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2 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with Ross Crozier, PW Section, Miami Base,
25 May 1961

1. Crozier, a contract agent, said that all five members of the PW section speak Spanish fluently and between them have 45 years of area knowledge. He has a Costa Rican wife. The other members are Kent and Patton. He arrived in September 1960. He was in Cuba from 1954 to 1958 and in March 1958 spent one month with the Castro forces in the Sierra Maestra Mountains. He was travelling with the newspaper contingent under the cover of a representative of Public Surveys Institute of Dallas, Texas which, he said, was conducting a survey for the American 1959 investment policy in Cuba. He then spent two years in Mexico working on CP penetration and international Communism. He left there in March 1960 owing to domestic marital difficulties. He has never had any Headquarters experience.

2. Crozier said that his chief matters were three: (a) a sixty foot cruiser called "Theano" or more recently "Sandpiper" which has been fitted out as a radio boat with a one kilowatt Collins transmitter for broadcasting propaganda on the medium and long-wave bands. It has a 25-mile radius and cruises ten to 15 miles off the Cuban coast. Its first broadcast was made 7 October 1960 (this is project AMHOSE). The ship broadcasts scripts/^{that} are prepared at WAVE based on themes approved in Headquarters. Special matters are edited in Headquarters. To date they have broadcast three or four times lasting an hour each time, the places being too near Havana and elsewhere on the coast. The boat has made two other trips, one of supply and one for infiltration, and six trips that have aborted as a result of bad weather. He has no way of knowing the effectiveness of these broadcasts. They have been pushed by Headquarters. The crew ^{are} ~~is~~ former Cuban Naval personnel. "Theano" is kept at Islamorada and has received no publicity. It was purchased for \$28,000 by Headquarters, as it was built in 1928 it is of wood and its engines needed replacement and overhaul. He does not know why this old ship was bought. It is in good condition now.

3. He has spent the bulk of his time on two groups, one of students, known as DRE, and a labor group called FORD. During the first few months of his stay in Miami he was pulled off his work frequently in order to use his Spanish in FI and training matters. The DRE at first was not built up but by January 1961 they were running propaganda teams into South America. Crozier's duties were to act as case officer to the organization in every phase. He supervised training in safehouses and then conducted

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operations for infiltration of DRE agents into Cuba for AGIT propaganda activities. Twenty-trained agents with instructions, guidance and funds were thus infiltrated. They subsequently went with 50 student leaders into the Sierra Maestra Mountains and were ready to rise up. Crozier said that the total number of students there was 1200 to 2400. They did not rise up at the time of the strike. Delivery of arms had been unsuccessful owing to the prohibition of overflights for the last three weeks prior to the invasion. He knows that of the 20 trained agents he sent in two or three are now under arrest, six in political asylum and 11 or 12 are in hiding. He feels that these DRE agents are one of our best assets. They are capable as a guerrilla force for they have appealed to the country people more than any other movement. This is ^{because} ~~that~~ they have been instructed to act in a non-political manner and this appeals to the peasants. At first the infiltration operations were conducted by the PM section who, however, did not always have the reception ready. Then he shifted to getting an entry made legally from Mexico. This man then set up four reception points and Crozier used his own boat, i.e., the "Askatuta" that he had borrowed. The PM section let him get away with this. Cooperation with them is good. Now all such matters are in the hands of the maritime section. The DRE executive committee exercised pressure on its members either to infiltrate or to go to the camp and train for the strike force. At present the committee, existing of 15 or 20, is still in Miami, plus 100 others. He does not have the figures on the numbers in the Cuban organization. The group have a good reputation in Cuba and later emigres have spoken admiringly of the training received by the members in Miami. He thinks that there are probably four to ten thousand members in Cuba, mostly men. Their leader was Albert Murro. At present we are paying this organization \$5,000 a month.

4. FORD, the labor organization, was formerly a sector of the Frente. We took it over as an affiliated organization. Other affiliates being the women, lawyers and teachers. FORD is more numerous than the students and was organized under the Frente out of dissidents of the CTC. His duties were similar to those for the DRE. FORD's operations have been on a smaller scale. They sent three trained infiltrators, with funds, into Cuba in January 1961 for the purpose of organizing the labor opposition clandestinely. These three men are now in asylum. The results have been disappointing. The future of this group is not as bright as DRE. The men are older, more political and not as receptive to guidance, but their propaganda activity has been effective. For example, protests to the Red Cross. They send out propaganda teams to ~~the~~ South America and Europe and they liaise with state-side organizations. The themes of their propaganda are presented by the base to them or they submit their own themes for comment by the base. We are now paying them \$8,000 a month; \$5,000 for salaries, \$1,500 for operations, \$1,500 for expenses.

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5. Crozier had several weighty criticisms to offer:

a. The strike force should not have been used except to ignite the three redoubts (Sierra Maestre, the Cristo, and another). We should build up stockpiles of arms while we train people to infiltrate in bunches of about six to 20 to go directly into the mountains and gradually to work up to a guerrilla war. We should also eventually build an air head, that is, a secure area for air drops so that the accuracy of dropping on a DZ would not be imposed.

b. Too much stress was placed on running tight operations, that is, in avoiding loss. From September 1960 to date, in our boat operations experience involving 28 vessels we have never lost a single boat or a single man. This proves that we could have gone beyond what was done. The operations could have been more daring in quantity and in the terrain chosen. We could have supplied more arms and other equipment and could have hit more targets. This excessive caution was due partly to directives received from headquarters.

c. With reference to air drops, we have never made a single successful air drop for the reason that U.S. pilots were not used. In the operations carried out, no pilot was lost therefore no U.S. pilot would have been lost had they been used.

d. Counter-terror should be employed against the Communist leaders in Cuba and against official personnel. There are only ten or 20 leaders at the top of the Castro organization. If these few were killed off, it would be extremely hard to fill their positions. This action should be carried out by European commando-type operations involving no Cubans.

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Robert D. Shea

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