

ESG 95-02
14 July 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review Group

FROM: Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
DO, Focal Point for ARRB

SUBJECT: Position on Release of Information Pertaining to
Mexico City Station and the JFK Assassination
Records

1. At its monthly meeting on 17 July the ARRB will be addressing the issue of the Mexico City Station and its operation in light of any deletions made by the Agency to protect sources and methods. The issues of greatest concern are those surrounding the joint teltap operations run by the Agency and the Mexican Services, official acknowledgment of which could have an impact on liaison and foreign relations. We therefore, wish to maintain protection of this information.

2. We are willing to release information which indicates the existence of operational teltaps against the Soviet and Cuban Embassies as long as they appear unilateral and we can continue to protect the existence of any participation of the Mexican Services. We are willing to release documents which indicate the existence of Mexico City Station during times outside the window which we have acknowledged when they contribute significantly to the historical record. These steps will be useful to the historic record and reveal the extent of coverage employed against these targets. We would want to continue protection of the information which identifies coverage of other countries and individuals other than Lee Harvey Oswald.

3. We also agree to release of the following:

- A. Pseudonyms of employees, aliases of employees, and file numbers.


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SUBJECT: Position on Release of Information Pertaining to Mexico City Station and the JFK Assassination Records

- B. Cryptonyms, such as those in the LI series, unless they appear in the context of liaison operational equities (such as LITENSOR and LITEMPO).
- C. We need to continue the protection of the cryptonym LIENVOY.
This cryptonym is used extensively throughout the collect to describe the joint activity from different perspectives. Individual occurrences may not seem to reveal anything significant but, when looking at the cryptonym in context over the entire collection it reveals the joint activity which we are trying to protect.

4. Regarding the revelation of names of employees who retired under cover, we request the Board to table its final determination until the individuals have been contacted and informed that their name is being considered for release. This will allow the individual to consider the impact it will have and convey relevant information. The Directorate database is not set up to track individuals who were involved in specific operations. We need the assistance of the employees to know their operational involvement's. Office of Central Cover has prepared and is coordinating a letter to be sent to the employees which will both inform them and solicit their assistance/comments.


Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

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September 11, 1995
WORKING PAPER

Notes from meeting w/ ARRB staff Sept. 11, 1995

ARRB Attendees: Marwell, Gunn, Mary + one
CIA Attendees : Barry, Ellie**Issue: Inconsistency between Mexico City Chrono item
 #132 and ARRB document #31**

Gunn proposed that the Agency release the information in document 31 that was released by mistake in the Mexico City Chrono. Otherwise, the staff would have to take the document back to the ARRB for reconsideration which they felt would undercut the credibility of the CIA and the staff. The Board will not uphold a postponement in a specific document if that information is released by mistake in another copy of the same document.

Ellie's response - because the information deals with Mex. liaison, she will have to take their proposal to a higher level. [response needed by 16 September]

They also requested a "new" highlighted version of the Mexico City Chrono which reflects all information released to NARA in the multiple copies of the Chrono and in the documents referenced in the Chrono.

Issue: The three documents of concern.

GIBSON - Ellie reviewed the Gibson issues--the fact that he had denied in court his affiliation with the CIA, etc. I noted that since the document would not be included in the determination list would the Board be willing to reconsider.

Marwell said that we could make an addition pitch to the Board to reconsider, but he did not think it would have any effect on their decision.

PROENZA - Ellie explained that our goal here was to protect the "asset" not the method and that the deletions could be reduced to those words that could result in the identification of the agent.

Marwell said that the Board may reconsider based on the need to protect a source.

Mary ask who was the asset? Was it LIRING?
Ellie said she did not know (it could have been some "AM" source.

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Mary ask for more information on LIRING.

"PRIVATE LINE TAP" - According the Marwell, the Board considered the issue of the "private lines" but since the paragraph dealt with Oswald, voted to release. Mary said is was hard to defend the individual released since she did not have any information on the person.

