and this he believes had a lot to do with his being able to get some special preference and move along as fast as he did in the KGB organization.

KGB PRESSURE ON FAMILY

(j) On 27 February 1964 during lunch, the SUBJECT stated that he has been informed that the KGB is putting pressure on his immediate family, particularly his mother. However, he said he was not overly worried about her because she is well-off financially, and being up in age there is not much they can do to her. However, what concerns him most is the fact that they have already started to play on the sympathies of his two children and his wife. The SUBJECT stated that he was anticipating this; however, he did not think that they would start so soon to pressure the family. However, he does have some hope that in due time he may be able to get his family out of Russia. This hope he said was given to him by the Chief of SR Division.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS PENETRATION


(k) On 25 February 1964 during a sightseeing tour of Washington by vehicle, as we passed the Library of Congress, the SUBJECT pointed to the building and stated that "we have people working in there". Special Agent Stanley C. LACH said, "who is 'we'?" and the SUBJECT answered, "KGB". He continued by stating that this was a good place to place people because they could readily learn by just watching what research was being done in the Library of Congress by the military

SECRET

SECRET

LESNIK, George M. (A)
#262 622 C SD/1

and thereby get an idea as to what the military was planning in the way of armaments and things of that nature. The SUBJECT also advised that the responsibility for getting information surreptitiously from American Embassies in foreign countries who employ indigenous personnel, falls within the confines of the KGB. He stated that the way they go about this is to work through the indigenous personnel and arrange to enter the embassy at special times during the night. They would first make a close survey and a photograph of the area in which the embassy keeps its classified material, then they would subsequently enter this area and open up the safes. When he was asked how this was done he stated, "oh, combinations to safes are not hard to acquire". He said that the important and difficult part of this activity is taking the material out and photographing it and then placing it exactly as it was before they touched it.


JOHN D. NOBLE, JR.
Special Agent in Charge

SECRET

APPEAL AND LITIGATION REVIEW FORM

1. Tab B contains Memo #1649-1081 dated 29 Oct 75

- Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) _____ of _____.
- Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under _____ of _____.
- Located during the DO appeals review.
- Referred to DO for review by _____.

3. Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

4. I RECOMMEND:

- Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) _____ of _____.
- ADD exemption(s) _____.
- DROP exemption(s) _____.
- Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under _____ of _____.
- ADD exemption(s) _____.
- DROP exemption(s) _____.
- Release additional information with excised portions exempted under _____ of _____.

Deny document in toto under exemption(s) (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(D) of FOIA.

Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(D) of FOIA.

5. The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

- Information from a foreign liaison service
- Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
- Information which would/could identify the source
- Information pertaining to a source
- Information pertaining to intelligence methods
- Location of CIA overseas installation
- Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
- Name of CIA employee
- File number
- Pseudonym
- Cryptonym
- Internal organizational data
- Name of FBI agent
- FBI file number
- Privacy of other individual
- OTHER

6. COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTION

F, E, D, H, C, K



*Warren Priestly agreed to release or sanitize.
JH
28 May 82*

7. During the DO classification review, the attached, which was marked as

- SECRET, was:
- maintained
 - classified to _____
 - declassified
 - desensitized
 - downgraded to _____

When detached from att.

