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TO: Special Group (CI) Assistants

23 March 1965

FROM: Paul Eckel

SUBJECT: Study entitled "The Havana CP Conference of November 1964"
(CIA - 319/00004-65)

Please correct a typographical error on page 7 of subject study which was sent to you on 19 March 1965. The error is found in the seventh line from the bottom of the page, which when corrected should read, "...with the ouster of Anibal Escalante in early 1962, and--outside..."

Correction made in study

(S) PAUL E. ECKEL
Paul E. Eckel
Special Group Officer

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The Special Group (CI) Assistants

19 March 1965

Paul Eckel

The Havana Conference of Communist Parties, November 1964

There is enclosed for your information and use a CIA Working Paper analyzing and commenting upon subject conference. I think you will find the contents of this document pertinent and timely particularly Section III dealing with conference decisions.

The dissemination of this document seems particularly appropriate at this time in view of the discussion at the Group's 18 March meeting concerning USIA's efforts to publicize communist support for and participation in subversive operations. Use of this material is governed by the stipulations contained on the inside cover page in the paragraph entitled, "Limitations."

Paul E. Eckel
Special Group Officer

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CIA- 319/00004-65

WORKING PAPER

The Havana CP Conference of November 1964
3 March 1965

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SCOPE

The Havana CP Conference of November 1964, 36 pages, dated 3 March 1965, describes the background, purposes, and circumstances of the Conference of Latin American Communist Parties held in Havana 22-29 November 1964, and discusses the issues involved and the decisions taken. It also identifies the programs and courses of action decided upon at the conference, certain of which have already been placed in operation, and discusses the tactics to be used in carrying them out.

LIMITATIONS

There are a number of instances in this paper in which the language employed has been adopted for the specific purpose of source protection. It is essential, therefore, that any proposed use of the paper or of material drawn from it be cleared in advance with the originator. The circulation of the paper should be kept on a strict need-to-know basis. Hence, any questions with respect to the use of this document or the material therein in a manner contrary to the dissemination controls must be addressed to the Document Division, OCR.

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THE HAVANA CP CONFERENCE OF NOVEMBER 1964

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THE HAVANA CP CONFERENCE OF NOVEMBER 1964

I. Summary.

The 22-29 November conference in Havana was the first publicly acknowledged regional congress of Latin American CP's since 1929, although it has been the practice since at least 1956 to hold such conferences regularly, if secretly, in Moscow. As with other such conferences, it was called to coordinate regional Communist activity with Soviet policy, and represents an effort by the Soviets to establish orthodox CP control and coordination over the revolutionary tactics to be employed in each country and to prevent unilateral support by Cuba to extremist groups of its own choosing.

Problems resulting from Soviet-Cuban differences over the conduct of subversive operations in Latin America emerged again after the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, and were intensified by the failure of the USSR and the Latin American CP's to give Castro the support he desired. During 1963 Soviet pressure on Castro and complaints by various CP's over Cuban "interference" in the revolution in their respective countries resulted in a number of discussions which, in turn, set the stage for the Havana conference. The careful coordination between Moscow and Havana and the publicity given by Moscow to the final conference communique testify to the importance given by the Soviets to this display of unity. The endorsement of the Moscow declarations of 1957 and 1960 can be interpreted by the CPSU as a declaration of loyalty to Moscow by the Latin American parties, including--for the first time--the new PURS of Cuba.

The unwritten but basic premise of the communique lies in an agreement by Castro to limit Cuban support to those revolutionary groups approved by the CP of the country concerned and, conversely, a pledge by the Soviet Bloc to support armed action in countries where such action is approved by the local CP.

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Soviet and Cuban statements, and covert intelligence sources, suggest that the Venezuelan, Guatemalan, and perhaps Colombian revolutionary forces may be the chief beneficiaries of this support, although the communique itself promises "active aid" to "freedom fighters" in other countries as well.

Preparations for the conference were made in Moscow in early November by various leaders and representatives of Latin American parties. The meeting was then held in Havana, attended by a Soviet observer, and subsequently a group returned to Moscow where they worked out the final editing of the documents approved in Havana. Before the communique was issued, a delegation of some ten Latin American leaders traveled to China in an unsuccessful attempt to gain Chinese cooperation with the conference agreements.

The overt conference decisions, as revealed in the communique, involve four region-wide solidarity projects: solidarity with Cuba; solidarity with all Latin American anti-imperialist struggles; solidarity for the release of political prisoners; and solidarity in support of the "combative" struggle of the Venezuelan people. Implementation of these campaigns began promptly with the scheduling of a Cuban solidarity congress in Montevideo in April and the initiation of an amnesty drive and other international campaigns. The Montevideo meeting will probably represent a major effort--comparable to the Mexico City liberation congress of March 1961--to demonstrate orthodox Communist willingness and capabilities to support Cuba. Argentine and Chilean parties have already met to pledge their utmost efforts to assure the success of the conference.

With respect to the general anti-imperialist campaign, the communique stresses the need for organization on a permanent basis to give "active" (but unspecified) aid to freedom fighters in some countries, to "intensify solidarity" with the people of Panama, and to give "resolute" aid to independence struggles in Puerto Rico and European dependencies. The wording suggests that some regional coordinating body may be

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formed. Both Che Guevara of Cuba and Salvador Allende of Chile have suggested some such coordination, and there is some evidence that sub-regional efforts have already begun.

The call for solidarity with Venezuela is not new. In 1963 the Cuban Institute of Friendship with Peoples (ICAP) made such a call, and a special effort to promote solidarity was made shortly before the unsuccessful FALN effort to disrupt the Venezuelan presidential elections. The attention given to Venezuela in the conference communique is significant, however, as it commits the Latin American CP's to support a liberation movement in which the main line has been the armed struggle. As failure of this line in Venezuela would undermine the line elsewhere, it is possible that the initiative was as much Cuban as Venezuelan. In any event, the Cubans began devoting increased attention to Venezuelan solidarity shortly before the conference and organized a Cuban-Venezuelan solidarity week during which an FALN office was opened in Havana. There is some evidence that the CP's in other countries are beginning to organize in support of Venezuela.

Behind the language of the conference communique lies an explicit though secret Soviet commitment to support the armed struggle in Latin America. A CPSU functionary has recently stated, in a closed meeting with non-Bloc Communists, that armed struggle is "likely to be necessary in some situations in Latin America," and a Pravda editorial clearly spells out the Soviet obligation to support the just struggle of armed patriots in Venezuela, Guatemala, and "a number of other countries." However, the Soviets apparently look to the local CP's to protect them from over-commitment and involvement in rash adventurism, and only in the case of parties which have clearly committed themselves to the support of specific revolutionary groups does there seem to be an obligation on the part of the Soviets. This is the case with Venezuela, where the CP has clearly identified itself with the policies and objectives of the FALN. It is less clear in Guatemala, where the CP recognizes the FAR (a nominal unified guerrilla command)

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but admits only a "certain degree of maturity" of conditions for revolution. In Colombia, the CP admits conditions are "mature," but admits that unity of action does not exist. In other countries, theoretical considerations may also qualify Soviet support.

