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NOSENKO'S KGB CAREERA. Introduction

During his 11 or 12 years' service in the KGB Second Chief Directorate, NOSENKO said, he rose from case officer to deputy chief of a department and from lieutenant to lieutenant colonel (or, as he has stated more recently, only to the rank of captain). An English speaker, he had specialized in operations against American targets in the USSR as he steadily advanced to higher positions in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department (from entry on duty with the KGB in 1952 or 1953 until 1955, and from January 1960 to January 1962) and in the Tourist Department (from June 1955 to January 1960, and from January 1962 until the defection). His duties took him to England in 1957 and 1958, Cuba in 1960, and Bulgaria in 1961 as well as to Switzerland in 1962 and 1964; also, NOSENKO made numerous trips within the USSR in connection with operations, inspections, and conferences. Commendations, twice accompanied by bonuses, were awarded to him by the KGB Chairman in 1956, 1959, and 1961 and by the head of the Second Chief Directorate in 1957 and 1958; he was one of 70 Second Chief Directorate officers awarded the Order of the Red Star in 1962; and in the same year he received a medal for completing ten years of "irreproachable service."* Thus, according to NOSENKO, his defection ended a promising career marked by promotions, responsible positions, extensive travel, and many honors.

NOSENKO has discussed a large number of KGB operations, including some in which he had a personal role, either as a participant or as a supervisor, and others conducted by other KGB personnel in the First and Second Chief Directorate about which he learned through his professional and personal contacts. Those in which he played a personal role are covered in this part of the paper. All are included in Part VI. The text of the paper distinguishes the information from collateral sources and investigations from the details which NOSENKO has provided on the same topics.

* NOSENKO has admitted recently, however, that he never got any awards at all in the KGB.

TOP SECRET

B. Entry into the KGB

NOSENKO has provided a wide range of dates for his entry on duty with the KGB and has offered disparate descriptions of the circumstances and procedures involved in his becoming a KGB staff officer. His statements on these two topics are presented under separate headings below.

1. Date of Entry

A range of dates between early 1952 and 2 April 1953 has been given by NOSENKO as the time when he entered on duty with the KGB, but he has been most consistent in placing his entry in the month of March 1953.* In summary, he has said the beginning of 1952 (statement of 31 January 1964), May 1952 with no day (statement of February 1964), 5 or 7 September 1952 (statement of 6 April 1964), March 1953 with no day (statements of 9 June 1962, 24 April 1966 and 27 October 1966), 12 or 15 or 17 March 1953 (statement of 8 April 1964), 13 or 15 March 1953 (statement of 26 July 1965), and 2 April 1953 (statement of 17 April 1966). When last questioned about this subject, on 27 October 1966, NOSENKO acknowledged that he had lied when he had earlier reported his entry as occurring in 1952. His statements about the entry date are arranged in chronological order below.

9 June 1962 (first CIA meeting with NOSENKO): "In the beginning of 1953 I came to Moscow [from duty with the GRU in Primorsk]. This was 1953, in the beginning, in January. Well, I came on leave to Moscow. I was staying at my father's dacha there... I was then in the Navy GRU. So I came to Moscow on leave and, while I was home near Moscow at my father's dacha, [General Bogdan Zakharovich] KOBULOV** dropped in on us. A conversation simply began. He said: 'What are you doing?' I said: 'I'm working in GRU. I worked in the Far East and now I'm working in the Baltic. I came here on leave.' KOBULOV said: 'How do you like the work?' I replied: 'Well, speaking honestly, I don't like the work.' 'Well,' he said, 'You better come to work with us. Where do you want to go? Into intelligence or counter-intelligence?'... I did not want to go into intelligence. I

* Several of NOSENKO's remarks about his date of entry into the KGB were made during CIA questioning about how and when he first learned of the KGB agent "ANDREY"; the lead to "ANDREY" was one of the two pieces of information which NOSENKO offered to sell when he approached CIA in 1962 (see Part II.B.); the "ANDREY" case is discussed at greater length in Part VI.D.3.b.

** Other sources have reported that KOBULOV was expelled from the State Security apparatus in 1946 and that he did not return to a position of authority until a few days after Lavrentiy BERIYA became MGB-MVD Minister on 9 or 10 March 1953. As of 1952, KOBULOV was working in East Germany for both Wismut A.G., a uranium ore-mining concern, and for the Soviet contingent to the Allied Control Commission. KOBULOV was arrested at the same time as BERIYA, along with others in the KGB. See Part V.B.2. for further references to KOBULOV.

consider that only people who have seven, even ten years' experience in counterintelligence work should be sent to intelligence. After this, let them go into positive intelligence. Then they know how counterintelligence operates... Well, when KOBULOV asked me where I wanted to work, I answered: 'It is better, of course, to go into counterintelligence.' 'Well,' he said, 'Good. Look, drop in to see me for a minute sometime.' This was simple conversation. Nothing official. A week later I got a telephone call. They were calling from Personnel and told me to stop by. I went. 'Come into this room,' /they told me/, 'it's not necessary to fill out a questionnaire (anketa). We have already obtained your personal file from the GRU. Go directly to the central entrance. A pass has already been issued for you; the pass is already there. Go to the Secretariat of Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV.' Well, I went. KOBULOV had been summoned somewhere high up in the government, and his assistant received me. 'How about working in the American Department?' he /the assistant/ asked. 'Well, good. Go there right now.' Well, I went to the Second Directorate... His /KOBULOV's/ assistant sent me directly to the Second Directorate, the American Department, the First Section, working with American correspondents...in '53, in March, in March '53. STALIN had just died."*

*STALIN died on 5 March 1953.

31 January 1964: Yuriy Ivanovich GUK was reassigned from the KGB Second Chief Directorate "in something like 1952," NOSENKO said, "exactly just about the time when I came from the GRU to the KGB. He was already gone by that time."*

February 1964: After his defection on 4 February 1964, NOSENKO prepared an official statement about his biography. He said that he had entered the KGB in 1952, and he shifted the dates of most of the events during the 1945-1955 period one year backwards from the version given in 1962. This was discussed with NOSENKO, and he repeated the new dates; he then studied and approved an official statement on his biography (for the Intelligence Community) which contained the new dates, including his claim that he entered on duty with the KGB in about May 1952.

6 April 1964: Confronted with the above inconsistencies, NOSENKO said that he returned to Moscow in August 1952 and during the same month had a conversation with KGB personnel about getting a job. The interview continued with the following dialogue:

Question: You came (to Moscow) in January?

NOSENKO: No, it wasn't January, it was the second part of 1952. Yes, before that I was in the GRU... Maybe - if I tell you 7 - 7 September - maybe it was 5, I don't know.

Question: ...What date did you enter on duty with KGB?

NOSENKO: I don't remember.

Question: Early September 1952?

NOSENKO: Early September 1952, yes... I came and the first few days was sitting in a room with KUTYREV, RAKOVSKIY, and GROBOV, in Room 615. Yes, it was 7 September when I had joined... 7 or 5... And so the first few weeks I had been reading cases, studying forms; I worked like that (during) December, January, February... No, it was March, yes, after STALIN's death, after the reorganization. And at the end of March I was transferred to the attaches cases...**

* This would place the entry date some time at the beginning of 1952, for the KGB defector GOLITSYN has reported that GUK was transferred from the Second Chief Directorate in January 1952.

** NOSENKO later settled on June or July 1954 as the time of this transfer. Part V.C. covers the period when, according to NOSENKO, he was engaged in operations against the U.S. military attaches in Moscow.

8 April 1964: The interrogator pointed out to NOSENKO that he had on different occasions dated his entry into the KGB as January 1952, March 1953, and in September 1952. The questioning continued:

Question: Which is the truth?

NOSENKO: After the death of STALIN, in March 1953. Why did I say it the other dates? You see, I finished the Institute in 1949. Then I defended my diploma, and then came the State exams. I passed all the exams except one - "Foundations of Marxism-Leninism," the philosophy. And I had to take all the examinations over again. All of them. I took four, passed three, flunked one. Just the same, all four had to be taken over again. For that reason I graduated, or I received the diploma from the Institute in 1950, although officially I graduated in 1949. This is an unpleasant thing and I did not want to mention it. And right after that I was sent to the GRU.* The rest is just as I told you, word-for-word. This was the only thing. And then, after I said it, I did not want to correct it. To twist around again. And the mistake I made was about my work in the KGB. It was not 1952, of course, but 1953... It was 12 or 17 or 15 March. KOBULOV accepted me right away. STALIN was still not dead and I was already accepted. March 1953, about the 15th, about 15 March 1953.

26 July 1965: "At the end of 1952 I came to Moscow from Sovetsk in Primorskiy Kray, near Baltiysk. I had worked in the Naval Intelligence Point (MRP) there. My aim in coming to Moscow was to get out of this work in the MRP. I couldn't stand that work. I couldn't stand that work... I arrived in Moscow at the end of 1952, December... I don't remember exactly the date of the order appointing me an officer in the KGB. It was 13 or 15 March 1953."

17 April 1966 (letter to CIA case officer): "From August 1952 until 1953 I worked at the Intelligence Point of the Naval Intelligence of the 4th Fleet in Sovetsk, where I received the rank of lieutenant of the Administrative Service. From 2 April 1953 until 4 February 1964 I worked in the Second Chief Directorate of the MGB-KGB."

24 April 1966 (signed autobiographical statement): "In the middle of March 1953 KOBULOV's assistant, Colonel SAVITSKIY called me at home and told me to come to see KOBULOV... I worked in the First Section, First American Department from the middle of March 1953 until July 1955."

27 October 1966: NOSENKO reaffirmed that he entered the KGB in mid-March 1953. He said that he had lied when he earlier said that he had joined the KGB in 1952, and that he knew he was lying at the times he made these statements. Asked why he had lied, he replied: "There was no sense." NOSENKO then went on to explain that because he was only an average student and because he was a heavy drinker, he had been found unsuitable

* Since April 1966, NOSENKO has said he joined the GRU in 1951, a year later.

by the KGB entry commission when he first applied in 1950. Therefore, NOSENKO continued, he had been trying to conceal this fact from CIA by moving events back a year, for he thought CIA would not have believed him if he reported that he was first rejected by the KGB and was later accepted.

2. Circumstances and Procedures of Entry

Although NOSENKO has consistently associated his entry into the KGB with his discussions with General KOBULOV,* he has been inconsistent concerning the content of their conversation, when it occurred, its relationship in time to other events (see Part IV.B.), and where it took place, at his father's dacha or at KOBULOV's dacha. Also, whereas NOSENKO said in 1962 that there were virtually no administrative formalities prerequisite to his entry, he recalled in 1964 that he had had conversations with various KGB personnel officers and (at home) had completed a KGB questionnaire and a biographic form. NOSENKO was questioned at length on these points during 1964 and 1965. As a result, he provided lengthy descriptions of his various interviews at KGB Headquarters and of the questionnaire and other documents he completed. In April 1966, however, NOSENKO reverted to his original statement of 1962: There were no interviews with KGB personnel officers, and he implied that he had filled out no official forms. His various statements are presented in chronological order below.

9 June 1962: "KOBULOV was at our dacha. Well, he is a great friend of my father. He was First Deputy to BERIYA, and my father was Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry... A conversation simply began. He said: 'What are you doing?' I said: 'I'm working in GRU. I worked in the Far East and now I'm working on the Baltic. I came here on leave.' KOBULOV said: 'How do you like the work?' I replied: 'Well, speaking honestly, I don't like the work.' 'Well,' he said, 'You better come to work with us. Where do you want to go? Into intelligence or counter-intelligence?'... I did not want to go into intelligence. I consider that only people who have seven, even ten years' experience in counterintelligence work should be sent to intelligence. After this, let them go into positive intelligence. Then they know how counterintelligence operates... Well, when KOBULOV asked me where I wanted to work, I answered: 'It is better, of course, to go into counterintelligence.' 'Well,' he said, 'Good. Look, drop in to see me for a minute sometime.' This was simple conversation. Nothing official. A week later I got a telephone call. They were calling from Personnel and told me to stop by. I went. 'Come into this room,' /they told me/, 'it's not necessary to fill out a questionnaire (anketa). We have already obtained your personal file from the GRU. Go directly to the central entrance. A pass has already been issued for you; the pass is already there. Go to the Secretariat of Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV.' Well, I went. KOBULOV had been summoned somewhere high up in the government, and his assistant received me. 'How about working in the American Department?' he /the assistant/ asked. 'Well, good. Go there right now.' Well, I went to the Second Directorate... His /KOBULOV's/ assistant sent me directly to the Second Directorate, the American Department, the First Section, working with American correspondents."

* See Part V.B.1. for further references to KOBULOV.

8 April 1964: "It was February [1953]. KOBULOV was in February - in Moscow. He was our friend. He said: 'O.K., George. I'll help you if you want, with the KGB.' I remember exactly. Yes. It was in February. I saw him at the cottage... By this time I had been in Moscow six weeks... KOBULOV was in February. He went to see my father at the Ministry. It was the end of the day. It was late and my father invited him to come along to the summer home. It happened to be a Saturday. KOBULOV's wife stayed in Germany. He was just here for a short TDY.* My father invited him to spend Saturday night and Sunday at the dacha... On Sunday we were playing billiards and KOBULOV asked me what I was doing. I told him 'nothing,' that I was at the disposal of the [GRU] Personnel Department. I said: 'I don't want to go back to Baltiysk, to the Baltic Sea, because I don't like the work there. I'm not doing anything there. I get no satisfaction from the work.' He said: 'Well, you should be utilized somehow... Do you want me to call the KGB Personnel - them look you over?' I told him: 'All right.' He called, and he must have given our number to them, our home phone. I was called subsequently by the Personnel Department of the KGB. In February. They told me to come see them at House No. 12. They had a pass for me... So I went. Picked up my pass and went... [NOSENKO next gives a description of his route to the KGB building, his receipt of a pass, and his visit to the Central KGB Personnel Office.] They talked to me. This man - I don't know who or what he was - asked where I worked before and all that. He said: 'O.K. We'll request your file from GRU. We will check you out and will let you know whether or not we will take you.' That's all." NOSENKO was asked whether he completed any forms or questionnaires. "No. Not there. They gave me three copies of forms to take home. There were so many questions. About my parents, my education, my residences, addresses. I filled all this out... Finally I completed all three copies and called them. I was told that this time I would not need a pass, that I should just go to the entrance, and the person [the personnel officer] would come down and take the papers from me. I went, brought the papers, and he took them from me, and also three copies of my handwritten autobiography... Then I was called by the personnel people once more. And at that time another officer talked to me, and this time I knew who was talking to me, because I was told to go to talk to ROZHENKO [first name unknown, later identified as a Section Chief in the Personnel Department]. This was in March... Just as soon as STALIN died, KOBULOV came back from Germany immediately. He must have been summoned by BERIYA or someone. And so, in just a few days - evidently he did not forget - I got a call. It was Bogdan Zakharovich's assistant. He told me to go to the central entrance, that I didn't need a pass. I remember it as if it just happened. I went in the uniform of a lieutenant, but with a civilian overcoat. This was, maybe, the 10th of March... I sat down [in KOBULOV's office]. I thought it would be for five minutes. I waited there almost two hours. The assistant came out a few times and told me that Bogdan Zakharovich is very, very busy, but that he would give me an escort. Some senior lieutenant came up to me and told me to follow him... We went up to the sixth floor of the old building. I remember it as though it just happened. I sat there about five or seven minutes. Then I was told to go in. I announced myself. He said: 'Yes, I know. Sit down. My name is SHUBNYAKOV, Fedor Grigoryevich.' He told me he was the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate and that they had talked things over and decided. He said that they wanted to offer me a position in counterintelligence, in the First Department, the American

* NOSENKO had been told by his interrogator shortly before that KOBULOV had been stationed in Germany and not in Moscow.

Department... Then he asked [A. M.] GORBATENKO to come in. He was filling in for the Chief of the First Department... He took me to his office... Well, they decided to put me in the First [U. S. Embassy] Section and called Yevgeniy KOZLOV, the Chief of the Section. He came in and said: 'Well, hello, Yuriy Ivanovich. I heard of you. Well, if you're finished with him, I'll take him along with me and show him around.' He took me and talked to me for a while and then told me to report... Either the 12th or the 17th. I don't remember."

15 April 1964: NOSENKO again described the KGB questionnaire and autobiographic forms he had filled out at home and recalled that he had also signed a secrecy agreement in the personnel office. He also remembered that he had made several additional phone calls to the KGB personnel office and described his second visit there to talk to ROZHENKO: "At the end of February I was told again to stop in the Pass Office and pick up a pass and go to the same floor, but another room. They told me I would have to talk to ROZHENKO today. He was a Chief of Section, of the Personnel Section. So we had a talk. It was the same thing again. He said: 'Tell me about yourself.' But he just wanted to look me over. And after that they said: 'All right, we have not gotten all your documents yet from your [military] district. So wait.'"

26 April 1965: NOSENKO recounted his conversation with KOBULOV, saying that it took place at KOBULOV's dacha in Usov, where he and his parents were visiting in January 1953. NOSENKO continued: "I was called at my family's dacha in February. They said it was State Security calling and that I was to report. I did this on the next day. Probably I then reported to House No. 12. An officer talked to me about my education, service, and so on. Biographic questions. Then he gave me a blank for my autobiography and a four to six-page anketa (biographic form). I filled these out at home. The next day I called in and was told to come to the Eighth Entry. The officer came down, and I gave him the forms and photographs of myself. They said they would call me. I did nothing from January to March. January was leave. In February and March I was at GRU Personnel's disposal." After STALIN's funeral NOSENKO was summoned to KOBULOV's office. His assistant, SAVITSKIY, told NOSENKO to wait. After more than an hour had passed, SAVITSKIY sent him to SHUBNYAKOV's office. There he learned that he would be assigned to the U.S. Embassy Section and was introduced to the Chief of the American Department, GORBATENKO. The official order appointing NOSENKO was issued the same day, the 13th or 15th of March 1953.

24 April 1966 (signed autobiographical statement: Again NOSENKO said that he had spoken with KOBULOV at the KOBULOV dacha and set the date at 1 January 1953. The document continued as follows: "I saw KOBULOV for the second and last time on the day of STALIN's funeral in my father's office in the Ministry of Shipbuilding in March 1953. I had come from the sanatorium to Moscow and dropped in to see my father at work. In his office I ran into KOBULOV as they were gathering to go to the Dom Soyuzov for the funeral. KOBULOV said he would concern himself with the question of my entry into the KGB. The same day I returned to the sanatorium, and several days later, having completed my treatment, I returned to Moscow. In the middle of March, KOBULOV's assistant, Colonel SAVITSKIY,

called me at home and told me to come see KOBULOV. KOBULOV didn't see me and SAVITSKIY directed me to the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, Colonel SHUBENYAKOV... SHUBENYAKOV told me that an order had been signed appointing me a case officer in the First Section of the First Department, Second Chief Directorate. SHUBENYAKOV called the Chief of the First Department, Lieutenant Colonel GORBATENKO, and introduced me. Then I went to the First Department and was introduced to the Deputy Chief of the First Department and the Chief of the First Section, KOZLOV. KOZLOV said I would take over the cases of Senior Case Officer, Captain /Anatoliy/ TORMOZOV and suggested that I begin work the same day. I was accepted for work in the MVD in precisely this way. It is necessary to note that none of the workers of the MVD Personnel Administration spoke to me, either before or after the signing of the order assigning me to the Second Chief Directorate of the MVD."

C. To June 1955 (American Department)

1. Introduction

Depending upon which date he has given for entering the KGB, NOSENKO's first assignment in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, working on American correspondents living in Moscow, lasted for about six to eighteen months. From that job, he said, he moved in 1954 to operations against U.S. Military Attaches assigned to the Moscow Embassy, remaining in the same section until being transferred in June 1955. His activities, as NOSENKO described them, and pertinent collateral information on his targets while he was in the U.S. Embassy Section are reviewed below.

2. Operations Against Correspondents

On the day of his acceptance into the KGB, NOSENKO was taken directly to the offices of the U.S. Embassy Section. There he met the section chief, V.A. KOZLOV, who told NOSENKO that he would take over the work of the departing case officer, Captain Anatoliy TORMOZOV, in operations against American correspondents in Moscow.

a. KGB Files on SHAPIRO, GILMORE, SALISBURY and WHITNEY

When NOSENKO reported for work the following day, according to statements made on 8 April 1964, he found a desk in Room 615. "There were three other guys sitting there. At first I was running traces, and at the same time I was reading the files on journalists... I think there were seven files in all, and I didn't see any other." NOSENKO listed these files as those on Henry SHAPIRO, Eddy GILMORE (as well as one on GILMORE's wife SEREBRYAKOVA and her sister CHERNYSHEVA), Harrison SALISBURY and Thomas WHITNEY.*

During the 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENKO identified SHAPIRO as an "old agent of ours." He said that WHITNEY "worked for us while he was in Moscow and gave us some material, but he refused to work for us when he left the country and would not contact us in the United States." GILMORE, NOSENKO said, was an active recruitment target in 1953 and 1954, but NOSENKO did not know whether he was recruited. Likewise, he did not know the status of SALISBURY as of 1953.

NOSENKO stressed that the files he was given to read during the early period of his KGB service were developmental files (delo formulyar) rather than the operational files of the agents. The developmental files were less sensitive, and from them "you would never be able to figure out whether he [the subject of the file] is an agent or not." NOSENKO explained that, once a person becomes an agent, another file is set up, and these agent

* NOSENKO made clear that he was not the case officer responsible for the more important correspondents: "KOZLOV himself was working with them, the chief of the section himself--with SHAPIRO, with SHAPIRO's wife. I also know that KOZLOV was working with WHITNEY and with [Andrew J.] STEIGER... For each of these persons there was an operational file which I did not see." According to NOSENKO, he was in no way involved with STEIGER and Edmund STEVENS, both of whom were American correspondents recruited as agents by the KGB.

files were held by the chief of the section, KOZLOV. NOSENKO stated that he read the files on these seven persons "slowly and made some extracts for myself in my personal log--such things as notations of their dates of arrival, things I could not remember." He was also given the files on the agents surrounding these correspondents, their drivers, maids, and cooks.

b. Agents Reporting on Correspondents

NOSENKO said he was responsible for handling the agents who were reporting on SHAPIRO, WHITNEY, SALISBURY and the GILMORES and met with them regularly to learn whether "anything was new, who did SHAPIRO meet, what might be interesting in his behavior, what might be suspicious in his behavior, who he is contacting, etc." He then reported to KOZLOV and would sometimes prepare a written report of his conversations with the agents. Asked to describe these meetings, NOSENKO replied: "Let us take the same case of SHAPIRO. I would meet drivers about three times a month or even two times. At the meeting I would ask the driver what was new in SHAPIRO's behavior since our last meeting, whether SHAPIRO had suspicious contacts with foreigners, about his meetings with Russians, were they conducted openly or, perhaps, was SHAPIRO walking behind the person he met. And then the man [agent] would begin his report. Of course, if he spots anything suspicious he calls immediately, and I would see him the next morning. Otherwise, I would tell him at the meeting that I would see him again in about ten days or in two weeks, but if there was something interesting he should call immediately. It was the same with the maid and the cook. Upon returning to the office I would have to report to KOZLOV about my meetings, either orally or in writing. If, for example, [V.M.] KOVSHUK [also of the U.S. Embassy Section] had a meeting with his agents, he too had to report immediately to KOZLOV or as soon as convenient to both. If the meetings were taking place late in the day and lasted until midnight or later and there were no written materials submitted at the meeting, I could go home and then report the next morning."

KOZLOV accompanied NOSENKO to meetings with the various agents surrounding the correspondents. "At first he was teaching me. Then he would go in cases when something interesting would begin to develop, even when it hadn't yet begun to develop but when there may have been a hint in a case of some other case officer."

NOSENKO's agent network consisted mainly of domestic and clerical personnel in contact with the correspondents and their families. Asked to describe them, he said on 15 April 1964: "My first agent was a woman agent, a cook, who was working at GILMORE's place. She also worked at the Associated Press later. Her codename was 'AGLODINA', a funny one. My second agent was a chauffeur whose codename, I think, was 'SERGEY'. I think he was driving WHITNEY. Then I also had SHAPIRO's chauffeur, a funny little fellow. In other words, charwomen, chauffeurs, this was my agentura [agent network]." Although NOSENKO was able to give a breakdown of this network in terms of the number and type of agents targetted against particular individuals, he had forgotten their true names and could not provide detailed personality information on any of them. He explained: "I don't remember now. They all passed by like a river because they were turned over often." NOSENKO did recall that it was he who selected and handled the agent who was placed in SHAPIRO's office as a secretary; this agent had earlier worked in the offices of Moscow News, an English-language newspaper published in Moscow.

He first identified GILMORE's cook, "AGLODINA," as Yelena S. KOSIENKO in the fall of 1965, while reviewing a list of Soviets employed by Americans in Moscow. He told CIA at that time that he had taken over KOSIENKO from TOMMOZOV upon entering the U.S. Embassy Section in 1953, and that she subsequently worked for and reported on GILMORE's successor, Richard KASISCHKE. NOSENKO said that KOSIENKO "never provided any interesting information."

NOSENKO estimated that he was responsible for handling 10 to 12 agents in operations against the correspondents. This, he said, was a normal load, although more experienced case officers might have as many as 15. In April 1964 NOSENKO broke his agentura down as follows:

<u>Target</u>	<u>Agents</u>
Eddie GILMORE	Two agents, the cook and the driver; one operational contact; a part-time cleaning girl; and a girlfriend of GILMORE's sister-in-law, who reported on the sister-in-law and GILMORE's wife.
Thomas WHITNEY	One agent, his driver.
Henry SHAPIRO	Three agents, SHAPIRO's secretary and his cahuffeur, plus an old woman who was a relative of SHAPIRO's wife and lived with the SHAPIROs in Moscow. (The secretary and chauffeur later worked for Kenneth BRODNEY and reported on him to NOSENKO; BRODNEY temporarily took SHAPIRO's place in Moscow.)
Harrison SALISBURY	Two agents, SALISBURY's driver, "SERGEY" and a part-time cleaning girl.

NOSENKO classified two other of his agents as "neutral," in that they did not have specific targets on whom to report. The first of these was the director of MOSGRAN, a Russian-language training program for foreigners in Moscow. His cryptonym was "RAKETA," but NOSENKO could not recall his true name. The second, "VOLODINK," was a female teacher in this same program who instructed some of the correspondents, including BRODNEY, and Embassy employees in their homes; he could not recall the true name of "VOLODINK." When NOSENKO was relieved of his responsibility for the correspondents in 1954, he turned over all of his agents to other case officers in the U.S. Embassy Section with the exception of "RAKETA" and "VOLODINK," whom he continued to handle in his work with military attaches.

c. Information from Other Sources

SHAPIRO was identified as a KGB agent by GOLITSYN in 1961, before the lead was received from NOSENKO, and he had previously been suspected as such on the basis of his long stay in Moscow, his unusually good access to Soviet information sources, and his marriage to a Soviet national. SHAPIRO was mentioned as a KGB

agent by a cryptonym (known to NOSENKO and confirmed by GOLITSYN) appearing in the CHEREPANOV papers.*

The KGB defector Nikolay KHOKLOV had earlier identified the Polish-born wife of WHITNEY as a KGB agent, an allegation which she denied, and it had been long assumed that WHITNEY too had reached some sort of accommodation with the KGB because of this fact and because of the long duration of his tour as a correspondent in Moscow.

GILMORE also had been suspected by CIA before NOSENKO's information was received. He served in Moscow for 12 years, from 1941 to 1953, and is married to a Soviet national.

SALISBURY served two short tours, of about one year each, in Moscow during the 1950's. During the second of these, he became enamored with the Pole who was to become WHITNEY's wife (see above) and was during this period a subject of criticism by other American correspondents in Moscow for his pro-Soviet articles. When WHITNEY married the Pole shortly after STALIN's death, SALISBURY returned to the United States and his articles took on an anti-Soviet tone.

NOSENKO claimed no involvement with the other two American correspondents whom he identified as KGB agents, STEVENS and STEIGER, both the subjects of a considerable amount of derogatory information in CIA files. They are discussed in Part VI.D.2. under the heading of NOSENKO's American leads.

3. Operations Against Military Attache Personnel

Some time in the first half of 1954 NOSENKO was relieved of his responsibilities for the correspondent cases, and from then until his transfer from the American Department he handled KGB Second Chief Directorate operations against the officer personnel of the U.S. Military Attache's office. NOSENKO's account of the turnover of the correspondent files to his successor and of the acceptance of the attache files is presented below.

- 8 April 1964: "I took over the Military Attache cases from Nikolay KHRENOV... When I was leaving in 1955, I turned the attache files over to Valeriy BUDYLDIN."

- 10 April 1964: "I made a mistake... I said I accepted the cases from KHRENOV when I was taking on the Military Attache work. This is not right. KHRENOV was not working in the First (U.S. Embassy) Section; he was working in the First (American) Department. I took over the cases from--let's see, there was ZHUKOV and Vladimir Aleksandrovich CHURANOV, and here was my table (desk), and I accepted the cases from Pavel Fedorovich PANKRATOV. This was in the beginning of 1954."

- 15 April 1964: NOSENKO said that he thought he turned over the correspondent files to F.V. KISLITSYN (who returned to the USSR from Australia in May 1954). NOSENKO asked when the PETROV's defected in Australia; he explained that he was

* See Part V.D.7.c. for a detailed discussion of the CHEREPANOV Papers.

not sure about KISLITSYN and could have given them to another officer. "If KISLITSYN came [back from Australia] in 1953, then it was to KISLITSYN. Otherwise, it was someone else."

