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DISPATCH NO. TRM-816

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OCT 3 1952

TO : Chief of Station, San Jose
FROM : Chief, WH

DATE: _____

SUBJECT: GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC - Security Review of Current Operations - Project HUMANOID

REF: Field Regulation No. 50-20, 1 July 1952

- Your attention is invited to the provisions of the referenced regulation which require periodic reviews of current operations.
- Since all operations at your station are currently embraced by a single project (HUMANOID), the schedule of reviews described in paragraph 15a of the referenced regulation will not be prepared and forwarded to you by Headquarters. Project HUMANOID and related sub-projects will be surveyed here as one operation.
- In connection with the present review, you are reminded that operational data contained in Headquarters files does not in all cases reflect an accurate and complete picture of every operation. Minor details known to the field but not presently available to us might result in a Headquarters review which does not truly reflect existing conditions. You are therefore requested to make pertinent comments and corrections, as well as indicate the feasible remedial action to improve the security of the operations, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 16 of the referenced regulation.
- Project HUMANOID is comprised of four agents: HUMANOID (U. S. citizen cognizant of employer of Station Chief, principal agent, cut-out), HUMANOID-I (indigenous agent, postal intercept), HUMANOID-II (indigenous agent, postal intercept), and HUMANOID-III (indigenous agent, penetration of the Vanguardia Popular which is the communist party of Costa Rica).
- The objectives of project HUMANOID, as set forth in the approved project outline, are as follows:

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RELEASING OFFICER

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WJF STC
COORDINATING OFFICER

U. F. Gibbons
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- (a) Cut-out services (HUMANOID).
- (b) Penetration of communist party (HUMANOID-III).
- (c) Postal intercept (HUMANOID I and HUMANOID II).
- (d) Penetration of communist women's front.
- (e) Information emanating from university and intellectual circles (HUMANOID).
- (f) Parallel penetration of communist party.
- (g) Additional sources of information on political movements.

6. The current method (a) of contact and communications between HUMANOID and HUMANOID-III is not clear to Headquarters. TRSA-1084 indicated that HUMANOID planned to close his photo shop thus eliminating the letter drop and safe house that had been used previously for contacts between these agents. TRSA-1215 pointed out that "contact between cut-out (HUMANOID) and agent (HUMANOID-III) is the weakest security link in the project at this time." It is expected that the field security survey will describe present contacts and communications in sufficient detail to clarify these points and indicate if the security risk involved has been removed or reasonably minimized.

7. Contact and communication between HUMANOID and the postal intercept agents appears to be reasonably secure. However, it is noted that the Director of the Post Office is witting of the operation. His permission to intercept communist mail was obtained by HUMANOID who indicated to the Director that "the Americans" were interested in communist literature and correspondence. The Director himself originally selected the two clerks (HUMANOID-I and HUMANOID-II) who were assigned to the task of intercepting mail. Since inception of the operation coverage has gradually increased to cover any mail of interest rather than merely communist correspondence. The station presumes that this expanded coverage has ^{been} done without the knowledge of the Director.

The alacrity (apparently) with which the Director acceded to HUMANOID's request, and the assumption that the Director is not aware of the expanded coverage, suggests possible security hazards which should be considered by the field station. Of importance is the possibility that the mail intercept is a shared operation. It is publicly known that postal authorities intercept and sometimes confiscate communist correspondence. Costa Rican officials, particularly the Director of the Post Office, might willingly provide HUMANOID with correspondence in order to detect the nature of our intelligence interests, identify higher elements in the net, control the operation, etc.

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It is recommended that this aspect of the operation be commented upon by the station with a view to strengthening the security and evaluating the risks involved in terms of value derived from the operation. As a first step it is suggested that biographic information be furnished Headquarters in order that we may initiate a name check on the Director. The station should also indicate the desirability of initiating security clearance action. This would seem to be especially important if the Director has extensive knowledge of the intercept, or other, station operations.

8. A study of past operational data suggests the possibility that too much dependence is being placed on the principal agent and cut-out HUMANOID. At the present time he acts as cut-out for two nets (mail intercept and penetration of the Vanguardia Popular). Recent renewal of the project envisaged implementation of other objectives which may require the recruitment of additional agents and the creation of additional nets. If HUMANOID's cut-out functions were to be extended to such additional nets, there is the possibility that compromise of this one key individual would jeopardize virtually all our operations in the area.

It is recommended that this matter be considered by the station if and when any additional nets are created. Consideration should be given to the recruitment of additional cut-outs in order to avoid over dependence on a single agent.

9. In March 1951 a technical surveillance was conducted on an individual of interest. Two agents HUMANOID and HUMANIST were utilized in the monitoring phase of the operation. When local authorities detected the operation, HUMANIST was apprehended, interrogated, and ultimately revealed the identity of the Chief of Station (since replaced). After a thorough review of available evidence, Headquarters concurred with the station's opinion that HUMANOID probably had not been identified by the Costa Rican Government. However, it is noted that the investigation by the government was conducted by Jorge PACHECO, Chief of Detectives and reportedly a follower of Jose FIGUERES.

PACHECO's participation in the investigation may or may not be significant because of his adherence to FIGUERES. In any event it is recommended that HUMANOID's role in the surveillance operation be thoroughly reviewed if FIGUERES' presidential aspirations are fulfilled in the national elections next year. It is also recommended that constant efforts be made to confirm the belief that HUMANOID was not contaminated.

10. A review of HUMANOID's past and present contacts with agent personnel reveals that he has had clandestine intelligence relations with HUMANIST (paragraph 9, above), HUGGER, HUMANOID-I, HUMANOID-II, and HUMANOID-III. Both HUMANIST and HUGGER have been terminated, and there is no evidence to indicate the circumstances attending their termination have in any way affected the security of HUMANOID. Nonetheless, it is noted that HUMANOID's intelligence activities are known to a widening circle of indigenous agents. In this connection it must also be remembered that HUMANOID's services in behalf of "the Americans" are known to the Director of the San Jose Post Office (paragraph 7 above). Moreover, in July 1951, TRSA-985 reported the fact that HUMANOID's wife, a Costa Rican, was witting of his intelligence activities.

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It is recommended that the above information be evaluated by the field station when the independent field survey of project HUMANOID is undertaken. Pertinent comments should be made regarding the significance of this information from a security viewpoint.

11. In summary, it is recommended that HUMANOID exercise extreme caution in all of his intelligence activities. Although there is no clearly defined security problem involved, paragraphs 9 and 10, above, suggest areas of possible danger.

12. The attached diagram illustrates our present understanding of the HUMANOID operation. Comments on the diagram as well as the text of the above review will be appreciated.

1 Attachment

J.C. King
J. C. KING

R. W. Wneedbee

By R. Wneedbee

RW:hw
19 September 1952

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J.F. HALL

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