The Soviet obligation to honor its commitment to aid an armed struggle may also be limited by unwillingness of Castro and pro-Castro groups to collaborate with the local CP's. In Guatemala, despite CP approval of the FAR, difficulty has existed between the CP and extremists in the 13th of November Movement which may delay the realization of the unity sought.

Despite the theoretical considerations which may limit Soviet support, there have been significant signs of stepped-up plans for sabotage, terrorism, and guerrilla activity in several Central American countries, under the direction of the local Communist party. In Guatemala, the party has formed a committee to consolidate information on professional men, landowners, and military officials who should be "liquidated" in 1965. In Honduras, Cuban-trained leaders of the Francisco Morazon Liberation Movement have agreed to submit to CP direction, and the CP military command has planned militant action for the post-election period. In El Salvador, the military command of the FUAR has been reactivated, and the CP Panama presented its military plan to Raul Castro at the time of the conference, asking for Cuban training and arms at the same time. In Venezuela also, there have been some developments of significance: the chief of the FALN, at the time of the conference, obtained promises of financial aid from Cuba and promises of arms from the Bloc; subsequently, he traveled to the USSR to seek additional support for the revolution. Reportedly, Cuban leaders agreed to give support only to those revolutionary groups approved by the local Communist party. If Castro abides by this agreement, it would resolve the complaints by various CP's over unilateral Cuban action and strengthen the hand of mature, orthodox, Communists over the young extremists. However, the record suggests

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that in 1963 and 1964 Castro responded only nominally to Soviet pressure, and this may be the case now, despite some evidence of Cuban sincerity. Without Chinese endorsement, which the Latin American CP's fruitlessly tried to enlist in December, the Havana agreement may not promote effective unity or bring about the cessation of polemics and elimination of factionalism for which it calls.

The Latin American parties, however, appear happy with the communique so far: the [redacted] leaders see it as softening the differences between hard-line and soft-line elements; the [redacted] feels that it will reduce the influence of the anti-party (pro-Chinese) faction; and a [redacted] spoke of the virtues of such efforts toward unity and complete understanding in the socialist camp, though without commenting on the disunity which exists in Brazil.

In conclusion, events in December and January indicate that efforts have been made to carry out the decisions of the Havana Conference, and these efforts may contribute to giving greater unity, common purpose, and momentum to Communist subversive activity throughout the region. But it is equally obvious that, if the CPSU seeks greater unity among its adherents, and if there is a renewal of the confrontation with the Chinese in the wake of Moscow's 1 March CP meeting, the Havana agreements may be subject to serious strain. The pro-Chinese Albanians have charged that the Havana meeting was a Soviet-inspired maneuver to trap the Cuban Communists and to restore Soviet control over Communism in the area. They demand that the CPSU not be given respite nor allowed to consolidate its "shaky position."

The orthodox Latin American CP's face a series of tests, both regional and national. Unimpressive showings in the various solidarity campaigns may easily lead to increased antagonism and recriminations. In Venezuela, the party must defend the FALN against increasingly effective government action and also regain political influence. In Cuba, in particular, the old-line Communists face Fidel Castro's efforts to resist Soviet orthodoxy through his influence over the development of the PURS. Every failure in these tests will put new strains on the Havana agreements.

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II. Background, Genesis, and Circumstances of the Conference.

A. The Precedents.

The 22-29 November conference in Havana was the first publicly acknowledged regional congress of Latin American CP's since 1929. However, it in fact has been the practice since at least 1956 to hold such conferences regularly, if secretly, in Moscow. They usually have followed major world CP conferences and are used for discussing, planning, and coordinating actions to be taken in carrying out the Soviet line endorsed at the world meeting concerned. Thus, following the 20th CPSU Congress in February 1956, a secret meeting of Latin American CP's was held to plan regional and sub-regional coordination. After the 40th Anniversary celebration in November 1957, a Latin American CP conference was held, under Soviet guidance, to organize a long-term action program to begin in 1958, a program which included coordinated support for the anti-dictatorial struggles in Venezuela and Cuba, improved sub-regional coordination, and hemispheric consolidation of anti-US action and propaganda. This program was implemented through support to the Cuban 26th of July Movement, through a conference of northern Latin American CP's in Mexico in March 1958, and a hemispheric peace conference in Buenos Aires in May 1958. These, in turn, allowed coordination at lower levels.

Following the 21st CPSU Congress in January 1959, a similar secret Latin American Conference was held, again with a Soviet "observer" present. Emphasis was put on a continuation of the 1958 action program and on more effective concealment of the Communist initiative and influence in the organization of popular movements.

After the 81-party conference in Moscow in November 1960, another secret LA CP conference was held, at which time emphasis was placed on support of Cuba against US-sponsored invasion threats and on the regional development of the national liberation movement after the Cuban model. Implementation of

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these objectives was furthered through the "national liberation" conference in Mexico (March 1961) and through a secret meeting of Latin American CP leaders in Havana (May 1961), at which the role of Cuba as the primary external training and coordinating base for subversion was established. From this came further sub-regional planning, such as the August 1961 conference of Central American CP's to discuss the armed struggle. Paralleling the coordinated CP action, there was a similar regional coordination of the Cuban-supported Castroist revolutionary movements.

B. Problems Requiring Coordinated Solutions.

Russo-Cuban conduct of Communist subversive operations in Latin America since 1959 has been marked by disputes and mutual concessions relating to the role of Cuba and Cuban revolutionary tactics. Initial differences between Castro and the Communists were apparently reconciled in late 1960, and as Castro subsequently dedicated himself to intensive study of Marxism-Leninism, the Soviets and the orthodox parties permitted Cuban-oriented national liberation movements to assume leadership in the revolutionary struggle. The WPC-organized national liberation conference in Mexico in March 1961 symbolized this collaboration, and during 1961 a number of guerrilla liberation fronts were founded in various countries. In December of the same year, Castro announced that he had become a "mature" Marxist-Leninist. However, the failure of the Soviets and the various Latin American CP's to defend Cuban sovereignty effectively during the October 1962 missile crisis created a grave breach. Castro initiated the purge of "old Communists" with the ouster of Anibal Escalante in early 1963, and--outside of Cuba--the orthodox CP's began to criticize Cuban "interference" in the conduct of the liberation struggle. These conflicts figured in a number of meetings in Moscow, Havana, Prague, and elsewhere during 1963, and the Havana Conference may be viewed as an attempt to show that a new basis for unity and coordination has been achieved.

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1. The Brazilian Party Protest.

In February 1963, Luiz Carlos Prestes, Secretary General of the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), left for Moscow and then Havana, to correct what he and other PCB leaders considered to be affronts to the PCB by both the Cubans and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The main complaint was that the Chinese and Cubans had often by-passed the PCB and had dealt with revolutionary groups in Brazil, particularly the dissident Communist Party of Brazil (CPB) and the Peasant Leagues of Francisco Juliao. Although while in Cuba Prestes declared his party's adherence to the Second Declaration of Havana and to the armed struggle line for Latin America, he insisted that the time was not propitious for violence or terrorism in Brazil, and apparently indicated that he had approval of his position from Moscow. Prestes was able to resolve some of the conflicts existing between Cuba and the PCB, but several major differences remained outstanding. Castro and other Cuban leaders refused to entertain Prestes' protest against their giving aid to Juliao, on the specious grounds that the question of PCB-Juliao differences was an internal question of the Brazilian movement on which it would not be proper for them to express an opinion. Prestes, who interpreted this as proof of the Cuban intent to continue support of Juliao, concluded that Cuban leaders were committed to the view that the best way in which Communist movements in Latin American countries could aid Cuba was to launch their own national revolution promptly.

