

SECRET		FORM 1057-53
TO: Chief, WHD	PRIORITY	10-104-25/2A
FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE		DATE: 28 December 1961
SUBJECT: JMWAVE/BUZAGE/AMBU/Operational		RE: 412 - (CHECK "X" ONE)
Transmittal of Passavoy Memo No. 120,		MARKED FOR INDEXING
a translation of the Dr. Pedro MARTINEZ Fraga		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
document.		INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. STAFF ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED: FYI		

UPGA-2920

Forwarded under separate cover is PASSAVOY Memo No. 120, a translation of the Dr. Pedro MARTINEZ Fraga document.

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Declassified
30 DEC 61
H.D. Pennington

19 December 1961

(20) (6) (1) - 2438
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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD NO. 120

SUBJECT: Document Titled "The Recognition of the Revolutionary Council of Cuba" -- Strictly Confidential.

1. Examination of this document containing both English and Spanish parts, indicates that the English part containing a brief biography of the author, Dr. PEDRO MARTINEZ PRAGA, and a two-page covering sheet summary of the proposal for recognition of the Cuban Revolutionary Council as the de facto belligerent Government of Cuba indicates that the English portion only was intended for the eyes of the U. S. Allies. Along with this proposal in English is the annex comprising four pages referring to the recognition of the Czechoslovak National Council in 1918. The remainder of this document is in Spanish and comprises a letter from MARTINEZ PRAGA to the members of the Revolutionary Council. This letter is dated 15 December 1961. Attached to this letter is a Strictly Secret and Confidential document titled "Examination of the Relations of the Government of the United States with the Cuban Revolutionary Council" and a formula for its indispensable and urgent revision by Dr. PEDRO MARTINEZ PRAGA, dated Miami, Florida, 20 November 1961. Following this there is the lengthy document containing a total of 17 pages plus two more pages of summary, for a total of 19 pages. This document in Spanish takes up in detail the relations between the F.F.R. and the Bender Group and later between the C.R.C. and the Bender Group. This document in Spanish also has lengthy extracts from the agreement between the U. S. Government and the Czechoslovak Government (de facto) and also makes reference to the recognition of the Polish Government-in-Exile and the De Gaulle Government-in-Exile. This portion of the document is very frank and somewhat belligerent in tone. Following is a translation of the Spanish part of the entire document, but without translating in detail the extracts from the recognition of the Czechoslovak National Council on 3 September 1918. First the letter addressed to the members of the Cuban Revolutionary Council:

227 NE 18th Street, Miami

Strictly Confidential

December 15th, 1961

Sir:

1. Permit me to send you attached hereto with a Strictly Confidential character a memorandum entitled "Examination of the Relations of the Government of the United States with the Cuban Revolutionary Council," and a formula for its indispensable and

urgent revision and (b) memorandum titled "The Recognition of the Revolutionary Council of Cuba," brief resumé of the foregoing.

2. The Cuban Revolutionary Council succeeded the Democratic Revolutionary Front of Cuba as the supreme organization of an historic enterprise which initiated the 12th of May 1960, was based on the representation assumed by the Fronte of the Cuban people opposed to the Communist dictatorship of Fidel Castro and resolved to combat it until its overthrow.

3. Therefore, in virtue of this representation, it is the responsibility of the Revolutionary Council of Cuba to work unceasingly for the most rapid success, the dignity and the supreme interests of the liberating crusade, to maintain intact the authority with which it is clothed and to carry out whatever efforts and sacrifices may be demanded for the efficiency and dignity of its own mission.

4. The Fronte, at the time of its birth, agreed with the Government of Washington represented in the form which the attached memorandums describe, an agreement or pact un-written -- a gentlemen's agreement -- regulating the established relations between both. These plans and initial efforts have developed into a state of war, which is proclaimed by thousands of dead, 50,000 prisoners and unspeakable suffering and anguish inside and outside of Cuba. These relations, as a result, should be the object of careful revision and of the modifications that are demanded by the events, the history, and the international law and the honor and interest of Cuba and of the United States.

5. I implore, therefore, your patriotism, the clear recognition of your responsibilities present and future, the dignity and the triumph of the revolutionary cause, and your concept of the

honor to rights and the obligations to all of us who participate in this struggle, to invite you most cordially to consider, to support and to defend the formula proposed in the attached memoranda in order to normalize and legalize the relations established by the Fronte and its successor, the Council, with the Government of Washington and with all the other Governments.