DCL RVW _____
 ORG 018207 EXT _____
 RSN _____ DATE _____

TYPE	YEAR	NUMBER	DOC. NO.	NEW DOCUMENT RECORD																																																										
1	75	5763	01649	Instructions for Divisions and Staffs: 1. Fill in and Sign on line 11. 2. Use back of form for any additional comments.																																																										
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION (Circle if appropriate) (130 CHARACTERS)				DAY	MONTH	YEAR																																																								
CABLE DISPATCH MEMO REPORT				FORM LETTER		29 OCT 75																																																								
FROM/ORIGINATOR (30 CHARACTERS)			TO/RECIPIENT (30 CHARACTERS)																																																											
3 SAG, RAYMOND M. REARDON			DC/SAG																																																											
CLASS	WHERE LOCATED (10 CHARACTERS)	REFERRED BY (10 CHARACTERS)	DDO 1	DO FILE NUMBER (20 CHARACTERS)																																																										
4 S																																																														
SUBJECT (80 CHARACTERS)																																																														
5 DOCS RELATING TO JFK ASSASSINATION																																																														
			TYPE OF REVIEW	DATE OF REVIEW	DAY MONTH YEAR																																																									
			0 A L		18 FEB 81																																																									
Determinations:																																																														
<input type="checkbox"/> A. Release in full text <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> B. Release in sanitized form <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> C. Deny in toto <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> D. Defer decision to (Specify in line 8) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> H. Coordinate with (Specify in line 8)			<input type="checkbox"/> E. Sustain initial denial in toto <input type="checkbox"/> F. Sustain initial release of sanitized version <input type="checkbox"/> G. Release additional information																																																											
DEFER DECISION TO (10 CHARACTERS)		COORDINATE WITH (10 CHARACTERS)	NEW CLASS																																																											
		SE, CI; O/S																																																												
SIGNATURE OF DO/IMS/PPLG REVIEWING OFFICER																																																														
																																																														
EXEMPTIONS AND PROVISIONS CLAIMED (40 CHARACTERS)																																																														
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> B1 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> B2 <input type="checkbox"/> B3 <input type="checkbox"/> B4 <input type="checkbox"/> B5 <input type="checkbox"/> B6 <input type="checkbox"/> B7C <input type="checkbox"/> PA <input type="checkbox"/> B J1 <input type="checkbox"/> J1B <input type="checkbox"/> J1C <input type="checkbox"/> K1 E.O. 12065																																																														
Exemptions and Provisions claimed to protect the following:																																																														
<table border="0"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>FOIA</th> <th>PA</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1. Classification</td> <td>(b) (1)</td> <td>(k) (1)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> 2. Information from liaison with a Foreign Government</td> <td>(b) (3)</td> <td>(j) (1) (b) (c)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> 3. Information pertaining to a liaison relationship with a Foreign Government</td> <td>(b) (3)</td> <td>(j) (1) (b) (c)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> 4. Information which would/could identify the source</td> <td>(b) (3)</td> <td>(j) (1) (b)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> 5. Information pertaining to a source</td> <td>(b) (3)</td> <td>(j) (1) (b)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 6. Information pertaining to intelligence methods</td> <td>(b) (3)</td> <td>(j) (1) (b)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> 7. Location of CIA overseas installation</td> <td>(b) (3)</td> <td>(j) (1) (b)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> 8. Location of unacknowledged domestic installation</td> <td>(b) (3)</td> <td>(j) (1) (b)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 9. Name of CIA employee</td> <td>(b) (3)</td> <td>(j) (1) (b)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> 10. File number</td> <td>(b) (3)</td> <td>(j) (1) (b)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> 11. Pseudonym</td> <td>(b) (3)</td> <td>(j) (1) (b)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 12. Cryptonym</td> <td>(b) (3)</td> <td>(j) (1) (b)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 13. Internal organizational data</td> <td>(b) (3)</td> <td>(j) (1) (b)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> 14. Name of an FBI agent</td> <td>(b) (7) (c)</td> <td>(j) (1) (b)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> 15. FBI file number</td> <td>(b) (2)</td> <td>(j) (1) (b)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 16. Privacy of other individual</td> <td>(b) (6)</td> <td>(b)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 17. Does not pertain to request</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> 19. Other (Specify in line 11)</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>							FOIA	PA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1. Classification	(b) (1)	(k) (1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 2. Information from liaison with a Foreign Government	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b) (c)	<input type="checkbox"/> 3. Information pertaining to a liaison relationship with a Foreign Government	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b) (c)	<input type="checkbox"/> 4. Information which would/could identify the source	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 5. Information pertaining to a source	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 6. Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 7. Location of CIA overseas installation	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 8. Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 9. Name of CIA employee	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 10. File number	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 11. Pseudonym	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 12. Cryptonym	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 13. Internal organizational data	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 14. Name of an FBI agent	(b) (7) (c)	(j) (1) (b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 15. FBI file number	(b) (2)	(j) (1) (b)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 16. Privacy of other individual	(b) (6)	(b)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 17. Does not pertain to request			<input type="checkbox"/> 19. Other (Specify in line 11)		
	FOIA	PA																																																												
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1. Classification	(b) (1)	(k) (1)																																																												
<input type="checkbox"/> 2. Information from liaison with a Foreign Government	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b) (c)																																																												
<input type="checkbox"/> 3. Information pertaining to a liaison relationship with a Foreign Government	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b) (c)																																																												
<input type="checkbox"/> 4. Information which would/could identify the source	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)																																																												
<input type="checkbox"/> 5. Information pertaining to a source	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)																																																												
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 6. Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)																																																												
<input type="checkbox"/> 7. Location of CIA overseas installation	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)																																																												
<input type="checkbox"/> 8. Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)																																																												
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 9. Name of CIA employee	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)																																																												
<input type="checkbox"/> 10. File number	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)																																																												
<input type="checkbox"/> 11. Pseudonym	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)																																																												
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 12. Cryptonym	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)																																																												
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 13. Internal organizational data	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)																																																												
<input type="checkbox"/> 14. Name of an FBI agent	(b) (7) (c)	(j) (1) (b)																																																												
<input type="checkbox"/> 15. FBI file number	(b) (2)	(j) (1) (b)																																																												
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 16. Privacy of other individual	(b) (6)	(b)																																																												
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 17. Does not pertain to request																																																														
<input type="checkbox"/> 19. Other (Specify in line 11)																																																														
REMARKS (IF OTHER WAS CHECKED ABOVE) (40 CHARACTERS)			SIGNATURE/OFFICE OF DO COMPONENT REVIEWING OFFICER																																																											
11																																																														
REMARKS (160 CHARACTERS)																																																														
12 JFK DOC 1649-1081																																																														
13																																																														
14																																																														

CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

1	TYPE FPE	YEAR 76 75	NUMBER 5273 526306	DOC. NO. 01649	NEW DOCUMENT RECORD
					Instructions for Divisions and Staffs: 1. Fill in and Sign on line 11. 2. Use back of form for any additional comments.

2	DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION (Circle if appropriate) (30 CHARACTERS)	DAY	MONTH	YEAR
	<input checked="" type="radio"/> MEMO <input type="radio"/> CABLE <input type="radio"/> DISPATCH <input type="radio"/> REPORT <input type="radio"/> FORM <input type="radio"/> LETTER <input type="radio"/> AIRGRAM	29	OCT	75

3	FROM/ORIGINATOR (30 CHARACTERS)	TO/RECIPIENT (30 CHARACTERS)
	SAG, RAYMOND M. REARDON	DC/SAG

4	CLASS	WHERE LOCATED (10 CHARACTERS)	REFERRED BY (10 CHARACTERS)	DDO ?	DO FILE NUMBER (20 CHARACTERS)
	S				

5	SUBJECT (80 CHARACTERS)
	DOCS RELATING TO JFK ASSASSINATION

6	TYPE OF REVIEW	DATE OF REVIEW	DAY	MONTH	YEAR
	O A L		18	FEB	81

7	Determinations:	
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> A. Release in full text <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> B. Release in sanitized form <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> C. Deny in toto <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> D. Defer decision to (Specify in line 8) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> H. Coordinate with (Specify in line 8)	<input type="checkbox"/> E. Sustain initial denial in toto <input type="checkbox"/> F. Sustain initial release of sanitized version <input type="checkbox"/> G. Release additional information

8	DEFER DECISION TO (10 CHARACTERS)	COORDINATE WITH (10 CHARACTERS)	NEW CLASS	SIGNATURE OF DO/IMS/FPLG REVIEWING OFFICER
		SE, CI; O/S		<i>[Signature]</i>

9	EXEMPTIONS AND PROVISIONS CLAIMED (40 CHARACTERS)	E.O. 12055
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FOIA B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7C PA B J1 J1B J1C K1	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