2. The Argentine Party Protest.

In March/April 1963, an official of the Communist Party of Bolivia (PCB) visited Argentina, and, on instructions from the CPSU, told PCA leaders that Cuba was preparing to organize and support insurrectionary groups in Bolivia, Argentina, Peru, and Venezuela with the cooperation of the PCB. On hearing the report, the Communist Party of Argentina (PCA) sent the head of its international section to

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Bolivia and Peru to argue that revolutionary planning such as this--outside of Communist party lines and control--could work against the Communist parties. The Argentine official pointed out that precipitous action, without mass support or psychological preparation, could compromise the regular efforts of the parties to build for future battles. The PCB leaders refused to accept the PCA's stand, and PCA President Victorio Codovilla went to Moscow in May to confer with Khrushchev and to come to an agreement with Castro, who was then making his long visit to Moscow. After meeting with Castro he notified the PCA Central Committee that Castro had accepted the party's position and had promised to suspend the revolutionary program on his return to Havana. He said Castro admitted that he had not realized how much dissension and bitterness Cuban support of non-party leftist groups was causing in the Communist parties.

3. The Peruvian Party Protest.

In this same month (May 1963), a CP Bolivia delegation was severely berated at a meeting in Moscow with CPSU members for being involved in guerrilla operations against Peru. It was told that a formal complaint submitted by Jorge del Prado Chavez, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Peru (PCP), against the PCB had, among other things, accused the PCB of violating the international Communist accords of 1957 and 1960 through interference in the internal affairs of another Communist party. The delegation protested fruitlessly that the PCP had full knowledge of the operation and had given its prior consent. They were bluntly asked not to intervene in the future in the internal affairs of another Communist party. On the other hand, the CPSU spokesman said that if the PCB felt that conditions were ripe within Bolivia, and if the PCB had sufficient strength to carry out a successful effort, it should initiate guerrilla activities in its own country.

Thus not only Cuba, but the Bolivian party leadership as well, was being attacked for intervention in the affairs of other parties.

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4. The Bolivian Party Protest .

In October 1963 it was the PCB's turn to protest. It charged the Cuban Embassy in La Paz with using PCB and Communist youth members in its organizing of terrorist and sabotage groups for operations in La Paz. The PCB thus turned against the Cubans the charge of meddling in the internal affairs of the PCB and protested that this was destroying the integrity of the party. Claiming that the PCB could not take any direct action to stop the Cuban activity because of the serious internal problems it would create for the party, the PCB said it was thinking of denouncing Cuban interference in the internal affairs of the PCB at the next international gathering of Communist parties, then expected to take place in Moscow in November.

5. In other countries, also, the Communist parties attacked Cuban interference, though such attacks were not made public. In Panama, for example, the CP prepared an internal document for party leaders only which enumerated cases of Cuban "indifference" to the CP and encouragement of the extremist VAN, which was attributed to "second echelon officials and the petty-bourgeois foundation of the Cuban revolution." Both Cuban and Chinese attempts to direct the Panamanian revolution were attacked privately by party leaders, who were warned that pro-Chinese petty bourgeois influence might cause the Cubans to assume an anti-Soviet position at any moment.

C. The Havana Conference--an Expression of Loyalty to Moscow.

One of the most interesting questions concerning the relationship of the 1964 Havana meeting to the earlier Latin American party conferences is raised by the publicity that it has been given since mid-January 1965. Earlier, the secrecy observed in connection with the meetings was paralleled by Soviet cautioning of the parties not to identify themselves openly--and particularly, the coordinated programs they were to develop--

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with the USSR. But in 1965 it was a TASS release in Moscow that first focused international attention on the meeting. (A press interview given at home by a Bolivian CP leader in early December was completely ignored by Communist media elsewhere.) In the light of evidence from other parts of the world, such as the Middle East, it is likely that this change in approach has been dictated at least in part by a Soviet desire to strengthen its control and manifest authority over the Communist parties of the developing countries in the Free World. If nothing else, the informal, "unanimous" endorsement at the end of 1964 of the declarations of 1957 and 1960 can be interpreted by the CPSU as a declaration of the loyalty of the Latin American parties--including, for the first time, the Cuban PURS--to Moscow.

While the November Havana Conference unquestionably was sponsored by the CPSU, its initiation was technically left to Latin American parties--CP Bolivia and CP Uruguay according to some reports, and the CP's of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Bolivia, according to others. On precedent, it seems probable that Bolivia, and Uruguay would have been the most interested initiators of such a conference for the CPSU. It has in fact been reported that some of the parties in the countries around Bolivia were unenthusiastic and felt that such a conference would be fruitless. Uruguay has often expressed its great concern about unity in the international Communist movement, and the Bolivians, after a period of collusion with the Cubans, subsequently experienced Cuban interference in what they deem to be their internal affairs.

D. The Conference Convenes.

In early November 1964 various leaders and representatives of Latin American Communist parties who were in Moscow for the November celebration began to prepare documents and an agenda for a meeting of Latin American Communist parties to be held in Havana later in the month. According to one source, the CPSU wanted the Havana meeting held for the purpose of discussing the

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Sino-Soviet dispute as well as other problems of common interest to the Latin American Communist parties. Travel of the delegates, as well as the printing of the approved documents after the meeting, were to be paid for by the CPSU.

In mid-November 1964, additional Latin American Communist party leaders began to leave for Moscow, which suggests that the first group was operating as a kind of preparatory committee.

From Moscow the groups went to Havana, where the Latin American meeting was held from 22 to 29 November 1964. It is not known how many of the participants in the conference went directly to Havana.

Following the Havana meeting, a group [REDACTED] returned to Moscow, where they worked with others on the final editing of the documents approved in Havana.

A delegation of some ten Latin American Communist leaders, who in all probability were with the group that returned to Moscow, went on to Communist China, carrying out a decision that had been taken at the conference itself. This group tried to get the Chinese to agree to work more closely with the USSR to lessen tension in the Communist world, particularly in Latin America, and to accept the policy of not supporting groups that did not have proper endorsement. No agreement was reached, however, and the delegates received no satisfaction from the Chinese, who treated them courteously but very coldly. The Chinese allegedly reaffirmed their determination to recognize and cooperate with "true Marxist-Leninists" who opposed Soviet policies, and made it clear that there was no chance that they would yield to pressure, no matter how many parties opposed them.

Most of the few known delegates to the Havana Conference returned to their native countries during the latter part of December 1964, or in early January 1965. (See Appendix: "Identified Participants in the Conference and Related Events.")