- 18 June 1964: "KISLITSYN came into the First Section in 1954 and I gave him the files on American correspondents. BUDYLDIN also joined the section this year and took the files on the Army Attache and his assistants from PANKRATOV. BUDYLDIN left later that year and turned those files over to me... Yuriy LEONTIYEV joined the section in 1955, and I gave him the files on the Army Attache and his assistants."

NOSENKO has also been indefinite as to the date he assumed responsibilities for the attaches. As noted above, he said on 10 April 1964 that he received the files in the beginning of 1954. He had earlier said that he worked on the correspondents "only about six months." If the date of March 1953, which he most often gave for his entry into the KGB, is correct this would place the turnover in the fall of 1953. On other occasions he has said specifically that he turned over the correspondent cases and began work against the attaches in January 1954, on still others that this occurred in May 1954. In February 1965, NOSENKO said that he could not remember when he changed assignments.

a. Agents Reporting on Military Attaches

Asked in April 1964 to describe the agent network (agentura) at his disposal in operations against U.S. Military Attaches during this period which began in 1954, NOSENKO replied: "There were two maids, a cook, drivers*... about ten persons, plus the agent 'SERVIZNIY' and the one with the code name 'DMITRIYEV'... These additional two agents, about 12 or 13 agents altogether." With one exception, this network remained constant until NOSENKO transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section in mid-1955. He met each agent about once a week, except for the chauffeurs who were met three times a month in a safehouse or on the street. According to NOSENKO, this network was "just a supporting agentura, which very seldom was worthwhile," the main source of information on the Military Attaches being the microphones in their offices.**

Newly added to the network while NOSENKO held this position was a maid inserted to report on Army Attache Earl L. MICKELSON and his successor, Fillmore K. HEARNS. Her name, NOSENKO thought, was NOVIKOVA. She was an English-speaking university graduate but "hid her knowledge of English in order to overhear conversations or read letters without taking them outside."

Besides NOVIKOVA, NOSENKO named one other maid who was his agent, Mariya NEVEROVA, code name "SHVEDOVA," and she was targetted against the Assistant Army Attache, Ira RICHARDS. He described NEVEROVA as a "little, old, thin woman," from whom he never obtained anything of interest. They met in a safehouse on Kuznetskiy Most.

Of the KGB agents among the chauffeurs, NOSENKO identified Nikolay SHNYRYEV, who was used by various of the attaches. "He reported where they went, what they said, whether they took notes or photographs, whether they had unusual packages with them, and so on."

When viewing photographs in September 1964, NOSENKO identified Vladislav VOROBYEV as the agent "SERVIZNIY." He had been working in the Embassy since its establishment, starting first as a messenger boy and, in NOSENKO's time, performing clerical tasks. VOROBYEV had no direct connection with the Military Attaches, and NOSENKO said he himself did not know why he had been given VOROBYEV to handle in 1954. The main function of this agent was delivering to NOSENKO copies of the unclassified telephone listings of the Embassy, issued monthly.

"DMITRIYEV's" true name may have been Dmitriy KUKOLEV: NOSENKO saw this name on a 1962 phone list and thought, but was not sure, that this was his agent. An electrician who worked on the Embassy's electrical wiring systems and elevator, "DMITRIYEV" reported to NOSENKO on antenna wires and

* The Military Attaches used a pool of five drivers at random, NOSENKO said. Apart from the permanent driver for the senior attache, none were targetted against individual members of the attache office.

** See Part V.E.3.g. on electronic operations against the U.S. Embassy.

other wires he had observed in the Embassy as well as on the security measures on the top floors. Like VOROBYEV, "DMITRIYEV" had no direct connection with the Military Attaches.

In September 1964 NOSENKO was shown a series of 260 biographic cards on Soviet citizens employed by the American Embassy in Moscow. Each card contained a photograph of the person involved and short biographic notes, including his name and job in the Embassy. The first time he went through these cards, NOSENKO was permitted to see only the photographs; NOSENKO did not identify the photographs of SHNYRYEV and KUKOLEV but said that the face of VOROBYEV was familiar, adding that he thought his name was VOROBYEV. When shown the biographic information on SHNYRYEV and KUKOLEV, he identified each of them as his agents during the 1954-1955 period in the American Department and equated them to the cryptonyms given previously. In the case of SHNYRYEV, when shown the biographic information, which listed SHNYRYEV as "chauffeur for the Military Attache," NOSENKO exclaimed: "Oh my God, this is my own agent." He later said it was a good photograph of SHNYRYEV.

b. NOSENKO's Targets

As the Second Chief Directorate case officer responsible for operations against American Military (Army) Attaches stationed in Moscow,* his main task was not to recruit them but rather was to prevent the attaches from collecting intelligence. He has used this statement about his main task (identical with that of other U.S. Embassy Section officers working against the Army and Navy Attaches) to support his claim that no U.S. Armed Forces Attaches were recruited by the KGB from 1953 until his defection in 1964. He has also said that this is one reason he knows relatively little about the personal backgrounds of his various targets during this period--the emphasis was on surveillance instead of development for recruitment purposes. Asked in February 1965 to list the Army Attache personnel for whom he was directly responsible during 1954 and 1955, NOSENKO gave the following names: "MICKELSON, MEARNES, RICHARDS, FELCHLIN, BENSON, MULE, STROUD, and CARDELLA."** His knowledge of the activities of these targets and of KGB action against them, coupled with information from other sources, is discussed in the following paragraphs.

*Naval Attaches were handled by ZHUKOV during this period, NOSENKO said, while Air Attaches were initially handled by CHURANOV. When CHURANOV left the section in early 1954, he turned over the Air Attache files to PANKRATOV, who turned them over later in the year to KHRENOV.

**This is the order given by NOSENKO. The list comprises two generations of Army Attaches in Moscow and is neither in alphabetical order nor in terms of date of service in Moscow. It is, however, in descending order of rank from Colonel MICKELSON through Captain MULE to Chief Warrant Officer CARDELLA. Questioned about these officers in a different context, NOSENKO indicated knowledge of their ranks. Not mentioned by NOSENKO was George VAN LAETHEM, Assistant Army Attache in Moscow from August 1951 to August 1953 (prior to the time when NOSENKO said he was responsible for work against the military attache office). VAN LAETHEM returned to Moscow in 1955, however, and was attached to the Army Attache staff again from 19 March to 19 May 1955, during which time NOSENKO claimed he was still responsible for this group.

(1) MICKELSON

NOSENKO has identified Earl L. MICKELSON as a colonel and the Military Attache in Moscow during 1954 and 1955. PANKRATOV was the case officer originally handling MICKELSON, and the case was turned over to NOSENKO in 1954. When asked about agents who might have been working against MICKELSON, NOSENKO said that there was one cook, a KGB operational contact whose name he did not recall, and MICKELSON's maid, whose name NOSENKO believed was NOVIKOVA; the cook and NOVIKOVA went to work for MICKELSON after NOSENKO had left the U.S. Embassy Section. In addition to these two, the only other source reporting on MICKELSON was his chauffeur, whose name NOSENKO also did not remember. NOSENKO said that the KGB learned nothing interesting about MICKELSON from concealed microphones, telephone taps, or surveillance, and that no operational approach or recruitment was attempted. There was, in fact, no interesting or derogatory information on MICKELSON from any source.

According to information in CIA files, MICKELSON was involved in at least two incidents inside the Soviet Union which NOSENKO has not reported. In May 1954 he was arrested in Tbilisi on the (false) charge of having photographed a bridge, but he persuaded the Militia not to press charges. In August 1954 MICKELSON was arrested again for illegal photographs south of KHARKOV; on this occasion he was held for two hours before being released.

(ii) MEARNS

NOSENKO identified Fillmore K. MEARNS as MICKELSON's replacement and said that he was the responsible case officer. There were two agents and one operational contact working against MEARNS. Of these, NOSENKO could recall the name only of NOVIKOVA, the same maid who reported earlier on MICKELSON. Besides being told to attempt to overhear MICKELSON's conversations NOVIKOVA was instructed to search his clothing and to copy any notes she might find, but she never overheard or found anything of interest to the KGB. NOSENKO recalled that MEARNS' personal effects were searched by the KGB while they were being shipped to Moscow from the United States, and that all his service records had been discovered and photographed.* NOSENKO described MEARNS as being more "active" in Moscow than MICKELSON had been and said that information from concealed microphones showed him to have a strong character. Nothing of interest concerning him was received from these microphones or from telephone taps.

CIA has no derogatory or otherwise significant information on MEARNS, who replaced MICKELSON.

(iii) RICHARDS

NOSENKO identified Ira B. RICHARDS as a lieutenant colonel who served as the Assistant Army Attache in Moscow. NOSENKO said that he was the case officer working against

*NOSENKO has told this same story about MICKELSON.

RICHARDS. The one agent reporting on RICHARDS whom NOSENKO could name was the maid Mariya NEVEROVA, KGB cryptonym "SHVEDOVA," but she had never provided any worthwhile information about RICHARDS. In addition, some Soviet drivers reported on RICHARDS, but nothing useful was obtained from them.

According to CIA records, RICHARDS served in Moscow from July 1954 to July 1956. There was a microphone in the office which he shared first with MICKELSON and later with MEARNS. RICHARDS confirmed that Mariya NEVEROVA was his maid and described her as a "mousy" woman who had a heart attack during the period she was employed by him. (This incident was not recalled by NOSENKO.) For about four months of his Moscow tour, RICHARDS took Russian-language lessons from Ludmila GROMAKOVA in his apartment. During these lessons, RICHARDS often discussed labor conditions and wages in the United States and, on one occasion, had her record her speech on his tape recorder. GROMAKOVA was pregnant and unmarried at the time. (NOSENKO has named GROMAKOVA as a KGB agent in another context but has not mentioned her contacts with RICHARDS.)* RICHARDS identified one "Volodya" (i.e., first name Vladimir) as his principal driver. About 62 years old in 1954, Volodya was the son of a rich jeweler in Moscow during the Revolution. Volodya himself was well educated and, on one occasion while picnicking outside Moscow, he spoke intelligently with RICHARDS about the Revolution, propaganda, and news media. (NOSENKO did not know of Volodya.) Further details from RICHARDS are given in the following section on FELCHLIN.

(iv) FELCHLIN

NOSENKO identified Howard L. FELCHLIN as a lieutenant colonel who served as Assistant Army Attache in Moscow and stated that he was FELCHLIN's case officer. FELCHLIN was in the Soviet Union during 1954 and part of 1955, until being declared persona non grata. NOSENKO did not recall the names of any agents specifically targetted against FELCHLIN, although he thought FELCHLIN must have had a maid and she would have been a KGB agent. Additionally, NOSENKO said, the Assistant Military Attaches shared a pool of cars and drivers, and these were his agents. Unable to recall the precise date of FELCHLIN's expulsion, NOSENKO related it to some event regarding Soviets stationed in the United States for which the Soviet Government decided to reply in kind. NOSENKO was imprecise as to the pretext used to expel FELCHLIN, but said the action was based on information which had been accumulated from a number of sources and incidents. For example, FELCHLIN had been caught taking some photographs and a report had been written; along with other similar indications of FELCHLIN's activities and reports of agents in contact with FELCHLIN, the report was filed away for possible future use. NOSENKO was questioned further on FELCHLIN during the February 1965 interrogations. He said then that FELCHLIN alone had been declared persona non grata, and that no other attaches had been involved. NOSENKO

* See Part V.E.3.d., which discusses coverage of John ABIDIAN, to whom she also taught Russian.

explained his having but few details concerning this action by the fact that it took place after NOSENKO had transferred from the American Department to the Tourist Department in June 1955. NOSENKO knew nothing of FELCHLIN's background.

Other sources have reported that FELCHLIN visited the USSR as a merchant seaman and a diplomatic courier before arriving in July 1953 as Army Attache. He served in the latter capacity for one year, until July 1954, when he was asked to leave the country. (He had previously served in Austria and West Germany and had been in official contact with known GRU officers at both posts, as well as in the United States.) During his entire tour in Moscow he was the subject of intensive KGB interest. Shortly after his arrival, in September 1953, FELCHLIN, with fellow Assistant Army Attache Martin J. MANHOFF, and two Air Force attaches took a train trip to Siberia, the first such trip permitted American attaches in many years. Six months later, on 25 March 1954, the Soviet newspaper Trud carried an article saying that FELCHLIN and his companions had lost some of their "spy documents" on the train. FELCHLIN said this charge was false. On another occasion, while travelling with a British Military Attache, FELCHLIN returned to his train compartment to find a scantily clad Soviet female in his bunk. (NOSENKO recalls neither of these incidents.) In June 1954, while in the company of Lieutenant Colonel F.J. YEAGER, an Assistant Army Attache, FELCHLIN was arrested in Kiev by a Soviet Army officer for photographing a military target. (NOSENKO has never mentioned YEAGER's name; when told the name and asked for an identification, NOSENKO said that he had heard it and that he thought YEAGER was the Air Force Attache.) A large crowd gathered and, after some jostling, FELCHLIN and YEAGER were taken to a Militia station where they were ordered to sign a confession. They were held eleven hours, and their arrest caused the American ambassador to deliver a strong protest note. FELCHLIN was told on 3 July 1954 that he had 48 hours to get out of the Soviet Union. No specific charges were mentioned. Major Walter A. MCKINNEY, the U.S. Air Attache and one of FELCHLIN's travelling companions at the time the "spy notes" were allegedly lost, was declared persona non grata at the same time.*

Queried concerning SHNYRYEV, RICHARDS and FELCHLIN immediately recognized his photograph and name as one of the general chauffeurs assigned to the Office of the Military Attache at the Moscow Embassy; RICHARDS was taken on his first trip outside Moscow by SHNYRYEV. He remarked that the

* Ambassador BOHLEN successfully insisted, against initial Soviet refusal, that his personal plane be allowed into the USSR to fly FELCHLIN and MCKINNEY out. In February 1965 NOSENKO was asked to describe the unusual circumstances under which FELCHLIN left. NOSENKO said he could not, inasmuch as he was no longer in the American Department at the time. Told that the expulsion took place in 1954, NOSENKO said this was not the correct date.

attaches referred to SHNYRYEV as either "Nikolay Perviy" (Nicholas the First) or "Nikolay Vtoroy" (Nicholas the Second) to distinguish him from the other chauffeur with the same name. FELCHLIN said that SHNYRYEV drove primarily for the Military Attache himself, but sometimes drove for the Assistant Military Attaches, and he remembered that SHNYRYEV was not well, suffered from war wounds, and had continuing chest or lung trouble. (Asked whether SHNYRYEV had any medical problem, NOSENKO said he was not aware of any.)

FELCHLIN said his maid Dora FEDOROVA (not specifically named by NOSENKO) was in her 50's. When she spoke with FELCHLIN about a job, she asked for about 120 rubles a month, which seemed excessive, so FELCHLIN offered 80. FEDOROVA refused and left. Two days later she returned and accepted. She spoke little English. Other maids came to the back door of FELCHLIN's apartment to "chat" with her, and suspecting that they were reporting to FEDOROVA, FELCHLIN teased her about it. FEDOROVA's previous employer at the Embassy gave her full name to columnist Drew PEARSON with a statement that she was one of the chief spies and the local "boss" of the Embassy network. PEARSON printed the allegation. In the summer of 1953 or 1954, according to FELCHLIN, the maid approached FELCHLIN with the article, waved it in his face, and accused him of being PEARSON's source. (NOSENKO did not recognize FEDOROVA's name and did not recall hearing or reading of this incident.)

(v) BENSON

NOSENKO identified his target John S. BENSON as a major and Assistant Army Attache in Moscow. He did not recall the names of any agents working against BENSON but said that BENSON was with MULE and STROUD (see below) in Stalingrad in 1955 when all three were caught by the KGB with electronic "spying" devices. They were declared persona non grata. The KGB had no other derogatory information on BENSON from any other source.

(vi) STROUD

NOSENKO identified William R. STROUD as a captain and an Assistant Army Attache. The only agents working against him were the Military Attaches' drivers. From concealed microphones, the KGB Second Chief Directorate learned before STROUD's arrival in Moscow that he was an expert in the use of electronic spying apparatus. He was with BENSON and MULE in Stalingrad and was declared persona non grata along with them (see below). Other than this, NOSENKO said, the KGB knew nothing unusual or interesting about STROUD from any source.

CIA files show that STROUD was, with BENSON and MULE, the victim of the Soviets' seizure of technical equipment in Stalingrad and was declared persona non grata on 7 May 1955. On 31 January 1955 he travelled to Kharkov from Moscow with First Secretary Frank SISCOE to interview an American defector living there. (According to NOSENKO, SISCOE was suspected by the KGB of being a CIA officer; [redacted])

(vii) MULE

NOSENKO identified Walter MULE as an Assistant Army Attache and said that he was the case officer responsible for him. NOSENKO described an operational approach to MULE, in which he himself participated: In 1953 or 1954 there had been several defection approaches to Soviets in the United States on the basis of money and the promise of a new life. After the KGB Second Chief Directorate decided to try the same measures, MULE was selected because he was only a captain despite his lengthy service in the Army and because material from concealed microphones indicated that he was often disparaged by the other attaches. When MULE received letters from home, he threw them in the trash, and the maids turned these over to the KGB; from this mail it was understood that MULE did not have a house in the United States but lived with his family in a trailer. The father of two children, MULE had sent his wife from Moscow to Germany for an abortion, as a third child would have imposed too great an economic burden. On the basis of all this the KGB appointed N.M. BORODIN, a recruiter of the American Department, to attempt to defect MULE. Together with BORODIN, KOVSHUK, and L.A. LEBEDEV (from the Second Chief Directorate's special technical section) NOSENKO travelled to Leningrad for the operation. LEBEDEV installed a clock containing a concealed camera as well as microphones in MULE's hotel room, and BORODIN entered the room to await MULE's return. When MULE started to enter the room, he caught sight of BORODIN and tried to back out, but NOSENKO and KOVSHUK closed the door from the hall and prevented his escape.* BORODIN reviewed for MULE the facts the KGB had accumulated about his lack of success in the Army, the disdain of his fellow attaches, and his shortage of money and then offered him a job as a "consultant." BORODIN had either \$5,000 or \$10,000 in an envelope to encourage MULE to accept. According to NOSENKO, MULE refused outright, telling BORODIN to get out, that he would not talk to him, and that he was a captain in the American Army.

CIA files show that MULE reported this incident. He said that he was locked in his hotel room and subjected to a recruitment attempt by an MVD agent calling himself Jack SIEGAL, who offered him \$10,000 for "work" on a long-range basis. SIEGAL emphasized that MULE would not be required to procure documents from the Embassy, and according to MULE, SIEGAL was aware of facts concerning MULE's personal life that could have been obtained only from listening devices in MULE's apartment or office. SIEGAL left after about 20 minutes, having warned MULE not to report the incident. MULE was unable to identify NOSENKO's photograph.

(viii) PNG of BENSON, MULE, and STROUD

After NOSENKO had been transferred to the Tourist Department in 1955, BENSON, MULE and STROUD were the targets of a KGB operation which resulted in all three men being

*Precisely the same role was played by NOSENKO in the recruitment approach to James STORSBERG, according to NOSENKO. (See Part V.E.3.c.ii.)

declared persona non grata. NOSENKO gave the following account of this incident: For some time the Second Chief Directorate had been trying to acquire a small, convenient piece of electronic equipment which American Intelligence officers were known to be using during their travels inside the Soviet Union. As early as the beginning of 1954, the American Department had been given authorization from the Central Committee of the Communist Party to steal this equipment from the Americans, provided that the success of such an operation was assured. Before his transfer to the Tourist Department in 1955, NOSENKO himself had helped to develop plans for the operation and had even arranged an abortive attempt to steal the equipment from an attache at a railroad station outside Moscow. While BENSON, MULE, and STROUD were on one of their trips (after NOSENKO's transfer) it was learned that they had the equipment with them, and the KGB decided to take it from them in Stalingrad. To carry out the operation, Lieutenant General P.V. FEDOTOV, then Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, and A.M. GORBATENKO, Chief of the American Department, flew with other personnel from the American Department to Stalingrad. The hotel rooms of BENSON, STROUD and MULE were watched constantly from a visual observation post, and it was noted that they never ate in the hotel restaurant but always in their rooms. It was also noted that the apparatus was placed under a pillow before they began to eat. While they were seated at the table having dinner, therefore, the KGB officers suddenly entered the room and seized the equipment. In order to partially cover the illegality of this act, it was decided to make a show of expelling BENSON, MULE and STROUD from the Soviet Union, and this was done via the persona non grata action.

According to information from other sources, the equipment was seized from BENSON, MULE, and STROUD on 5 May 1955, and the three were declared persona non grata on 7 May (a month before NOSENKO claimed to have transferred to the Tourist Department).* When the 7 May date was given to NOSENKO during the February 1965 interrogations, he replied that the operation was handled at a higher level, that he did not directly participate in it, but that he had been involved in the earlier planning to seize the equipment. It was pointed out to him that he had always said he was in the Tourist Department at the time of this operation, and that he had consistently said that he transferred from the American to the Tourist Department in June 1955. NOSENKO shrugged, but offered no comment.

*The [redacted] source Kaarlo R. TUOMI, who served in the United States as a GRU Illegal from 1958 to 1963, reported to CIA in 1964 that while working as a KGB informant in Kirov in the early 1950's, he was targeted against three U.S. Military Attaches travelling on a train. TUOMI believed that he might have contributed information leading to the three Americans (as he later read in the Soviet press) being declared persona non grata. It would appear that TUOMI's targets were BENSON, MULE, and STROUD.

(ix) CARDELLA

NOSENKO said that in 1954 and 1955 there was an administrative officer in the Embassy by the name of James CARDELLA. The KGB had no interesting or unusual information concerning CARDELLA from any source, and NOSENKO could say nothing more about him.

CIA files show that Chief Warrant Officer CARDELLA served in Moscow from September 1953 until June 1955. Other than the fact that a microphone was discovered in CARDELLA's Moscow Embassy office in 1964, no significant collateral information concerning him is available.

(x) VAN LAETHEM

NOSENKO identified George VAN LAETHEM as an Assistant Air Attache at the U.S. Embassy against whom an operation was attempted in 1953 or 1954. He said that during this period a Russian actress, Alla LARIONOVA, was placed on a train going from Berlin to Moscow with the mission of striking up an acquaintance with VAN LAETHEM which could be followed up in Moscow. She succeeded in meeting him and gave him her address and telephone number. Although she was certain that she would hear from him, he never did call her in Moscow. NOSENKO said that he had heard about this from P.F. PANKRATOV, the case officer handling LARIONOVA. He added that CHURANOV was the case officer responsible for VAN LAETHEM, as he was for all members of the Air Attache's office at that time. NOSENKO knew of no other interest or activity concerning VAN LAETHEM.

CIA records show that VAN LAETHEM was not an Assistant Air Attache but an Assistant Army Attache, serving in Moscow from March 1951 to March 1953.* As cryptographic security officer and officer in charge of the Embassy code room, he had supervisory responsibility for the military code clerks and mechanics, including Dayle SMITH, and he was on fairly close personal terms with Sergeant Roy RHODES until the latter's departure from Moscow in January 1953; VAN LAETHEM's duties also carried responsibility for sensitive electronic activities in the Embassy.** He was again in Moscow from 19 March to 19 May 1955 (at a time when NOSENKO claims to have been the KGB case officer for U.S. Army Attaches). Although this trip was always intended to be only a TDY, it was represented to the Soviets as a PCS Assistant Army Attache assignment because of the extremely sensitive nature of his business there. He was project officer for the entire electronics program at the Embassy, and went to Moscow to review the operations including the planned use of the new electronic equipment which was seized from BENSON, MULE, and STROUD in Stalingrad in May 1955 (see above).

* Although VAN LAETHEM completed his two-year tour in Moscow in March 1953, just at the time NOSENKO said he entered the KGB, he was succeeded in his post by Walter MULE, for whom NOSENKO has claimed full responsibility. Thus, the fact of his position as Assistant Army Attache and MULE's predecessor would presumably be available to NOSENKO.

** Each time NOSENKO gave CIA the story of the recruitment of "ANDREY" in the June 1962 meetings, he related it to Roy RHODES. Each reference to Roy RHODES was followed by a statement that it was through RHODES that the KGB learned of the existence of special electronic equipment in the U.S. Embassy. RHODES had no access to such information.

D. June 1955 to January 1960 (Tourist Department)

1. Introduction

By his account NOSENKO served in the American-Canadian-British Section of the Tourist Department,* KGB Second Chief Directorate, from June 1955 (shortly after the department was created to operate with and against foreign travellers in the USSR) until his transfer to another department in that directorate in January 1960. He was a case officer until appointed Deputy Chief of the Section about June 1958. In statements made prior to April 1966, NOSENKO claimed to have been twice promoted during this four and one-half year period--to captain in July 1956 and to major in August or September 1959--but in a signed statement of April 1966 he said he remained a captain from 1956 until his defection.

NOSENKO has described his personal and direct participation in the section's activities as consisting of:

-Recruitment of two Soviet nationals as homosexual agents,** with NOSENKO their handler from the outset until they were dropped in 1962 or 1963.

-Recruitment and handling of Soviets as agents targeted against American tourists; their number varied from eight to 14 and many were employed by Inturist.

-Operations involving 14 foreigners who visited the USSR for various lengths of time.

-Recruitment and handling of the American Express Company representative in Moscow, whom NOSENKO continued to meet following his reassignment in January 1960.

-Decision in October 1959 that Lee Harvey OSWALD was of no operational interest to the KGB, and subsequent participation in the KGB investigation of OSWALD's activities in the USSR.

Each of these categories is discussed separately below.

2. Soviet Homosexual Agents

Because he had been seen meeting a foreigner in a public lavatory in Moscow, NOSENKO said, the KGB concluded that A.I. VOLKOV might be a homosexual and hence of some operational value. The KGB therefore mounted an operation which verified this possibility in 1957: A homosexual agent of the Moscow Criminal Investigations Department provoked VOLKOV into a compromising situation. Then VOLKOV, who had previously been a KGB agent but was at this time deactivated, was called to KGB Headquarters where, after NOSENKO interrogated him, he admitted his homosexuality and agreed to

*These components are also known as the First Section and Seventh Department, respectively.

**This term refers to agents whose homosexuality is exploited by the KGB against certain male targets.

NOSENKO's proposal to work for the KGB among homosexuals. VOLKOV helped NOSENKO the following year to recruit a homosexual acquaintance, Aleksey (patronymic not recalled) YEFREMOV. The two agents subsequently worked as a team against foreigners under NOSENKO's direction; in addition to specific targets, they had the general assignment of associating with foreign visitors in Moscow for the purpose of spotting possible homosexuals. NOSENKO described on 12 June 1962 his use of these agents: "Although I am a chief of section there I have all sorts of agents. I have a good agent apparatus. I have beautiful girls, beautiful girls, whom I can use as I like--anything you want. I have homosexuals, pederasts, and, in particular, I have one special pair. I am afraid they are known to both you and the British. I permitted this pair to work in general [without specific assignments]. I send them out to look on their own. I give them money and tell them to go out. 'Stroll about. Here are theater tickets. Look around, but only Americans. Look for American pederasts.' They are a couple, that is, they love each other. They are able to do anything desired, either active or passive, anything. They call me at night: 'Yuriy Ivanovich. There is a mister so-and-so here. He wants to go to bed with us.' I say: 'Well, let him. We'll talk about it tomorrow.' So the next day they go to a special hotel room. We make photographs. Then we think about what he represents. Is he worth it? Then, as Chief, I recommend that he be recruited or not--depending on his position, what he can give, what he can tell. If he can give something, I say: 'Well, let's have a go [igrat]'. After this, I speak to these boys: 'Well, go to bed with him again, one or both of you, as you wish. Do whatever is wanted.' All this is seen [observed by the KGB]. The [hotel] administrator enters. 'What are you doing?' The administrator calls the Militia. An akt is drawn up. 'Well, you are a foreigner. This is not our business. We don't know what to do with you.' Then the Chief arrives: 'What's up. Aha, I see.' Well, then a conversation begins: 'Listen, what shall we do? Pederasty is punishable by three to five years and now, on the basis of recent legislation, by up to eight. Understand, if your friends find out that you are a pederast--and how can they help but find out?..."

When NOSENKO moved from the Tourist Department to the Second Chief Directorate's American Department in January 1960, he took VOLKOV and YEFREMOV with him. They were never used against targets in the U.S. Embassy, but, NOSENKO said, the Tourist Department "used to call me on homosexual prospects." VOLKOV and YEFREMOV continued as active KGB agents until some time in 1960 or 1961, after which they could not be used further since they had become too well known, and NOSENKO finally retired their files to KGB archives in 1962 or 1963. The last operation in which these two agents participated was during January 1962.

During interrogation on these agents, NOSENKO has been unable to tell where they lived in Moscow, their family situation, or other such details. He said that he never met either in a safehouse (always on the street) and never met either of them alone, without the other being present.

NOSENKO has described eleven KGB approaches to Americans based on compromising evidence obtained with the assistance of VOLKOV and/or YEFREMOV and several other cases in which Americans were suspected of being homosexuals on the basis of the evaluation of these two. Additionally, [redacted] at least six Americans, not reported on by NOSENKO, have had contacts with one or both of these agents in Moscow. [redacted]

With one or possibly two exceptions, all the contacts of VOLKOV and YEFREMOV reported by NOSENKO or other sources took place during the period from April to November 1959. The known exception was the KGB approach to W.E. JOHNSON in January 1962;* the possible exception was the contact with the American psychiatrist, which took place in 1959 or early 1960 but cannot be dated precisely. Finally, NOSENKO has described the contacts between VOLKOV, YEFREMOV, and the American Robert BARRETT in the summer of 1959 but does not know of their contacts in the summer of 1961, shortly before BARRETT was approached on the basis of compromising information obtained in 1959.**

3. Other Soviet Agents

The Tourist Department, just established when NOSENKO was transferred to it in mid-1955, had no agent network for operations against American and British tourists. Consequently, NOSENKO said, he and the other case officers had to "start from the beginning."