Thanking you for your kind attention to these lines, I remain

Very truly yours,

S/
PEDRO MARTINEZ PRAGA

Attached memoranda marked Strictly Secret and Confidential, with the title "Examination of the Relations of the Government of the United States with the Cuban Revolutionary Council" and formula for their indispensable and urgent revision by DR. PEDRO MARTINEZ PRAGA dated November 24, 1961 at Miami, Florida.

I. Background (12 May 1960 to 17 April 1961)

1. Beginning in the second half of 1959, diplomatic and consular representatives and agents of the United States in Havana, established, maintained and promoted secret conversations with various individuals opposed to the Castro regime, members up to that time, for the most part, of the 26th of July movement.

2. Some of these individuals moved to Miami and New York during the first months of 1960 and in March in Miami Mr. FRANK BENNETT, representative of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began preliminary conversations with them which developed on 12 May in the founding in New York of the Frente Revolucionario

Democratico de Cuba.

3. The reunion in New York which lasted several days was attended by DR. MANUEL A. DE VALLERIA, JUSTO GARRIGU, JUAN I. MASCO, MANUEL ARTINE, ANDRÉS VARGAS GONZALEZ and PEDRO MARTINEZ PRAGA and with RICARDO LEWIE.

4. Mr. FRANK BENDER accompanied by Mr. WILBUR CARR opened the session held in the New York Bar Association, reiterating to those present what had been manifested in Miami, in which were expressed the basis or conditions of the Government of United States for lending its collaboration and backing to the forces opposing the Castro regime.

5. These basis or conditions can be summarized in the following manner:

a. The Government of Washington delegates to the Central Intelligence Agency, represented exclusively by Mr. FRANK BENDER, the powers and authority necessary to carry out the cooperation promised to the anti-Castro revolutionaries. Said Government, in addition, officially overlooks the relations established by CIA with the Cubans and therefore recommends the maximum possible discretion in the development of these relations.

b. The Cuban revolutionaries should create a central and supreme organ or directorate which would have charge of the preparation, direction and execution of the war against the Castro regime and the drafting and execution of the minimum program which would constitute the goal, the objective and the reason for the existence of the

struggle. In this superior Directorate should be represented the totality or if necessary the majority of the sectors and groups already organized or which may be organized in the future. Only to be excepted from this are the factors representing the deposed Batista regime.

5. The Government of the United States through the CIA, will facilitate and administer the indispensable means for organizing and carrying out the struggle. The F.R.D. will adjust its budget of expenses to what is indicated in the matter by the CIA. The Cubans, nevertheless, remain at liberty to collect funds independently of the CIA. To carry out this basis or condition, the CIA would function under the name of Bender Group (Grupo B) translation of the commercial title, Bender Associates.

6. The first of these bases or conditions was carried out on the part of the Frente while it was possible. The transfer of the Executive Committee of the FRD to Mexico City was arranged and the maintenance in secret of whatever was related to the activities of this organization. Very soon, nevertheless, it became evident by events the material impossibility of maintaining this organization secret and from that finally the Executive Committee, after officially constituting itself in Mexico City and of some of its members residing there, established itself finally in Miami and with it here were established the various commissions (propaganda, planning, military, financial, etc.), operating parts of the Frente.

7. The second of the conditions or bases was also fully carried out by the F.R.D., although running into the inevitable

and well known initial difficulties. It is necessary to recall that the situation of Cuban public opinion in the middle of 1960 was far different from that reigning today. There were very few groups, sectors and movements organized at that time. Except for the UR whose official representation participated in the founding of the Frente, all and each of the other organizations that have belonged to the Frente and now pertain to the Cuban Revolutionary Council, arose long after the 12th of May 1960. It should be observed that, in spite of the efforts and maneuvers carried out by well-known elements of the deposed Batista dictatorship, the FRD consistently closed its doors to these elements. The minimum program agreed to by the Frente on being founded, amplified in the meeting in Mexico City upon organizing itself constitutionally synthesized with the warm approval of the United States, the fundamental objectives of the struggle against Castro.