We pointed out that the this release impacted on other documents which dealt with private line taps plus the Board had not limited its release to the paragraph that mentioned Oswald but released the name in other calls which had nothing to do with Oswald.

Marwell said the Board may re-look at the document as part of looking at similar documents.

The issue of the taps on other Bloc embassies came up. Mary said the Board was inclined to release given the end of the Cold War.

[Note: we will locate as many of the "private line tap" documents we can for special review]

Issue: Removing the Proenza and Private line tap documents form the formal notification list

Marwell clearly prefers not to do it at this time (said they would discuss). Has no problem with asking the Board to reconsider or giving us the opportunity to presence additional evidence since their next meeting was within the 30 days set by the law, but felt that the Board was not inclined to keep tabling documents that they had reached a decision on.

Marwell asked if the Agency plans to "appeal"; he would like a heads-up.

Later, in private, Marwell said that he wanted to build into the process a loop that would handle these types of situations.

Issue: Presentation to Board at Sept. 20/21 meeting

It was agreed that "STATIONS" would be the focus of the presentation -- 10:00 am, 20 Sept., one hour.

Marwell recommended providing evidence of bilateral agreements as well as identifying current harm. Said that the Board was leaning strongly toward releasing stations.

Mary pointed out that there were still issues on the Mexico City station window. There are documents from the 50s,

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references in summaries to the founding of the station and, most important, the visit by the HSCA to Mexico City.

Ellie said there was the possibility of opening windows of stations when Oswald was present, however, this was a key issue for the Agency and a senior Directorate/Agency decision. She indicated that the DO would oppose expanding the Mexico City window into the 70s.

As for the older documents, we pointed out that we had already agreed to the release of those documents.

Marwell suggest that the 20 Sept. presentation would be a good opportunity to address the **Private Line and other Tel Taps** issue rather than requesting a separate meeting.

After the meeting Marwell elaborated on the presentation. He said to try a avoid going over old ground (US-Mexico relationship; when possible provide specific/hard evidence (bilateral agreements carry weight); war-stories did not go over well and neither did Bill McNair. He emphasized the importance of using the language of the law.

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September 12, 1995
WORKING PAPER

Notes from meeting w/ ARRB staff Sept. 11, 1995

Issue: Presentation to Board at Sept. 20/21 meeting

It was agreed that "**STATIONS**" would be the focus of the presentation -- 10:00 am, 20 Sept., one hour.

Marwell recommended providing evidence of bilateral agreements as well as identifying current harm. Said that the Board was leaning strongly toward releasing stations, particularly those in Europe.

Mary pointed out that there were still issues on the Mexico City station window. There are documents from the 50s, references in summaries to the founding of the station and, most important, the visit by the HSCA to Mexico City.

Ellie said there was the possibility of opening windows of stations when Oswald was present, however, this was a key issue for the Agency and a senior Directorate/Agency decision. She indicated that the DO would oppose expanding the Mexico City window (into the 70s).

As for the older documents, we pointed out that we had already agreed to the release of those documents.

Marwell suggest that the 20 Sept. presentation would be a good opportunity to address the **Private Line and other Tel Taps** issue rather than requesting a separate meeting.

After the meeting Marwell elaborated on the presentation. He said to try to avoid going over old ground (US-Mexico relationship); when possible provide specific/hard evidence (bilateral agreements carry weight); war-stories do not go over well. He emphasized the importance of using the language of the law especially when citing harm. He specifically mentioned Sec. 6. (B) {copy attached} which sets a standard of "interfere with the conduct of intelligence activities".

[Note: In a previous meeting with Gunn, he stressed similar themes including avoiding what he called "chicken little" arguments. He also raised the question on sensitivity of acknowledging we had a station in Moscow during the 60s. "It would have been logical to have one during the Cold War."]