As a first step, NOSENKO was introduced by a fellow officer to a number of "trusted persons" in Inturist; these were not agents, he explained, but "just persons known to the KGB so that a KGB man could approach one of them with questions about somebody or something." NOSENKO began to collect information on these individuals and others with the aim of formalizing their recruitment; by the end of 1955, he estimated, he had a network of about eight agents, all of them Inturist interpreters. During the following four years, the number of agents whom NOSENKO handled varied: Some would be transferred from one case officer to another, agents would leave Inturist, and "things were sort of changing all the time, back and forth." In 1956, NOSENKO said, he had about ten agents, in 1957 there were about 12, in 1958 about eight, and at the end of 1959 (when he was preparing to return to the American Department) he had approximately 12 to 14. NOSENKO has provided information on five of these agents, all of whom he says he recruited from within Inturist during 1955. These were:

-Larissa SOBOROVA: An Inturist interpreter and one of the first Inturist agents recruited by NOSENKO. SOBOROVA was NOSENKO's agent until 1959 (when she married and retired) and reported to him on all foreigners with whom she worked as an interpreter. She worked with NOSENKO in the operation

*See Part V.F.4

**See Part V.D.4.a.

against [REDACTED] in the summer of 1957.* NOSENKO reported specifically on her possible sexual involvement with two other tourists, one American and the other British, during 1957-1959. NOSENKO mentioned at one point that he "even told Larissa about his last name."

- Vladimir MUROMTSEV: KGB cryptonym "LEBEDEV," recruited in 1955. (NOSENKO has also said that MUROMTSEV had been a Second Chief Directorate agent "since 1958.") MUROMTSEV was called into the Army in about 1959 and was sent to some Soviet Air Force academy in Central Asia, where he worked as an interpreter for Syrian students studying there. During this period, his file was held by the local KGB in Central Asia. Later he returned to Moscow and was reactivated by the Second Chief Directorate.

- Nikolay ROGOV: KGB cryptonym "Ozero," recruited in 1955. ROGOV had formerly been a "confidential contact" of the KGB. He worked in the central office of Inturist which assigned interpreters to British and American citizens visiting the Soviet Union.

- Natalya SHULGINA: Recruited by NOSENKO in 1955, as Inturist interpreter. Shown SHULGINA's photograph on 6 February 1964, NOSENKO failed to recognize it; when he was given her name, however, he said that this was a Second Chief Directorate agent, on whom Boris BELITSKIY had reported to CIA.** NOSENKO's only other statement on SHULGINA was made on 17 April 1964, when discussing the agents he acquired in 1955. He said: "So, for example, I had this SOBOROVA, then I had MUROMTSEV. I recruited him. Who else? Natalya SHULGINA, KUNGAROVA. Well, anyway, during this short period, during 1955 until the end of '55, I had about eight people, all of them translators from Inturist." NOSENKO therefore said he handled SHULGINA and implied that he recruited her. (Information from other sources indicates that SHULGINA worked for two years as secretary/interpreter for the NBC correspondent in Moscow, Irving R. LEVINE, who arrived in the Soviet Union in July 1955. Although there is no evidence that SHULGINA was directly involved, the KGB attempted to recruit LEVINE in November 1955. She has travelled abroad twice, the first time to Paris in 1956 and the second time as an interpreter at the Brussels Fair in the summer of 1958. As NOSENKO indicated, BELITSKIY reported on SHULGINA, who he said was a close friend. BELITSKIY said that she was directly involved, probably as the principal, in a sexual entrapment operation, in the recruitment of a member of the British Parliament. BELITSKIY reported to CIA on SHULGINA in October 1962; NOSENKO said his last connection with the BELITSKIY case was in Geneva in the spring of 1962.)

- Tamara KUNGAROVA: Inturist interpreter recruited in 1955 (according to NOSENKO's statement in April 1964 - see above on SHULGINA). In October 1964, NOSENKO said she was transferred as an agent to the Tourist Department by the British

* [REDACTED] are discussed in Part V.D.4.d.

**NOSENKO reported in 1962 that the KGB controlled BELITSKIY, a source of CIA (see Part VI.D.6.).

Commonwealth Department in 1957 or the beginning of 1958. In 1957 or 1959 she was involved in a sexual compromise operation against an American professor, which did not reach the point of a recruitment approach. Between 1957 or 1958 and 1960 she was working against an American tourist named Philip NIELSEN who was suspected of connection with CIA and who was under study for recruitment by the KGB.* KUNGAROVA later married NIELSEN and the two lived in England. The KGB was still interested in NIELSEN at the time NOSENKO left the Tourist Department, but NOSENKO believed there was no recruitment. Mrs. NIELSEN died in 1965.

Besides those in Inturist, NOSENKO has named several other agents whom he recruited or was given while in the Tourist Department. These included the following:

-Aleksey A. DMITRIYEV: KGB cryptonym "TOMO," a candidate member of the Academy of Sciences USSR and a specialist on Japan and Thailand. DMITRIYEV speaks Japanese and English and worked at the Japanese exhibition in Moscow. NOSENKO did not indicate how DMITRIYEV was used operationally or how he was connected with the American-Canadian-British target.

-(fnu) IVANOV: A lawyer employed by the Institute of Foreign Trade in Moscow. NOSENKO did not personally recruit this agent. IVANOV moved to Moscow from the Baltic area and his previous handlers there notified the Center, suggesting that the agent might be of use in the capital. NOSENKO contacted IVANOV and later turned him over to the British Commonwealth Department of the Second Chief Directorate which, NOSENKO believed, "planted him in the British Trade Mission or something like that."

-Marina RYTOVA: KGB cryptonym "KRYMOVA," born about 1923 or 1924 and educated at the Military Institute of Foreign Languages, a special school which also had Communist students from foreign countries. There she studied military subjects as well as foreign languages. She speaks English and Greek well. NOSENKO could not recall who recruited her, but she was turned over to him by I.A. KONSTANTINOV, a Tourist Department case officer, in 1956 or 1957. At that time she was working as an interpreter at the Russian Permanent Exhibit in Moscow and continued in this job until about 1960, when she became an instructor in the Greek language school of the Institute of International Relations. She reported to NOSENKO any information which she obtained on foreign delegates or foreign tourists who visited the Exhibit in Moscow. As she was often invited by the Ministry of Agriculture to interpret during meetings between Soviet officials and delegates from America, England, and Greece, she also reported this information to NOSENKO. RYTOVA served several times as an interpreter for KHRUSHCHEV and once participated in a conversation he had with Iowa farmer GARST. In 1959 or 1960 she was sent as interpreter with a small delegation which visited GARST's farm in the United States and was used by the KGB Legal Residency in Washington,



D.C., to report on observations enroute and while there. RYTOVA is married to a man who works in one of the military offices in Moscow and is a captain or a major. They have one daughter, approximately 14 years old.

-Yevgeniya ("Jane") DANKO: KGB cryptonym "OKSANA." She worked in the American Express Company office in Moscow for Arsens FRIPPEL and later for FRIPPEL's successor, Michael JELISAVCIC.* DANKO was handled by I.A. KONSTANTINOV from about 1955 to 1957 and was then turned over to NOSENKO. She reported on JELISAVCIC, who was not approached, according to NOSENKO.

4. Operations with Foreign Visitors

NOSENKO said he participated in 14 operations with foreign visitors to the USSR while a member of the American-Canadian Section of the Tourist Department. Nine of these operations resulted in recruitments (excluding one who later was recruited by another element of the KGB, but including another whom NOSENKO classified as a borderline case). Of the remaining five operations which did not end with a recruitment, no approach was contemplated by the KGB in one case, one target rejected NOSENKO's proposal, the KGB was unable to obtain compromising material for an approach to a third, and for political reasons the KGB decided against approaching the final two.

Although the information from NOSENKO on the timing of these operations does not always agree with that from other sources, these cases can be grouped chronologically as follows: 1955 - one; 1956 - one; 1957 - three; 1958 - two; and 1959 - seven. The operations in 1955, 1956 and, with one exception, 1959 were homosexual provocations. The recruitment of Arsene FRIPPEL in 1959 was based on heterosexual compromise.

These fourteen operations are summarized briefly below in the approximate order in which the cases began. For each case, NOSENKO's information is followed by a summary of the results of CIA investigations. The description of the BURGI case is more detailed than the others, for reasons indicated in the text.

a. Attempted Entrapment of MALIA (1955)

NOSENKO's Information: Martin MALIA, a graduate student, spent about four months in the USSR in 1955 and was suspected of having connections with American Intelligence. Toward the end of his stay, while under surveillance, MALIA was observed in contact with a Soviet citizen believed to be a homosexual. The Soviet was detained by the KGB, and NOSENKO eventually obtained a confession that he had had homosexual relations with MALIA. After NOSENKO had arranged for the Soviet to introduce MALIA to a KGB homosexual agent, the latter enticed MALIA to a specially equipped hotel room in Moscow; NOSENKO was on the scene (but not directly in touch with MALIA) when the introductions were made in a

*See Part V.D.5. for further details on FRIPPEL and JELISAVCIC.

Moscow restaurant, and from an observation point in a neighboring hotel room he watched the KGB agent and MALIA having relations. With MALIA insisting on the lights being turned off, however, it was impossible to obtain compromising photographs (the KGB did not yet have infra-red photographic equipment, NOSENKO said) and therefore no recruitment approach was made to MALIA. During this and a later trip to Moscow in 1961, MALIA was "very cautious," and the KGB never again succeeded in exploiting MALIA's homosexuality for a recruitment approach.

Investigation Results: MALIA, a U.S. Navy intelligence officer during World War II, has visited the Soviet Union in 1955 and twice in 1962. While buying books for the Library of Congress and several universities in 1955, MALIA travelled over 10,000 miles throughout the USSR, which was sufficiently unusual at the time to attract press publicity. In 1955 and 1962 he had contacts with dissident Soviet citizens and clandestinely brought to the West literature for publishing abroad. In December 1963 MALIA was the subject of an attack in the Soviet press which charged that during 1962 he had "spent his time in Moscow looking for dissension in the ranks of young intellectuals at drunken debauches."

In the spring of 1963 he claimed to have had no involvements with blackmarketeers, homosexuals, or females inside the Soviet Union at any time. He made a similar statement to [REDACTED] in October 1963. MALIA has not been interviewed in connection with NOSENKO's information about him.

b. Recruitment of BURG I (1956)

NOSENKO's Information: At the first meeting in 1962 and despite his stated fear for his own security and his determination to discuss only the two leads he wished to sell CIA, NOSENKO described his recruitment of Yale Professor Richard BURG I on the basis of a homosexual provocation operation which began in Moscow and culminated with an approach in Kiev in June 1956. NOSENKO reported that he received a letter of commendation (blagodarnost') and a bonus of one month's pay for this recruitment, but in 1966 he retracted this claim. The BURG I case was the first operation in which NOSENKO had direct contact with a foreign target of the KGB, and NOSENKO said he counted it as a turning point in his personal and professional life: It was with this successful operation, NOSENKO stated, that he "began to grow" from a spoiled playboy into a responsible and effective counter-intelligence officer. The BURG I operation was the first recruitment carried out by the Tourist Department after it was created in 1955, according to NOSENKO. In 1964 NOSENKO reported for the first time that his superior, A.S. KOZLOV, Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, had also taken part in this operation, but that he, NOSENKO, was the responsible case officer. In August 1965, when asked who had recruited BURG I, NOSENKO replied: "KOZLOV and NOSENKO." Asked who recruited him first, NOSENKO said: "KOZLOV, naturally. He was the Deputy Chief of the Department. The collection of the materials [in preparation for the approach] was in the hands of Case Officer NOSENKO." Because of the personal and general significance ascribed to this operation by NOSENKO, it is discussed in detail here:

In August 1965 NOSENKO reported that at the time of BURGI's arrival in the USSR, his file contained a copy of his visa application (anketa), "maybe" an excerpt from a cable sent by the Soviet Embassy in the United States saying that a visa had been granted, a routine note from Inturist giving BURGI's anticipated date of arrival and his itinerary inside the Soviet Union, and the results of traces of the general KGB Archives and of the First Chief Directorate Archives. NOSENKO himself ran the traces, which proved to be negative; there was no information on record concerning BURGI, and since no other names were mentioned in the material available on BURGI, no other traces were made. The KGB interest in BURGI derived exclusively from the fact that he was a professor of Slavic studies and therefore had contact with students who might some day work for the U.S. State Department, American Intelligence, and other target organizations. NOSENKO did not recall who first suggested an attempt to recruit him.

When BURGI arrived in the Soviet Union, he came in contact with a number of KGB agents, and their reports were placed in the unofficial file maintained by NOSENKO.* NOSENKO could not recall in 1965 how many such agents there may have been, their names, or what they might have reported concerning BURGI. (BURGI had an Inturist interpreter but NOSENKO did not know whether he was a KGB agent.) From some source, name forgotten by NOSENKO, the KGB obtained indications that BURGI was a homosexual, and it was decided to try to obtain the grounds for recruitment by homosexual compromise. NOSENKO therefore approached Yu.A. LOPUKHOV, an officer of the British Department who handled the homosexual agent Viktor BELANOVSKIY, and asked permission to use his agent in setting up the compromise. After permission had been received to mount an operation on this basis, LOPUKHOV and NOSENKO met with BELANOVSKIY and instructed him to make BURGI's acquaintance in a hotel dining room. The compromise proceeded according to plan: BELANOVSKIY met BURGI, the fact of mutual homosexuality was recognized, and BURGI was invited to BELANOVSKIY's hotel room where homosexual acts took place and photographs were made. NOSENKO was in the adjoining room and directed the compromise. He did not meet BURGI at this point, however,

As the result of NOSENKO's special request, the compromising photographs were ready by the following day. A report of the compromise and a request for permission to attempt recruitment were then submitted to NOSENKO's superiors. The request came back with the approving signatures of O.M. GRIBANOV and A.S. FEKLISOV, the Chief of the American Department of the First Chief Directorate, which had expressed interest in using BURGI in the United States. BURGI's itinerary called for him to fly from Moscow to Kiev a short while after this episode and, having called the Kiev KGB with instructions, NOSENKO and KOZLOV flew there the day before to prepare the operation. BURGI arrived the next morning and was met at the airport by (fnu) KHODAKOVSKIY, an officer of the Second Directorate in Kiev who operated under Inturist

*NOSENKO explained that no official files were kept on tourists until 1960--only "collections of materials."


cover. NOSENKO was unable to recall how the car was acquired, whether it was a KGB or Inturist vehicle, who the driver was, whether he was in the employ of the local KGB, or other details.


In accordance with the operational plan, the local KGB officer told BURGI enroute to the city that all the hotels in Kiev were full at the moment because of various conferences, but that Inturist had arranged for him to stay for about a day in a private apartment in the center of town; he would be moved to a hotel as soon as possible. When the car arrived at the apartment building on Kreshchatik Ulitsa in Kiev, NOSENKO, KOZLOV, V.S. PETRENKO, a local KGB officer, and (fnu) RASTYKAITE, a woman housekeeper, were waiting for them. NOSENKO could not remember how or whether he introduced himself to BURGI. The recruitment conversation, he said, was handled by "KOZLOV-NOSENKO," but NOSENKO had forgotten by 1965 who said what: "I don't remember what I talked about and I don't remember what KOZLOV talked about. Many things were discussed. It started with how he liked his stay in the Soviet Union... Then we slowly proceeded to say how unfortunate it was that information had been received about his conduct in Moscow. We told him that his homosexual activities were known, that this was punishable under Soviet law according to article so-and-so of the criminal code, etc., that he was not a diplomat, had no diplomatic immunity, that he could be taken to court according to the Soviet law... Well, he was scared, confused, upset, and felt uncomfortable. Then we slowly proceeded to say that all that could be smoothed out, but, you understand, the basis was prepared for the man to say: 'All right, I agree to help.'... We showed him the pictures. He was embarrassed of course--he was naked. Then we prepared the basis: 'You have a noble task. You teach; you have students; the students might become future specialists on Russia or might work as diplomats, etc., but many of these students could be used by intelligence. They might be sent somewhere with special tasks. Maybe you will tell us who among the students is preparing for government service, how they are distributed, etc.'... During the first conversation everything was made completely clear... He was not at all willing to help or work for Soviet Intelligence. He was told that he must understand that in this case 'helping Soviet Intelligence' was a very broad term. I remember that I told him: 'Understand, nobody is going to ask you that you help our friends over there, or me, if I should be there, or that you do anything bad or conduct any kind of subversive activities, that you organize explosions or murder.' After the Soviet Union, he was supposed to go to Italy, to visit the Russicum of the Vatican, and here KOZLOV grabbed the subject and began to ask questions about this school. He told us a bit about the Russicum and we asked him to write about it and he wrote down some names of the professors who teach Russian subjects..." According to NOSENKO, the discussion lasted about five hours; at its end, BURGI signed a short statement that he agreed "to assist the organs of Soviet Intelligence." NOSENKO first said that it was he who took this statement from BURGI but later said he could not remember whether he or KOZLOV did this. BURGI was then taken to a hotel.

This was the first time NOSENKO met BURGI. Following the recruitment, he moved into the same hotel, a floor above BURGI, and for the remainder of BURGI's stay in Kiev became his constant companion and guide. An attempt was made "to smooth out all the dirty business that had been brought up during the recruitment talk." NOSENKO took BURGI to an old cathedral in Kiev; with KOZLOV and PETRENKO they visited a kolkhoz and the writer SHEVCHENKO's grave in nearby Kaniv. The subject of homosexuality was not raised again. From Kiev, BURGI went directly to the West, without returning to Moscow. Before the approach, NOSENKO had visited the American Department of the First Chief Directorate and had arranged with its chief, FEKLISOV, for a re-contact plan in New York City should BURGI be recruited. Before he left BURGI was briefed on these arrangements, which called for a first meeting in the New York Public Library. BURGI was given a recognition signal and a KGB cryptonym, but the latter was not discussed with him.


About five days after returning to Moscow, NOSENKO turned over all his materials on the BURGI operation to the First Chief Directorate. Somewhat later Sergey GUSKOV, Chief of the American-Canadian-British Tourist Section, KOZLOV, and NOSENKO visited FEKLISOV in the First Chief Directorate and expressed an interest in further developments in the case. FEKLISOV told them that BURGI had arrived for his first meeting, but the KGB had not established contact; the first meeting in New York City took place the second or third time BURGI appeared and the New York Legal Residency continued to meet with him until the Revolution in Hungary in late 1956. NOSENKO later heard from someone in the American Department, First Chief Directorate that the case was closed. For their roles in this first recruitment of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO said in 1965, he and KOZLOV received letters of commendation and bonuses of one month's pay by order of KGB Chairman SEROV; PETRENKO was given a letter of commendation and half a month's salary; and even RASTYKAITE, the housekeeper, got a commendation. In October 1966, however, NOSENKO said his only KGB award was for his longevity of service.


Investigation Results: BURGI was first interviewed on 22 November 1957 concerning his recruitment by the KGB.





In August 1965, ROSENKO visited Moscow.





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BUREAU then continued to describe the remainder of his stay in Kiev (generally agreeing with NOSENKO's account).


c. Approach to [REDACTED] (1957)

NOSENKO's information: NOSENKO made an unsuccessful recruitment approach in 1957 to [REDACTED] on the basis of [REDACTED] interest in continuing his commercial activities in the USSR. Originally the responsible case officer had been A. I. VERENIKIN of the Sixth Section of the Tourist Department; this section was then responsible for operations against foreign seamen. Since VERENIKIN spoke no German and [REDACTED] was known to speak English, NOSENKO was selected to make the approach because he "knew English a little." When asked why a German-speaking KGB case officer was not used, NOSENKO answered: "The higher-ups said 'go work on this case,' and that was all." After being rebuffed by [REDACTED] NOSENKO saw him several more times during the 1957 visit to Moscow, but when NOSENKO attempted to renew contact upon [REDACTED] return to the Soviet Union in 1958, the latter refused to see him.

Investigation Results: [REDACTED] was interviewed [REDACTED] on 19 July 1965, and, while generally uncooperative, described a "mild approach" in Moscow during 1956 or 1957 which may be the one described by NOSENKO. (He was not questioned on the identities of the Soviets involved.)

[redacted] continues to have extensive business contacts with Soviet commercial representatives in West Germany and was recently reported to have negotiated a sizable shipping contract with the Soviet Union shortly after a visit to the USSR. His principal contact at [redacted]

d. [redacted]



c. Recruitment of (name [redacted])


NOSENKO's information: In 1957 or 1958 [redacted] visited the Soviet Union and an attempt was made to recruit him. A Second Chief Directorate officer, S.A. ARKHIFOV, made [redacted] acquaintance and handled the entire operation against him, but NOSENKO himself played a role. It had somehow been determined that [redacted] had a fondness for girls. NOSENKO therefore presented himself to him, using the name "SVIRNOV" or "SERGEYEV" and posing as a painter, and told [redacted] that he could find women for him. A party was arranged, with a KGB agent as [redacted]

*See Part V.D.8 for more discussion of this point.

**This incident is described more fully in Part III.A.


date and a Second Chief Directorate secretary as NOSENKO's. Late in the evening NOSENKO and his date excused themselves, and [redacted] had sexual relations with the female agent. Photographs of the scene were taken by the KGB. When NOSENKO and [redacted] saw one another the next day, [redacted] announced that he had some articles, cameras and the like, that he want to sell on the black market. NOSENKO offered to arrange the sale and took [redacted] to a dingy section of Moscow. As they arrived before a small house, NOSENKO asked [redacted] to give him the things to be sold. At this moment a man officer posing as a militiaman approached and arrested the two for blackmarketeering. At the Militia station, [redacted] was recruited by K.N. DUBAS, then Chief of the Tourist department, under threat of imprisonment. (It was DUBAS who had had the photographs taken the previous evening.) There was no further contact with [redacted] after he left the USSR, however, because on his return to Oslo he published an article in which he described his experiences, "but not all of them."

Investigation Results:



f. Recruitment of HARRIS. (1958)


NOSENKO's Information: NOSENKO in 1958 recruited Gisella HARRIS, an employee of the American Express Company in Salt Lake City, based on her romantic and sexual involvement with a Soviet citizen. The Soviet told HARRIS that he was in trouble with Soviet authorities and persuaded her to accompany him to the police. HARRIS agreed to meet and cooperate with the Soviets if they established contact with her in Salt Lake City, but the case was turned over to the First Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO was unaware of any further contact with her.



g. Compromise of KRAFT (1958)

NOSENKO's Information: Virgil KRAFT, a clergyman from the Chicago area, visited the Soviet Union as a tourist in 1957 or 1958, and NOSENKO was assigned to be the responsible case officer. During an earlier trip to the USSR, the KGB had learned, KRAFT had been intimate with a Soviet woman. NOSENKO arranged for her to come to Moscow from Kiev, where she was living in 1957 or 1958, in order to compromise KRAFT. Although his wife was accompanying him in Moscow, KRAFT and the Soviet woman were intimate in the latter's room in the Grand Hotel. NOSENKO was present at the time supervising the operation. Photographs were taken. Then militiamen broke into the room, finding KRAFT and the woman in the nude; a recruitment approach was then made by DUBAS, the Chief of the Tourist Department. (NOSENKO had been the case officer and had handled the operation thus far, but he took no part in the confrontation or recruitment approach "because DUBAS wanted it for himself.") Although the recruitment was not firm, KRAFT and DUBAS "had an agreement" that nothing would be done about the compromise if KRAFT did not criticize the Soviet Union in lectures about his trip there which he was to give in the United States. DUBAS again contacted KRAFT when he came to Moscow in 1963, and after this his file was turned over to the First Chief Directorate. NOSENKO recalled that the First Chief Directorate "said that KRAFT was not in a good region of the United States. And also it smelled like he had spoken of the approach made to him." Therefore, NOSENKO concluded, he probably had not been contacted in the United States.

Investigation Results:



h. Recruitment of DREW (1959)

NOSENKO's Information: George DREW, an American who visited the Soviet Union in the spring of 1959, had originally been the responsibility of V.M. IVANOV, a case officer of the section dealing with American and Canadian tourists. By chance, however, DREW became involved with NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFRENOV (see Part V.D.2), and they reported this to NOSENKO, then the deputy chief of the section. NOSENKO and IVANOV discussed the case with DUBAS and possibly GUSKOV, the section chief, and NOSENKO flew alone to Leningrad to make the approach. (IVANOV was not considered to be sufficiently experienced and his English was not good.) NOSENKO arranged for DREW to be compromised in a Leningrad hotel room with a homosexual agent of the local KGB handled by a Leningrad officer, (fnu) PERELETOV. Using the name "Mr. SERGEYEV," NOSENKO

alone recruited DREW in an office of the hotel. The KGB First Chief Directorate was interested in DREW's recruitment because he might be able to spot other homosexuals, possibly some in the U.S. Government.

Investigation Results:

i. Recruitment of [REDACTED] (1959)

NOSENKO's Information: In June or possibly July 1959 NOSENKO personally recruited a [REDACTED] subject*, [REDACTED] in a room of the Hotel Astoria in Leningrad after [REDACTED] had been compromised by NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV (see Part V.D.2.). The case was then turned over to Ye. A. TARABRIN, at that time Chief of the British Department of the First Chief Directorate. NOSENKO furnished no more information on this case and did not know its current status, but he believed the KGB has not been in contact with [REDACTED] subsequently.

Investigation Results:

j. Recruitment of [REDACTED] (1959)

NOSENKO's Information: By himself NOSENKO recruited [REDACTED] in the Nova Moskovskaya (now the Bucharest) Hotel in Moscow in July 1959, after [REDACTED] had been compromised by either VOLKOV or YEFREMOV, his homosexual agents (see Part V.D.2.). [REDACTED] is a [REDACTED] citizen and his case was also turned over to TARABRIN.

Investigation Results:

k. Recruitment of [REDACTED] (1959)

NOSENKO's Information: NOSENKO personally and alone recruited the Moscow representative of [REDACTED]

* NOSENKO explained his involvement with British nationals by saying that, after 1958, the Tourist Department had two geographic sections, one dealing with U.S. and UK citizens and the other with tourists from other countries. NOSENKO was involved in the first of these, "so they assigned them to me."

whose name NOSENKO did not recall, at the Hotel Metropol in Moscow during the summer of 1959, possibly in August. The approach was based on homosexual compromise involving NOSENKO's agents VOLKOV and YEFRENOV (see Part V.B.2.).

Investigation Results:

1. Recruitment of MERTENS (1959)

NOSENKO's information: When General MERTENS visited the Soviet Union in July or August 1959, NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFRENOV, as part of their general assignment to become acquainted with homosexuals (see Part V.B.2.), accidentally met MERTENS in Moscow and reported their suspicions to NOSENKO. NOSENKO wrote a report of this contact and requested authority to take compromising photographs in preparation for a recruitment approach, and DUBAS, his chief, then assigned the case to him. (MERTENS had previously been the responsibility of A.A. VELITSKIY, another case officer.) Photographs were taken of homosexual relations between VOLKOV and MERTENS on two separate occasions in Moscow. When MERTENS later travelled to Uzhgorod he was "arrested" by KGB officers (posing as militiamen) while he was engaged in relations with a homosexual agent of operational contact from Odessa. NOSENKO arranged by phone to bring this homosexual to Uzhgorod; he did not recall his name, but supplied CIA with a physical description. (NOSENKO could give no background on the agent and when asked why not, said he "wasn't interested.") MERTENS was then brought before NOSENKO, who recruited him during a session lasting approximately five hours. NOSENKO later travelled with MERTENS when he visited Lvov and Minsk before leaving the USSR. NOSENKO said that he had used the name "George" with MERTENS, but he could not recall what last name he had given him.

Investigation Results:

* NOSENKO explained that the Tourist Department in 1959 had a section dealing with commercial representatives, which was responsible for the [redacted] man, but had asked NOSENKO's section for help. "They said they didn't have any agents or anything and didn't know what to do. So somebody said, 'Well look, why don't you ask the chief of the section? He's a specialist on homosexuals and can arrange everything for you.' So I wound up handling the case, and TARABRIN (of the First Chief Directorate) said I should report to him." In this passage NOSENKO seemed to be referring to himself, although he said he was deputy chief of the section; the chief of the section at that time, M.A. LEONOV, is not known to have participated in operations stemming from the homosexuality of the prospective agents.

m. Compromise of BARRETT (1959)

NOSENKO's Information: Robert BARRETT, a guide at the U.S. Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, had become friendly with the homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV (see Part V.0.2.), whom he met at the fairground. Although BARRETT was not a homosexual, VOLKOV succeeded--after a long period of development--in involving him in homosexual acts, which were photographed by KGB personnel from an adjoining hotel room. As case officer for VOLKOV and YEFREMOV, NOSENKO was responsible for arranging the compromise, was present when the photographs were taken, and has described the occasion in detail. There had been much complaining among the photographic technicians because of the amount of time they were forced to spend waiting for VOLKOV to succeed in his mission, and NOSENKO recalled that he "had to provide them with drinks and treat them well" because "they were a big help" to him in this operation. The photographs were good, but the KGB was unable to use them in 1959 because of a general ban placed by SHELEPIN on the recruitment of U.S. Exhibition guides due to the possible repercussions on KHRUSHCHEV's planned visit to the United States.* (NOSENKO reported, however, that BARRETT was recruited on the basis of the 1959 photography when he returned with another exhibition in 1961. This recruitment was carried out by another component of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO had nothing to do with it.**)

Investigation Results:


* See the discussion of the WILLERFORD case, below, for additional information on SHELEPIN's prohibition.