3. The third of the conditions or bases now examined, despite the opposition and the reservations of some of the founders of the Frente, was accepted without debate, among other reasons, because the reigning circumstances, that is, those inherent at the beginning, overcoming enormous difficulties, of a struggle against the government of Castro still supported by the majority of the Cuban people, obliged these founders to admit, while any other thing might be impossible, the provoking situation which in every stated degree or that might be stated in the control system through the means of a subsidy unilaterally administered which the CIA was exercising and did exercise over all and each

of the various aspects, economic, political and military, of the war against Castro.

6. The 5th of June 1960, before completion of the first month of the founding of the FRD, the writer sent Sr. FRANK BROWN a personal and confidential memorandum, whose Spanish version reads as follows:

(1) A Gentlemen's Agreement: The FRD has added its forces or its strength to Group B through an unwritten pact -- a Gentlemen's Agreement -- with the object of fighting until the overthrow and destruction of the totalitarian Marxist personal dictatorship imposed on the Cuban people by Fidel Castro and his international Communist allies, and in doing this, to save the Western Hemisphere of the mortal threat which said dictatorship represents for the system of free democratic life which is the purpose of all the American Republics.

A common purpose engendered by the grave common danger is, as a result, the basis of the Gentlemen's Agreement above mentioned. The high nature of its objectives frees it from every kind of interest purely political, personnel or economic of any of the parties to this agreement. It is a pact, a covenant, an alliance, inspired by the desire to save Cuba and the Americas of the very real Communist danger, guided by the necessity of helping one and another against the common enemy, and agreed to in good faith and with a sincere unbreakable determination.

The FRD recognizes with a deep sense of gratitude the generous and efficient aid lent to its directors by Group B in the first stage of its organization.

This stage has closed almost completely and it appears necessary to examine the procedure and the resources necessary to

realize the fundamental objectives of the agreement.

(2) The Triple Program: These objectives and goals demand the preparation of a triple program, to wit: that of finance, that of propaganda and the military.

A reduced committee of delegates of the MDD and of Group B should study and prepare the relationship and the planning of these three programs.

(a) The Financial Program: The MDD understands that the Cuban people should contribute to the general expenses of the undertaking within the limits of their possibilities, and the Directors of that organization have stated frequently that the resources provided by Group B should be considered as a part of a war loan to be paid to the said Group B by the Provisional Government which may be established after the overthrow of the Castro regime.

(b) Urgent Expenses: The undertaking, even before closing its preliminary stage, requires a certain sum of money needed for what may be called "initial working capital." The urgency of these needs excludes the possibility of waiting for the private contributions of the Cuban people. The said sums of money must form part of the general loan of Group B to the MDD."

The memorandum explains further along the various suggestions in relation to the program of propaganda and military matters, some general observations relative to any pact, intelligence or alliance with members of the deposed Batista regime and the urgency of immediate action.

10. Three days later, 3 June 1960, the writer sent Mr. FRANK BENTON another memorandum and a confidential one titled,

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These observations on the financial program," whose Spanish version is the following:

"(1) The unwritten agreement -- gentlemen's Agreement -- (referring to memorandum of 5th of June) entered into by the FRD and Group B is based on the support and mutual aid and assistance by both organizations with the object of achieving common objectives.

(2) The financial program suggested in the above cited memorandum should determine the amount of money considered indispensable by experts and technicians for carrying out the different stages of the object of the game, that is the overthrow and destruction of the Castro regime.

(3) It is not necessary to be an expert or technician to understand that that amount of money will reach a considerably large figure.

(4) It has been clearly agreed that Group B is capable of providing the necessary money for our great enterprise and that the loan of those funds and technical assistance of the Group are and should be its most important contributions to the success of the common cause.

(5) The FRD, naturally, ought to and will try to obtain as much money as may be possible in the present and well-known circumstances, but as that moral and financial obligation might or might not be realized sufficiently rapidly, it would be advisable to consider the contribution of the FRD as purely contingent and secondary. On the other hand, to rely on the funds eventually obtained by the FRD would take away as much from the Gentlemen's Agreement as the fundamental contribution of Group B to the common undertaking of its significance and essential and basic purposes.

(6) As has been pointed out in the memorandum of 5 June, there

should be prepared a proposal for agreement for a loan guaranteeing the payment to Group B of the money lent to the FRD.

(7) The planning and execution of the financial programs is a complex task and a very urgent one. We do not have much time available for it. Therefore there is the obligation of all those interested to carry out their best efforts to bring it about without more delay.