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

FEB 02 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Intelligence Coordination,
Intelligence and Research, Department of State

SUBJECT: Appeal of Unfavorable Determination by the JFK
Assassination Records Review Board (AIUO)

The JFK Assassination Records Review Board (Board) recently released documents revealing the existence of CIA stations in [redacted] and [redacted] a joint tel-tap operation with Mexican liaison, and the identity of a unilateral penetration [redacted]. It is the CIA's assessment that such releases could seriously damage intelligence operations as well as adversely affect the foreign relations of the United States. CIA is presently preparing an appeal of these rulings by the Board and requests the support of the Department of State should these appeals be brought before the President. (S)

Additionally, the Board has just released the existence of stations in [redacted] and [redacted] and in March-April, it will be reviewing a document that reveals the location of every CIA station in 1965. It is anticipated that CIA will be preparing to appeal those releases and requests State Department's assessment as to the damage to foreign relations should the location of CIA stations be publicly acknowledged. (S)

It remains essential that the U.S. Government stand by assurances to persons and foreign governments that information they provide and activities they undertake based upon expected confidentiality remain protected for as long as necessary. These releases made by the Board seriously undermine the ability of CIA to uphold secrecy obligations it took on in the past and to make those assurances in the future. (C)

CL BY 2103140
REASON 1.5(c)
DECL X1; X5
DRV LOC 3-82
DRV LIS 3-82

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SUBJECT: Appeal of Unfavorable Determination by the JFK
Assassination Records Review Board (AIUO)

We have a critically short deadline in which to address issues concerning the release of [redacted] and The [redacted] stations, the identity of the asset, and Mexican liaison. The release of the identities of the remaining stations must be resolved over the next two weeks. We request your comments and expert opinions regarding the impact such releases would have on the foreign relations of the United States, and hope to cite State Department's support as we finalize our appeal. (S)

David N. Edger

David N. Edger

Acting Deputy Director for Operations

CIR-316/ 00293-96

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SUBJECT: Appeal of Unfavorable Determination by the JFK
Assassination Records Review Board (AIUO)

C/IMS/ESG/F.Wickham/tdn/x44448/2Feb96

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ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani

NOTE FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
FROM: Linda C. Cipriani
DATE: 03/18/96 06:24:14 PM
SUBJECT: JFK Meeting today

After speaking with you tonight about the results of the meeting today, Jeremy Gunn called me and relayed his concerns about the Board's understandings (or misunderstandings) of CIA's position. Bob Caudle and I discussed what happened at the JFK meeting and the following is our impression of what resulted. Basically, Edger did not commit himself on any specifics on these issues, but expressed his willingness to cooperate with the Board:

1. Station Edger was more willing to negotiate this one, but does not agree to its release. CIA wants to present more information. Edger was not under the impression that this station was to be discussed today so he did not come prepared to present new information on it. CIA should do this for the Board at the next possible opportunity.
2. Open Period for Stations - Edger agreed that the staffs of the Board and HRG should work out the exact time period. He had no problem with the Sept 63-64 period and opening it up to 61 in the Oswald file. He did not make any firm commitment on the dates to the Board, saying that the staffs should come to an agreement on this.
3. Substitutions for stations - Although Edger suggested "Station" as a substitution, he clearly preferred something less revealing like ("European station 1, 2, etc."). Using the former term has far less plausible deniability. The latter option basically gives up what we want to protect.

Once HRG hears from Edger as to what his understandings are, then someone needs to speak with Jeremy Gunn ASAP on Tuesday morning before the Board leaves. Jeremy said that unless we correct the Board on its mistaken impression about the above, they will leave assuming we have come to an agreement and will refuse to revisit this at a latter date.

Let me know if you need me to help out in any way on this. FYI, I will be in meetings at 10AM and 2pm (Win Scott settlement discussions!!!) tomorrow.