** In 1961, shortly before his recruitment, BARRETT had ostensibly accidental contact with VOLKOV and YEFREMOV in Moscow. NOSENKO has not mentioned this.

n. Compromise of WILLERFORD

NOSENKO's Information: Frederick WILLERFORD was BARRETT's roommate during the 1959 exhibition in Moscow. Initially he was a target of the local KGB organization for the city of Moscow, which believed WILLERFORD to be an FBI agent and had been collecting materials on him. At the same time and, without knowing of the interest of the local organization, VOLKOV and YEFREMOV had made WILLERFORD's acquaintance, and NOSENKO had arranged for compromising photographs of WILLERFORD and YEFREMOV in a Moscow hotel room. NOSENKO watched WILLERFORD and YEFREMOV through a two-way mirror and was able to describe the scene in detail. It was only after this compromising material had been obtained that NOSENKO learned of the local KGB's interest in WILLERFORD. NOSENKO's department and the local KGB unit then made a joint request for operational approval to approach WILLERFORD, but permission was refused because of the general ban on recruitment approaches at this time. The case file was retained by the Moscow KGB organization, and NOSENKO did not know whether WILLERFORD has been approached subsequently.

Investigation Results:



Note: There is a similarity between NOSENKO's description of the ban on recruitment approaches in 1959, which prevented the Tourist Department from taking advantage of its compromising photography of BARRETT and WILLERFORD, and information provided by the earlier defector, GOLITSYN. GOLITSYN reported that an American employed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, possibly a code clerk, was prepared for recruitment on the basis of homosexual compromise during 1959 and 1960. According to information he said he learned from U.S. Embassy Section case officer G.I. GRYZANOV, the KGB had photographs of the American in various stages of a homosexual act, and there was no question about the recruitment being achieved: "The only question was to where." At the time, however, SHELEPIN had just become Chairman of the KGB and was stressing ideological rather than blackmail recruitments. He was shown these particular photographs but decided that an approach on their basis would be too crude and that another way should be found. Although SHELEPIN did not exclude the use of these photographs some time in the future, according to GOLITSYN, he had reservations against using them at that time for fear of the propaganda repercussions if the attempt should fail and be exposed publicly. GOLITSYN did not know whether the recruitment was subsequently carried out. The essential differences between this account and that of NOSENKO are that GOLITSYN implied the ban was in effect at least into 1960 and that GOLITSYN appeared to be speaking of a general prohibition,

whereas NOSENKO related the ban specifically and only to the U.S. Exhibition at Sokolniki Park which ended on 4 September 1959.*

* In speaking of the 1959 U.S. Exhibition at Sokolniki Park, Moscow, [redacted] told [redacted] that both the KGB and the GRU launched an all-out effort to recruit Americans employed at the Exhibition. All officers at GRU Headquarters were assigned to this task, and some were used by the KGB in an attempt to compromise the Americans; V.A. GRUSHA (identified by NOSENKO as a KGB officer specializing in American operations of the First Chief Directorate) directed many of these KGB activities in which GRU personnel were involved. As a result of this endeavor, "more than one American" was recruited, and [redacted] indicated that the technique of compromise--such as "bed pictures"--was employed. When questioned on this subject [redacted] [redacted] reported that to handle the Exhibition, the CPSU Central Committee issued a special directive to form a committee headed by the KGB (GRUSHA was in charge of one section of this committee) and to which the GRU [redacted] [redacted] contributed personnel. Its purposes were two-fold: protective, that is, to prevent propaganda, to disrupt presentations, and to conduct counterintelligence; and to recruit. [redacted] [redacted] and that the GRU did not recruit any Americans at the Exhibition. [redacted]

TOP SECRET

5. The FRIPPEL Case (1959-1963)

As a member of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO in 1959 personally took part in the recruitment of the American Express Company representative in Moscow, Arsene FRIPPEL. He continued to be one of this agent's two KGB handlers after transferring to the American Department in 1960, and FRIPPEL was asked to report on the U.S. Embassy as well as on two Embassy officials in particular. FRIPPEL left the Moscow job in 1961 but returned on trips to the USSR in 1962 and 1963, when NOSENKO met him. The only recruited American whom NOSENKO ever handled as a reporting source, FRIPPEL [REDACTED] the accounts of this operation by NOSENKO and FRIPPEL differ in several details, but both agree that FRIPPEL provided the KGB with no significant information. These two versions are presented separately below.

a. NOSENKO's Information

NOSENKO first mentioned FRIPPEL during the third meeting in Geneva in 1962 while discussing KGB successes in Moscow: "There was another agent [KGB cryptonym] 'ARTUR.' He was not a correspondent. He knew me as George, Yuriy Ivanovich, and my last name as NIKOLAYEV. He was a permanent representative, not in the Embassy, but of the American Express Company in Moscow. FRIPPEL. Arthur FRIPPEL. But he also has the cryptonym 'ARTUR.' He liked drinking, always drank. He was also strongly attracted to women. I provided him with beautiful women... Well, we decided to have a talk with him. Why? What could he give? He now works in the American Express Company [main office in New York City]. A new department has now been organized for the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Democracies. And he is chief of the department... He is no longer in Moscow, but he was here two and a half or three years. We hope that he will return. We are waiting for him to come back. We know that the company wants to send him again, because he knows the Russian language very well. He is, in fact, an emigre, this FRIPPEL. And he also did a good and intelligent job of establishing relations with Inturist. He had very good relationships with ANKULINOV, the Chairman of Inturist, and with other people, both the chiefs and the low-level workers... But, why was FRIPPEL recruited? I was interested in knowing precisely by whom, by name, and how approaches were being made to our delegations [in the United States], i.e., I was interested in him from the point of view of counterintelligence, not intelligence. What kinds of approaches are taking place to our people in America and by whom? This is what interested us. But he didn't know anything. He couldn't say anything. He provided only superficial information, nothing more."

NOSENKO was then asked whether FRIPPEL would not have been useful for coverage of Americans visiting the Soviet Union. He replied that the KGB had already had great success in this by other means and launched into a long description of the methods of covering foreign tourists in the USSR.

NOSENKO was present in the adjoining room when FRIPPEL was compromised by a Soviet female agent, Klara Konstantinovna GORBACHEVA. NOSENKO described the compromising scene in detail as well as the attempt by a KGB technician to take motion pictures of these activities through a two-way mirror, and the confrontation with the militiamen who broke into the room.

TOP SECRET

After returning to Geneva in 1964 and during subsequent debriefings and interrogations, NOSENKO made the following additional statements concerning the FRIPPEL case:

- Although he had personally recruited FRIPPEL, he did not do so alone; Col. V.D. CHELNOKOV, Deputy Chief (and later Chief) of the Tourist Department, was present; he and NOSENKO "carried out the recruitment together" in early September 1959. NOSENKO was, however, FRIPPEL's case officer.

- NOSENKO attributed his involvement in the FRIPPEL recruitment to the following: "In 1958, after 1958, when I became the Deputy Chief of the section, my area of activity was narrowed down. I didn't handle all the tourists at that time. I worked as the Deputy Chief of the section and I had my own little area--for example, the permanent representative of the American Express Company, and besides that I began to collect all the material on all American tourist firms which have anything to do with Inturist and who send tourists to the USSR."

- FRIPPEL never provided any information of value to Soviet tourist operations.

- When NOSENKO began to work in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department in 1960, he took FRIPPEL with him because FRIPPEL was acquainted with some Americans at the Embassy. NOSENKO was asked to question FRIPPEL about the U.S. Embassy and such Embassy officers as George WINTERS and Lewis W. BOWDEN, but FRIPPEL never told NOSENKO anything along this line.*

- FRIPPEL provided no interesting information during NOSENKO's two meetings with him in 1962 and 1963, when FRIPPEL returned to the Soviet Union as a tour guide.

- NOSENKO met "pretty steadily" with FRIPPEL during the period to January 1961, and once NOSENKO and his wife, in company with CHELNOKOV and his wife, had dinner at FRIPPEL's home, where they met Mrs. FRIPPEL. Odette FRIPPEL was unaware of her husband's status as a KGB agent, and therefore NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV used Inturist cover for their acquaintance with FRIPPEL. Although unusual for KGB Second Chief Directorate case officers to visit agents in their homes with wives present, NOSENKO explained that he went because he "was invited," and CHELNOKOV went "because he was also involved in the recruitment."

- First as Deputy Chief of a section of the Tourist Department and later as Deputy Chief and Acting Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, NOSENKO continued to meet with FRIPPEL in Moscow hotels and restaurants. Throughout this period, he was almost invariably accompanied by CHELNOKOV: "Perhaps one time I met with FRIPPEL alone, otherwise it was always with

* See Part V.E.3. regarding NOSENKO's duties in the U.S. Embassy Section.

CHELNOKOV." Usually NOSENKO would arrange these meetings with FRIPPEL at CHELNOKOV's request and the two continued to meet with FRIPPEL, despite his lack of production, because they "kept hoping he would give something." In a different context, but speaking of CHELNOKOV, NOSENKO explained: "You see, never mind if you are a chief or a deputy chief of a department, you must have one, two, or three agents. GRIBANOV insists, so that you don't forget how to work. The Chiefs of the [Second Chief] Directorate do not demand that they have 12 or 13 agents, but they must have two or three. They will have important agents or those in leading positions."

- NOSENKO continued to act as FRIPPEL's case officer after FRIPPEL had left the Soviet Union and NOSENKO had been transferred and promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department. He met twice with FRIPPEL during this latter period when FRIPPEL visited the Soviet Union as a guide with groups of foreign visitors. Both of these meetings were handled by NOSENKO alone, without CHELNOKOV.

- The first meeting took place in the summer of 1962, after NOSENKO had returned to Moscow from Geneva. FRIPPEL had arrived in the Soviet Union as a guide for some American journalists. (NOSENKO was unable to give the composition of the journalist group or to recall where they stayed in Moscow and where else they travelled in the Soviet Union.) NOSENKO contacted him in Moscow to learn what questions the newsmen intended to ask KHRUSHCHEV during a scheduled interview; subsequently NOSENKO acknowledged that standard practice required visiting journalists to submit their intended questions for KHRUSHCHEV in writing to Soviet authorities prior to interviews. After the interview, he recontacted FRIPPEL to learn the reaction of the journalists to their talk with the Soviet leader. NOSENKO could not recall their specific reaction to the KHRUSHCHEV interview but did remember that they were "satisfied." Another reason for contacting FRIPPEL, NOSENKO added in a later discussion, was to learn whether any of the journalists might have joined the group at the last moment in the United States, which might suggest intelligence connections on their part.*

- NOSENKO met FRIPPEL alone for the second and last time during March 1963. Since FRIPPEL was a guide for tourists aboard the ship "Olympia," which stopped for a day in Yalta and Odessa, NOSENKO flew to Odessa from Moscow and accosted FRIPPEL in the lobby of the hotel where the tourists were having dinner. Finally able to get away

* NOSENKO had earlier said on several occasions that one of the things KGB sources in foreign tourist companies abroad were instructed to report to the KGB was any last-minute additions to a tour group to the USSR; this might signify intelligence affiliation.

from his group, FRIPPEL called on NOSENKO in the latter's hotel room, and the two drank and talked. NOSENKO had given FRIPPEL a bottle of vodka as a gift, and FRIPPEL said he wanted to give NOSENKO some whiskey in return. They drove in NOSENKO's car to the port, where NOSENKO waited in the car while FRIPPEL went aboard for the whiskey. (He had invited NOSENKO to visit the ship but could not obtain a pass for him.) When FRIPPEL returned, he brought another American, so NOSENKO had to invent for himself a suitable cover (Inturist) on the spot. The three returned to the hotel and drank some more, everyone getting drunk. During this contact, FRIPPEL reported "nothing of importance," and his most interesting news was that he might again be reassigned to Moscow in December 1963 as the American Express Company representative.*

- On 3 February 1964, while reviewing the CHEREPANOV papers** in Geneva, NOSENKO was asked about the following passage which appeared in the KGB operational plan against BOWDEN, dated February 1960 and signed by V.A. KUSKOV of the U.S. Embassy Section: "He [BOWDEN] showed himself to be an indiscreet person... Ironically, one day as though by chance, he [BOWDEN] blurted out to our agent SHMEPOVA [the fact of] "ARTUR's" affiliation with American Intelligence."*** NOSENKO confirmed that the "ARTUR" of the CHEREPANOV papers was FRIPPEL, but he said he "could not say" whether FRIPPEL had any affiliation with American Intelligence.

* NOSENKO said he later read a report that FRIPPEL had been reassigned, and it was therefore unlikely that his agent would return to Moscow; this report was submitted by V.V. KOSTYRYA (alias VLADIMIROV), a member of the KGB Legal Residency and overtly an Inturist employee in New York City, who was a former Second Chief Directorate colleague of NOSENKO.

** The CHEREPANOV Papers are discussed in detail in Part VI.D.7.c.

*** There is no other report of BOWDEN making such a remark and no basis for it.

While in the Soviet Union in August 1962 and shortly before his recruitment on homosexual grounds (see Part VI.D.2.), the American Spencer ROBERTS was approached on the beach at Sochi by a young Soviet male. ROBERTS and the Soviet, who spoke French, soon became friends, and the Soviet told ROBERTS that he had been used as an agent in several operations against French-speaking foreigners in the USSR. One of these was FRIPPEL, the Soviet said, adding that FRIPPEL was suspected by the KGB of being an American Intelligence agent. NOSENKO, who has provided much detail on the ROBERTS case, did not mention the unidentified Soviet in this context or while discussing FRIPPEL.

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- under investigation in connection with the referring to his 1942 refusal to cooperate with CIA inside the Soviet Union, ROSENKO stated for the first time that "if you had been here, however, you would have made no work in Moscow. You would have been sent to my apartment. It was possible, even with Communists."

b. FRIFEL's Information

FRIFEL, who was the nickname "Arthur," was the American Express Company representative in Moscow from 7 April 1959 to 3 January 1961.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


* See Part III.C., which describes ROSENKO's emphatic refusal during the 1942 meetings to have any contacts with CIA inside the Soviet Union.

[REDACTED]



* FRIPPEL also had social contact with NOSENKO's target John ABIDIAN (see Part V.II.3.J.). NOSENKO said they did not know one another. There is no indication that FRIPPEL was questioned on these contacts by NOSENKO and/or CHELNOKOV.

** In February 1965 NOSENKO denied that this meeting took place. Department of State records show that in November 1961 FRIPPEL applied for a new passport indicating that he intended to depart the United States in February 1962 aboard the "Olympia" for a cruise which would visit the Soviet Union.



* NOSENKO said it was "impossible" that he should have to request permission to board the vessel.

** In February 1965, NOSENKO did not recall having told FRIP-PEL these details of his life and said that, if he had done so, it was while he was drunk.

6. Lee Harvey OSWALD (1959-60 and 1963)

As in the FRIPPEL case, NOSENKO was involved with Lee Harvey OSWALD during both periods of his assignment to the Tourist Department of the Second Chief Directorate (1955-1960 and 1962-1964).^{*} While Deputy Chief of the American-British-Canadian Tourist Section, NOSENKO had a direct hand in the decision in October 1959 that OSWALD was of no operational interest to the KGB and should be returned immediately to the United States. Before President Kennedy's assassination in November 1963, when NOSENKO was again in the Tourist Department as its Deputy Chief, he was present at the time the KGB Second Chief Directorate learned of OSWALD's application to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City to re-enter the USSR. After the assassination, he also played a role in the KGB investigations of OSWALD's activities during residence in the Soviet Union from October 1959 until June 1962.

Collateral information relating to OSWALD's stay in the Soviet Union, and particularly concerning any connections he may have had with Soviet intelligence, is meager and indirect. It derives almost entirely from indications of primary interest by the KGB (among all Soviet Government organs) in every defector to the USSR, and from inferences which may be drawn from certain entries in OSWALD's "Historical Diary" and certain statements made by his wife, Marina, during interviews on behalf of the Warren Commission. After President Kennedy's death, the Soviet Government provided the United States with official documents and letters pertaining to OSWALD's defection to the USSR, his suicide attempt, his marriage, and other events inside the Soviet Union. This information from the Soviet Government generally agrees with the information from NOSENKO. The materials furnished by the Soviet Government make no mention of any Soviet intelligence interest, or lack thereof, in OSWALD.

In this sense NOSENKO's information is unique: It was and remains the only such information available on the 32 months of OSWALD's life in the USSR.** NOSENKO's access to

^{*} For continuity of presentation, both periods of NOSENKO's alleged involvement, 1959-1960 and 1963, are discussed in this part of the paper.

^{**} Independent sources, however, reported on visits by OSWALD to the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City between 29 September and 3 October 1963 and on his (apparently overt) contact with a KGB officer under Consular cover at the Soviet Embassy there. NOSENKO originally said he knew nothing of any such contact. In October 1966 he revised this to say that OSWALD did not have contact with the KGB in Mexico City. NOSENKO explained that he had been sitting in the office of Tourist Department Chief, K.N. DUBAS, when a cable arrived at Moscow Headquarters from the KGB legal Residency in Mexico. The cable, which NOSENKO said he did not personally see, reported that OSWALD had visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City requesting permission to return to the USSR and that he had dealt with Soviet Foreign Ministry personnel only.


information on KGB involvement with OSWALD in 1959, at the time of OSWALD's request to remain in the USSR, derives exclusively from the claimed fact that he, NOSENKO, was Deputy Chief of the KGB Section dealing with American tourists at that time. He said he knew of later developments because of his position as Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department from mid-1962 until 1964. The central theme of NOSENKO's information, as given to CIA and the FBI, is that the KGB determined as early as 16 October 1959, when OSWALD made his first declaration of intent to remain in the USSR, that he was "not normal" and thereupon "washed its hands" of him entirely. According to NOSENKO, the KGB had no operational interest in OSWALD and made no attempt to recruit or even to debrief him during the time he spent in Moscow and Minsk or during his trip to Mexico shortly before killing the President.

a. Statements to the FBI


[REDACTED]



OSWALD attempted to renounce his U.S. citizenship at the American Embassy on 31 October, three days after leaving the hospital. From his diary, the Warren Commission concluded he received permission to reside in the Soviet Union on a year-to-year basis about 1 January 1960, approximately the time he moved to Minsk.



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* NOSENKO later told CIA on one occasion that he "only skimmed the file" and on another that he had it in his possession about 20 minutes. In October 1966 he again said that he read the file and that while doing so he saw a picture of OSWALD for the first time. NOSENKO added that he never met OSWALD personally.

** In October 1966 NOSENKO said he learned that OSWALD was a poor shot from V.V. KRIVOSHEY, a fellow KGB officer who had been told this while visiting Minsk.

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b. Statements to CIA

On the basis of the FBI interviews of NOSENKO and the similar information which he had previously provided CIA, further debriefings were conducted by CIA on 3 and 27 July 1964. New and explanatory information received during these debriefings is presented below.

(i) KGB Interest in OSWALD

Until OSWALD mentioned to the Inturist guide his desire to remain in the Soviet Union, he was treated routinely by the KGB. When OSWALD made his request, this was reported immediately to the Tourist Department, and it was from this moment that the KGB began to pay attention to him. All available materials on him were thereupon collected and examined--the visa application, Inturist reports, interpreters' reports, reports from hotel agents, and the results of a check of KGB Archives. KRUPNOV interviewed the interpreter to whom OSWALD had stated his desire. Although the KGB considered it possible that OSWALD might be an American agent, the KGB did nothing to investigate this possibility as "this would be done after the person is allowed to stay in the Soviet Union." Surveillance of OSWALD was not increased after his request, and OSWALD was not interviewed by the KGB in an attempt to establish his intentions. There was no attempt to debrief OSWALD because "he was not an interesting person and wasn't normal." OSWALD was never questioned on his past nor asked to write an autobiography.** From the

* NOSENKO provided details on this point to CIA (see below) and made a similar statement when asked in 1964 why KGB agent Tamara KUNGAROVA had been permitted to marry an American (her own developmental target) and then emigrate to England; See Part V.D.3.
** When he appeared at the U.S. Embassy to renounce his citizenship on 31 October 1959, OSWALD told the counsellor officer that he had been a radar operator in the Marine Corps and had told a Soviet official that he would give the Soviets any information concerning the Marines and radar which he possessed.

materials and reports immediately available it was decided that something was not quite normal about OSWALD, and the KGB therefore had Inturist tell him that he would have to leave the USSR when his visa expired. OSWALD's suicide attempt supported the Tourist Department's feeling that it had been right in deciding to refuse OSWALD's request for citizenship, particularly as the hospital also reported that he was not normal, and the Tourist Department decided: "We will do nothing; we don't want to know him." Inturist was subsequently told: "'There is no KGB interest in him. Do what you want'... The KGB thought that he was of no interest for the country or for the KGB, that he was not normal, and that he should leave the country." The Tourist Department and the KGB in general thereupon "washed their hands" of this matter.

There was never any operational use of OSWALD nor was there anything in OSWALD's file to indicate that the KGB attempted to debrief him on his past service in the U.S. Marine Corps or other matters; this was because "he is a very little person and also it is felt that he is not normal, so the KGB is afraid to do this with him."* The GRU was not informed of OSWALD's defection. Neither was any attempt made to exploit OSWALD for propaganda purposes in Moscow or in Minsk. In short, there was no intelligence interest or contact with OSWALD after the initial assessment of abnormality.

(ii) KGB Interest in Marina OSWALD

The KGB had no knowledge or interest in Marina (nee PRUSAKOVA) until she and OSWALD applied for permission to register marriage. In fact the KGB did not know that she was a friend of OSWALD until this point, for there was no surveillance on OSWALD to show that he knew her. When the KGB learned of their relationship, checks were made of the Archives of the Minsk KGB as well as neighborhood checks and checks at her place of employment. The people where she lived and worked and went to school considered her a simple girl, not very clever, only fair in her studies, not an active member of the KOMSOMOL. She was a simple "philistine," an uncultured girl more interested in gossip than in anything important. The KGB never considered recruiting her as an informant on OSWALD "because it was considered dangerous to recruit a wife to report on her husband." Nor was it considered to recruit her for use after she arrived in the United States, "because she would tell him and also she would probably tell the Americans, based on the assessment of the type of person she was."

(iii) OSWALD's Marriage and Departure from the USSR

NOSENKO was asked why there were so few difficulties in the way of Marina's marriage to a foreigner and her departure from the Soviet Union. He replied: "The Soviet law allows any Soviet citizen to marry a foreigner. It was

* NOSENKO subsequently defined this KGB reservation about OSWALD as fear of becoming involved with an unstable person.

easy in this case because OSWALD was already living and working in the Soviet Union. It would be more difficult, of course, with tourists or others who are in the Soviet Union only for a short period and want to marry Soviet citizens."* Asked whether it is not unusually difficult for Soviet citizens to leave the Soviet Union, NOSENKO explained: "In this case it was easier because Marina was already married to a foreigner." NOSENKO was next asked what office or level of the Government or Party must make the final decision regarding Marina's marriage to OSWALD. He described the procedure as follows: "They would come to the Regional Registration Office to apply to register their marriage. [There] they will be told that they will have to wait a week or two while they think it over to be sure they want to get married. During this period the necessary checks are conducted. The Regional Office would call the Militia, and the Militia would call the Minsk KGB. The Minsk KGB said that it is all right for them to get married--that the KGB has no objection. But it is the law that allows them to be married. There are no formal approvals necessary."

Concerning the decision to permit the couple to leave the USSR, NOSENKO said on 3 July 1964 that the decision would be made on the local level, in Minsk, and that there is no need to check in Moscow. On 27 July 1964 he corrected this statement to say that, while local authorities make the decision, it must be approved in Moscow by, he thought, the Ministry for the Preservation of Public Order (MOOP).

(iv) OSWALD's Visit to Soviet Embassy in Mexico

Asked whether he had any information on OSWALD's visit to Mexico in September 1963, NOSENKO said that he knew only that OSWALD had applied at the Soviet Embassy there to come to the Soviet Union. The Mexico City Legal Residency of the KGB reported his visit to Headquarters by cable, requesting information; this was the first that the KGB First Chief Directorate had heard of OSWALD. M.I. TURALIN, Deputy Chief of Service Number Two (KGB counterintelligence abroad), thereupon phoned V.K. ALEKSEYEV, Chief of the Sixth Section of the Tourist Department, whom TURALIN knew personally, to learn whether any information was available. NOSENKO believed that ALEKSEYEV then came to V.D. CHELNOKOV or A.G. KOVALENKO to ask about OSWALD, and NOSENKO thought that he himself was present at the time. ALEKSEYEV was given the background on OSWALD, including his suicide attempt and the fact that he was not considered normal, and was told to advise the First Chief Directorate that OSWALD should not be permitted to re-enter the Soviet Union. ALEKSEYEV then telephoned TURALIN to relay this message. NOSENKO did not know to whom OSWALD had spoken at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, and he knew

* By the time OSWALD applied for permission to marry, he had already written the American Embassy in Moscow, through Soviet mails, of his desire to return to the United States. The letter, dated 5 February 1961, was mailed from Minsk and was received by the Embassy in Moscow on 13 February. The OSWALDs were married on 30 April 1961.

of no contacts between OSWALD and Cubans or representatives of the Cuban Government there or elsewhere.

(v) NOSENKO's Comments on Possible KGB Involvement in the Assassination

When first discussing the OSWALD case with NOSENKO on 23 January 1964, a CIA case officer commented: "It is a very unfortunate thing that these prior events occurred in the Soviet Union." (NOSENKO apparently misunderstood the case officer's intent, which was not to imply that the KGB was behind the assassination, but only that the fact of OSWALD's "defection" placed the USSR under probably unfounded suspicion.) NOSENKO's immediate response to this remark was: "That is not correct. This is putting a false color to it. I am your friend. I am completely with you, and I will continue to work with you and against the Soviet Union in all respects. But the truth should always remain the truth. No matter how I may hate anyone, I cannot speak against my convictions, and since I know this case I could unhesitatingly sign off to the fact that the Soviet Union cannot be tied into this in any way. I say this because I know they were frightened of this man [OSWALD] and that everything should have been said to him or that he should have been in any way worked on, in any way [by the KGB] --God forbid!... I know this because I sat on this matter for several days after the tragic matter occurred to the President. To investigate in detail if anything had been done, particularly by the local authorities, that is, by the local KGB in Belorussia..., I had to make a complete investigation and even sent several workers down there to investigate--not trusting official papers. Even without specific orders I had to make a complete investigation on my end of things because this is a serious matter when the head of a government is assassinated... If you want to know, it would be a greater advantage to the Soviet Union if the President were still Kennedy because he was a personage who was a realist and looked at many things in the eye boldly... In the history of any intelligence service there have been assassinations of one kind or another. I can say this: That in our organization, not even speaking of myself, many persons were shocked by the assassination--to think that this should happen in the twentieth century and in, of all places, the most powerful government in the world."

7. Supervisory Responsibilities and Knowledge of Tourist Operations

a. Information from NOSENKO

In June 1958 there was a reorganization within the Tourist Department of the Second Chief Directorate. The Second Section, which had theretofore concerned itself with operational activity against foreign tourists from all countries, was broken down into separate sections; one section dealt with tourists from the United States, Canada, and Great Britain, the other with tourists from Europe, Latin America, and all other countries. NOSENKO said that he was promoted at this time to the position of Deputy Chief of the first of these new sections.

NOSENKO's involvement in at least one major case, Lee Harvey OSWALD, stems entirely from his having held this position. It is also on this basis that he was able to claim awareness of all recruitments from among American tourists from mid-1958 until he returned to the American Department at the beginning of 1960. His knowledge about recruitments is based additionally, he said, on the fact that some time between May and October 1959, during the tourist season, he was ordered by Ye. S. KIRPICHNIKOV, GRIBANOV's secretary, to gather facts for GRIBANOV concerning the use of tourist cover by foreign intelligence organizations during the period from 1955 through 1958. NOSENKO gathered this material from earlier annual reports of the Tourist Department and by talking with various case officers in the department.*

On the basis of his general and supervisory experience in the Tourist Department as well as his research for this paper, NOSENKO had the following to say about Tourist Department operations prior to 1960 (taken from the protocol he signed on this subject on 25 February 1965):

"Operations against tourists were developing slowly during this period and very little was known by the KGB about the use of tourism by American Intelligence at the time I wrote the report in 1959. No agents were definitely uncovered among American tourists during the years 1958 or 1959 and, until 1960, no tourists were 'caught in the act' of mailing letters, servicing deaddrops or contacting agents, except one whose name I remember as McGUIRE. I do

* Questioned on this paper in February 1965, NOSENKO said he did not remember whether he discussed it with GRIBANOV, nor could he recall any examples of the material he included in it, what the paper said about CIA tourist operations, or what other U.S. Intelligence organizations were using tourism as an operational cover in this period. He did remember, however, that it incorporated statistical data on the growth of foreign tourism.

not know any details concerning the operational activity which led to the discovery of McGUIRE's letter mailing.*

"I know of no case in which an American tourist was definitely uncovered as an agent of American Intelligence and thereafter approached for recruitment by the KGB during this period.

"I do not know of any such American tourists who were CIA agents, and who were recruited by the KGB during this period.

"In addition to McGUIRE, the Seventh Department developed suspicions concerning a number of tourists, but didn't learn of any specific intelligence connections. Some were taking pictures, others were disseminating literature. Although various operational measures were taken against them, including vyemka (covert baggage search) and the use of KGB agents, none of these tourists received real operational development."

b. KGB Knowledge from George BLAKE

During the first week of June 1959, a three-day meeting was held in London, England, between representatives of CIA and the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, commonly referred to as MI-6) on the subject of "legal-travel" intelligence operations against the USSR. At the conclusion of this meeting there was drawn up a 19 page document summarizing what had been discussed at the meetings. This summary spelled out CIA operational doctrine pertaining to tourist operations, including agent-spotting techniques, criteria for agent selection, agent assessment, agent training, and tasks to be carried out by tourist agents during the coming (1959) tourist season. It stressed CIA's reliance on tourists for the spotting, recontacting, assessing, and communicating with clandestine assets in the Soviet Union. A copy of the document as well, presumably, as other British documents relating to the joint meetings was given to George BLAKE, who has admitted having made a photographic copy which he passed to the KGB. He gave the KGB this information in the summer of 1959.