(8) Our undertaking is historic, politically and materially immense, and immense also are the responsibilities assumed by the men and organizations which have decided to save Cuba and the rest of the Western Hemisphere from the Communist threat. All should be planned and executed carefully and prudently, but the responsible Directors of this crusade should remember that rapidity is indispensable for triumph and as the Latin said, "de minima non curat priator."

11. The 16th of June 1960, MR. FRANK BENDER acknowledged receipt of the above copied memoranda and of many others relative to the statutes of the FRD, the regulations of its commissions, the programs of the same, etc. This is what MR. BENDER says:

"Permit me to acknowledge receipt of the various memoranda which you have sent me. I desire to assure you that they not only give cause for thinking, but are very useful to me, although undoubtedly they will serve as bases for some future action."

12. In the first days of July 1960 the Executive Committee of the FRD met with MR. BENDER in New York, the Committee being composed of DR. MANUEL A. DE VILHENA, President, JOSE I. MASCO, Secretary,

and JUSTO CABRILLO, RAFAEL MARTIN, and AURELIANO SANCHEZ
ARRANCO with the purpose, among others, of discussing and pro-
paring the first budget of expenses of the Frente.

13. The writer is unaware if at that point they took into
account (the Members of the Executive Committee) the observa-
tions and suggestions contained in the memoranda reproduced
above (that they knew about because they had received their
corresponding copies), but from that occasion on and despite
having gone through the original organizing stages (in the
month of August and duly constituted there was functioning
already in Miami the various commissions of the Frente), the
system of subsidies provisionally accepted as a part of the
relations no less provisional between the Frente and Group B,
this system acquired the character of unteachable permanence.

14. The moral, political and military propaganda and action
consequences of the above-mentioned system of subsidies need
not be recalled here. Very soon the economic control exercised
by the Bender Group, thanks to this system, was extended slowly
but inexorably to all and each one of the functional activities
of the Frente, said group participating, with or without the
agreement of the Executive of the FRD, even into the most min-
ute details of the administration, programming, propaganda,
and military actions of these activities. It is fitting to
recognize that only one of the functional commissions of the
Frente, ~~due~~ without doubt to its specific character, that of
planning, was freed from all participation or interference both
on the part of the Bender Group as well as by the Executive
Committee itself. With respect to the rest of the Commission,

and especially to the military and para-military organisms (General Staffs, recruiting centers, security, etc.), it is sufficient to say that they were so absorbed and deprived of authority by the mentioned Border Group that almost on the eve of the 17th of April 1961 they had practically disappeared.

15. The interference in the control which as a logical consequence of the subsidy system was suffered by the Executive Committee and the functional organs of the FPD, frequently provoked violent opposition and resistance which badly presented or presented on secondary and transitory bases, (that is to say, forgetting the fundamental cause of those problems, that is the inadmissible nature of our relations with Group B) produced no other results than that of creating friction, difficulties and crises, generating in turn, new and greater interference and a more ironclad and not always justified control.

16. Upon the creation last March paralleled with the Executive Committee of the FPD, the Cuban Revolutionary Council which later was to absorb said Committee, nothing was done or nothing was attempted or succeeded in being done to revive the abnormal status reigning in our relations with Group B, which, we do not tire in repeating it, did not always coincide with the character, the dimensions, and the dignity of the common and historic liberation undertaking.

17. The frustrated invasion of April 17th ended in a negative way the first stage of the mentioned relationship, opening another which because of the events and well-known declarations, introduced into those relationships one single modification, that relating to the official ignoring on the part of the

Washington Government of the revolutionary anti-castro activities, and opened the logical hope (determined by the unprecedented failure in which unilateral direction by the Bender Group resulted with the subsidy system and absolute control of everything related to the struggle) that the relationship between Cuba-in-arms and the Government of Washington would be revived in a loyal and intelligent manner.

II. Background (17 April 1961 up to the present time).

1. The change referred to in the previous paragraph 17 was brought about through repeated and public declarations by President J. F. Kennedy, shortly after the disaster of Playa Giron, and by the official visits of Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, President of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, to the Chief of State himself. Historic events of international importance cancelled in this way the first condition or basis for secrecy which from May 1960 controlled our relations with the United States. The declarations of President Kennedy, as well as the visits made by Dr. Miro to the White House, and the system of official contacts agreed to by both, may be interpreted at least as a beginning or trial of a de facto recognition of the Revolutionary Council. It is evident that the tragic and complete defeat of the Cuban-American effort of 17 April, supplementing and controlling the will of men, has caused the Washington Government to begin, even officially or semi-officially, the revision or rectification of the unacceptable unilateral system of relations still existing between said Government and ourselves.