CC: John F. Pereira
Eleanor Neiman @ DO

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From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani

NOTE FOR: Fredrick Wickham @ DO
Johnny Goin @ DO
Eleanor E. Neiman @ DO

FROM: Linda C. Cipriani

DATE: 03/29/96 11:52:57 AM

SUBJECT: JFK release of [redacted] station(S)

I just spoke with EA legal and informed her about the latest release by the JFK Board of [redacted] station and the fact that we have a letter from the Ambassador objecting to the release. She indicated that Art Brown would be a good candidate to go down to speak with the Board at their next meeting (what are the dates?) to request that they reconsider. It might also be more persuasive if we could arrange for a State Department person [redacted] desk) to come to the Board with us and present the Ambassador's letter. (S)

I would appreciate hearing your thoughts on this course of action. If we plan on doing this, we need to arrange it with Marwell and then brief the appropriate people in the DO and State Department as soon as possible. (S)

CL BY 2224130
CL REASON 1.5(c)
DECL ON X1
DRV FM LOC 3-83

CC: Robert D. Caudle
J. Barry Harrelson

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Barry H.

21 March 1997


JFK PROJECT WORKING PAPER

SUBJECT: Policy Guidance--"Atsugi" and "U-2"

1. References to "CIA base/Station/representatives at Atsugi, Japan" in the U-2 context is releasable.

2. Information relating to the [redacted], other bases, and Agency representatives elsewhere in [redacted] will continue to be protected.

3. The issue was coordinated with the DS&T (Teresa Wilcox), DO (Lee Carle), the Air Force (Captain Thomas D. Rock) and the Department of State (Nina Noring); all of whom had no objection to the declassification and/or release of "CIA Base at Atsugi, Japan" and "U-2" project / effort / activities.



J. Barry Harrelson

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DD/O 95-3059

- 7 NOV 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, JFK Assassination Records Review Board

FROM: David Cohen
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents

1. I understand the JFK AARB is presently considering the release of documents which would identify CIA stations to the public. I am opposed in general to revealing the locations of our stations and would prefer instead to substitute the station name with a regional designation, e.g. European Station vice Brussels. I would be willing, however, to open certain stations during a specific window of time if they are substantively relevant to the assassination investigation and provided that the documents in question are sanitized to conceal the permanent presence of the station. (S)

2. In all but a handful of instances, public acknowledgment of a station would be a political embarrassment to the host government and would threaten ongoing sensitive operations and liaison relationships. In a few instances, the damage probably would be minimal or not at all as long as the presence appears to be temporary. I have surveyed the involved components and determined the damage to national security which would follow such release. (S)

3. I strongly urge that you not allow the information regarding the Congo and [redacted] to be released. The Congo is now Zaire and the station in the 60's would have been in Leopoldville, now Kinshasa [redacted]

CL BY 0695930
CL REASON: 1.5 (C)
DECL ON: X1
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SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents

4. Within the context of our European presence, I have the following comments:

[] - Public acknowledgment would force the government and liaison service to pay closer attention to Station operations and therefore present a threat to ongoing sensitive operations. (S)

[] - A neutral country. Public acknowledgment of a CIA station would embarrass the government and liaison; thereby inhibiting the close and productive liaison relationships we now enjoy as well as presenting a threat to ongoing sensitive operations. (S)

Paris - No additional damage. (S)

Bonn - No specific damage. (S)

Berlin - No specific damage. (S)

[] - Public acknowledgment would embarrass the government and inhibit liaison cooperation; thus endangering ongoing operations. (S)

[] - Public acknowledgment would draw questions from the press and create political problems for the government and liaison. This would endanger the continuation of sensitive joint operations. (S)

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SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents

[] - Public acknowledgment would draw questions from the press and threaten very productive and very sensitive ongoing joint operations. (S)

[] - Public acknowledgment would draw press attention and embarrassing questions for the government and liaison service. This would further damage an already delicate liaison relationship which is vital to us for counterterrorism operations. (S)

[] - A [] Public acknowledgment would be politically embarrassing for the government and liaison services. This would likely endanger any continuation of joint operations. (S)