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The Havana CP Conference of November 1964, if it has in fact resolved the problems that developed among Latin American Communists over the past three to four years, establishes new bases of Soviet-Cuban subversive collaboration. Effective planning, coordination, and vigorous efforts to carry out programs on a regional and sub-regional basis, after the pattern of the years before 1960, may be expected in 1965-- though not without the possibility of disruptive or independent action by recalcitrant pro-Castroist or pro-Chinese elements.

III. The Conference Decisions.

A. The Regional "Solidarity" Projects for 1965.

Four region-wide solidarity projects were approved at Havana:

1. A campaign of solidarity with Cuba.
2. A general campaign of solidarity with Latin American anti-imperialist struggles.
3. A campaign for the release of political prisoners in various Latin American countries.
4. A specific solidarity campaign in support of the "combative struggle" of the Venezuelan people.

The implementation of a number of the conference objectives in the field of solidarity activity began promptly. Indeed, some preliminary steps were taken even before the conference communique formalized the projects. Meetings during the Cuban Week of Solidarity with Venezuela that immediately preceded the party conference in Havana provided an excellent opportunity for working out the specifics of projects that would fit in the over-all program. Moreover, a Society of Soviet-Cuban Friendship was officially created in Moscow on

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11 November 1964, in the presence of Giraldo Mazola and other members of a Cuban delegation representing the Cuban Institute of Peoples' Friendship (ICAP). This new body in the USSR may well serve hereafter as a Soviet instrument for supporting and promoting action in Latin America, after coordination on the policy level, through the channels provided by Soviet officials working with other friendship societies in Latin America, since the Soviet equivalents of the friendship societies abroad work under a single body in Moscow--the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries--with which the Soviet intelligence services are deeply involved. Moreover, this body has as one of its components an association that deals only with countries of Latin America. A CPSU official, M. F. Kudatchkin, long identified with the CPSU Foreign Section's work in Latin America, arrived to join the new Soviet Embassy in Santiago, Chile, as of the beginning of February, and may well play a key role in guidance and coordination of regional activity.

On 22 November, the day on which the conference opened, the Secretary of the Cuban-Mexican Society for Cultural Relations returned from a one-month visit to Mexico, during which she visited the University of Morelia and contacted Mexican intellectual and cultural figures. While the specifics of her discussions are not known, it is likely that they involved planning for 1965 activities.

While each of the four region-wide solidarity projects may involve a separate organization effort, they are clearly intended to be mutually supporting and to work toward a single goal. The Cuban campaign is being built around two themes-- Cuban right of self-determination and demands that other Latin American governments adopt a policy of non-intervention in Cuban affairs. The general anti-imperialist solidarity campaign will also advocate self-determination, but in addition will take the offensive, exposing and attacking alleged acts of "imperialist intervention." The amnesty campaign, by its defense of "patriots," will spearhead the attack against local anti-Communists and

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anti-Communist national governments. The Venezuelan campaign, dealing as it does with the presently most significant test case of Communist subversion in Latin America, will involve elements of all three general campaigns. Whatever contribution it may make to supporting and encouraging the liberation struggle in Venezuela, this campaign clearly will also serve as a testing mechanism through whose operations each of the Communist parties can assess which of the various projects is most likely to produce results in its own national environment.

B. First Organizational Moves in the Solidarity Campaigns.

1. On 8 January, an Uruguayan pro-Cuban front (FIDEL) demonstrated in favor of renewal of Uruguayan-Cuban diplomatic relations and at the same time announced the formation of a "Latin American Congress of Solidarity with Cuba and for the Self-Determination of Peoples," to be held in Montevideo 2-4 April 1965. There is little doubt that many CP's--and the Soviets as well--will make a major effort to mobilize the greatest and most impressive participation possible for this event (which is comparable to the 1961 National Liberation Congress held in Mexico), if only to demonstrate to Cuba, China, and the world the willingness and capabilities of the orthodox CP's in LA to support Cuba and the liberation movement as long as agreements on a common policy are observed. A number of similar conferences in recent years have been postponed or subtly sabotaged by local Communist foot-dragging in the face of Cuban efforts to dominate policy. The local parties also stand to gain. Uruguayan Communists are already reported to be optimistic that the Havana agreement will reduce inner party friction and permit greater local influence to be achieved by FIDEL, their popular political front. External support for this Congress has already been received. The representatives of the Argentine and Chilean Communist parties met in Buenos Aires during 22-23 January in the first of a series of bilateral meetings as envisaged in the Havana Conference and declared: "At the present time it is vitally necessary to put forth the utmost

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effort to assure the success of the coming continental conference in solidarity with Cuba and for the self-determination of peoples and nations. Both parties pledge themselves once more to this."

2. The communique's language dealing with the general anti-imperialist campaign called for the formation of solidarity movements, unions, and campaigns, organized on a permanent basis, to:

a. give active (but otherwise unspecified) aid to freedom fighters in Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay, and Haiti, and also to intensify movements of solidarity with the people of Panama;

b. give "resolute" aid to independence struggles in Puerto Rico and British Guiana; for the autonomy of Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana; for the return to Argentina of the Falkland Islands; and for rendering support to the national aspirations of the British and Dutch colonies in the Caribbean.

Should such a regional solidarity organization emerge, it would have international significance as the Latin American counterpart of the Cairo-based Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization, many of whose national affiliates have essentially the same character. A three-continent conference to bring together the Latin American and Afro-Asians has long been projected, but the convening of the preparatory meeting planned for Havana has been repeatedly postponed. In early October, the Cubans suddenly informed the Cairo AAPSO secretariat that the meeting could be scheduled and named organizations in six Latin American countries which would be represented--Mexico (MLN), Venezuela (FALN), Guatemala (13 November Movement), Uruguay (FIDEL), Chile (FRAP), and Cuba (PURS). There has been no recent news, but it is possible that, as the Cubans suggested, a preparatory meeting was held in Algiers at the AAPSO Economic Seminar scheduled for five days beginning 22 February. The Montevideo Conference scheduled for April may well bring the Afro-Asian to Latin America.

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3. The decision to conduct a hemispheric campaign for the release of political prisoners was a logical sequel to, and was probably inspired by, the Youth Conference of Solidarity with Political Prisoners of Latin America, which was already in the planning stage at the time of the Havana Conference. At the Havana meeting, Orlando Millas Correa, Chilean representative, offered Santiago as a meeting place and headquarters for the political prisoners organization. The Youth Conference referred to above actually took place in Santiago between 11 and 13 December 1964, and one of the decisions adopted called for the formation of a permanent committee for the liberation of political prisoners. The conference was organized, controlled, and attended almost exclusively by Communists, although there were a few participants of other political tendencies.

Only about twenty delegates arrived from outside Chile. They included Argentines, Brazilians, Colombians, Paraguayans, Uruguayans, and Panamanians. Most of those attending the meeting were exiles and students from various Latin American countries who were already living in Chile. The Cuban delegates, who were expected to be the key personalities at the meeting, failed to arrive.

Delegates given special recognition at the conference were Hernando Garavito Munoz (Communist), Colombian deputy; Paulo de Tarso, former Minister of Education in Brazil under Goulart; and Elizabeth Tortosa Cuenco, wife of Jesus Faria, Secretary General of the Communist Party of Venezuela, who is now in jail.