2. Currently, or throughout the seven months which separ-

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ate today from the catastrophe of Playa Giron, except for the modifications mentioned above, the relations between Washington and ourselves continue being as much or more unilateral and intolerable as before that debacle. The personal efforts carried out by Mr. Miro Cardona have for the purpose of achieving a total or partial revision of these relations have been useless. On the other hand, the claim for recognition badly presented by factors outside of the Council are founded on an absurd formula of in-existent constitutionality, has contributed without any doubt in strengthening the negative attitude of the White House, or at least in delaying indefinitely the study of such an urgently needed revision.

3. The motives of the North American policy in this matter are very well known, transparent and ancient, and it is not worth the trouble to relate them in this document. Opposite them -- the result of new errors born of old errors -- arise the inalienable rights of Cuba-in-arms, and the representatives of Cuba-in-arms have the obligation of claiming the existence and the respect of those rights. As we shall see later, there does not exist in international law, in history or in the procedures themselves of the foreign relations of the United States, a single argument which juridically or reasonably justifies the apparent motives or real motives on which Washington rests its policy in relation to the Council and the revolution. Not even that represented by the impenetrable secrecy which necessarily should surround whatever refers to the preparation and execution of strategy and military tactics,

so insistently invoked by Washington on refusing or delaying or delaying the revision of our mutual relations -- possesses validity against said revision. The latter obtained thanks to the recognition of the Revolutionary Council of the authority, power and privileges of a de facto Government in any affects, prejudices or obstructs the maintenance of that forced and impenetrable secrecy. Far from it, it guarantees secrecy fully because such recognition sanctifies in a rigorous manner the responsibilities of any government, either de facto or de jure, and above all, the recognition establishes and legalizes on honorable, fair and just foundations and free of whims or improvisations the participation, whatever may be its degree, of the Cubans, represented by their political and military chiefs, in the preparation and execution of the war conducted at the cost of their own and heroic sacrifices in order to re-conquer the independence of the Patria and to save the Continent -- all the Continent -- of the mortal Communist danger.

4. Neither does it appear necessary to enlarge on considerations about the very important economic aspect of the solutions -- honorable, fair, just and free of whims and improvisations -- which recognition gives to the same. It is not possible to cite any kind of reason capable of justifying the economic system maintained by the Government of Washington for the financing of the war in Cuba, that is to say that of providing graciously and generously, of course, enormous amounts of money in relation to which the Cubans have no other right or obligation than those of accepting without debate the

amounts which the United States may deem appropriate to provide them. On the other hand, there could be listed indefinitely the reasons -- moral, political, honor, Cuban economic capacity, efficiency, responsibility, etc. -- which require imperatively and without delay the revision of the present economic support system and their inclusion among the powers or attributes of a de facto Government, authorizing to the Revolutionary Council to contract the necessary loan which a liberated Cuba would return religiously and liquidating and terminating the subsidy system -- implying not having reached one's age, financial or moral incapacity -- which, if it was inevitable a year and a half ago for the reasons indicated above, today lacks completely a reason for existence, either moral or economic.

III. Revision of the Relations between the United States and the Cuban Revolutionary Council -- Proposed Formula.

1. The only formula susceptible of correcting the evils referred to and, we may add, of avoiding other greater ones, is that offered by international law and history and in a concrete case, of the United States through irrefutable diplomatic precedent by means of which the Government of Washington ought to grant the Revolutionary Council of Cuba all the prerogatives of a de facto Government and as a result of this recognition that of its belligerence in a war undertaken with the Communist regime of Castro and the exercise of adequate authority to direct military and political affairs of the Cubans in the war with the above-mentioned regime.

2. The doctrine of recognition of de facto Governments has been sanctified for more than a century and a half (it was born in connection with the independence of the Spanish Colonies in Latin America) by the practice of international law, and besides by historic precedence in the foreign relations of the United States. Referring to the later, we offer below the official version of the precedent which, besides being extremely important, fits to an extraordinary degree the Cuban case, that is the one which refers to the de facto recognition by the United States Government (and those of other countries) of the Czechoslovak National Council in July 1918.