* One Robert Alan McGUIRE, a former staff employee of CIA, travelled to the Soviet Union as a tourist during April and May 1958. Although he was debriefed on his return, he had no connection with CIA in preparation for this trip and mailed no letters for CIA inside the USSR. While in the Soviet Union, McGUIRE was approached on numerous occasions by Soviets seeking blackmarket deals, American girls, and assistance in defecting to the Americans. While en route to Leningrad, his brief case was overtly searched by a customs employee, who confiscated a Radio Liberation script. McGUIRE reported that he was compelled to sign a document which stated that the script had been confiscated, but the reasons for the action were left blank. NOSENKO, who has reported none of these details, appears to have confused McGUIRE with Edward McGOWAN, a CIA agent who mailed a letter in Minsk in August 1958 and was detected doing so by the KGB; NOSENKO said McGUIRE mailed a letter in Minsk in 1959.

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A second joint meeting on this same subject took place in Washington, D.C., from 20 to 23 April 1960, and BLAKE admitted providing the KGB with a copy of the 21-page summary of the sessions.*

c. GOLITSYN's Tourist Document


When he defected to CIA in December 1961, GOLITSYN brought with him a top secret KGB document dealing with the use by American Intelligence of tourists for espionage inside the Soviet Union and with KGB countermeasures.** This study relied heavily upon the two documents supplied to the KGB by BLAKE, and although it purports to be a study of American tourist operations during 1960, it cites as examples many cases which occurred in earlier years. In these examples, the American agents detected by the KGB are named and their operational roles accurately described. (As noted above, NOSENKO said that McGUIRE/McGOWAN was the only American definitely determined to have intelligence connections prior to 1960.) Cited below are excerpts from the GOLITSYN document, along with additional information [redacted]

The document states: "McGOWAN, Edward, born 1935, [redacted]

[redacted] after a thorough check [for surveillance] sent an espionage letter containing secret writing. Further investigation of McGOWAN showed that he specialized for a long period of time on Russian and Polish questions [redacted]

* This occurred at a time that NOSENKO claims to have been in the American Department. During the 1962 meetings in Geneva, when NOSENKO said he was Chief of the American Tourist Section, he was asked about BLAKE. He replied only that BLAKE had been "an agent of the British Department of the Second Chief Directorate" and that he was not nearly as valuable as the Canadian Ambassador [redacted] or "the other Englishman" (VASSALL). At the time of his defection, NOSENKO said he was First Deputy Chief of the entire Tourist Department. Asked about BLAKE after his defection, NOSENKO replied: "Who's BLAKE?" During the February 1965 interrogations, NOSENKO was first asked whether the KGB had received any significant information concerning the use of tourism as operational cover by CIA during 1960 and 1961, when he was in the American Department, and was then asked specifically whether the KGB obtained documentary information on this subject from an agent source. He replied "no" to both questions.

** This document was transmitted from KGB Headquarters in Moscow to the KGB Legal Residency in Helsinki on 7 April 1961. In content it is similar to the general description of the document which NOSENKO said he himself wrote. NOSENKO said in 1964 that he knew GOLITSYN had passed CIA this report and that it had been written in the Tourist Department.



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During his trip to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1958, McGOWAN mailed in Minsk an operational letter containing secret writing. In the CIA debriefing upon his return to the United States, McGOWAN described a number of incidents in the USSR. On 20 August 1958, for example, while staying at the Metropol Hotel in Moscow, McGOWAN met [redacted] fellow Americans, and the three of them were photographed by a surveillance team when leaving the hotel. Within several days of his arrival in Moscow, McGOWAN found he was incompatible with his female Inturist interpreter/guide and succeeded in having her replaced. His new guide was V.L. ARTEMOV, who assured that McGOWAN had female companionship for the remainder of his visit.**

The document from GOLITSYN also states: "SIMARD, Lionel, born in 1939, a college instructor, expressed an abnormal interest towards military literature of the USSR; he made contact with Soviet citizens and attempted to slip into the area of ship-building factories in Leningrad. Later it was recorded that this 'pedagogue', while in Moscow, sent espionage letters containing secret writing. The letter contained the coordinates of a dead-drop for an American agent."

[redacted]

Another part of the document supplied by GOLITSYN says: "An American, Whitmore GRAY, born 1932, an assistant professor at Michigan University, sent three espionage letters containing secret writing, while in Kiev. In Stalingrad he was detained while he was photographing a military factory."

[redacted]

* NOSENKO reported on a 1959 trip to the Soviet Union by [redacted] but said he was not aware of earlier ones.

** This is the same ARTEMOV identified by NOSENKO as a fellow case officer in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department and as the man with whom he worked on the BELITSKIY case in Geneva in 1962. ARTEMOV appeared again in operations against American tourists in 1959 when he was assigned as Inturist guide/internpreter for a group of Americans [redacted]. On one occasion, when this officer returned unexpectedly to his hotel from the theater to which ARTEMOV had escorted him, he caught ARTEMOV searching his hotel room. NOSENKO has not mentioned these contacts of ARTEMOV, which took place at the time he said he was Deputy Chief of the section dealing with American tourists. In October 1966, in answer to a specific question, NOSENKO stated that ARTEMOV never had any connection with the American Section of the Tourist Department.

*** NOSENKO has identified IVANOVA as an agent of the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, but has not described her earlier activities against tourists.

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but GRAY detected surveillance daily thereafter until he left Kiev and later in Yalta. He was approached on 17 November in Baku by an attractive woman who persistently offered her services despite his refusal, and on 18 November by a girl in Tbilisi who occupied a seat next to his in a theater and made similar overtures. GRAY was also approached by blackmarketeers and by purportedly disaffected young men. On 13 November he was arrested in Stalingrad while photographing industrial installations and was released after interrogation and confiscation of his film. NOSENKO made no references to GRAY.

The KGB document elsewhere states: "A guide of a tourist group, John Milton FRANCIS, born 1934, an instructor of Russian at a college of Yale University, when in Odessa with a group of tourists--American students--separated himself from the group and travelled through the city alone. In a notebook which was lost by him, notes and sketches were found which pointed to the fact that he utilized his trip for the purpose of selecting suitable places for the placing of deaddrops, or for checking those deaddrops which were earlier selected by American agents. In Moscow he selected routes which were used to check and discover the existence of surveillance, utilizing passable backyards and following skillful methods. At the present time FRANCIS is the chief interpreter of the State Department, servicing Soviet delegations in the USA."

FRANCIS did have such a mission in 1958 and brought back a notebook with sketches of the sites he selected. He did not mention losing his notebook. In 1954 and 1955 FRANCIS was in frequent contact with V.V. KRIVOSHEY in Berlin; KRIVOSHEY, who served there until the late 1950's, has been identified as a KGB First Chief Directorate officer who later became an officer in the Correspondents Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate.* FRANCIS was also a student of Richard BURGI at Yale in 1956, the year that NOSENKO was involved in BURGI's recruitment (see Part V.D.4.b.). NOSENKO has not mentioned the FRANCIS case and did not recognize his name.

* KRIVOSHEY was a participant in the Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON case to which NOSENKO provided the lead (see Part VI.D.3.c.).

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8. TDY's to London (1957 and 1958)


NOSENKO reported that his first official travel outside the Soviet Union occurred in the fall of 1957 when he was selected to accompany a group of athletes who had been invited to visit London. As he explained on 8 April 1964, it is necessary for a security officer to accompany any such delegation, and the Eleventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate, responsible for recruiting Second Chief Directorate officers for this purpose, telephoned K.M. DUBAS, Chief of the Tourist Department, to request an officer who spoke English. DUBAS asked NOSENKO whether he wanted to make the trip. NOSENKO replied: "Why not? I have never been abroad yet." NOSENKO consequently travelled to London, using the alias Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV and posing as "the deputy chief" of the delegation. He was specifically instructed to observe one member of the delegation, a woman named MYARIMYAYE, whose father had been killed in a Soviet prison and whose political reliability was uncertain. Additionally, he had the general task of watching all members of the delegation for possibly suspicious contacts with foreigners. The delegation consisted of approximately 50 persons and to help him in carrying out these duties, NOSENKO was assigned three or four agents and several operational contacts among the delegation members. He was the only staff security officer making this trip.

The second trip to London took place a year later, in the fall of 1958, again as a security watchdog. This time he accompanied a delegation of 11 or 12 boxers, and again he used the alias NIKOLAYEV and the cover position of deputy chief of the delegation. NOSENKO was the only security officer with the delegation, and he had two agents and two operational contacts among the boxers. His assignment was general; nobody in particular was kept under observation, and the KGB had no derogatory information concerning any members of the delegation.


NOSENKO has associated his use of the NIKOLAYEV alias in London with the use of the same name with the British subjects [redacted] and [redacted] (see Part V.D.4.d.) shortly before the first of these two trips. On 17 April 1964 NOSENKO explained this situation as follows: "With [redacted] I used the name NIKOLAYEV, Yuriy Ivanovich, a representative of the Ministry of Culture. And then when the question was raised of sending me in 1957 with the delegation to England, I was forced to go there as NIKOLAYEV. I was forced to. And again under the cover of the Ministry of Culture. Because [of this] I went as the assistant head of the delegation, representing the Ministry of Culture. I didn't go under my own name because it was decided that when these people [redacted] came back to England, they would tell who they were with [report their contacts in the USSR]. They would probably question [redacted] especially as one who used to work in intelligence. [redacted] would say: 'There was this man from the Ministry of Culture, NIKOLAYEV. He was with us all the time, even went to Leningrad with us.' So they would say: 'How does he look [what does he look like]?' He would say: 'He looked so-and-so.' So,

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of course, I would go there the same year. I'd go there, and they would look at me and say: 'How come this man--his name is NOSENKO, and yet he is very similar to the one described by [REDACTED]. That was why it was decided I have to go again under the name NIKOLAYEV. Just a matter of conspiracy. Since I already became known as NIKOLAYEV to the Britishers, this would be noticeable.'



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E. January 1960 to January 1962 (American Department)

1. Introduction

NOSENKO claims to have served as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, from sometime in January 1960 until the first days of January 1962.* This section, in his words, was working against "the most important counterintelligence target in the Soviet Union," the permanent American representation in Moscow. It regarded every American stationed there as a possible spy and, simultaneously, as a target for eventual compromise and recruitment.

The functions of the U.S. Embassy Section were described by NOSENKO as being, first, to control all contacts by Embassy personnel with Soviet citizens; second, to evaluate information collected from all possible sources on American Embassy employees; and third, to use this information as a basis for planning and carrying out recruitment approaches. The Americans' personalities, jobs, personal relationships, weaknesses, daily routines, security precautions, contacts with Soviet citizens, and the major and minor scandals in their Moscow lives formed the basis for this work. To gather such information, the section's officers directed and debriefed large numbers of agents and informants, including the indigenous employees of the Embassy, Soviet citizens moving in Embassy social circles, and third-country nationals with American contacts; the officers also assigned tasks to and assimilated the reports from the numerous surveillance teams at their disposal, and they read and tried to exploit materials from telephone taps and microphones placed in the offices and homes of the Americans. Each officer had a limited number of American targets and attempted to become thoroughly familiar with each; annually, they submitted detailed operational plans to exploit the knowledge they had gained of their target. During 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO said, special emphasis was placed within the section on "identifying intelligence officers at the Embassy and active development of them, the acquisition of ciphers, and the detailed and painstaking study of code clerks, creating the conditions on the basis of which they can be recruited."

As Deputy Chief of this section, NOSENKO has said, he had access to all information concerning its activities: "Nothing was hidden" from him. On this basis, he expressed certainty that in 1960 and 1961 the KGB did not recruit any Americans associated with the Embassy, that no Americans assigned to the Embassy were being handled in Moscow as KGB agents in this period, and that, in fact, the KGB had recruited no American Embassy personnel since "ANDREY."** From continuing friendships with his fellow-officers of 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO has also claimed certainty that there were no KGB recruitments from the time he left the section in January 1962 until the January 1964 trip to Geneva.

* In debriefing and interrogating NOSENKO, CIA placed particular emphasis on his activities during the period January 1960 to January 1962, since this information was of special importance to U.S. Government security.

** See Part VI.D.3.b. for a discussion of the case of the KGB agent "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH), whose recruitment has been variously dated by NOSENKO between the years 1949 and 1953.

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Meanwhile, no one replaced NOSENKO as Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department's American Section because (as he explained on 29 January 1965) the Tourist Department, which had earlier operated against members of delegations and various other categories of foreign visitors, was being reorganized in January 1960 for work against tourists alone and the Deputy Chief slot was eliminated.* With the exception of A. A. DMITRIYEV, Marina RYTOVA, and the homosexuals YEFREMOV and VOLKOV, NOSENKO turned over all of his agents to another officer in the section named TIMOFEYEV. NOSENKO said on 29 January 1965 that he had two separate files on his agent Arsene FRIPPEL, a developmental file and an operational file, and that he turned the former over to TIMOFEYEV and the latter to V. D. CHELNOKOV, Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department. During later interrogations, however, NOSENKO has said that he continued to handle FRIPPEL while in the U.S. Embassy Section and was the case officer during FRIPPEL's visits to the Soviet Union in 1962 and 1963.**

2. NOSENKO's Transfer to the U.S. Embassy Section

In December 1959, while serving as Deputy Chief of the American-British-Canadian Section of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO learned from K. N. DUBAS, the department Chief, of plans to transfer him to the U.S. Embassy Section as Deputy Chief. NOSENKO said he was opposed to the move and wanted to remain in the Tourist Department: "I was used to it there and wanted to continue. I wanted to stay in the Tourist Department. This the transfer was no promotion. Here I was the Deputy Chief of section and would be the same there. But, of course, its more important there. The American Department is, of course, the most important. But here I was working against American tourists. This is also important. Furthermore, I showed had proven myself there in '55, '56, '57, '58, and '59 and was considered to be not a bad case officer. And here, in the American Department, I must show prove myself with new people." NOSENKO therefore asked DUBAS in December 1959 to "please fight for me to stay." DUBAS later told NOSENKO that he had twice spoken to Second Chief Directorate Chief O. M. GRIBANOV on his behalf, but to no avail. In January 1960 the official orders transferring NOSENKO were issued.

On the day NOSENKO reported to V. A. KLYPIN, Chief of the American Department, to begin his new job, he was told to report to GRIBANOV's office. To GRIBANOV NOSENKO again expressed misgivings about the change of assignment. GRIBANOV replied that DUBAS had spoken to him about this but that he, GRIBANOV, "had his own plans and that was all." GRIBANOV told NOSENKO that

* There was no change in the functions of NOSENKO's section, however; as before, it continued to be responsible for operations against tourists from the United States, England, and Canada.

** FRIPPEL has reported that NOSENKO continued to meet him until he left the Soviet Union in January 1961 and again when he returned as a guide to tourist groups twice in 1962 and once again in 1963; see Part V.D.5.

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he thought NOSENKO could bring "fresh air" to the U.S. Embassy Section's operations and that he was to pay particular attention to operations against American code clerks, the "number one target."* Neither GRIBANOV nor KLYPIN told NOSENKO why he had been selected for this position or who had recommended him for it.

NOSENKO was asked on 17 April 1964 whom he had relieved upon reporting for duty in the U.S. Embassy Section. He replied: "Nobody." He was then asked to identify the persons from whom he had assumed certain of his duties as Deputy Chief of the section (these are discussed in detail below). NOSENKO said that he took the responsibility for maintaining the section file on the security of the U.S. Embassy from the Chief of the section, V. M. KOVSHUK.** Regarding his responsibility as case officer for the Security Officer of the Embassy, NOSENKO explained that because former Security Officer Russell LANGELE had been declared persona non grata in October 1959 and because his successor John ABIDIAN was not to arrive until March 1960, no one in the section had this responsibility when he, NOSENKO, arrived in January 1960. Asked who had been LANGELE's case officer, NOSENKO replied: "LANGELE was handled by several people - by /A.S./ MALYUGIN, then after that by /V.A./ KUSKOV, then by KOVSHUK, then

* In late December 1961, GOLITSYN also commented on this subject to his CIA handling officer: "The task of strengthening of work against the Americans has been a standing requirement, both in the past and most particularly at this time. This work was particularly intensified after the appointment of SHELEPIN to the KGB... In 1960, it was recommended in the KGB to intensify the work against the Americans at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and against American colonies in other countries... This question of intensifying work against the Americans was up before the Collegium of the KGB. Thereafter, there was a directive from SHELEPIN regarding the intensification of work against the American cipher-clerks."

**There is an apparent contradiction between NOSENKO's designation of KOVSHUK as Chief of the First (U.S. Embassy) Section in 1960 and information earlier supplied by GOLITSYN. GOLITSYN told CIA of a conversation he had with KOVSHUK in January 1961 in Moscow (see Part V.E.3:c.2. concerning a recruitment approach to the American code clerk James STORBERG) but at that time described KOVSHUK only as an American Department officer, without indicating his position. The only time that GOLITSYN has given a position for KOVSHUK was in the context of questioning concerning KHRUSHCHEV's "Secret Speech" denouncing STALIN in 1956; GOLITSYN said that at this time KOVSHUK was Chief of the American Department (sic) of the Second Chief Directorate. On 16 February 1962 GOLITSYN identified Vladimir PETROV as Chief of the "section concerned with the American Embassy of the American Department of the Second Directorate" in 1960. NOSENKO had identified PETROV as Chief of the Second Section of the American Department, which was concerned with the penetration of U.S. intelligence operations inside the Soviet Union.

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IPIN. Yes. LANGELE was before my time." Two months later, on 24 June 1964, NOSENKO stated: "In 1959 and possibly in 1958, Mikhail Fedorovich BAKHVALOV was the Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section. I replaced him in this position in 1960 and he went to the Fifth (Eastern Countries) Department as Deputy Chief."* On 8 September 1964 NOSENKO volunteered for the first time that BAKHVALOV, as Deputy Chief of the section, had been the case officer for LANGELE. Under interrogation in early 1965, NOSENKO added that BAKHVALOV had also been responsible for maintaining the file on the security of the U.S. Embassy. At this time he explained his earlier statement by saying that BAKHVALOV had left the section before his arrival and had given the file to KOVSHUK to hold for his successor. The file continued to be charged officially to BAKHVALOV, however, even though he was no longer in the section, and NOSENKO arranged for the official change of custody shortly after reporting for duty (see Part V.E. 3.f.). NOSENKO said further, in January 1965, that BAKHVALOV had shared responsibility for supervising code clerk operations with KOVSHUK before NOSENKO arrived to assume these duties himself. NOSENKO had been given a number of opportunities prior to 24 June 1964 to identify BAKHVALOV as his predecessor, but he did not do so. These are summarized below:

25 January 1964: In a discussion of the Fifth (Eastern Countries) Department of the Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO said: "The Chief of this department is Colonel Artem DAVIDYAN. He is an Armenian. His Deputy is Colonel Mikhail BAKHVALOV."

27 February 1964: NOSENKO was shown a photograph of V.A. ALEKSEYEV, a Soviet who was in Japan from July to September 1961 as a member of a trade delegation. NOSENKO immediately recognized the face as that of the Deputy Chief of the Fifth Department of the Second Chief Directorate. He said that he did not know this person's last name, but that his first name and patronymic were Mikhail Fedorovich. When shown the last name ALEKSEYEV, NOSENKO recognized it as an alias, but provided no further information concerning his true identity or earlier service in the American Department.

10 June 1964: NOSENKO was asked to list in writing the names of KGB officers who had received various awards for their service. He wrote: "The following got either the Order of the Military Red Banner or the Order of the Red Star, I'm not sure which: Mikhail BAKHVALOV, Deputy Chief of a section in an unremembered department of the Second Chief Directorate."

18 June 1964: NOSENKO was asked to list all the officers who had been assigned to the American Department for each year since he joined the KGB. He named the chiefs and deputies of the U.S. Embassy Section from 1953 through 1956. When he came to 1957, however, he said that he could not provide accurate information as to which officers were assigned to the section for that year through 1959 (he was

* With reference to the Fifth Department, NOSENKO has furnished only one other item of information: he reported that in 1958, or as late as the fall of 1959, the Israeli Section was transferred to this department after having been a component of the American Department.

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allegedly in the Tourist Department in this period) and could not describe their functions. On this basis NOSENKO was then asked to list the officers who had joined the section between 1956 and January 1960, when NOSENKO said he had returned. He provided 14 names, but BAKHVALOV's was not among them. Asked to name the officers who had left the section in the same period, he named five, again omitting BAKHVALOV.

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3. Duties and Knowledgeability

a. Introduction

Shortly after reporting for duty in the U.S. Embassy Section and following his short discussion with GRIBANOV, NOSENKO met with Department Chief KLYPIN and Section Chief KOVSHUK to discuss his responsibilities and functions in the section. Repeating what GRIBANOV had already said, KLYPIN stressed that NOSENKO's most important single responsibility in the section would be supervision of all KGB operational activity against American military and State Department code clerks stationed in Moscow. As for the other Americans at the Embassy, KLYPIN suggested a division of labor under which KOVSHUK would be responsible for supervising operations against State Department personnel and NOSENKO would supervise work against the Army, Air Force, and Naval attaches and their assistants.* NOSENKO was also made responsible for maintaining certain files in the section. On 19 February 1965 NOSENKO signed an interrogation protocol which he agreed contained a listing of his principal responsibilities during 1960 and 1961. It read in part:

"During the entire period in the First [U.S. Embassy] Section, First [American] Department in 1960 and 1961 my position was Deputy Chief of Section. My responsibilities were the following:

-General Deputy to the Chief of the First Section, Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOVSHUK, and Acting Chief of Section in his absence.

-Immediate supervisor for the operational work against American code clerks. In this capacity I closely guided the work of case officers Gennadiy GRYAZNOV and Vadim KOSOLAPOV.

-Case officer for U.S. Embassy Security Officer, John ABIDIAN.

-For about the first six months of 1960, supervisor of the work against the offices of the U.S. Military, Naval, and Air Attaches.

-I maintained the file on American Embassy security.

-I maintained the log books for the reports sent to the First [U.S. Embassy] Section by the Operational Technical Directorate, KGB, based on the information obtained from all the microphones installed in the American Embassy. I read all the reports and gave the pertinent reports to the appropriate case officers in the Section. In my absence this work was done by KOVSHUK or GRYAZNOV.**

*NOSENKO mentioned his responsibility for supervising attache operations for the first time in 1965. These functions are discussed below.

**The final sentence was added at NOSENKO's request at the time the protocol was signed.

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-During this period I was the agent handler for agents 'SHMELEV', 'GRIGORIY', 'PROKHOR', 'ARTUR' and 'SARDAR'.*

"Throughout this entire period I sat in room 618 of KGB Headquarters at House Number 2, Dzhershinskiy Square, Moscow. GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV shared this office with me throughout most of this period."

b. Functions as General Deputy and Acting Chief of Section

(1) Access

Since his defection NOSENKO has maintained under repeated interrogation that as general deputy to KOVSHUK, with the responsibility of taking over in KOVSHUK's absence, he had access to all information on the section's activities and was obliged to keep current on this information. On this basis he has been able to assure his questioners that the KGB was completely unsuccessful in its attempts to recruit Americans assigned to the Embassy in these two years. NOSENKO has also said at various times that his access to section files and his discussions with section officers made it certain that there were also no successes from 1953 to 1960 and from January 1962 to January 1964. His statements on this subject during the February 1965 were distilled in a protocol which NOSENKO signed on 20 February (quoted in full):

"1. As the only Deputy to the Chief of the American Embassy Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, KGB, Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOVSHUK, from January 1960 to January 1962, one of my functions was to serve as KOVSHUK's general deputy and to assume the rights and responsibilities of Chief of the Section during KOVSHUK's absence. In order to perform this function I had the right and the obligation of knowing the details about every important activity of the section against the American Embassy and its personnel. No activity of this nature was withheld from me.

"2. As Deputy Chief of the Section I know definitely that no U.S. officials serving in the Embassy were agents of the KGB or reporting unofficially in any way to the KGB during my service in the Section. There were no approaches or recruitments made by the Section during the period January 1960 to January 1962 against personnel of the American Embassy, including personnel of the State Department, the offices of the Military Attaches (Army, Navy, and Air), the Department of Agriculture and USIA, including Marine guards, Army sergeants, State Department code clerks and Army code clerks except against STORSBERG and KEYSERS, both unsuccessful approaches.

*VOLKOV, YEFREMOV, Johan PREISFREUND, FRIPPEL, and [REDACTED] respectively, who are discussed in other parts of this paper. At other times NOSENKO has named additional agents he handled in this period; they are discussed below.

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"3. There were no approaches or recruitments made against any employees of the United States Government who were assigned to the American Embassy on temporary duty during this period. I have read and understood this report and certify it as correct."

(ii) Duties

On 29 January 1965, NOSENKO was questioned concerning his supervisory duties as Deputy Chief of the section, particularly his function of supervising activity against code clerks. The transcript of this discussion is quoted here:

Question: To which of the major responsibilities you have mentioned did you have to devote the most time?

Answer: I don't know.

Q: What was the most important?

A: Everything was important.

Q: Whom did you supervise in the American Embassy Section?

A: GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPOV, [Vladimir] DEMKIN, and later [Yevgeniy] GROMAKOVSKIY who worked with DEMKIN. Then there was [N.A.] GAVRILENKO, [I.Ya.] KURILENKO; and BELOGLAZOV working with the Attaches.

Q: They were all in the First Section?

A: Yes.

Q: What were their responsibilities?

A: GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV had all the code clerks. DEMKIN was charged with all persons living in America House, except code clerks. GROMAKOVSKIY helped him. GAVRILENKO had the Air Force Attaches and [their] assistants, and also he had the plane of the Ambassador. He must think about watching the pilots who were living in a hotel. KURILENKO-- Army Attache and assistants; BELOGLAZOV--Navy Attache, assistants, and Marines.

Q: What is your understanding of the meaning of the word "supervisor"?

A: Personally to be at the head, to direct.

Q: So, in your responsibilities of supervising all the work against all the code clerks, this meant that you were the head of this work, that you were directing this work, that you were participating in discussions concerning this work, and in these discussions you were talking about what measures were necessary.

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(interrupting.) When necessary, because there are little questions which the case officer must decide himself. When it was necessary.

Q: And participating personally when necessary?

A: Yes.

Q: What sort of case officer questions were you answering?

A: All kinds. If I couldn't answer them, if my authority isn't enough for this, it is necessary to discuss them with KOVSHUK. I was discussing with KOVSHUK, with KLYPIN, with [KLYPIN's successor as Chief of the American Department, S.M.] FEDOSEYEV. Several times, not once, we were discussing questions with GRIBANOV. Also, concerning measures, concerning future steps. When it was necessary.

Q: What other duties did you have as a supervisor?

A: I told you. When it was necessary I was going to agent meetings with case officers. When it was necessary. Or, besides, I met personally with "PROKHOR" [PREISFREUND] or ██████████ "PROKHOR" was working against STORSBERG, "SARDAR" against ZUJUS. I was working myself with them.

Q: You personally worked agents "PROKHOR" and "SARDAR"?

A: Yes.

Q: When did you find it necessary to go to an agent meeting with a case officer?

A: Well, for example, DEMKIN would come to me and say: "You know Ella [UMANETS, an agent in America House]. Ella said that MORONE had looked at her and was smiling." This is just an [hypothetical] example....Okay, I am going with him, hearing Ella myself, [to learn] what happened, [whether] it is possible to make something or not.

Q: You met Ella and talked with her?

A: Yes, with DEMKIN. Very, very difficult to say, why and how we are going. When it was necessary to go.

Q: As a rule did you try to make it a practice to visit the agents of the section who were working against the American target?

A: Yes, I am telling you. There was such an agent, Inga [VARLANOVA]. GRYAZNOV was meeting with her. It might be necessary to go to meet her. But, we knew how Inga was afraid of intelligence. And, you see, they don't like it when a new case officer appears. But, maybe, for the sake of the file,

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it was necessary to go, to hear her. Not because you do not believe GRYAZNOV. No. But, you see, to hear from the source [emphasized], directly, what is going on, and how it is going on, to get a feeling. Because the source will tell the case officer, then the case officer will tell you. Maybe sometimes he will not give you every detail, every intonation. But in some cases, it is necessary to feel this. But, of course, it depends on the agent, on the target, whether you will go or not go. It's very difficult, again, to say.

- Q: Could you say that you met 50 per cent of the section's agents?
- A: No, I can't say.
- Q: Fifty per cent or 75 per cent?
- A: I can't answer you.
- Q: What about your functions as a supervisor in regard to safehouses, to "K.K.'s" and "Ya.K.'s"?
- A: Oh. I myself had a file on my flat, a yavochnaya kvartira, which I brought from the Seventh [Tourist Department]. It was my own. GRYAZNOV had his own yavochnaya kvartira. KOSOLAPOV had also his own yavochnaya kvartira. And not one of us had a conspirative apartment.
- Q: And you took the "Ya.K." from...
- A: (Interrupting.) Which I had from the Seventh. And, by the way, when I was leaving the First [American] Department, I took this file again to the Seventh.
- Q: And not one of you had a conspirative flat.
- A: No, because the section had only--how many?-- [P.I.] MASSYA had one conspirative. [V.P.] FEDYANIN had one conspirative, and then there was one conspirative flat, where, in fact, an agent was living. In the First Section there were three or four conspirative flats.
- Q: But among you, GRYAZNOV, and KOSOLAPOV there was none?
- A: Only "Ya.K.'s".