[] - A [] Public acknowledgment would create political problems for the government and liaison service and force greater attention to our operations. This would create an intensive counterintelligence atmosphere for our operations; likely to cause a decrease in our operations. (S)

London - No specific damage. (S)

Ottawa - No specific damage. (S)

5. Our Eastern European stations pose a unique problem when we consider public exposure. [] Station is recovering from operating for almost fifty years in an undeclared status. During the last three years we have managed, with much effort, to begin the establishment of good working relations with the host government and internal/external services. As a result, the station has recently begun some very sensitive and high-level bilateral operations. These obviously depend upon the good will of the host service. The [] citizenry came of age in an atmosphere in which distrust of intelligence services in general, and the CIA in particular, was thoroughly ingrained. That distrust lingers in the public's mind even today. Exposure of our station's previously undisclosed presence and operational activities during the Cold War will necessarily raise questions about our activities then, and almost certainly lead to further

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SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents

inquiry about our present relationship. It is doubtful that our relationship, and certainly our very sensitive operations, could withstand the resulting public debate. The existence of [redacted] Station, past and present, cannot be surfaced at this time without serious damage to national security. (S)

6. Public acknowledgment of our stations in Managua, San Jose, Panama City, San Salvador, Santo Domingo, Buenos Aires, Lima, Santiago, and Montevideo would not further damage our operational capabilities in a specific sense. Overall, any release of information about a clandestine service breeds distrust in professionalism [redacted] (S)

7. We receive significant national collection systems support from [redacted] which affects national system collection efforts against Tier IA targets throughout Asia. We would jeopardize this by releasing the presence of our station to the public. [redacted] is a special case in that there is continuing disagreement regarding our station. We should not complicate the current "Spy Mania" atmosphere in [redacted]. There have been two incidents regarding our presence in [redacted] during the present year. Any further disclosure would exacerbate the tension and create an untenable operational atmosphere for our station and personnel. (S)

8. Public acknowledgment of a station in [redacted] would be a problem for the U.S. Government. U.S. and [redacted] foreign relations are always delicate; the [redacted] Government is very sensitive to perceived slights to its national sovereignty, and public acknowledgment of a station would prove embarrassing to the [redacted] Government which in turn could ask that the station be closed. If the station were closed or significantly downsized, it would affect a large number of important intelligence collection operations. (S)

9. Public acknowledgment of a station in [redacted] would be a problem for [redacted] vis-à-vis its [redacted] neighbor. [redacted] and [redacted] share a border which means the [redacted] Government must act with some prudence regarding its relations with [redacted]. The [redacted] Government would almost certainly respond very negatively.

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
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SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents

to a public acknowledgment of a station in [] and might well engage in harassment/sabotage/terrorist actions in [] to show its displeasure. If the [] Government should ask that our station be closed, the U.S. Government would lose a capability to collect on [] stability, and Islamic extremism. (S)

10. Public acknowledgment of a station in [] would be a problem for [] vis-à-vis its Islamic fundamentalist population. [] like so many countries with a majority Muslim population, has a growing Islamic fundamentalist problem, and Islamic fundamentalists are frequently opposed to the U.S. in general and the Agency in particular. Public acknowledgment of a station in [] could cause its Islamic fundamentalist population to react negatively and demand that our station be closed. If the station were closed, the U.S. Government would lose intelligence on the [] conflict, [] stability and Islamic extremism. (S)

11. In those instances where I have indicated damage to operational capability and national security, I would feel compelled to seek a reversal of any decision to make a public acknowledgment. In those cases where I indicate "no specific or additional damage", I am prepared to accept your decision yet I must call your attention to the general damage done to us by any disclosure of operational presence. Our operational capabilities are in direct proportion to the confidence placed in our ability to protect source identities and operational methods. Disclosure to the public of our presence weakens this confidence. (S)


David Cohen

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