3. It should be recalled for the purposes of measuring and weighing properly the importance of that recognition and its correct application to the case of the Cuban Revolutionary Council the following well-known circumstances:

(a) The National Czechoslovak Council represented a people, a nation, but not an independent and sovereign state because the Czechoslovak Territory formed an old and traditional part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918.

(b) That people or nation as a part of the political-geographic of the said Empire had fought under the flag of the latter and allied to the flag of the Germans since 1914 and only as the end was nearing in 1918, the Czechoslovaks resident in Italy, France, Russia, etc., created a Supreme National Council and presented to the world their independent aspirations and with deserting units of the Austrian armies organized regiments of volunteers which

were utilized by the Governments of the Entente.

(c) Nevertheless, such adverse and outstanding circumstances, Italy, France, United States and Great Britain granted their recognition of de facto Government to the National Czechoslovak Council.

(d) The obtaining of this recognition was not an easy undertaking and it is precisely said triumph the pedestal on which rests the glory of that giant who was named THOMAS GARRIGUE MASARYK, Father of the Czechoslovak Fatherland.

(e) The recognition of the National Council which Masaryk headed adopted, as will be observed later, the widest character and, in some cases, (as the British recognition note shows, a masterpiece of its kind) they foresaw all the eventualities, possibilities capable of insuring the said Council the full exercise of its rights and obligations as a de facto Government.

4. We reproduce further on the Spanish version of the official text of the Government of the United States (translated from Hackworth Digest, Volume 1, pages 203 and following) which summarizes the procedure of recognition granted (May 18 to September 3, 1918) to the National Czechoslovak Council by Italy, France, United States and Great Britain.

XXXXXXXXX Translation of pages 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 of extracts
not reproduced here XXXXXXXXXXXX

The recognition by the United States and other Powers of the National Czechoslovak Council and a de facto Government does not represent one single case in diplomatic history of those countries which keep a very tight relationship on the

Recognition claimed by the Revolutionary Council of Cuba. A proper parallel with this case they have in effect with the recognition of the National Polish Committee headed by LEON KIELESKI and later by JASIELSKI during the last months of the First World War; of the Baltic Countries at the proper time; and of the Free French directed by GEN. CHARLES DE GAULLE after the surrender of France in 1940.

IV. Plans for the Application of the Principle and Formula of Recognition.

1. In the preceding paragraphs, the origin and development of our relations with the Government of Cuba are explained and the principle and application and historic precedence of de facto recognition which authorize and justified the claim for this recognition for the Revolutionary Council of Cuba and in this way the normalization of such relationship. There only remains for us to point out in general terms a possible plan for application of said principles, practices and precedence to the concrete case of Cuba-in-arms, represented by the Revolutionary Council and allied until now to the United States, thanks to an agreement which for some time only functions at the will of one of the two parties.

2. The possible plans for translating into reality the application of the cause of Cuba for de facto recognition and its far reaching effects are and can be numerous. Taking into account known precedence, it appears advisable in the first place to facilitate and stimulate the decision of the U.S. Government, obtaining from one or more friendly countries, perhaps Peru, Guatemala, Nicaragua, etc., that they be those

which by previous agreement with Washington first grant their de facto recognition to the Revolutionary Council of Cuba.

3. The execution of the plan must be based, inevitably, in the confidential communication of the same to the Government of the United States in order that, if its approval is obtained, to carry it out without loss of time, and in case of not obtaining that approval, to adopt the decisions which are indicated later on.

4. The putting into execution of the proposed solutions, both to the Government of the United States and to the other friendly governments, should necessarily be moderated by an unalterable resolution to achieve success, and in case of failure to adopt the decision of communicating to the people of Cuba and to the world the just and urgent petition formulated; The reasons of law, honor and advantages on which it is based; The impossibility of continuing to maintain a situation which does not adjust itself to the principles and juridic international precedence, to the dignity of Cuba and the present and future responsibility of those who direct and carry out since more than a year ago the terrible struggle against the Castro tyranny; the negative result of the proposals made and finally the irrevocable declining of all responsibility and participation in a program of struggle which overlooks and offends the dignity of the liberation war.