*A "K.K." [konspirativnaya kvartira--conspiratorial apartment) is defined by NOSENKO as a safehouse or apartment owned and maintained by the KGB. A "Ya.K." (yavochnaya kvartira--meeting apartment) is an apartment occupied by a tenant who is perhaps subsidized by the KGB and absents himself when there is a need to use the apartment for meetings or other activities. The "K.K." is used for more sensitive operational purposes, he said.

- Q: Who kept a record of these three?
- A: The case officers.
- Q: Where was your "Ya.K."?
- A: Vorovskogo Street.
- Q: And where was GRYAZNOV's?
- A: GRYAZNOV's was on Kachalogo Street.
- Q: And KOSOLAPOV's?
- A: Don't remember. Don't remember. (Pause.) It was in the vicinity of the Suvorovskiy Boulevard. KOSOLAPOV's or DEMKIN's. In the region of Arbat Square. KOSOLAPOV's or DEMKIN's. KOSOLAPOV's. DEMKIN's I don't remember.
- Q: And you didn't have any responsibility for supervising the activity that went on at these flats?
- A: I don't understand.
- Q: Was there some central control of the use of the "Ya.K.'s"?
- A: What kind of control?
- Q: Who would be using them, when they would be using them, under what conditions?
- A: No. The case officer who was working with it decides how to use this flat or how not to use it, et cetera, et cetera. Besides that, very often we were using rooms in hotels.
- Q: So GRYAZNOV would take any of his operational activity to his "Ya.K."?
- A: He would also meet with his agents, with his operational contacts in hotel rooms. KOSOLAPOV was meeting his agents in his own "Ya.K."; NO-SENKO was meeting his agents or operational contacts in his own "Ya.K.".
- Q: Could GRYAZNOV or KOSOLAPOV ever use these "Ya.K.'s" without your knowing about it?
- A: Of course. It's their own flat.
- Q: But you're supervising their work?
- A: Must I keep them like a little, little child? No, no. They don't have to report to me: "Today I go to meet my agent at my flat."
- Q: They can use them whenever they like without checking with you as supervisor?
- A: Of course, of course. They are meeting their own agents.

Q: You have no idea who they are meeting, or when they are meeting them?

A: When they are meeting an active development agent, they tell me afterwards. They are telling "this, this, this, this" and I am answering "this, this, this." But usually they are going to meet maids or they don't have to report. There is nothing active and there is....The file is going on.

Q: What about operational vehicles? Automobiles?

A: You see, we had one automobile for the whole department. Besides this, we could apply, when necessary, to the officer on duty for the Second Chief Directorate and he would give a car, because he has a number of cars at his disposal.

Q: Approximately how much of your time did you spend supervising GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV?

A: I can't say.

Q: Was it the most important function?

A: Yes, it was important. All work in the First Section was important. This was the most important. But one day I could devote the whole day to code clerks, the next day maybe half the day, maybe two hours in the day. The rest of the day I will be absent. I will be meeting with KLYPIN, or I will be having a meeting with surveillance, or I will be at another place. The third day, again, maybe the whole day, maybe part of it. No, I can't tell you. It depends on the situation.

(iii) Additional Duties in KOVSHUK's Absence

As Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, one of NOSENKO's responsibilities was to serve as Acting Chief when KOVSHUK was absent from the office. NOSENKO recalled that he fulfilled this function during KOVSHUK's two 30-day leave periods in 1960 and 1961, but he did not remember when this leave occurred in those years. He also served as Acting Chief for about a month in the summer of 1960 when KOVSHUK was in the KGB hospital with heart trouble and for a week or two some time in 1961 when KOVSHUK was ill again. NOSENKO was unable to recall any operational or inspection trips that KOVSHUK made in 1960 or 1961, and the only other specific time that he could remember KOVSHUK being absent was for several days in connection with preparations for President Eisenhower's planned visit to the Soviet Union in 1960.

NOSENKO's description of his duties in KOVSHUK's absence was summarized in a protocol which he signed on 3 March 1965:

"I do not remember any particularly important operational decisions I made as Acting Chief of Section, nor any unusual things that happened during

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these times. The only specific responsibility KOVSHUK had which I handled in his absence was to report to the Chief of the First Department about all mail going out of the First Section. I did not meet any of KOVSHUK's agents during his absences because there was no necessity to do so. His only Russian agent whom I remember was Ilya GLAZUNOV [KGB cryptonym "VRUBEL"], whom he transferred to FEDYANIN in 1960, I think. The only other agent of KOVSHUK's whom I remember was the correspondent Edmund STEVENS.* The only thing that was different for me as Acting Chief of the Section was that I had to go every day to see the Chief of the Department.

c. Supervisor of all Code Clerk Operations

(i) Introduction

Among the numerous KGB activities against American code clerks in Moscow which NOSENKO has discussed are five operations wherein the KGB intended or effected approaches for recruitment/defection purposes. According to NOSENKO, none was successful. The five major cases are reviewed separately below, one of them in the context of duty trips abroad by NOSENKO's subordinate KOSOLAPOV.**

NOSENKO said that, upon assuming responsibility for supervising operations against American code clerks, he found a very "difficult situation." Prior to the assignment of KOSOLAPOV to the U.S. Embassy Section in late 1959, all operations against code clerks had been handled by A.S. MALYUGIN, but during MALYUGIN's two years of effort there had been no operational approaches and no successes. When

*The Edmund STEVENS case is discussed in Part V.C.2.

**GOLITSYN on 20 March 1962 identified KOSOLAPOV's photograph as that of a veteran KGB officer with whom he was personally acquainted. GOLITSYN said that KOSOLAPOV had entered the KGB in about 1952 and had served for two or three years as a member of the First [American] Department of the KGB First Chief Directorate under United Nations cover in New York City; subsequently he had worked for two or three years in the First Chief Directorate at KGB Headquarters. According to GOLITSYN, the bachelor KOSOLAPOV was transferred to the KGB Second Chief Directorate some time prior to 1960 in line with a KGB policy for only married men to be sent abroad. As of 1960, GOLITSYN said, KOSOLAPOV was working against code clerks stationed in the American Embassy in Moscow. He added that KOSOLAPOV speaks excellent English. Prior to GOLITSYN's identification, CIA had no indication of intelligence activity on KOSOLAPOV's part. Between February 1953 and April 1955 he was assigned to the United Nations Secretariat Translation Unit as a translator; in August 1958 he had been an interpreter at the Geneva Conference on Nuclear Test Detection; in September 1959 he accompanied KHRUSHCHEV on his trip to the United States (see Part V.E.3.d. which describes the role of NOSENKO's target John ABIDIAN in connection with the KHRUSHCHEV trip). KOSOLAPOV's English is flawless.

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NOSENKO took over there were no active developmental operations against code clerks underway, and the only agents or operational contacts being used against them were poorly educated maids and waitresses, none of whom had accomplished anything of importance. No foreign agents were being used in operations against coderoom personnel, and at the time NOSENKO had no agents of his own in America House, or in the Embassy, who could be used in these operations.

In January or February of 1960 GRYAZNOV was assigned to the U.S. Embassy Section as a second assistant to NOSENKO in his code clerk activities. From this point on, NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV, and GRYAZNOV shared the same KGB Headquarters office (Room 614). There all KGB files on American code clerks, as well as the files on agents available for work against them, were stored in one large safe, accessible to all three officers. NOSENKO supervised all of the section's work along these lines, and no provocations, compromises, recruitment attempts, or recruitments could have been planned or carried out without his prior knowledge and agreement.

*GOLITSYN first used GRYAZNOV as a case officer of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate, on 31 December 1961. He said at that time that he had been personally acquainted with GRYAZNOV since 1945 and that, as of the spring of 1960, GRYAZNOV was "working only against code clerks of the American Embassy in Moscow." GRYAZNOV had travelled to the United States at some time in the past, GOLITSYN added.

On 5 June 1962 GOLITSYN told CIA that he had been a classmate of GRYAZNOV during 1947 and 1948 at the "SMERSH" counterintelligence school in Moscow; he described GRYAZNOV as a specialist in operations against American code clerks, saying that GRYAZNOV was "very experienced" and had had "some successes." As an example, he told of having spoken to GRYAZNOV in the spring of 1960 while he, GOLITSYN, was visiting the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department in connection with his forthcoming assignment as a First Chief Directorate counterintelligence officer in Helsinki. GOLITSYN had complained to GRYAZNOV that the KGB had no U.S. assets in Helsinki at the time, and to CIA he quoted GRYAZNOV as replying: "Maybe we will help you." According to GOLITSYN, GRYAZNOV went on to explain that he was handling an agent, a code clerk in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, who was about to be transferred, perhaps to Helsinki; he told GOLITSYN that the KGB had received information from this American code clerk and classified him as a "real agent." NOSENKO has not mentioned such an agent (who has yet to be identified) and has denied that the KGB had any agents in the U.S. Embassy at this time. GOLITSYN identified a photograph of G.I. LAPIN, who travelled with the Maiseyev Dance troupe to the United States and Canada in 1958, as being identical with GRYAZNOV. CIA had no prior indication of intelligence activities by GRYAZNOV, under the alias LAPIN, and had no traces on GRYAZNOV in true name.

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when he was in Moscow. If NOSENKO went away on a trip, he said, he would have been told about any such activity upon his return.

When NOSENKO took over responsibility for operations against code clerks, he read available files on targets and agents, discussed the situation with M.M. YUGIN, (the U.S. Embassy Section case officer responsible for the findings and recommendations to his superiors, and KLYPIN. Several changes were made as a result, including a new program for the work of the section, suggested the use of third-country nationals (not and not Soviet) for agent work against code clerks; with this suggestion, he personally recruited a cryptonym "SARBAR"), and him against the America House. (After his first few was specifically targetted against military code Matthew ZUJUS.) Another such agent directly handled SENKO was the Finnish businessman Johan PREISBERG, figured in the case of the military code clerk James BERG. NOSENKO also suggested initiating activity clerks prior to their arrival in the USSR and proposed that operational measures be undertaken operational possibilities be studied in Helsinki, through which most of the code clerks passed on their way to Moscow.

Finally, according to NOSENKO, none of the operations against code clerks was successful during the two years he spent as Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section; he did the KGB have any success between January 1962 and January 1964, when NOSENKO left Moscow for Geneva. He stated that GRYAZNOV would have told him if any successful approaches had taken place during this latter period.

(11) Approach to STORSBERG

From the start of his association with CIA, NOSENKO emphasized that the primary mission of the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960 and 1961, during his incumbency as Deputy Chief of Section, was the recruitment of an American military cryptographer. He has explained the special stress placed on this requirement (vis-a-vis the recruitment of State Department code clerks) by saying that, while the KGB had broken U.S. State Department cipher systems and could read messages up to and including those classified "secret", had been no such success with American military ciphers, there remained secure in this period. NOSENKO also has repeatedly that the KGB had not been able to recruit any American code clerk, either State Department or military, during the years since the recruitment of "ANDREY" in 1953.

*See Part VI.D.3.b., which discusses the "ANDREY" case.

On the several operations against military code clerks which NOSENKO has described and in which he has claimed a personal role, his greatest detail and emphasis has been given to the case of James Harry STORSBERG. In 1962 NOSENKO said that, in line with GRIBANOV's instructions that he pay particular attention to code clerk operations, he devoted most of his time for almost a year to the STORSBERG operation, and played a personal role in the unsuccessful KGB approach; he described in the first person his conversation with STORSBERG. During the 1954 to 1966 period, NOSENKO denied not only that he had personally participated in this way but also that he had ever claimed to have done; he continued to say, however, that he supervised the operation from beginning to end. According to NOSENKO, this operation got under way with the recruitment of a third-national agent (Johan PREISFREUND, a Finn) some time in the first half of 1960. The specific aim in using this agent was to involve STORSBERG in compromising activities, which would then form the basis for the approach. The operation dragged on through 1960 and until the spring, summer, or autumn of 1961; at this time N.S. SKVORTSOV, a KGB officer, was introduced in the guise of a wealthy French businessman to continue the development of compromising information. PREISFREUND was then withdrawn from the operation. Several weeks later STORSBERG was approached, principally on the basis of his financial need, but he rejected the KGB bid and the operation was over. NOSENKO was certain that STORSBERG had not reported the approach and said that the KGB would use this fact as an additional element of pressure should STORSBERG again be posted outside the United States. NOSENKO also knew that GOLITSYN had reported to CIA concerning KGB modus operandi in this case as well as PREISFREUND's part in it.

GOLITSYN in early 1962 had, in fact, told CIA about PREISFREUND having been used by the KGB in an operation against an American stationed in Moscow. Contrary to NOSENKO's information, he said that this American had been approached--and recruited--by the KGB at the end of 1960.

A second item from GOLITSYN may also relate to the STORSBERG operation: GOLITSYN told of learning in the spring of 1960 that the KGB had developed a military code clerk in Moscow to the point that recruitment was virtually assured. According to U.S. Army records, only two military code clerks were stationed there at that time, STORSBERG and his superior William S. HURLEY, the military communications officer who additionally performed cryptographic duties. NOSENKO has said that there was no KGB operation against HURLEY, and HURLEY has reported no approach.

In addition to the detailed information given by NOSENKO on this case, the FBI and Army Intelligence have interviewed STORSBERG (who confirmed NOSENKO's account and denied recruitment) and CIA has talked to the KGB agent PREISFREUND (who also generally confirmed the information given by NOSENKO but did not know the outcome of the case). The results of these interviews, together with information from GOLITSYN and from other sources, are summarized in this order below.

- January 1960: STORSBERG arrived in Moscow (this date was supplied by the interrogator and was accepted by NOSENKO as accurate, which it is).
- Early 1960: PREISFREUND was recruited by KOVSHUK. (This was consistent with earlier statements, and NOSENKO had always said he first met PREISFREUND a week or so after his recruitment. On 21 October 1966, however, NOSENKO said that he and PREISFREUND first met in the middle of 1960, in the summer of 1960. He subsequently stayed with the general date mid-1960.)
- Summer 1960: PREISFREUND first supplied a woman to STORSBERG.
- Early 1961: Compromising photographs of STORSBERG and a Soviet female were first obtained at the Hotel Peking in Moscow.
- About May 1961: PREISFREUND was withdrawn from the operation and SKVORTSOV, alias MICHAUD, was introduced. (NOSENKO dated this by saying it was about three weeks before the approach to STORSBERG.)
- June 1961: Unsuccessful KGB approach to STORSBERG in the Leningrad Hotel, Moscow. (Earlier on 20 October 1966 NOSENKO had said that the approach was made "a month or a month and a half before STORSBERG left Moscow." Told that STORSBERG was reassigned in November 1961, NOSENKO said that the approach was in June 1961, i.e., five months before STORSBERG's departure date. STORSBERG has reported that the approach was in October 1961; see below.)


NOSENKO was questioned further on the STORSBERG case later in the October 1966 interrogations. He asserted on 21 October that he had first met PREISFREUND in the summer of 1960 and that he continued to meet with him in his case officer capacity after the unsuccessful approach to STORSBERG. He saw PREISFREUND most recently, he said, in Moscow during 1963. NOSENKO also explained how PREISFREUND first came to know his true name: Initially NOSENKO was introduced to PREISFREUND only by first name and patronymic, Yuriy Ivanovich; on one occasion, however, NOSENKO was visiting PREISFREUND's hotel room in Moscow and "lost his KGB certificate" there. Thereafter PREISFREUND knew him as NOSENKO. On 25 October 1966, NOSENKO repeated his earlier statements that the STORSBERG case was the only one in which PREISFREUND participated, although he may have reported casually on other Americans he met during his visits to America House. For the first time he specifically named GRYAZNOV as the case officer holding the operational file on STORSBERG. He continued to maintain that he, NOSENKO, supervised the operation against STORSBERG.

(C) Information from STOPSBERG

STOPSBERG did not report any contact with MORONE until he was interviewed by the FBI on 14 September 1964.

STOPSBERG was interviewed by the FBI on 14 and 16 September 1964 in connection with the MORONE case. (He had not been identified on the basis of information received from STOPSBERG.)

Official records indicate that MORONE was transferred from Moscow to Lisbon, Portugal, in August 1961. If these records are correct, STOPSBERG could not have seen MORONE with MICHAUD on this night in October 1961.



* This is in reference to NOSENKO's statement that PREISFRIEND involved STORSBERG in speculation which PREISFRIEND also claimed; see also GOLITSYN's second lead, discussed below.

TOP SECRET

(c) Information from PREISFREUND

CIA initially interviewed PREISFREUND on 8 July 1965 in Helsinki. (NOSENKO himself had suggested that PREISFREUND would confirm his story of the STORSBERG case.) During this first meeting with him, PREISFREUND correctly identified photographs of KOVSHUK, NOSENKO, and STORSBERG. He maintained, however, that his relationship with KOVSHUK and NOSENKO was strictly on a business level, that he had never had anything to do with the KGB, and that he did not know what the initials "KGB" stand for. Toward the end of this meeting, PREISFREUND allowed that he may have been unwittingly involved in some activity against STORSBERG and agreed to tell the "entire truth" the following day.

On 9 July 1965 PREISFREUND described how he had been caught in a blackmarket operation in Moscow and was, on this basis, recruited by KOVSHUK "either at the end of 1959 or early 1960." Several weeks later, he said, he was approached by NOSENKO who explained that KOVSHUK was unavailable and that the KGB wanted him, PREISFREUND, to arrange an introduction between STORSBERG and a Soviet female, Irina, the daughter of a Soviet general.* PREISFREUND then left Moscow, and when he returned about two months later, he took STORSBERG to the Peking Restaurant, where the introduction was effected. PREISFREUND, STORSBERG, Irina, and another girl then went to PREISFREUND's hotel, where STORSBERG and Irina were intimate.

PREISFREUND said on 10 July 1965 that he was fairly certain his recruitment took place in early 1960, probably in March or April. At the time KOVSHUK had refused to explain what the KGB wanted him to do; he said only that they would talk about it later but assured PREISFREUND that he would not be asked to undertake anything detrimental to Finnish interests; nor did KOVSHUK establish any means of communications with PREISFREUND, telling him only that the KGB would know where to find him. PREISFREUND subsequently visited the USSR on several occasions, but no contacts were made. Just as he was beginning to believe that the affair had been forgotten, NOSENKO contacted him at his room in the Berlin Hotel in Moscow. Asked to explain his earlier statement that NOSENKO first met with him two weeks after the recruitment, PREISFREUND said he could not remember exactly how long it was, but that it was definitely on another trip to Moscow and that it was probably several months later.

PREISFREUND was asked how he had first met STORSBERG. He first replied that it had been at America House and recalled that NOSENKO had simply told him to go there and "find Jim;" it was only with some difficulty that he finally managed to strike up an acquaintance at the bar. On second thought, PREISFREUND said, he may have first met STORSBERG at the sauna in the Finnish Embassy in Moscow through a mutual Finnish acquaintance. Throughout this initial period, NOSENKO and KOVSHUK made repeated promises that once the introduction of STORSBERG to the Soviet female had been accomplished, there would be no more demands made of PREISFREUND by the KGB. PREISFREUND added:

* According to NOSENKO, this was Irina LEBEDOVSKAYA, an agent of the U.S. Embassy Section who was handled by A.V. SUNTSOV.

"Both NOSENKO and KOVSHUK used to make all sorts of promises to me about helping me out in my business and so on, but they never did a damn thing for me. On the contrary. The only promise they kept was that I would not be asked to do anything except the STORSBERG job. But, as for the rest of it, they didn't help me at all."

PREISFREUND was eventually successful, he said, in introducing STORSBERG to Irina as NOSENKO wished and the three of them returned to PREISFREUND's hotel room on a summer evening. PREISFREUND slept in the hotel corridor while STORSBERG and Irina shared his bed. He told his CIA interviewers on 10 July 1965 that at one point during the evening he caught a glimpse of NOSENKO in the corridor wearing a rubber apron and from this deduced that NOSENKO had been taking surreptitious photographs of STORSBERG and Irina together.* On orders from NOSENKO and KOVSHUK, it was the last time he saw STORSBERG.**

Toward the end of the 10 July 1965 meeting PREISFREUND said that about six months elapsed between his recruitment and the beginning of his involvement with STORSBERG. "The job," he said, "dragged out a long time." He reaffirmed that this was the only operation in which he participated and that he had told to the best of his ability all he knew of it. He admitted that he was a heavy drinker and said that for this reason he could not be sure about his dates. PREISFREUND added that he would not have forgotten, however, if he had performed other services for the KGB.

PREISFREUND was shown GOLITSYN's photograph and remarked: "Was he here [in Finland]? I don't know him." Shown the photograph during a later meeting, he said that he had once invited a large group of Soviets to go fishing with him in Finland and that this person may have been among them. When given the name KLIMOV, which GOLITSYN used in Finland in 1960 and 1961, and told that it was an alias, PREISFREUND asked whether KLIMOV had signed visas. He was told this was correct and was asked for the true name. PREISFREUND replied: "GOLUB? Yes?"

At the close of the 10 July 1965 meeting, PREISFREUND mentioned to his interviewers that he was planning to travel to Leningrad by automobile with his family for about five days, beginning on or about 23 July. He said that he had learned from his business contacts in Moscow and from hotel personnel there that the Soviet authorities suspected him of complicity in NOSENKO's defection and was therefore apprehensive of the forthcoming trip.*** He said that he was particularly concerned about

* NOSENKO has not mentioned this.

** PREISFREUND could not date this occasion precisely; he said it was probably before the time he accidentally caused a fire in a Moscow hotel, which was in 1961.

liaison
*** An official [redacted] service has advised CIA that in discussions with V. Ya. CHEKALOV, the Chief of the KGB Ninth (Guards) Directorate [redacted], a representative of that service was asked by CHEKALOV for whom PREISFREUND was working during his frequent visits to the Soviet Union. CHEKALOV told the representative of the [redacted] service that PREISFREUND is considered to be an agent of American Intelligence.

what his response should be if the KGB accused him of confessing to American Intelligence and asked his interviewers to brief him in this regard. During the final CIA meeting on 13 July 1965 PREISFREUND said that he had decided that the situation was too dangerous; he would not be going to the USSR after all. Reliable information shows, however, that he did go to the Soviet Union several days later, returning to Helsinki on 24 July 1965.

TOP SECRET

(d) Information from GOLITSYN

GOLITSYN, who had served the KGB most recently as a counter-intelligence officer in Helsinki during 1960 and 1961, reported separately two possibly related leads to operations against American personnel assigned to the United States Embassy in Moscow. One of these was a developmental operation against a military code clerk which the KGB felt was almost certain of success, the other a recruitment approach to an Embassy employee which GOLITSYN was told had been successful. GOLITSYN learned these two items of information from different KGB Second Chief Directorate officers at different times.

GOLITSYN provided the first of these leads on 23 December 1961, when he reported information he said he learned during conversations with his personal friend GRYAZNOV at KGB Headquarters in Moscow some time between April and July 1960.* At that time GOLITSYN was visiting the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate in connection with his preparations for assignment in Helsinki as a First Chief Directorate counter-intelligence officer. GRYAZNOV told GOLITSYN that he, GRYAZNOV, had personally prepared an operation involving an American military code clerk to the point that the KGB was "99 per cent sure" that the recruitment approach to this code clerk would be successful. GOLITSYN subsequently narrowed the time of his conversation with GRYAZNOV down to "April or May 1960" and quoted GRYAZNOV as saying that the KGB "is certain that the recruitment is prepared and will be successful." GOLITSYN also said that the recruitment plan for this operation "evidently involved a woman," but could provide no further details. During these same talks, according to GOLITSYN, GRYAZNOV said that although the KGB had earlier recruited U.S. Department of State code clerks in Moscow, this would be the first recruitment of a code clerk in the office of the American Military Attache since the establishment of the Second Chief Directorate's American Department (in the 1940's).

GOLITSYN reported on the second operation on 26 February 1962, while discussing the KGB agent PREISFREUND. GOLITSYN said that he first met PREISFREUND when the latter went to the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki in connection with an application for travel to the USSR. On several later occasions, GOLITSYN said, the two men had drinks together in Helsinki cafes. According to GOLITSYN, PREISFREUND had been used in the recruitment in Moscow of at least one American who "could have been a code clerk or a diplomat." He also knew that the recruitment had been accomplished "in 1960, at the end of 1960" and that PREISFREUND, having met the target at America House in Moscow, had helped to set up the target for the recruitment approach by involving him in speculative activities and by arranging his introduction to various KGB female agents. GOLITSYN thought that PREISFREUND had dropped out of the case after "he had helped to create the circumstances" and had not taken a direct part in

* According to NOSENKO, he himself was GRYAZNOV's superior at this time. NOSENKO did not recall visits by GOLITSYN to the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960.

the approach, which was made by KGB officers. During an interview by the FBI on 18 June 1962, GOLITSYN

This second lead, GOLITSYN said, stemmed from his conversations with KOVSHUK whom he said was the "assistant" (chief) of the American Department,* while GOLITSYN was temporarily in Moscow during "December 1960."** GOLITSYN related that he had visited the American Department to request permission to use PREISFREUND operationally in Helsinki. This request was refused with the explanation: "You see, he (PREISFREUND) helped us in one recruitment now, and it is necessary to be careful for about six months

* GOLITSYN could mean either Pomoshchik (assistant) or Zamestitel' (deputy). The CHEREPANOV papers show that KOVSHUK was Deputy Chief of the Department as late as 1959. NOSENKO said that, as a result of a drinking incident, KOVSHUK was demoted from Deputy Chief of the American Department to Chief of its American Embassy Section in 1959 and held this position until early 1962. GOLITSYN said he had known KOVSHUK for about ten years and characterized him as a capable officer with about 15 years of KGB experience, at least ten of them in the American Department, Second Chief Directorate. In about 1956, according to GOLITSYN, KOVSHUK was handling KGB agent Henry SHAPIRO. CIA records show that in addition, KOVSHUK was involved in the Moscow and Washington phases of the "ANDREY" case (he was identified by Dayle SMITH; see Part VI.D.3.b.) and in the development in Moscow of CIA officer George WINTERS (who identified his photograph; see Part VI.D.7.c.). According to NOSENKO, KOVSHUK took personal part in the recruitments of Roy RHODES and Dayle SMITH, in the approach to Army Attache Walter MULE, code clerk Louis MANNHEIM, State Department Officer Richard HARNSTONE, and code clerk James STORSBERG, and in the interrogations of CIA officers Russell LINGELLE and Richard JACOB.

**GOLITSYN's passport and travel records held by CIA confirm that GOLITSYN travelled only twice to the Soviet Union after his arrival in Helsinki on 20 July 1960. The first of these trips was on 19 January 1961, when he flew directly from Helsinki to Moscow; he returned to Helsinki by rail a week later, on 28 January. GOLITSYN's second trip to the Soviet Union was from 9 to 15 April 1961, when he appears to have spent all or most of this period in Leningrad. A Finnish national, whom GOLITSYN had been developing in Helsinki, has reported that he met with GOLITSYN in Leningrad on a daily basis from 10 through 13 April 1961. Moreover, GOLITSYN has never mentioned being in Moscow during this time. Since GOLITSYN remained in Helsinki from April until December 1961, when he defected, it appears that he erred by one month in reporting the date of his conversations in the American Department and that he learned of the second lead some time during the week of 19 January 1961. This is the same conversation of which NOSENKO spoke several times in 1962 and subsequently (see above). NOSENKO has always maintained that he was out of Moscow on leave at the time of GOLITSYN's visit and that this was in the summer of 1961. When he was told in February 1965 that GOLITSYN was in Moscow in January 1961, NOSENKO replied that CIA was either wrong or was attempting to deceive him. NOSENKO declined to change his story of the summer leave.

(e) Information from other Sources

Information available to CIA indicates that the Attaches of the three U.S. military services represented in Moscow shared a single cryptographic center as of 1960 and 1961 and that, except for overlapping assignments during periods of turnover, there was normally only one military code clerk assigned to the Embassy at any particular time. This military code clerk was responsible for enciphering and deciphering the traffic of all three military services. In practice, at least one other member of the Attache staff in Moscow has held a cryptographic clearance and has been trained and has performed the function of back-up for the military code clerk during periods of the latter's absence from the Moscow Embassy or inability to perform his functions for other reasons.

STORSBERG was the only military code clerk assigned to the Moscow Embassy from February 1960, when his predecessor, Everett HOBSON, was reassigned, until September 1961, when his successor, Mathew ZUJUS, arrived. STORSBERG himself arrived in Moscow in January 1960 and departed in November 1961.

During the period of STORSBERG's tour in Moscow, back-up cryptographic duties were performed by the Military Communications Officer, CWO-2 HURLEY. HURLEY performed these duties on a number of occasions, including the night of the approach to STORSBERG, and he could be loosely termed a code clerk.* Additionally, he performed repair work on the cryptographic machines and directed certain other sensitive activities at the Embassy. HURLEY's tour in Moscow began shortly before STORSBERG's, in December 1959, and he served there until June or July 1962.