10	Exemptions and Provisions claimed to protect the following:																																																									
	<table border="0"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>FOIA</th> <th>PA</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1. Classification</td> <td>(b) (1)</td> <td>(k) (1)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> 2. Information from liaison with a Foreign Government</td> <td>(b) (3)</td> <td>(j) (1) (b) (c)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> 3. Information pertaining to a liaison relationship with a Foreign Government</td> <td>(b) (3)</td> <td>(j) (1) (b) (c)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 4. Information which would/could identify the source</td> <td>(b) (3)</td> <td>(j) (1) (b)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 5. Information pertaining to a source</td> <td>(b) (3)</td> <td>(j) (1) (b)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 6. Information pertaining to intelligence methods</td> <td>(b) (3)</td> <td>(j) (1) (b)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> 7. Location of CIA overseas installation</td> <td>(b) (3)</td> <td>(j) (1) (b)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> 8. Location of unacknowledged domestic installation</td> <td>(b) (3)</td> <td>(j) (1) (b)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 9. Name of CIA employee</td> <td>(b) (3)</td> <td>(j) (1) (b)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> 10. File number</td> <td>(b) (3)</td> <td>(j) (1) (b)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> 11. Pseudonym</td> <td>(b) (3)</td> <td>(j) (1) (b)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> 12. Cryptonym</td> <td>(b) (3)</td> <td>(j) (1) (b)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 13. Internal organizational data</td> <td>(b) (3)</td> <td>(j) (1) (b)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> 14. Name of an FBI agent</td> <td>(b) (7) (c)</td> <td>(j) (1) (b)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> 15. FBI file number</td> <td>(b) (2)</td> <td>(j) (1) (b)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 16. Privacy of other individual</td> <td>(b) (6)</td> <td>(b)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> 17. Does not pertain to request</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> 19. Other (Specify in line 11)</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		FOIA	PA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1. Classification	(b) (1)	(k) (1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 2. Information from liaison with a Foreign Government	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b) (c)	<input type="checkbox"/> 3. Information pertaining to a liaison relationship with a Foreign Government	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b) (c)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 4. Information which would/could identify the source	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 5. Information pertaining to a source	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 6. Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 7. Location of CIA overseas installation	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 8. Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 9. Name of CIA employee	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 10. File number	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 11. Pseudonym	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 12. Cryptonym	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 13. Internal organizational data	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 14. Name of an FBI agent	(b) (7) (c)	(j) (1) (b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 15. FBI file number	(b) (2)	(j) (1) (b)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 16. Privacy of other individual	(b) (6)	(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 17. Does not pertain to request			<input type="checkbox"/> 19. Other (Specify in line 11)		
	FOIA	PA																																																								
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1. Classification	(b) (1)	(k) (1)																																																								
<input type="checkbox"/> 2. Information from liaison with a Foreign Government	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b) (c)																																																								
<input type="checkbox"/> 3. Information pertaining to a liaison relationship with a Foreign Government	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b) (c)																																																								
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 4. Information which would/could identify the source	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)																																																								
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 5. Information pertaining to a source	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)																																																								
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 6. Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)																																																								
<input type="checkbox"/> 7. Location of CIA overseas installation	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)																																																								
<input type="checkbox"/> 8. Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)																																																								
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 9. Name of CIA employee	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)																																																								
<input type="checkbox"/> 10. File number	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)																																																								
<input type="checkbox"/> 11. Pseudonym	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)																																																								
<input type="checkbox"/> 12. Cryptonym	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)																																																								
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 13. Internal organizational data	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)																																																								
<input type="checkbox"/> 14. Name of an FBI agent	(b) (7) (c)	(j) (1) (b)																																																								
<input type="checkbox"/> 15. FBI file number	(b) (2)	(j) (1) (b)																																																								
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 16. Privacy of other individual	(b) (6)	(b)																																																								
<input type="checkbox"/> 17. Does not pertain to request																																																										
<input type="checkbox"/> 19. Other (Specify in line 11)																																																										

11	REMARKS (IF OTHER WAS CHECKED ABOVE) (40 CHARACTERS)	SIGNATURE/OFFICE OF COMPONENT REVIEWING OFFICER
	<i>Concur</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>

12	REMARKS (160 CHARACTERS)
	JFK DOC 1649-1081.

13	REMARKS (160 CHARACTERS)

14	This Form is Unclassified Unless The Classification is Checked and The Information below is completed.
	<input type="checkbox"/> DECL <input type="checkbox"/> REVW