5. The general outline of the modus operandi to be developed as soon as the de facto recognition of the Revolutionary Council is obtained, have been explained in Section 3, relative

to the case of the Czechoslovak National Council. The Revolutionary Council of Cuba, as a result, should obtain recognition as the supreme organ of the people of Cuba-in-arms against the tyranny of Castro, with the category, the privileges and the rights inherent to a de facto Government and hence it will direct, either directly or associated with the Government of the United States or with any other governments in the struggle against the Castro regime, the political and military Cuban affairs which concern it; to enjoy the privileges inherent in a de facto Government, in the order of representation, power of making contracts, issuance of passports, etc., and in this way and without being concerned with the imminent or distant plans of the Government of Washington, the present and future evils will be corrected which originated through the intolerable irregularity of the relations which today unite us to that Government and will permit to the Cuban to develop his proposals with full and responsible dignity.

6. The difficulties and obstacles are not forgotten or overlooked with which the execution of this plan may encounter and neither are the efforts carried out by Dr. Jose Miro Cardona overlooked or forgotten with a view to achieving the so-necessary and desired recognition. Upon examination and measuring those obstacles and difficulties, it seems advisable to look also at the historic, personal and collective responsibilities which weigh on all and each one of the Cubans in the struggle against Castro; the negative results of the unilateral control exercised in every way by the Washington

Government, made evident in the unparalleled disaster of Playa Giron; the impossibility that in the year 1961 there should be reproduced the cruel farce of the Treaty of Paris which ignored the will of the Cuban people on being signed in their absence a peace which ended their own war of independence, and above all things to recall that it is up to the Cubans, and only the Cubans, to claim their rights since in international and internal politics the struggle may be rough, but the result, if the struggle is conducted with courage and firmness, cannot be other than the obtainment of recognition of the Cuban Revolutionary Council with a category of a de facto belligerent Government.

V. Summary.

1. Circumstances beyond the will and possibilities of the members of the FRD brought about the acceptance of the system of subsidies. Upon agreeing with the U. S. Government (May 1960, represented by the Bender Associates (CIA)), the Gentleman's Unwritten Agreement, whose supreme object was and continues being the overthrow of the Communist tyranny imposed on the Cuban people by Fidel Castro and his Sino-Soviet Allies, in order to re-establish under the protection of the Constitution of 1940 the democratic representative regime and in this way save the Western Hemisphere from the imminent Communist danger.

2. The economic control of the Bender Group on the Frente, imposed finally the total control by said Group on all the activities related to the preparation and execution of the

liberating war in Cuba.

3. This total control maintained and increased even after the initial organizational stage, and the ignorance of the participation of the Fronte in the preparation and execution of the war provokes friction, protests, difficulties and grave crises and culminated in the unprecedented catastrophes -- strategic, tactical and intelligence -- of Playa Giron.

4. The founders of the Fronte always encouraged the idea of regularizing the relationship of the revolution with the United States and they, as well as their successors, Directors of the Revolutionary Council, have attempted, although without success, to bring about the revision of said relations.

5. This revision does not admit any other character or nature than that sanctified by the recognition of the Cuban Revolutionary Council as the de facto belligerent Government, and hence "clothed with adequate authority to direct the military and political affairs of the Cubans."

6. Such de facto recognition would grant to the Council the category corresponding to historic responsibilities, national dignity, hemispheric dimensions and affects of the liberation struggle of Cuba and the dignity and authority of the people of Cuba and of its Chiefs, besides those claimed by the international obligations of the United States itself.

7. The precedence established by the de facto recognition of the Czechoslovak National Council, the National Polish Council, the Free French (de Gaulle), etc., indicate the modus operandi to be followed in order to agree to and declare that of the Cuban Revolutionary Council.

8. If, for the misfortune of Cuba and of the cause of democracy in the Western Hemisphere, the Washington Government should refuse to accede to this legitimate and undelayable claim, the Council and the Organizations which compose it should denounce the Unwritten Pact which unilaterally and irregularly has functioned since May 1960 between the revolution and the U. S. Government, due to considering it prejudicial to the dignity of Cuba and to the interests of the continental struggle against Communism and of the Cuban revolution and the varied interests of the United States, and to decline any participation and responsibility of the future carried out and contracted under the said Pact.

Miami, Florida
November 24, 1961

S/
PEDRO MARTINEZ FRAGA

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