The only other person performing official functions in the military code room during the 1960-1961 period was James KEYSERS, who arrived in Moscow on 22 December 1960 and was assigned to the office of the Air Force Medical Officer. As a concurrent secondary assignment, KEYSERS worked as a clerk-typist in the office of the Air Attache. From February until mid-April 1961, as a collateral duty, KEYSERS worked in the joint military code room where he was in training to serve as back-up cryptographer. He was relieved of this duty in April 1961 for reasons of low

* Although NOSENKO has distinguished between STORSBERG's function as "military code clerk" and HURLEY's duties as "military code machine mechanic," he said on one occasion that he considered both to be within the general category of "military code clerks." NOSENKO reported that there was no KGB operation against HURLEY.

aptitude and lack of interest; in June 1961 he was removed from Moscow because of reported homosexual activities.*

* NOSENKO has described an operation against KEYSERS (see below), but because of the date of KEYSERS' arrival in Moscow, he must be ruled out as a candidate for the first of GOLITSYN's two leads discussed above. On the basis of available information, it appears that the subject of this lead must have been either STORSBERG or HURLEY, the only two "military code clerks" in Moscow in the spring of 1960. The subject of GOLITSYN's second lead could have been STORSBERG, HURLEY, or, in fact, anyone else at the Embassy, although GOLITSYN suggested that he might be a code clerk and might be a military man. By his statement that there was no KGB operation against HURLEY, together with his description of the operation against STORSBERG beginning in the spring of 1960 and his (and PREISFREUND's) assertion that PREISFREUND took part in only one operation for the KGB--that against STORSBERG--NOSENKO has said in effect that both of GOLITSYN's leads were to the STORSBERG operation, which ended in failure. This conflicts with GOLITSYN's report that PREISFREUND was involved in a successful recruitment operation in late 1960. There are also inconsistencies between the NOSENKO and GOLITSYN leads as regards the progress of the operation. GOLITSYN reported that recruitment of a code clerk was "99 per cent" assured in May-June 1960, whereas NOSENKO and PREISFREUND describe an operation which, at best, was just becoming active at that time. GOLITSYN, in reporting his second lead, said that the operation in which PREISFREUND participated culminated "in late 1960;" NOSENKO reported that the only operation in which PREISFREUND took part ended in an unsuccessful approach to STORSBERG in "mid-1961" or, on other occasions, in "autumn 1961."

(iii) TDY's by KOSOLAPOV on Code Clerk Cases

(a) Introduction

According to NOSENKO, the U.S. Embassy Section officer KOSOLAPOV travelled only once to Helsinki, and KOSOLAPOV at that time succeeded in his mission of accompanying--together with a KGB female agent--a suspected American code clerk, Paul Francis JENNER, by train to Moscow. (The KGB later learned that JENNER was not a code clerk but a pouch clerk who also met couriers at the Moscow airport, NOSENKO said, and this KGB identification of JENNER's specialty is confirmed by U.S. Department of State files.) The report by NOSENKO on KOSOLAPOV is contradicted by two sources, travel records available to CIA and the KGB defector GOLITSYN.

Statements made by JENNER in 1960 and 1962 parallel those of NOSENKO in 1964 and 1965 to the extent that two young Soviets, a man and a woman, did converse with him on the train, and later JENNER did encounter the same woman at a Moscow airport. Nevertheless, travel records contradict NOSENKO's statement that KOSOLAPOV was the Soviet male aboard the train with JENNER on the 24-hour journey.

Although NOSENKO insisted that KOSOLAPOV was on a single TDY to Finland, in early 1960, travel records show that KOSOLAPOV (under a different identity) went to Helsinki in both the spring and fall of 1960. Travel records on the second Helsinki TDY by KOSOLAPOV, on which NOSENKO has not reported, are borne out by GOLITSYN. GOLITSYN said that KOSOLAPOV, in order to lay the groundwork for a future relationship in Moscow, accompanied a U.S. Embassy code clerk by train from Helsinki about November 1960, or perhaps as late as the beginning of 1961. Again on the basis of travel records, it has been determined that on 16 November 1960 KOSOLAPOV was a fellow passenger of an American code clerk named John W. GARLAND on the daily train from Helsinki to Moscow.

The following discussion of the TDY's of KOSOLAPOV is divided into three parts: KOSOLAPOV's false identity for travel, the early 1960 TDY, and the November 1960 TDY. Each part incorporates the information from all sources, including NOSENKO.

(b) False Identity for Travel

Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV was born in Perm' on 19 February 1928. According to travel records, one Viktor Dmitriyevich KOLOSOV, born in Perm' on 19 March 1927, was in Finland from 31 March to 2 April 1960, in Finland from 12 to 16 November 1960, and in Denmark from 25 October to 1 November 1961.* In July 1965, Johan PREISFREUND (see Part V.E.3.c.ii. on STORSBERG operation) identified for CIA a photograph of KOLOSOV as that of a KGB officer named Vadim (last name unknown) who approached him in Moscow

* NOSENKO reported that KOSOLAPOV travelled to Copenhagen in 1961 to recontact the YOUNGERS, an American man and wife who were arrested for espionage and recruited by the KGB while touring the USSR in 1961 (see Part VI.D.2.).

in the fall of 1964 to ask whether he knew anything about NOSENKO's defection. Shown KOLOSOV's photograph in October 1966, NOSENKO immediately identified him as KOSOLAPOV.

NOSENKO told the FBI [REDACTED] subsequently CIA prepared a protocol, which NOSENKO read and signed, corroborating its accuracy. This protocol reads:

"I do not know about this trip of KOSOLAPOV's to Helsinki in November 1960. I do not know that he accompanied a coin clerk back to Moscow at that time.

"I was KOSOLAPOV's direct supervisor from January 1960 to January 1962 and would have to know and approve any operational travel by KOSOLAPOV outside the USSR. In the case of his trip in March 1960 to Helsinki to accompany Paul JENNER, I talked with him about it, and then approved after he wrote it, the cable to the Helsinki residentura (Legal Residency) informing them of his mission, and of course received his report after the trip.

"Normally, I would know about and approve this trip in advance. If I were away at the time, normally I would have heard about the trip upon its return. However, I don't remember anything about this trip either before or after KOSOLAPOV's trip to Helsinki. If there were further developments in this case, I certainly would have known about them."*

(c) The Early 1960 TDY (JENNER Case)

NOSENKO first mentioned a TDY by KOSOLAPOV in an interview by the FBI. [REDACTED]

* NOSENKO reminded his interviewer that he had travelled to Cuba in November 1960. He was told that CIA travel records show that he transitted Amsterdam on a direct flight to Cuba from Moscow on 15 November 1960, three days after KOSOLAPOV arrived in Helsinki. NOSENKO was then asked if he would have learned of the trip in any case, whether or not he was in Moscow, and he stated that he would have. [REDACTED]

TOP SECRET

NOSENKO was interrogated by CIA on the JENNER case on 15 February 1965. On the basis of this interrogation, a protocol was drawn up in question-and-answer form, incorporating NOSENKO's responses, and on 19 February 1965, NOSENKO signed the protocol, attesting to its accuracy. The following is taken from this signed statement:

Question: Did you supervise the work against JENNER?

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: Did you read the file on JENNER?

NOSENKO: I don't remember.

Question: Did you read reports on JENNER?

NOSENKO: Yes, I read materials on JENNER, everything which came into the section on JENNER and the other code clerks.

Question: Did you ever see JENNER personally?

NOSENKO: Yes. We had his anketa [visa application].

Question: What was the operational plan on JENNER?

NOSENKO: Before his arrival we had only the anketa, nothing more. He was listed as secretary/archivist,* and there was a date on this anketa which was the date he was due to cross the Finnish border--the middle of the month, the 15th. It was the beginning of 1960, not long after I had arrived in the First Department. We decided to create an active operation. We knew the date, and we thought he was to

* The position of secretary/archivist at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow was usually occupied by a code clerk, but as previously stated, this was not true in JENNER's case.

be a code clerk. We wanted to send KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki with the mission of returning with JENNER on the same train, during which time KOSOLAPOV was to study his behavior. JENNER was young and so was KOSOLAPOV.

Question: How old was JENNER at the time?

NOSENKO: I don't know. We sent GRYAZNOV's agent, a ballerina, to Vyborg as part of this operation. I think her first name is Yeva, but I don't remember her last name; her code name was "SOLISTKA"... She was placed on the train in Vyborg as if she had been visiting someone there and was returning to Moscow. The main idea was to place an agent near JENNER before he even arrived in Moscow. We wrote a proposal to the Chairman of the KGB giving the reasons for doing this. We explained that we had usually only one year in which to work. The agent "SOLISTKA" met JENNER and spoke with him. KOSOLAPOV also became acquainted with JENNER and spoke with him, but I can't say that they were all speaking together at one time. She gave JENNER a telephone number.

Question: A KGB telephone number?

NOSENKO: Of course not; it was her own telephone number, but he didn't call her. We then noticed that he wasn't working in the code room but in the mail room. O.K., that was interesting too. We waited one or two months for the call to come, but nothing happened. When JENNER once went to the railroad station or airport alone to meet the couriers, we sent her with GRYAZNOV by car in an attempt to have them meet again. JENNER saw her but did not approach [her]. Instead, he turned in the other direction. Only later did we learn that he is a very quiet person. There was nothing else on JENNER at all except a suspicion that he may have been a homosexual, but there was no proof. He was like a child.

Question: How much time did you have between the time of the anketa's arrival and the time of JENNER's arrival?

NOSENKO: A month, plenty of time to prepare.

Question: A month?

NOSENKO: Well, approximately a month. The usual approval from the Central Committee was necessary so that KOSOLAPOV could go abroad.

Question: Who wrote this?

NOSENKO: I prepared the kharakteristika [official form] on KOSOLAPOV for this TDY and gave it to the Personnel Office.

Question: Whose idea was it for this Helsinki operation against JENNER?

NOSENKO: It was the idea of the group.

Question: Did you advise KOSOLAPOV on what his role was to be before he left--what he was to do?

NOSENKO: I was discussing this case with GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV, and maybe we discussed it with KOVSHUK on the day before KOSOLAPOV left.

Question: Was "SOLISTKA" an experienced agent?

NOSENKO: She had been working before 1960, but I don't know for how long.

Question: Who handled her before GRYAZNOV?

NOSENKO: I don't know.

Question: How did you coordinate this trip of KOSOLAPOV's with other units, for example, with the [KGB] First Chief Directorate (FCD)?

NOSENKO: KOSOLAPOV wrote a cable saying that he was coming for two or three days.

Question: Did you approve this cable?

NOSENKO: I didn't sign it, but I read it, and then we took it to KLYPIN for his signature. Once it was signed, KOSOLAPOV took it to the Second [European] Department, FCD.

Question: What cover did KOSOLAPOV use for this trip?

NOSENKO: I don't remember.

Question: What name did KOSOLAPOV use?

NOSENKO: I don't remember if he used his own name or another.

Question: What other correspondence was there?

NOSENKO: Correspondence?

Question: What other cables or letters were sent to or received from the Helsinki Rezidentura [Legal Residency of the KGB] concerning this operation, KOSOLAPOV's trip?

NOSENKO: Only this cable, nothing else. KOSOLAPOV was to discuss with the Rezidentura the possibility of obtaining their help in Helsinki with the work against code clerks, to see what agents they had, or to study the situation, the possibilities. We wanted to use agents against the code clerks in hotels and restaurants, to use girls...

Question: With whom was KOSOLAPOV to speak in Helsinki?

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NOSENKO: He spoke with the Resident and the Deputy Resident. He discussed this question with them and they said they would see about it, but we were told that the Residency has more important questions.

Question: What was more important than the work against code clerks?

NOSENKO: They didn't tell us.

Question: Well, wasn't there some sign, some hint as to what was so important?

NOSENKO: Code clerks in Helsinki would be more important for them; this is the work of the FCD.

Question: How did KOSOLAPOV know how to find JENNER, to recognize him and make contact?

NOSENKO: KOSOLAPOV had his photograph, knew his name, and with the help of the Residency, I think, they found out at the railroad station who was going on the train. Then they bought a ticket on the same train for KOSOLAPOV. We knew JENNER must cross on the 15th.

Question: When did KOSOLAPOV leave for his trip to Helsinki?

NOSENKO: I don't know.

Question: When did he return?

NOSENKO: I don't know, don't remember.

Question: How long was KOSOLAPOV gone in all?

NOSENKO: About one week, not more than one week counting travel time.

Question: How did KOSOLAPOV travel to Helsinki?

NOSENKO: By train, both ways.

Question: Was he alone on the way down or did someone go with him?

NOSENKO: He was alone.

Question: How did you arrange for "SOLISTKA" to board the right train?

NOSENKO: GRYAZNOV sent "SOLISTKA" alone to Vyborg and had the local KGB officers there meet her and place her on the correct train. They knew the date and would establish the fact that KOSOLAPOV was on that train before placing her aboard...

Also on 15 February 1965 NOSENKO made the following additional statement not included in the protocol: "The agent was 'SOLISTKA.' She was GRYAZNOV's agent even before 1960. GRYAZNOV briefed her for the mission... KOSOLAPOV wrote a report on

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his trip. Nothing unusual or interesting in it. 'SOLISTKA' also gave a report to GRYAZNCV, but there was nothing there, either."

NOSENKO was questioned on 20 October 1966 about his responsibility for and knowledgeability of KGB operations against American code clerks. He was required to give only brief answers, without discussion, to specific questions. The CIA questions and his answers were as follows:

Question: Did you supervise all code clerk operations in 1960 and 1961?

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: Were GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV your subordinates during this period?

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: How many times did KOSOLAPOV travel to Helsinki in order to travel to Moscow on the train with American code clerks?

NOSENKO: I know of one.

Question: When was that? Which one?

NOSENKO: Don't remember. 15 March or April 1960.

Question: Which code clerk?

NOSENKO: It wasn't a code clerk. When he arrived it was found that he worked with the mail. He came as a secretary/archivist and the First [U.S. Embassy] Section thought he is a code clerk. Found out later that he worked on the mail.

Question: JENNER?

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: Do you know of any others?

NOSENKO: No. What do you mean?

Question: Only one?

NOSENKO: Only one--JENNER.

Question: Was the operation successful?

NOSENKO: No it wasn't successful. But it was interesting. It was the first try to send an officer to Helsinki.

Question: When did it happen?

NOSENKO: First part of 1960. I think approximately 15 March or April.

Question: Other than the trip to meet JENNER, did KOSOLAPOV make other trips abroad?

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NOSENKO: He went to Copenhagen to meet this couple [the YOUNGERS] and was in the United States at one of the General Assemblies. That's all. That was in the '50's. No others.

Question: Did KOSOLAPOV personally meet JENNER?

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: Did you read his report of this meeting?

NOSENKO: Yes.

When on 26 October 1966 NOSENKO was shown the KOLOSOV photograph for the first time, the following discussion ensued:

Question: Do you know the person in this photograph, number 17 [Viktor Dmitriyevich KOLOSOV, employee of Vneshtorg, born 19 March 1927 in Perm, USSR]?

NOSENKO: KOSOLAPOV, Vadim KOSOLAPOV, the former case officer of First Chief Directorate, First Department. From '59, the end of '59, case officer of the First Department, Second Chief Directorate.

Question: We have information that a Viktor--

NOSENKO: (interrupts) Vadim Viktorovich.

Question: Anything else you want to say about the name?

NOSENKO: KOSOLAPOV.

Question: Concerning his travel to Helsinki by train in March of 1960 under cover of Vneshtorg, does that mean anything to you?

NOSENKO: I was telling you that there was trip when he was returning with Paul JENNER.

Question: JENNER, the code clerk?

NOSENKO: He was secretary/archivist, but he wasn't working as a code clerk. He was working with mail.

Question: Well, according to official records he arrived in Helsinki by train from Moscow.

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: On the 31st of March 1960.

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: And he went to meet JENNER, to come back on the train with him. Right?

NOSENKO: I was thinking and I'm not sure. '60 or '61. I'm not sure. '60 or '61. I'm not sure. I'm not sure '60 or '61. I was telling '60, but I'm not sure. Anyway, I cannot tell exactly. I know he was in Helsinki, that he was going to Helsinki.

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- Question: It's 1960. He made a trip in 1960, in March, to Helsinki by train using this name, KOLOSOV, and using this cover, Vneshtorg, and we also have a report from official Finnish sources that he left Helsinki by train on 2 April 1960 and went to Moscow.
- NOSENKO: I don't remember the dates. Don't remember. Must be 15 March or 1 April, 15 March or 1 April.
- Question: No, he didn't arrive until 31 March. We have the official record on his travel. We have his photo here, which you just saw.
- NOSENKO: On the visa certificate, anketa, with this picture of Paul JENNER, it was said that he must come; we knew that he must come 1 April or 15 March, or something of this kind.
- Question: But we have the official records showing KOLOSOV's, or KOSOLAPOV's, arrival on 31 March.
- NOSENKO: I cannot give you any details. All I have said, everything what I knew. If you need something on KOSOLAPOV, I will try to remember.
- Question: The interesting thing is KOLOSOV, or KOSOLAPOV, left Helsinki on 2 April. JENNER, Paul JENNER, according to the same official sources, left Helsinki by train to go to Moscow on the 31st. Two days before.
- NOSENKO: They were going in one train.
- Question: They weren't even on the same train.
- NOSENKO: Here, please, they were going in one train.
- Question: KOSOLAPOV remained in Helsinki.
- NOSENKO: (interrupts) KOSOLAPOV in one even carriage, in one even carriage with Paul JENNER. Then...
- Question: (interrupts) How do you know this for sure?
- NOSENKO: I was reading his report after his coming. I was reading also the agent's report of the female agent who was put in this carriage, in this carriage in this train, and at the station Vyborg, the first Soviet station, Vyborg, where she was taken by GRYAZNOV, and was put in the same carriage, and she was acquainted with JENNER. And later, it was a try, as I was telling, to show her to JENNER, but JENNER didn't want to have a contact with her. That's all. It was finished... And she was acquainted with him and was speaking with JENNER, and KOSOLAPOV himself was speaking with JENNER... I was reading KOSOLAPOV's otchet [official account] about his [trip].
- Question: That's quite possible. It's quite possible that they gave you a report to read concerning this. But it is a fact that official records show that the two men were not on the same train. They were two days apart.
- NOSENKO: No (whispered).

Question: JENNER left on the 31st.

NOSENKO: I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. Maybe this is a mistake of Finnish officials. I don't know, but he was on the same train and he was returning from Helsinki with Paul JENNER. The same train, ~~the same train.~~

The remaining information on KOSOLAPOV's TDY in early 1960 comes from other sources:

- After arriving in Moscow on 1 April 1960, JENNER reported that he was approached on the train from Helsinki by two young Russians, "a boy and a girl, probably university students."* The two Russians struck up a conversation and were soon baiting him on the question of racial discrimination in the United States. They said that they might see JENNER in Moscow. About three months later, on 29 June, JENNER was performing his normal duty of escorting Embassy couriers to Shermetevo Airport when he was again approached by the Russian girl, Yuli, who acted surprised to see him and asked him to go outside to talk. Yuli explained that she was waiting to say goodbye to a friend who was leaving on a flight to Irkutsk (JENNER had seen the Irkutsk flight depart a half hour earlier) and told JENNER that her male companion on the train trip to Moscow, Yura, had returned to his studies in Vyborg. Interspersed with Yuli's questions concerning JENNER's impressions and personal activities in Moscow were others about how often he came to the airport and how he liked his job at the Embassy. When JENNER said he must leave, she gave him her telephone number in Moscow and insisted that he call her.** She advised JENNER that "it would be better if you did not mention our conversation to anyone."

- Besides information about his Soviet companions on the Moscow journey, JENNER also told U.S. Department of State security officials about sexual advances made by his first maid in Moscow and about provocative clothing worn by his second maid. (NOSENKO has not indicated that either of these two women was a KGB agent, but has said in another context that all maids of American code clerks were KGB agents or informants.)

- CIA investigations showed that I. Ye. SERGEYEV, a KGB officer and the Soviet Consul in Helsinki, contacted the police chief there on 31 March 1960 to ask his assistance in locating an American named Paul F. JENNER who was due to arrive in Helsinki the day before.*** SERGEYEV explained that he had some "business" with JENNER, but he

* KOSOLAPOV was 32 years of age at the time.

** NOSENKO has mentioned several times that GRYAZNOV's agent "SOLISTKA" gave JENNER her telephone number.

***GOLITSYN identified the Helsinki police chief as a Soviet Intelligence agent from "about 1945 on."

did not specify its nature. Reportedly this was the first time that SERGEYEV had made such a request of the police chief.^o

- CIA travel records show that JENNER arrived in Helsinki en route to Moscow on 30 March 1960 and departed by train the following day. KOSOLAPOV arrived in Helsinki the same day that JENNER left, 31 March 1960, and remained there until 2 April 1960 when he too departed for Moscow by train. The Finnish train manifest for 31 March 1960 indicates that there was only one passenger aboard the daily train leaving Helsinki for Moscow on this date, Paul JENNER, listed as a U.S. citizen and secretary/archivist. The manifest for 2 April 1960 carries the name Viktor KOLOSSOV (KOSOLAPOV) and shows that no American citizens were aboard.

(d) The November 1960 TDY (GARLAND Case)

Apart from denying that it ever took place, NOSENKO has said nothing about a trip to Helsinki by KOSOLAPOV in November 1960, but GCLITSYN said such a trip occurred and related it to an incipient KGB operation against an American code clerk.

GOLITSYN was not posted to the KGB Legal Residency in Helsinki until July 1960, i.e., after KOSOLAPOV's first trip to Helsinki, under the KOLOSOV alias. He has reported that at "about the end of 1960, about November or possibly by the beginning of 1961," the KGB Second Chief Directorate sent a telegram to the Helsinki Legal Residency. The telegram advised that an American code clerk would arrive in Helsinki in transit to Moscow; the responsible case officer would be KOSOLAPOV, who was being sent to Helsinki under an alias and under Vneshtorg cover; KOSOLAPOV was to strike up an acquaintance to be continued with the American in Moscow.

The following extracts are from the transcript of GOLITSYN's further remarks on this subject in early 1962:

Question: You say that around November 1960 KOSOLAPOV came to Finland?

GOLITSYN: Came to Finland.

Question: He came under cover?

GOLITSYN: Yes.

Question: Under a new identity? With an alias?

GOLITSYN: Yes, as an employee of Trade Union (Vneshtorg). But, of course, there may be some different dates. Maybe November. I suppose [believe] it was the end of 1960 or it can be the beginning of 1961. And he waiting for some days, a week or so.

Question: In Helsinki?

^o A similar request to the police chief was made by SERGEYEV with regard to GARLAND (see below).

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Finnish Travel Manifest for 16 November 1960
(See Part V.E.3.c.iii)

Luettelo matkustajista, joiden Sukupuoli ja nimenimet	Junnalla Ostettu (Hinnat)	Syynsästä Syyntodotus	Kansalaisuus	Määrämaa	Osasto Suomessa
1 Mouraviava, Nonna ✓	soo.män.	dipl.	N:liiton	N:liitto	Lähetystö, Hki.
2 Parve, Palf	kirjeilija	1919	"	Esti	"
3 Morozov, Alexandro	dipl.kur.	dipl.	"	N:liitto/N-S-T	Kauttakulku
4 Otchagovskii, Alek. Gno	"	"	"	"	"
5 Cavallona, Maria ✓	rouva	1922	"	N:liitto	-
6 Kolesov, Viktor	viikkolija	19.03.27	"	"	-
7 Agafonov, Samuil	"	1922	"	"	-
8 Akimov, Petr	sirkustait.	1913	"	"	-
9 Lait, Jean Eppiste	dipl.kur.	17.08.07	Ranskan	"	Kauttakulku.
10 Garland, John Jr.	sihteeri	22.03.32	USA:n	"	"
11 Bruckner, Henry Charles	tato siht.	dipl.	Suomen	"	Ulkoasiainministeriö.
12 Kontalainen, Antu Ilmari	kirvesmiehen	14.11.19	"	"	Kulmat. E.H.05, Hki.
13 Oksanen, Frans Oskar	sähköasent.	28.05.00	"	"	4.Linja, 20.D.39, Hki.
14 Immonen, Heikki Juhani ✓	lainop.kant.	21.01.30	"	"	Kivatorin R. 23. C, Hki.
15					
16					
17					
18					
19					
20					
21					
22					

Passintarkastaja:
V. t. ylikontt. *E. Saukkonen*
E. Saukkonen

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GOLITSYN: Yes. Maybe four days. Then we knew that the American Embassy took a ticket for him [the American target] for the train... And KOSOLAPOV took a ticket in the same compartment. And before the departure we knew exactly from the guide [conductor] of that train that it's the same person--[I'm not certain whether he was a] code clerk or not a code clerk*-- but his name, his real name. It was listed. And I was at the railroad station at that time. I went to see off the delegation, the Soviet delegation.**

Question: See them off?

GOLITSYN: Yes, the delegation. And I asked him, KOSOLAPOV: "Who is this person? I suppose [he is an] American?" I suppose [believe] he said: "He's a fat man, a young fat man."

Question: The American?

GOLITSYN: Yes. And I suppose [believe KOSOLAPOV said] bespectacled.*** And KOSOLAPOV and these persons were smiling and looked through the window before departure.

Question: In the compartment? The train compartment?

GOLITSYN: Yes, and then this other person visited Helsinki from KOSOLAPOV's division [the U.S. Embassy Section, American Department, Second Chief Directorate].****

Question: When was this?

GOLITSYN: It was in summer or maybe September or so of 1961. And I asked him. I reminded him about his case...

Question: Who was this? Do you remember?

GOLITSYN: I don't remember because he changed his name. I know him but I... And I asked him how is that case that I helped KOSOLAPOV with? And he did not want to discuss it. That's why I came to the conclusion that this case was a success. Otherwise he would have told [me]. And I am not sure but I can try to recognize this person in pictures.

Question: You think that you could?

* When he first gave this lead, GOLITSYN identified the American as a code clerk.

** GOLITSYN was not asked details of this delegation. There were eight Soviets, including KOSOLAPOV, on this train.

*** KOSOLAPOV's description does not fit John GARLAND; it is, however, a fairly accurate characterization of Paul JENNER.

**** NOSENKO has not mentioned this TDY, and the KGB officer remains unidentified.

GOLITSYN: Yes, probably. He reminds me a little of one of my friends.

Question: He looks a little like your friend?

GOLITSYN: Yes.

Question: Which one? KOSOLAPOV?

GOLITSYN: No, no. This American

The Finnish railroad manifest lists the passengers travelling from Helsinki to Moscow on 16 November 1960. KOSOLAPOV was one of eight Soviets aboard the train, and John W. GARLAND was the only American. GARLAND, by his own statement, arrived in Helsinki on 14 November 1960; he was travelling to Moscow to assume the duties of supervisor of the State Department code room in the U.S. Embassy.

As he had with regard to JENNIFER (and also SERGEYEV of the KGB Legal Residency in Helsinki) asked the local police chief (and KGB agent, according to GOLITSYN) on 11 November 1960 for help in locating GARLAND, an American who would arrive there on 14 November.

GARLAND was first interviewed by John ARIDIAN, the Embassy Security Officer in Moscow in connection with the GOLITSYN lead on 17 June 1962. In this interview GARLAND denied having met any Soviet or KOSOLAPOV's physical description during the Helsinki-to-Moscow train trip and also denied having ever been approached by Soviet Intelligence. On 30 July 1963 GARLAND was interviewed by the FBI

NOSENKO on 28 January 1964 identified 20 Americans employed by the U.S. Embassy in Moscow who were of interest to the KGB because they were suspect intelligence officers or agents, or because they fell into some other category of interest to the KGB. He gave a short statement concerning each of these 20 persons. One of them was GARLAND, about whom NOSENKO said: "code clerk, but nothing doing." NOSENKO was asked on 2 September 1964 to review this list for the purpose of supplying any additional information he might have concerning the individuals named. NOSENKO stated: "As with all code clerks, they were studying him (GARLAND) in order to gather enough material to make a recruitment. The case officer was KOSOLAPOV. I don't remember the names or descriptions of any agents, and I didn't hear of any derogatory information. As far as I know, there was no operational approach and no recruitment." Although he could not recall whether he had read the KGB file on GARLAND or not. NOSENKO on 15 February 1965 said he thought that he must have read current materials concerning GARLAND as they came into the U.S. Embassy Section. NOSENKO also said that there was no operational plan drawn up for GARLAND because the KGB had no derogatory information whatsoever concerning him. NOSENKO has not provided additional information concerning GARLAND, whom he had presumably never seen, and was unable

to recall any background information concerning GARLAND or any details on his travels and acquaintances while stationed in Moscow.

In the context of discussion of KOLOSOV/KOSOLAPOV's travels to Helsinki, NOSENKO's interrogator pointed out on 26 October 1966 that CIA was aware of a second trip there which NOSENKO had not reported. The following is a transcript of this portion of the discussion on that date:

Question: Well, we started to look for other trips by KOSOLAPOV, or KOLOSOV, and we did run across another trip, again by KOLOSOV, using the same alias.

NOSENKO: To Copenhagen?

Question: No. This was a trip to Helsinki.

NOSENKO: Oh. I don't know. Maybe after, after '61 maybe. I don't know--'62, '63, I don't know.

Question: No, this was in 1960. When you say you were in the First [U.S. Embassy] Section, First [American] Department, Second Chief Directorate. He was on the train, according to official records, on 16 November 1960, going from Helsinki to Moscow.

NOSENKO: I know about one, he has took trip, when he was returning from Helsinki with Paul JENNER.

Question: We looked at everybody else, all the other records concerning this train trip to see who was on the train with KOSOLAPOV or KOLOSOV. KOLOSOV was the name he used.

NOSENKO: Yes?

Question: We found there was one American on that train with KOLOSOV going from Helsinki to Moscow.

NOSENKO: Yes? And his name? If it is not secret, if you can say, of course?

Question: One of your targets, an American code clerk.

NOSENKO: He was, I know, going from Helsinki, only with Paul JENNER.

Question: You don't know this man's name?

NOSENKO: (silence)

Question: Well, we checked further and we found out that GOLITSYN had told us about a trip.

NOSENKO: When he was returning from Helsinki with Paul JENNER? GOLITSYN was then out, yes?*

* GOLITSYN arrived in Helsinki in July 1960, over four months after JENNER passed through Finland en route to Moscow.