4. The call for a Venezuelan solidarity effort is not new. In 1963 the Cuban Institute of Friendship with the Peoples (ICAP) called on all Latin American countries which had not already done so to set up Committees of Solidarity with Venezuela. At that time, however, the call evoked only lukewarm response.

The increased attention given by other Latin American CP's to Venezuela at the present time is, however, significant. For several years the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV) has

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been engaged in an all-out, but thus far unsuccessful, struggle to overthrow the government of Venezuela by force and violence, primarily through its paramilitary arm, the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN).

The wisdom of continuing the armed struggle, however, was increasingly questioned during 1964 by "soft-line" members of the PCV. An ally of the PCV, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, has already split on this point. The "soft-liners" have pointed out, with considerable truth, that the armed struggle had not brought the party any closer to achieving political power. On the contrary, the party had been seriously weakened. Mass support had not been forthcoming, the peasantry and the bulk of organized labor had remained loyal to the government, and the party was virtually isolated politically. Moreover, the loss of its representation in Congress deprived it of the operationally useful immunity which its representatives had enjoyed, and of their salaries, a portion of which was used to finance party activities. Principal party leaders are, or were until recently, in jail; still others are in hiding or abroad, and the party itself is outlawed.

The "soft-line" faction was beginning to gain strength and in the last half of 1964 it became more assertive in pressing for a change in party policy. There was an increasing possibility just before the Havana Conference that control of the party would pass from the "hard-line" to the "soft-line" faction.

An obvious failure of the armed struggle in Venezuela would be a serious blow to the Cuban leaders, who have consistently advocated armed struggle as a solution to the problems of Latin American countries. If the party finally admitted that the armed struggle had failed in Venezuela it would have a deleterious effect on armed struggles elsewhere (Guatemala, Honduras, etc.), and would discourage or inhibit other CP's in future efforts to apply this policy. It is thus probable that the initiative for this solidarity campaign was inspired as much by the Cubans as by the Venezuelans.

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Venezuela has long been a prime target for Cuban subversion; the importance to Cuba of a victory of the revolutionary movement there was underscored by Blas Roca in a speech on 24 January 1963 in Havana, on the occasion of the 5th Anniversary of the ousting of the Perez Jimenez regime, when he stated: "The victory of Venezuela will give Cuba a tremendous boost. We will cease to be the solitary Caribbean island facing the Yankee imperialists and we will have a nation on the continent to back us."

Just before the Havana meeting, Cuba began to devote increasing attention to Venezuela. Havana radio on 5 October reported the establishment of a new organization called the "Cuban Committee for Solidarity with Venezuela," although the prior existence of a "Cuban-Venezuelan Solidarity Committee" had been indicated on a number of occasions. The significance Cuba attached to the new organization, is suggested by the prominence of its sponsors. So, too, is its character as a venture in which the existing functional organization of labor, youth, and women should coordinate their effort with that of the CP. The president of the new committee is Haydee Santamaria, a member of the PURS governing council, wife of Education Minister Hart, and a confidant of Fidel Castro. Others participating in launching the organization included labor leader Lazaro Pena, student leader Jose Rebellon, and women's federation head Vilma Espin, the wife of Raul Castro.

The week of 14-21 November 1964 was designated as the Week of Cuban Solidarity with the Struggle of Venezuela for National Liberation. Coincidentally, during this same period, an office of the FALN was officially established in Havana. According to Prensa Latina, representatives of the USSR, Communist China, and other Bloc countries were present at the opening of this office and pledged their solidarity with the FALN.

The November 1964 pledges of hemispheric and international support and aid for the liberation struggle in Venezuela have undoubtedly resulted, at least temporarily, in a strengthening of the control of the "hard-line" faction over the PCV.

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The basis on which the Venezuelan campaign can be linked by Communists elsewhere in Latin America to the regional amnesty and national liberation campaigns appears with particular clarity in an August 1964 statement issued by the Politburo of the PCV's Central Committee. In it the PCV, under the slogan "We are not cultivators of violence," tortuously tries to put the blame on the Venezuelan government for the original and continuing armed struggle.

It charges that a "Fascist group" in the governing party and which has influence in the government is systematically committing acts of provocation, which they then attribute to the "revolutionary organizations," in order to create a climate of violence as a pretext for repressive measures of an anti-revolutionary character, for holding political prisoners, and for refusing to restore political liberties. It accuses the Venezuelan government of responding to a national movement for amnesty for political prisoners by increasing repression, and, finally, declares that, while the PCV and its revolutionary allies have showed their desire and willingness to work peacefully, they are determined to continue to use violence ("the higher forms of struggle") as long as they are forced to do so.

5. Not all regional coordination will take place in the organizational framework being built in connection with the solidarity campaigns. The traditional front organizations, too, will play a role. For example, coordination of women's activities in support of the conference resolutions will be the subject of a meeting now scheduled to be held in Havana in March. This will bring together women's representatives of the Latin American Communist parties for the purpose of strengthening solidarity and improving relations, especially with Cuban women, and developing "common goals" towards which all will work. Preparations for this meeting probably took place at the October 1964 meeting of the Executive Council of the Women's International Democratic Federation in Sofia.

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C. The Conference Treatment of the Role of, and Support for, Armed Struggle.

1. The Soviet Commitment.

Behind the language of the conference communique lies an explicit though secret Soviet commitment to support the armed struggle in Latin America; but what little is known of the commitment indicates that the timing, nature, and extent of Soviet aid is by agreement to be determined by the Soviet-oriented orthodox CP's in line with Soviet interests. The preliminary meeting in Moscow, the attendance of a Soviet observer at the conference itself, and the final coordination of the communique in Moscow all point to careful efforts by Moscow to insure that it can control the demands placed upon it, even while it publicizes its willingness --in principle--to give support. The existence of such a Soviet commitment is indicated by remarks made by a CPSU Foreign Section functionary who, in a closed meeting with leaders of a key European CP in early 1965, stated that armed struggle, while not a possibility in Europe, was still likely to be necessary in some situations in Latin America.

Although for years the Soviets have distinguished between "just" and "unjust" wars, and have promised support to "just wars" of liberation, the CPSU commitment to aid armed struggle in Latin America has never been spelled out as clearly as in the Pravda editorial of 14 January, which coincided with the publication of the conference communique. The Pravda editorial notes that (underlining supplied): "Communists in Latin America, guided by the general line worked out by the international Communist movement, come out for the use of all forms of struggle, both peaceful and non-peaceful." It specifically praises the "just struggle of patriots, arms in hand, in Venezuela, Guatemala, and a number of other countries." Most importantly, the editorial concludes that the Soviet people consider it their sacred duty to provide support to such "patriots."

Under the new policy, the Soviets appear to be looking to the local orthodox CP's to protect them from over-commitment and involvement in rash adventurism, as these CP's assume the authority and burden of distinguishing between wise and unwise revolutionary

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efforts in their countries. The Soviets have been preparing the parties for two years to assume this responsibility. Under the earlier modus vivendi with Castro, which obtained during 1961 and 1962, the Soviets apparently were willing to permit Castro, with the aid of the Cuban CP, to assume the role of sponsor of armed liberation movements which were penetrated and unofficially aided by orthodox CP elements, despite overt policy differences. This led to the formation of guerrilla groups such as the 13th of November Movement (M13N) in Guatemala, the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Nicaragua, and the "Francisco Morazon Liberation Front" in Honduras. With the notable exception of the Venezuelan CP, however, the orthodox parties, with their limited penetrations, were generally unable to control the guerrilla movements, particularly where serious differences developed after the Cuban missile crisis. Therefore, beginning in 1963, Castro was pressured by the Soviets to withdraw support from extremist leaders, and some orthodox CP's initiated purges of extremist and "pro-Chinese" elements while establishing their own paramilitary apparatus. The Guatemalan CP, for example, established a systematic military program under Rafael Tischler in Jan. 1963, although PGT members had been active since 1961 within the M13N. Other parties also developed military apparatus, while an accelerated training program for CP leaders was initiated in the USSR to strengthen the will and ability of the CP's to resist and deal with the extremist and pro-Chinese views. In some countries this gave the parties greater contact with guerrillas and greater influence over paramilitary activities.

The Soviet commitment to armed struggle is thus fairly well controlled and delimited where it has puppet parties in Latin America, although the statement of this commitment is purposely obscure. A number of parties -- such as the Colombian CP -- admit armed violence as "one of the forms" of struggle, and many argue that peasant revolts, demonstrations, and spontaneous violence are inevitable and justifiable responses to repressive conditions. The general line, however, does not necessarily involve more immediate or deeper Soviet commitment than at present in any specific case. On the other hand, the fact that certain parties have clearly committed themselves to support of specific revolutionary movements places an obligation upon the Soviets as well. The Venezuelan CP, when it resumed publication of its theoretical organ, Principios, in September-October 1964, began by

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printing a collection of policy documents which clearly identify the party line with the support of the FLN and with continuation of the armed struggle by the FALN. Of all the Latin American CP's, no party can advance a better claim to Soviet support, under the new commitment, than the Venezuelan party.

The Guatemalan CP (PGT) has also emphasized its commitment to armed struggle, which it calls "inevitable." It, too, explicitly mentions--but without clear and full approval--the policies of the Armed Revolutionary Forces (FAR), a nominal unified guerrilla command of which the M13N is a part. It has noted that the "maturing conditions" must be given "thorough, scientific, analysis" and cautiously goes no further than stating that a "certain degree of maturity of the conditions for revolution and the objective trend making for their further ripening exist in Guatemala." But the PGT also states that the masses must be organized and activated, and that "the unity of all the democratic and anti-imperialistic forces is the cardinal condition for victory" (World Marxist Review, June 1964). That such proper unity (or, now, simply assurance of the orthodox CP's control of fighting "patriots") has been the immediate problem is seen in the recent "open letter" from the Guatemalan CP to the extremists of the M13N guerrilla faction, whose organ, Revolucion Socialista, has followed a Trotskyist line which leans toward both Chinese and Castroist concepts. The Colombian CP view is similar to the Guatemalan. In January 1965, Gilberto Vieira White stated, even less ambiguously than the PGT, that the armed struggle has now become "absolutely inevitable as one of the forms of struggle," and that conditions for revolution are mature. But, on the other key question--unity of action among revolutionary forces--he frankly admitted that it did not exist. Vieira, moreover, does not mention by name any armed revolutionary front similar to the FAR in Guatemala or the FALN in Venezuela, both of which have the explicit recognition of the orthodox local CP. Such recognition and approval would, under the terms of the Havana Conference understanding, seem to be necessary prerequisites to the Soviets becoming fully committed to support of a particular armed struggle.

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The Soviet obligation to honor their commitment may also be limited by the willingness of Castro and the pro-Castro groups to collaborate with the local CP's. Although there is already some evidence that Cuban support to armed groups will be channeled hereafter through the CP's, there is as yet no compelling reason to assume that Castro will exert himself to force non-orthodox groups to abandon their Castroist faith in "instant socialism" through the creation, by violence and terrorism, of the conditions for victory. Castro himself has been reported to have virtually ignored the Havana Conference, and during December Che Guevara intentionally re-emphasized Cuban support of violence. It is possible, therefore, that some "patriotic" revolutionary groups--particularly if they see clear possibilities of Chinese support--will reject the Communist party appeal for unity. Only the eventual response of the M13N in Guatemala to the PGT letter, and similar exchanges between CP's and non-party revolutionary groups elsewhere, are likely to give some clue as to whether Castro and the Cubans are willing to pressure their followers to abandon polemics with the local CP and join in the unified liberation struggle asked for in the Havana communique. It is interesting in this context to note that just such an appeal to abandon polemics and to recognize the value of PGT support and collaboration was made to Guatemalan guerrilla leaders in October 1964 by Victor Rico Galan, a Mexican leftist journalist with both orthodox CP and Castroist contacts, who had also discussed the problem of unity with Alfredo Guerra Borges, author of the PGT "open letter." In a subsequent propaganda article, published in Siempre (4 November), Rico Galan emphasized unity and quoted FAR guerrilla leader Yon Sosa as stating that "unity... is the basis of victory," that "we count on international solidarity," and that "this armed struggle is no one's property: the revolution has no master.... We are neither prejudiced nor sectarian...."

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2. Post-Conference Developments in the Field of Violence.

The Cuban-Soviet agreement to support armed revolution and any action in close coordination with the CP's provides for a more efficient, unified, and centralized direction of the armed struggle in selected countries. Since the conference, there have been significant signs of stepped-up plans for sabotage, terrorism, and guerrilla activity in several Central American countries, under the direction of the local Communist party. There has also been evidence that some Castroist revolutionary organizations or individual Castroists have acquiesced to orthodox CP direction.

a. In Guatemala, the Communist party (PGT) has formed a new committee to organize and coordinate terrorist activity by youth and students, and this committee has called for information concerning professional men, military officers, and landowners who should be "liquidated" during 1965. On 10 January, the PGT and its labor front (FASGUA) made plans to create sabotage groups of ten men each to carry out terrorist activity in factories. The FASGUA had already sent one of its leaders to the Pacific banana zone on 3 January to inform the peasants that the "armed revolution had begun" and to call on them to denounce unpopular landlords, who would subsequently be "liquidated." The provocative character of this kind of agitation is obvious. In neighboring El Salvador, the military command of the United revolutionary action front (FUAR) has been reactivated.

b. In Honduras, [REDACTED] that military training would be completed by the 16 February elections, after which a call would be issued in the name of the Popular Action Front for revolution, to be followed by assassinations, kidnappings and sabotage. He claimed excellent information concerning the government order of battle. [REDACTED] also warned that informers would be liquidated immediately, without a party hearing or expulsion. In early January also, an alignment was

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reached between the "Francisco Morazon Liberation Movement" (MLFM), led by Cuban-trained elements, and the PCH, under which MLFM leaders will take orders in the future "directly from the PCH."

Here, too, other current information indicates that violence and preparation for violence are being tied in with political action. CP groups have been instructed to take additional security measures and to agitate after mid-February for a general strike to protest the elections. At the end of January, the National Civic Movement was formed, with Communist youth elements providing direction, to bring together as many groups as possible in a militant campaign ostensibly to prevent the election of a conservative military man to the Presidency. In this movement Communist elements, including dominated student and youth groups, trade unions, women's organization, and professional associations, are ostentatiously supporting a non-Communist progressive political party, whose left-oriented youth group is particularly vocal in calling on all liberals to be prepared to fight, if necessary, to defeat so-called enemies of democracy. The real Communist effort, however, was clearly being planned for the post-election period, presumably on the assumption that much of the non-Communist opposition will be more easily exploitable after the electoral defeat which the Communists expected them to suffer.

c. In Panama, the Panamanian CP (PDP), which has been developing a military apparatus since late 1962, drew up a plan for armed action in Panama "in the near future" which it presented to the Havana Conference. The plan was received with interest by Raul Castro, and the Panamanian representative made a request for Cuban support, including guerrilla training and arms. That Cuba is now disposed to work within the context of the Havana agreement is suggested by Raul Castro's request for copies of the conclusions of the PDP plenums, including that of 1962 which established a staged plan for the seizing of power and preparation for armed violence against imperialism "in accordance with the correlation of forces for a world-wide basis." At this time the PDP was preparing a \$50,000 budget for military action--a sum which was promised to the party in Moscow in mid-1963 and delivered in late 1963, and which

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may have contributed to the development of the military apparatus in the Chiriqui banana zone which was uncovered in September 1964.

d. In Venezuela, the operational policy of the PCV since the end of 1964 still involves violent struggle as an essential part of its subversive effort. However, it now is trying to:

(1) exploit, as part of a political action program intended to create a solid base for mass organizations and new support, demonstrations and strikes over such "grass roots" issues as rises in the cost of living (rally held in January to commemorate the fall of Perez Jimenez regime was to be exploited to this same end);

(2) relate and synchronize military action with political programs;

(3) de-emphasize urban terrorism, shifting the emphasis to the guerrilla effort in the countryside. Since the emphasis is now being placed on operations that will build the Party's strength and following, guerrilla operations and violence are likely to be tactical or provocative sorties for local political impact and for discrediting the government, rather than part of a systematic buildup to achieve a revolutionary takeover in the immediate future.

The Soviet contribution to these aspects of the Venezuelan struggle is now new.

~~In the second half of 1963, a small group of Venezuelan Communists received guerrilla warfare training in the Soviet Union. One member of the group also received intelligence training. This training had been negotiated by the CP of Venezuela with the Soviets and was apparently designed to balance Chinese influence on guerrilla warfare trainees going to Communist China.~~

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In June 1964, the Soviet Union turned over to the PCV an initial sum of \$400,000 to purchase arms and also finance a study to determine suitable locations on the Venezuelan seacoast where arms and other supplies can be smuggled into the country.

Alberto Lovera, a member of the Political Bureau of the CP Venezuela and chief of the FALN, was in Cuba at the time of the Havana Conference and presumably was one of the Venezuelan CP representatives. While in Cuba, Lovera attended conferences with top Cuban leaders and Soviet, Chinese, and Czech representatives. He also held bilateral talks with representatives of the other Latin American Communist Parties.

In his private talks with Cuban leaders, Lovera obtained a promise of financial help during 1965, which he estimated to be valued at three million dollars. Also discussed was the training abroad of up to 1,000 Venezuelan youths in different types of courses and the selection of several men to send to Cuba for a special training course.

During Lovera's talks with the Czechs, the latter offered to provide arms. Lovera agreed with the Czechs to send a representative to examine the different types of arms available for the needs of the FALN.

After leaving Cuba, Lovera proceeded to the USSR to request moral and financial support for the revolution. The results are not known. He also wished to visit Communist China, but the time factor prevented him from doing so.

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IV. The Conference and International Communist Unity.

A. Cuba, the Orthodox CP's, and Other National Liberation Elements.

Reportedly, the Cuban leaders (Fidel Castro, Guevara and others) have agreed to support only those revolutionary groups approved by the local CP. This, in effect, gives a national CP the authority to define for the country concerned the "stage of revolutionary development" and the "unique national conditions" which determine the appropriate combination of the various forms of struggle (peaceful or non-peaceful). It thus could resolve the basic complaints by various CP's over Cuban unilateral intervention and strengthen the hand of the "mature" Communists over the young and immature Communists who lack ideological training.

Will Castro abide by this agreement, which represents the culmination of two year's increasing effort by the orthodox Communists and the Soviets to reduce Castroist influence? The record shows that under Soviet pressure Castro's support was withdrawn from the VAN in Panama in mid-1963, and that other Central American Castroist leaders and organizations suffered a decline in influence while increased Soviet funds were funneled directly to the CP's. Nevertheless, Panamanian and other extremists continued to receive training in Cuba, and it is probable that in 1963 and 1964 Castro was only nominally responding to Soviet pressure. This may be the case now, although it has recently been reported that Cuban support to Colombian leftist groups has been stopped and will be channeled henceforth through the orthodox CP.

There is some evidence that the Chinese have taken over the financing of a number of groups formerly supported by Castro, a development that may have Castro's tacit approval and support. In any event, without Chinese endorsement the Havana agreement may do little to develop unity in the national liberation movements, particularly in those which have a

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guerrilla component. The original wording of the communique, however, is sufficiently broad and flexible to permit concessions to the Chinese and thus to bring them into partnership if the Chinese should become convinced that their confrontation with the CPSU and its allies among the CP's of the world would be indefinitely postponed. While the Havana conference delegation to Peiping received no encouragement, it is possible that the high-level Cuban visits to Peiping in January and early February, as well as the Kosygin conferences, might have some relation to this question. Specifically, a new postponement of the inter-party preparatory meeting now scheduled for 1 March would be a necessary precursor to such a change. Sensitive reports state, in fact, that the attitude of the Latin American CP's, including that of the Cuban PURS, is likely to be of decisive importance in connection with the March plans.

One immediate result of the Havana Conference has been the posing of financial problems for certain Cuban-supported revolutionary groups which are not endorsed by the recognized CP. This has already occurred in Colombia. A leader of the pro-Cuban Youth of the Liberal Revolutionary Movement stated that his organization was now in a bad financial situation as a result of the agreements reached in Havana and is no longer receiving funds from Cuba. He stated that this was also true of other leftist groups which had received money from Cuba in the past.

These revolutionary groups, in Colombia and elsewhere, are thus faced with grave financial problems which could affect their very existence. It is doubtful that any of these groups could remain active for long on the contributions of its members and sympathizers alone. Therefore, other sources of funds and support must be found. Several alternatives are available:

1. To obtain the money by violent means, such as the robberies which have recently taken place in Ecuador and Venezuela: those who advocate these operations have justified them by quoting Mao's advice, that a guerrilla supports himself by taking from the enemy;

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2. To reach an agreement with the orthodox Communist party: this would be unpalatable to most groups, as it would lead inevitably to control by the CP;
3. To ally with pro-Chinese groups who are receiving support from Communist China;
4. To appeal directly to the Chinese Communists for support.

Of the above choices, the latter will be the most appealing to these revolutionary groups, as each is anxious to maintain its separate image. The Chinese, however, are likely to insist on close coordination with the groups they already support and on an eventual formation of a revolutionary front.

B. The National CP's and Internal Factionalism .

In a bilateral meeting during 22-23 January, the Argentine and Chilean Communist parties declared their full, enthusiastic support for the declaration adopted in Havana condemning factionalism and actively defending the unity of each Communist party. Neither party appears, however, to have intensified its actions against dissidents, which in fact had been pursued vigorously earlier in 1964. A leading Chilean CP member has, however, publicly broken with the party and is now militantly adopting a pro-Chinese line criticizing the CP's policies concerning the critically important parliamentary elections which are imminent. In Uruguay, the Uruguayan Party functionaries have suggested that one immediate benefit of the Havana conference will be to soften differences between hard-line and soft-line advocates within the party, thereby permitting leaders to formulate a sound tactical position with a minimum of difficulty and dissension. In Bolivia, PCB First Secretary Mario Monje has stated that the Havana conference is a great achievement, since it will reduce the influence of the anti-party (pro-Chinese) group of the PCB who are trying to establish contacts outside of Bolivia.

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Concerning Brazil, Pedro Motta Lima, Brazilian Communist Party representative on the staff of the international Communist journal Problems of Peace and Socialism, in Prague, commented publicly in January on the Havana communique, stressing the efforts for unity within each party and the categorical repudiation of all divisive activities as called for in the communique. He said: "It would be most gratifying to Latin American revolutionaries if all of our parties merged into a single Marxist-Leninist group in unity and complete understanding within the socialist camp. We would thereby avoid the factors of division and maintain a fraternal dialogue."

The dissident CPB has maintained that it is the legitimate CP and that it is the only "revolutionary" force left in Brazil. It has been saying that the 31 March 1964 military coup has demonstrated the futility of the orthodox Prestes-led PCB's line of right revisionism, with its traditional emphasis on non-violence. There have been indications that some militants within the orthodox PCB agree with the hard revolutionary dissident line. In an effort to attract new followers, the CPB is reported to be drawing away from its extremism and to have relegated violent action, such as sabotage and terrorism, to a secondary plane, at least temporarily. It should be noted, however, that even while emphasizing its pro-Chinese orientation, the CPB is now willing to adopt, as an expedient, participation in a Communist united-front, if only to harass the present government. In view of this and the unanimous criticism to which the orthodox PCB was allegedly subjected by the other Communist parties at the Havana meeting for "being too peaceful and relying too much on the bourgeoisie and not enough on the proletariat," it appears that the area for rapprochement between the two parties has broadened significantly. If any factional tensions remain important, they now are likely to affect the orthodox party's right wing, against which charges of past opportunist errors are now most likely to be directed.

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V. Conclusions.

Events in Latin America during December and January indicate that an effort has been made to carry out the decision of the Havana Conference, and that the effort could contribute substantially to giving unity, common purpose, and new momentum to Communist subversive activity throughout the region. But it is equally apparent that some of the problems that the conference tried to deal with can easily become serious again on short notice.

The first problem likely to arise concerns the next Soviet steps in their effort, through the 1 March meeting or some alternative device, to restore unity throughout the Communist movement. If the CPSU opts for tighter unity with their known supporters and an open renewal of the confrontation with the Chinese, the Havana agreements may be subjected to serious strain. The CPSU's opponents are not likely to let such a Soviet move go unchallenged; in fact, they are likely to try to exploit it.

In mid-February, the pro-Chinese Albanians issued a major anti-CPSU attack on the 1 March meeting plans which explicitly charged that the Havana Conference was a Soviet-inspired maneuver to trap the Cuban Communists and exploit Cuba's popularity with other Latin American revolutionaries in order to restore Soviet control over the Communists of the area. After spelling out analogous Soviet moves in other areas, they demand that the CPSU not be given the respite it is seeking, nor allowed to consolidate its "shaky positions".

The next tests are likely to involve the mobilization campaigns, in which unimpressive efforts at display of strength, or otherwise poor performances by one or more CP's, may easily lead to recriminations and loss of enthusiasm. But, during this same period, the Communists of Chile, Venezuela, and Cuba will confront special tests. In Chile, the forthcoming parliamentary

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elections are of great importance; in Venezuela, it is the party's ability to disrupt or withstand the repressive operations against the FALN and to make a good showing in its renewal of political activity that is crucial. In Cuba the old-line Communists face Fidel Castro's efforts to resist Soviet orthodoxy through distribution of key governmental posts and through directing the development of the PURS--the single party which has yet to hold its first congress. Again, since "it is results that count," each success is likely to reinforce the trend that began with the Havana Conference. However, with more Latin American governments and leaders showing that they understand at least the main implication of the tactics which the Communists are employing, the chances for major gains seem limited if appropriate countermeasures are vigorously carried out.

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APPENDIX

IDENTIFIED PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE
AND RELATED EVENTS

<u>Representatives</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Prep.</u> <u>Comm.</u>	<u>Moscow</u>		<u>Havana</u> <u>Meeting</u>	<u>China</u>	<u>Final</u> <u>Editing</u> <u>Comm.</u> <u>(Mosco</u>
			<u>Before</u>	<u>After</u>			
Codovilla, Victorio	Argentina	X	X		X		
<u>Monje</u> Molina, Mario	Bolivia	X	X	X	X		X
<u>Kolle</u> Cueto, Jorge	Bolivia		X		X		
<u>Melgar</u> Justiniano, Hernan	Bolivia		X		X		
Ziller, Armando	Brazil				X		
Luchesi, Ramiro	Brazil				X		
<u>Millas</u> Correa, Orlando	Chile	X	X		X		
<u>Donaire</u> Cortés, Uldarico aka Cortes, Rafael	Chile			X	X		
<u>Vieira</u> White, Gilberto	Colombia		X		X	X	
<u>Mora</u> Valverde, Manuel	Costa Rica		X	X	X		

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APPENDIX
(CONTINUED)

<u>Representatives</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Prep. Comm.</u>	<u>Moscow</u>		<u>Havana Meeting</u>	<u>China</u>	<u>Final Editing Comm. (Moscow)</u>
			<u>Before</u>	<u>After</u>			
<u>Mora Valverde,</u> Eduardo	Costa Rica		X		X		
Rodriguez, Carlos Rafael	Cuba			X	X	X	
Guevara, Ernesto ("Che")	Cuba		X		X		
<u>Olivares Sanchez,</u> Carlos	Cuba	X	X				
Echeverria, Rafael	Ecuador				X		
Rodriguez, Carlos	Ecuador				X		
* <u>Del Prado Chavez</u> Jorge	Peru		X				
Arismendi, Rodney	Uruguay	X	X			X	
Lovera, Alberto	Venezuela			X	X		

NOTE: Absence of an "X" merely shows that no explicit report of participation at specific event has been received.

* Planned to leave 10 November for Moscow. Departure not confirmed: may have traveled clandestinely.

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