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Question: GOLITSYN told us that KOSOLAPOV was travelling to Helsinki to meet a code clerk in November 1960. You understand what I'm telling you?

NOSENKO: Yes, I understand. And KOSOLAPOV must tell him about the code clerk, but we found out that Paul JENNER is not a code clerk when he began to work at the Embassy.

Question: This is not Paul JENNER. This is a different time of year--

NOSENKO: (interrupts) When he began to work in Embassy.

Question: This is not March 1960. This is November 1960. A different time. It's the same year, but a different time.

NOSENKO: I know only about his trip when he was returning with Paul JENNER.

Question: Well, how do you explain that this man, who's supposed to be under your supervision in the Embassy Section, is aboard this train with this American code clerk, one of your targets, in November 1960?

NOSENKO: I know only about one trip [by] KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, when he was returning with Paul JENNER, about whom he was thinking also that he was a code clerk. Yes.

Question: KOSOLAPOV or KOLOSOV was not on the same train with JENNER. We have the names; we have the facts; we have the official records. We also have GOLITSYN's information about November 1960. GOLITSYN went with KOSOLAPOV to the train station to see him off.

NOSENKO: He must. He was working as a case officer of counter-intelligence, of the Fourteenth Department. Of course he must, of course he must. And KOSOLAPOV must speak with him.

Question: KOSOLAPOV spoke with GOLITSYN, and KOSOLAPOV rode with this American code clerk from Helsinki on the train back to Moscow. But GOLITSYN was not in Helsinki when JENNER was there. It wasn't JENNER.

NOSENKO: With Paul JENNER I know, but I don't know of anybody else... You are giving me such a big bluff. I don't know, I don't know, I don't know.

Question: It's no bluff. Do you have any idea who this other code clerk was?

NOSENKO: No. There wasn't such a one.

Question: Well, I'll tell you who it was... Did you ever hear the name GARLAND?

NOSENKO: Yes, I heard GARLAND. And there wasn't any approach made to GARLAND. There wasn't any attempt to recruit him. There was a study of him, yes, but there wasn't recruitment or something else...

(iv) KGB-Polish UB Activities Against MORONE

(a) Introduction

In 1961 CIA learned from a Polish source who furnished much reliable and sensitive information that, with the assistance of its Polish counterpart, the Office of Security (UB), the KGB in November 1960 began using a female agent against Joseph MORONE, a U.S. Department of State code clerk assigned to the American Embassy in Moscow in August 1960. The woman accompanied MORONE on a train trip from Moscow, became intimate with him in Warsaw, returned to Moscow twice in February 1961, and there had sexual relations with him. The compromising scenes of MORONE and the Polish UB agent were photographed. This information on the KGB operation was received by CIA soon after the woman's second visit to Moscow. On the basis of this report, MORONE was interviewed and polygraphed in Oslo in May 1961, and he was transferred to Lisbon from Moscow in August 1961.

NOSENKO gave a few details on the same case, without mentioning the name of the KGB target, during the 1962 meetings in Geneva. In 1964 and 1965 he furnished more particulars on the MORONE case, identifying three KGB agents (besides the Polish female) who participated in the operation. NOSENKO, however, said that two of them added no information of use to the KGB against MORONE, and that he was unable to remember what the third agent reported: statements by other sources indicate that regarding MORONE all three agents could have acquired information of operational potential for the KGB. NOSENKO has not reported, as have other sources, that a fourth KGB agent named Ella UMANETS was in contact with MORONE, or that the KGB officer SKVORTSOV--posing as MICHAUD--was with MORONE at America House on at least one occasion, the night when STORSBERG says he was approached by the KGB (see above). NOSENKO has confused the MORONE case with another by saying that a fifth KGB agent was directed against MORONE, whereas she was apparently directed against the American code clerk ZUJUS (see below). The sensitive source of the original report on MORONE stated that a KGB officer "VOLODYA" (Vladimir, last name unknown) personally met the Polish female agent when she arrived in Moscow, and NOSENKO said that the KGB officer was his subordinate KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO at first claimed a KGB photographic technician supporting the case reported to him, but he retracted this remark after CIA showed him that travel records on NOSENKO made it impossible for the technician to have spoken to him as he described. According to NOSENKO, MORONE was reassigned from Moscow before the KGB could take further steps against the code clerk, and he speculates MORONE's transfer was prompted by American authorities' concern over his relationship with one of the KGB female agents.

(b) NOSENKO's Information

At his first meeting with CIA on 9 June 1962 NOSENKO made a passing reference to an operation in which he had placed a female agent of the Polish service in contact with an American from the Moscow Embassy while the latter was visiting Warsaw. Later, NOSENKO said, he brought the same female to Moscow in order to obtain further compromising materials on this American.

Asked on 11 June 1962 whether he had had foreign agents working against the U.S. Embassy, NOSENKO described his having introduced the idea of using such agents to develop Americans afraid of contacts with Russian girls. He said that he himself had several of these third-national agents, that he sometimes would ask the German and Polish services to supply him with agents, and that it was unnecessary for him to explain their intended use in operations against Americans. NOSENKO then gave an example: "Listen, the sergeants [enlisted men] who lived in America House had a custom--it was too far to go to America, so where did they go to rest [on leave]? To Finland or Poland. Why Poland? Because they can find women there, the rate of exchange is good, and so on. What do we do? We planted a female Polish agent [on an American] in Poland. Then she comes to Moscow. We arranged a chance meeting, and things developed. Once two guys, a Marine guard and a code clerk went to Warsaw. They were on leave for a week and a half. We knew when they would be going. I made an immediate phone call to Warsaw. 'Give me a woman,' I said. 'Get a good whore for me there, a pretty one but not one who strikes the eye particularly.' Well, they sent me such a girl. And I placed this Polish agent on the same train, in the same car, even in the same compartment. The train left. One of the Americans, the one in whom we were particularly interested, the code clerk, wanted the girl and there, in the compartment, they went to bed together while the other American slept. I told the Poles in Warsaw to give the girl an apartment and to get photographs. They arranged an apartment and he came there. Everything was O.K. After a week and a half he returned to Moscow. We did not rush things. A month passed. Two months. Let's not rush, I said. A half a year went by. I insisted that nothing further may be done any earlier. Then I said, 'All right, let's give him this girl, this Pole.' She arrived [in Moscow] and they met one another. I created the conditions: we created the conditions. They slept with one another once, twice. A [Soviet] girlfriend showed up. The same thing. And he also began to sleep with the girlfriend. The Pole left and he was with this Russian, and she was our agent. You see, first the boys are afraid of Russians. But [we gave him] a Pole and then transferred him to a Russian."

NOSENKO stated on 1 February 1964: "I remember we were working on one of the members of the guard of the American Embassy, who was going to Warsaw for a good time, for a few days' relaxation.* We wrote to our advisors [KGB officers attached to the Polish UB] to do everything possible--to get a pretty Polish girl for the fellow and to photograph any intimate scenes. The Poles introduced the guard to the girl, they did have intimate relations, but they gave us photographs without any intimate scenes. Just how they are sitting together, how he is kissing her--that's all. Well, we got these photographs and some time went by and then we asked that the Poles send us this Polish girl so that she could meet him in Moscow. They

* The guard referred to is Frank BEGGS, a marine enlisted man who accompanied MORONE to Warsaw. The facts, however, seem to relate to MORONE, who has described his encounter with the Polish girl and her subsequent recontact in Moscow. BEGGS has also reported (see below) that MORONE met a Polish girl on the train to Warsaw and that she later contacted him in Moscow; BEGGS has denied that he, himself, was contacted by any such girl in the Soviet Union after the trip to Warsaw with MORONE.

sent her. TRAZNOV and MUDIN also in 1959 had asked her, during the conversation, whether they had reached the ultimate in intimacy. She said she had not. They said they were surprised. She said she had never had reported that this relationship had reached that stage. You see, the Poles had not told us that until the fall of 1959. They gave us that news at the very first press conference I remember we called the Poles a few weeks before that. They were doing this under instructions from the other side with hard things. As my report says, this was not developed any further.

[REDACTED]

* NOSENKO has also mentioned a prohibition on recruitment attempts during the 1959 Sokolniki exhibition because of the need to avoid incidents affecting U.S.-Soviet relationships. GOLITSIN told CIA of such a prohibition placed on the use of homosexual compromise material against a U.S. Embassy employee in 1960 because of the impending visit of President EISENHOWER to the Soviet Union. As a result of the U-2 incident on 1 May 1960, this visit never took place, and U.S.-Soviet relations deteriorated. Throughout the rest of 1960 and most of 1961 they remained very strained, and Soviet pressures and hard lines culminated in the Berlin crisis and wall-building in Berlin in August of 1961.

NOSENKO further reported to CIA that the KGB case officer working against MORONE was NOSENKO's subordinate and specialist in code clerk operations, KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO read the file on MORONE and saw his visa photograph, but he never saw him in person and so could not provide a physical description. NOSENKO had discussed the MORONE case with KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV on a number of occasions.

NOSENKO said that the KGB agents working on MORONE were:

- Svetlana IVANOVA, a maid or waitress at America House who reported to DEMKIN, the case officer responsible for Americans living there, on everything she saw or heard concerning MORONE. KOSOLAPOV visited her several times with DEMKIN to discuss MORONE, and NOSENKO himself met her once or twice in one of the two safe apartments that DEMKIN had at his disposal. NOSENKO did not recall any specific information on MORONE which was interesting or useful from this source.

- [REDACTED] an Egyptian employed at the Egyptian Embassy who was an agent of the Sixth (Underdeveloped Countries) Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. [REDACTED] visited America House and met MORONE, but he did not report anything of value that NOSENKO remembered.

- One of two East German females imported for use against the inhabitants of America House. In early 1960 GRYAZNOV went to East Berlin to obtain two German women who could be used for this purpose. The first of these was Hanna, blonde, documented as a West German travelling to Moscow. NOSENKO never met her but instructed PREIS-FREUND (see the STORSBERG case) to take her to America House and leave her on her own. Hanna went several times to America House in 1961, but NOSENKO can recall nothing that she may have reported on MORONE. The other East German girl was documented as an Austrian. NOSENKO never met her but recalled that she was asked for her documents at America House on her first or second visit there. She replied that she had left them at her hotel, left America House, and never returned. NOSENKO did not remember the time when this incident occurred, beyond the fact that he was still in the U.S. Embassy Section and that ABIDIAN was the Embassy security officer at the time.*

- [REDACTED], an Italian [REDACTED] at the American Embassy and KOSOLAPOV's agent, reported everything he heard or saw about Americans to KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO recalled nothing specific that [REDACTED] had said about MORONE.

* CIA has no information concerning such an incident in 1960-1961, but the circumstances described by NOSENKO seem to apply to those surrounding a relationship between a woman named Lillian (last name not known) and the military code clerk ZUJUS. These details are given in Part V.E.3.c.(v). In any event, the incident involving Lillian occurred after the date when NOSENKO says he was transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section. At the time, Hugh MONTGOMERY rather than ABIDIAN was the Embassy Security Officer.

TOP SECRET

From one of these agents, or possibly in some other manner, the KGB learned that MORONE was planning to go on leave to Warsaw. NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV, and GRYAZNOV thereupon decided to employ a Polish female agent in an attempt to compromise him. KOSOLAPOV wrote the draft of the operational plan for the attempt, which was approved by GRIBANOV after some editing by NOSENKO and KOVSHUK, chief of the section. KOSOLAPOV next met with a Polish UB counterintelligence officer in KGB Headquarters to discuss the plan. The Pole was told that the target was a U.S. Embassy employee, but not that he was a code clerk; this fact was deliberately kept from the Poles.

As a result of this meeting, a Polish girl was obtained by the Polish UB and sent to Moscow by train. Upon her arrival she was met by KOSOLAPOV, who took her to a Moscow hotel, where he gave her instructions concerning her role in the operation. The girl was told to meet MORONE on the train, flirt with him, have him fall in love with her, continue the association, and study him. She was to tell him that she had been in Moscow as a guest of her uncle, a member of the Polish Trade Representation in Moscow, and that she could meet him again on her next visit.

Arrangements were made with the KGB Operational Technical Directorate for a technician to be placed on the train in the compartment next to that of MORONE and BEGGS and for audio and visual (but not photographic) coverage.

NOSENKO did not recall when MORONE and BEGGS left Moscow. The Polish agent did, however, succeed in making MORONE's acquaintance, and the technician from the Operational Technical Directorate reported back to NOSENKO the day after the train reached Warsaw.* The technician told NOSENKO the girl had engaged in sexual intercourse during the trip. The technician also reported that the tape recordings obtained were of poor quality.

Because the KGB still lacked compromising materials, KOSOLAPOV prepared a paper requesting that the girl again be brought to Moscow and permission to acquire compromising photography during her visit. The requests were approved by higher KGB authority. When the girl arrived, KOSOLAPOV met her alone and took her to the Hotel Peking, to a specially equipped room. The girl called MORONE at America House, and MORONE subsequently visited her in the hotel room two or three times, during which photographs were taken. These were placed in the KGB's file on MORONE. He did not fall in love with the girl, as the KGB had hoped, and she had no further contacts with him.

NOSENKO transitted Amsterdam on 15 November 1960 on a through flight from Moscow to Cuba.

NOSENKO returned from Cuba approximately 14 December 1960. When told this, NOSENKO stated that instead of talking to the technician himself, he may have read the report and seen the film strips after his return.

Although the KGB had the compromising photography, it was felt that there were insufficient materials for a recruitment approach to MORONE. The KGB wanted to trap him in the apartment of a Soviet woman, to catch him in something that is definitely prohibited. For this purpose, Svetlana IVANOVA (see above) was supposed to lure MORONE into the city, but before anything further could be done, the Americans ordered MORONE out of Moscow before the end of his tour, possibly because they were concerned about his association with IVANOVA. Therefore, NOSENKO said, the KGB made no operational approach to MORONE and no recruitment of him.

(c) Information from Other Sources

A sensitive Polish source reported in 1961 that on 8 November 1960 a Polish female, an experienced English-speaking agent of the Polish UB, arrived in Moscow where she was met by a KGB case officer named "VOLODYA." She stayed at the Hotel Warsaw in Moscow. The KGB case officer, apparently from the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, on 10 November 1960 pointed MORONE out to this agent at a railroad station in Moscow. Under KGB instructions, the Polish female met MORONE on the train to Warsaw, where intimacies began. In Warsaw on 12 November 1960 she was quite friendly with MORONE, but pursuant to instructions, she refused all overtures to engage in intimacies. The next day she took MORONE to a Polish UB safe-house suitably prepared for clandestine photography, and revealing photographs of an intimate nature were taken of MORONE and herself. The female agent again travelled to Moscow on 5 February 1961 and stayed at the Peking Hotel. Further compromising photographs were taken of her and MORONE on this trip. The female agent travelled to Moscow a third time and on 12 and 13 February 1961 more photographs were taken of her and MORONE.

GOLITSYN was questioned on the basis of this lead on 16 February 1962:

Question: Do you know anyone in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate who worked against the American Embassy and used the name "VOLODYA?"

GOLITSYN: Yes, I know CHURANOV. He worked at one time against the U.S. Embassy. Later he worked against the British Embassy and later he was sent to Denmark.

Question: When was he sent? Do you know?

GOLITSYN: It was in '57 until probably '60... I suppose that he will continue to work now in the First Chief Directorate. He transferred there from the Second...

Question: Do you know anyone who used the name "VOLODYA" in the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow in the fall of 1960?

GOLITSYN: There is another person. It is [Vladimir Ivanovich] PETROV. He is the employee of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate who works against the American Embassy. He evidently knows English. ...and he worked in the American Department. I know him and I met him in 1960. He was Chief of the American Section, the Embassy Section...

Question: Well, in VOLODYA, I'm interested in a KGB case officer who would be working against American code clerks in the fall of 1960.

GOLITSYN: Yes he [PETROV] is the Chief of this section. That is why. He is the Chief of this section where GRYAZNOV works. [GOLITSYN had earlier identified GRYAZNOV as a code clerk specialist in the U.S. Embassy Section.]


Question: And GRYAZNOV is under him?

GOLITSYN: Yes, he was an assistant at one time, but is not [now], and then there was the reorganization and he became a little "liquidated" [downgraded in position].

In an October 1962 interview, following his withdrawal from Moscow, MORONE stated that he had travelled with Frank BEGGS to Warsaw on 12 November 1960. On the train he saw a Polish girl outside their compartment and asked her what languages she spoke. Later she entered his compartment, and when he tried to engage in sexual relations with her, she slapped his face. A day or two after they arrived in Warsaw, the girl contacted him at his hotel, and he went to her room where they had sexual relations. According to MORONE, he had sexual relations with at least two other women while in Warsaw. He and BEGGS returned to Moscow without incident. On 6 February 1961 the Polish girl from the train called him at America House, and the following day he visited her in her room at the Peking Hotel, where they had several drinks and sexual relations. On this occasion or earlier the girl told him that she had an uncle in Moscow. MORONE had denied being approached or recruited by Soviet Intelligence, a statement which was supported by a polygraph examination administered in 1961. (Further details on this interview of MORONE are inserted in a later paragraph containing information from MORONE's associates in Moscow.)

The Marine guard BEGGS has confirmed MORONE's account in general, with the exception that he has stated that the two travelled to Warsaw on 13 November 1960 and that, after meeting the Polish girl on the train, MORONE and she got into the lower bunk in their train compartment. They arrived in Warsaw on 14 November and returned the 20th. BEGGS had heard from MORONE that the latter had been recontacted by the Polish girl in Moscow in February 1961.

The U.S. military code clerk STORSBERG has reported that MORONE was acquainted with "Michel MICHAUD" (SKVORTSOV), who laid some groundwork for the KGB approach to STORSBERG in the fall of 1961. When interviewed by the FBI



In February 1965 NOSENKO said that SKVORTSOV undoubtedly met other Americans on his visits to America House, but he did not remember who they were. He added that the KGB would not be interested in SKVORTSOV's contacts with other code clerks because "we told him not to squander his forces, to concentrate on Jim [STORSBERG]. Jim was his target."

MORONE's fellow code clerks and residents of America House have described him as a heavy drinker, a heavy gambler, and a ladies' man. Various reports indicate that MORONE was involved in a currency-speculation ring operated by ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ the KGB agent mentioned by NOSENKO, and MORONE has confirmed that, on at least one occasion, ~~XXXXXX~~ arranged the introduction of MORONE and other code clerks to Soviet females. MORONE had relations with one of them in ~~XXXXXX~~'s apartment in the spring of 1961. MORONE was also said to be a close friend of the Embassy ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ identified by NOSENKO as an agent of KOSOLAPOV, but not mentioned by him in connection with the MORONE operation. (MORONE admitted that along with other Americans, he made it a common practice to purchase rubles illegally from ~~XXXXXX~~. One report states that ~~XXXXXX~~ asked a Marine guard to deliver blackmarket rubles to MORONE in the State Department code room, a restricted area to which ~~XXXXXX~~ had no access. A number of reports indicate that MORONE was sexually intimate with Svetlana IVANOVA, DENKIN's agent, and with Ella UMANETS, another KGB agent at America House identified by NOSENKO but not mentioned by him in connection with MORONE. (MORONE denies having had relations with IVANOVA but said that he told his friends that he had been intimate with her. He said, however, that he knew both IVANOVA and UMANETS well and that he had once asked IVANOVA to arrange dates for him and another code clerk with two Russian females. IVANOVA did, and sexual relations ensued. MORONE has also admitted sexual relations with a number of women from various Western embassies in Moscow.)

(v) Developmental Operation Against ZUJUS(a) Introduction

NOSENKO reported that he personally recruited and handled the "main agent" in the KGB developmental operation against U.S. Army Sergeant Matthew Peter ZUJUS, although GRYAZNOV was the officer responsible for the ZUJUS case. [redacted] military officer posted to Moscow for training, was used only in this operation, but NOSENKO continued to meet him even after transferring from the U.S. Embassy Section to the Tourist Department. While being interrogated in February 1965, NOSENKO said that [redacted] could vouch for his bona fides, and he suggested that CIA approach [redacted] for this purpose.*

ZUJUS arrived in Moscow in September 1961 to assume the military code clerk duties of STORSBERG (see above), and he remained there until January 1963. After initially confusing ZUJUS with James KEYSERS**, NOSENKO first described the KGB operation against him in February 1964. According to NOSENKO, neither [redacted] nor any other source supplied significant information to the KGB, and the KGB therefore did not attempt to recruit ZUJUS. Claiming not to know the names of KGB agents besides [redacted] who participated in the operation, NOSENKO nevertheless in other contexts has mentioned two female agents who reportedly associated with ZUJUS. One is Ella UMANETS, the other an East German woman posing as an Austrian. NOSENKO indicated the latter was in contact with MORONE (see above), whereas it is clear that ZUJUS was the American code clerk who met this woman. The date that she and ZUJUS were together, however, falls during the summer of 1962 when, NOSENKO said, he was no longer engaged in operations against the U.S. Embassy.

(b) Information from NOSENKO

The first reference by NOSENKO to the ZUJUS case was made on 2 February 1964:

NOSENKO: With respect to ZUJUS, I'll tell you exactly what we tried to do with him because I spotted this in some notes. This mistake [confusion of KEYSERS and ZUJUS] made me so mad. I completely forgot about ZUJUS until I saw my little note. In 1961 I recruited a Syrian who was from Damascus. [redacted] he used to go to the American Club, and he became acquainted with ZUJUS. The reason why they had something in common was that sometime earlier ZUJUS had been stationed in Lebanon and the Syrian himself was from Damascus, which is a relatively short distance away... Here is his name. He wrote it out himself. It is [redacted], and he wrote out his own address [redacted]

** The KEYSERS case is discussed in the next part of this paper.

here [on one of the notes NOSENKO brought with him to the meeting]. We did not work with him, and we retired the case to Archives, and did not turn him over to anyone. Here is his address. The street is [REDACTED]... I worked with him myself at the end of 1961 and the beginning of 1962. And when I was leaving Moscow to come here for the Disarmament Conference in 1962 I turned him over for contact to GRYAZNOV. I said goodbye to him and he was scheduled to leave the USSR permanently in April, back to Syria.

Question: What did you do against ZUJUS?

NOSENKO: Nothing at all. He [REDACTED] was merely studying and developing him. During the conversation [at America House] they even spoke of how nice it would be to have some Lebanese vodka, and we specially had some shipped in from the [KGB Legal] Residency [in Beirut], and the Syrian brought it to ZUJUS saying it had come from his friends. ZUJUS by character is a very quiet, unexcitable, calm person... Nothing disturbs him.

Question: Why didn't you turn [REDACTED] over to the First Chief Directorate?

NOSENKO: There was no reason for this because he was a [REDACTED]. If we were to turn him over to anyone it would have been to the GRU. But we decided to hell with it and put the case into our Archives.

Question: Did [REDACTED] know ZUJUS when you recruited him?

NOSENKO: No, he didn't hardly know anyone--even by name. So we showed him photographs, and when he said that he had met ZUJUS, then we directed him to develop ZUJUS and not to pay attention to anyone else... If you want to approach him you can use my name, simply Yuriy Ivanovich.

NOSENKO then proposed a false-flag recruitment of [REDACTED] whereby a CIA representative would approach [REDACTED] saying that he was from the KGB. A year later NOSENKO told CIA that if CIA talked to [REDACTED] the latter would be able to vouch for NOSENKO's bona fides.

Speaking of his own agents on 20 April 1964, NOSENKO said: [REDACTED]...I took with me, even though I had transferred to the Seventh [Tourist] Department [in January 1962]. But it had been decided that no one else knew him from the First [American] Department; it would have taken some time before anyone would get used to him. But he was already working in the development of ZUJUS. So they [the First Department] said that they were asking me to continue meeting with him, and they were counting on my cooperation. They also promised to speak to CHELNOKOV [Chief of the Seventh Department] so that I would not have to stop [REDACTED] meetings with ZUJUS."

When reviewing lists of employees of the U.S. Embassy between 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO on 19 September 1964 identified ZUJUS as STORSBERG's replacement and said that the case officer working against him was GRYAZNOV. He said that his (NOSENKO's) agent [redacted] was working against ZUJUS, but that he did not know the names of other agents involved, nor of any unusual or interesting information concerning him, although he had read the Second Chief Directorate file on ZUJUS. There was no information on ZUJUS from KGB microphones, telephone taps, or surveillance. The KGB, NOSENKO stated, did not make an operational approach to ZUJUS and did not recruit him.

NOSENKO reported on 2 February 1965 that he himself had supervised GRYAZNOV's handling of the operation and personally handled the main agent, [redacted]. NOSENKO read all current reports on ZUJUS as they came into the U.S. Embassy Section, and he discussed the case with GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPOV, DENKIN (the case officer responsible for the America House) and his superiors. GRYAZNOV wrote the operational plan on ZUJUS, which called for thorough development by [redacted] in order to learn everything possible about him and eventually to introduce an agent to ZUJUS through [redacted]. [redacted] was to invite ZUJUS to a restaurant in March or April 1962, and a "friend" was to be introduced to ZUJUS at that time. This had not been accomplished as of NOSENKO's departure for Geneva in 1962.

Progress was slow because ZUJUS was quiet and reserved and often stayed alone, even in America House, plus the fact that although [redacted] and ZUJUS were acquainted, they did not become good friends. On the days [redacted] was to visit America House, NOSENKO met him in hotels or restaurants (never in safehouses). This was once every week or two, depending on [redacted]. They would meet again the following day; [redacted] would report on which Americans were drinking heavily and which were caressing the girls from foreign embassies in Moscow. Although [redacted] went to America House once or twice a month and drank there with ZUJUS, he reported little of interest. The KGB learned something about ZUJUS's family in the United States, the details of which NOSENKO did not recall; NOSENKO was sure, however, that there was nothing unusual or interesting about ZUJUS's family background. NOSENKO stated that the KGB was not aware of any vices or vulnerabilities that ZUJUS may have had. There was no recruitment and no approach by the KGB--if there had been, even after NOSENKO left the U.S. Embassy Section, his friend GRYAZNOV would have told him about it.

(c) Information from Other Sources

In connection with a security investigation at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, ZUJUS prepared a statement in January 1963 which acknowledged his having had sexual relations with only one woman in Moscow, an employee of the Finnish Embassy. During a routine debriefing by U.S. Army authorities later in 1963, however, ZUJUS said that he had once had sexual relations with a girl who said she was an Austrian. The U.S. Embassy Security Officer reported in the summer of 1962 that ZUJUS had been intimate with an Austrian woman, Lillian (last name unknown), who had gone to America House with someone

from the United Arab Republic and had returned alone a few days later, when she was picked up by ZUJUS. Since ZUJUS was a cryptographer, the manager of America House decided to interview the woman. She told him that she was from Vienna and was travelling with her employer, a Czech. The manager then reported to the Security Officer, who learned from the Austrian Embassy that no passport had been issued to this woman. The Security Officer went to America House, and asked Lillian for her passport; she replied that she had forgotten it, and she then left saying she was going to her hotel for the passport. She never returned to America House.*

The U.S. Army report of its debriefing of ZUJUS states

[REDACTED]

ZUJUS was interviewed by a CIA representative in November 1965. Asked whether he had met any nationals of Near Eastern countries while in Moscow, ZUJUS named among others a person from Beirut who had been in Damascus or a person from Damascus who had been in Beirut--he could not remember which. ZUJUS said that he had been acting as doorman at America House when this person entered, and that the two "shot the breeze" for about 15 minutes. ZUJUS could not recall what they had talked about, but their conversation apparently did not interest the visitor, because he left after a short while and went to the bar. ZUJUS may have seen the man on several other occasions, but he could supply no additional information. ZUJUS did not recall that this person gave him Lebanese vodka, but did say he favored this beverage. ZUJUS said that he did not know this man's name or why he was in Moscow, and he could provide no physical description.

ZUJUS said that, as manager of the America club, he had frequent dealings with Ella UMANETS (a long-time agent named by NOSENKO). ZUJUS often used her as an interpreter in his dealings with other Soviet employees of America House and was able to provide a considerable amount of background information concerning her. He repeated his earlier statements that he had never been approached or recruited by Soviet Intelligence.

FBI investigations indicate

[REDACTED]

* See also NOSENKO's account of the KGB using one of two East German women, who represented themselves as Austrians, at America House in an operation against MORONE.

(vi) Approach to KEYSERS(a) Introduction

U.S. Army Specialist Fifth Class James KEYSERS began his tour in Moscow on 20 December 1960 as an assistant to the Embassy Medical Officer, Donald C. MARTIN, an Air Force captain; as an additional duty he was assigned administrative functions in the office of the Air Attache. For a short period in early 1961 KEYSERS was trained to perform back-up cryptographic duties under James STORSBERG in the military code room, but he was relieved of this in April 1961 because of low aptitude, laziness, and lack of interest. Because of his admitted homosexual tendencies, coupled with his attitude and behavior, KEYSERS was removed from Moscow by his American superiors in June 1961. The decision to transfer him was made on 13 June, and KEYSERS was informed of it the following day; approximately two hours before leaving America House for the airport on 16 June, KEYSERS received a letter from the KGB suggesting that he defect. This was followed by an approach to him at the Moscow airport.

NOSENKO has claimed that he was the KGB officer who spoke to KEYSERS on this occasion and has said that this incident was his only face-to-face contact with an American target during his 1960-1961 period of service in the U.S. Embassy Section (excepting the alleged brief encounter with STORSBERG--See above). NOSENKO has confused the KEYSERS and ZUJUS cases, but corrected this error prior to defecting. In most particulars NOSENKO's account of the case matches the details from KEYSERS and other sources. However, whereas NOSENKO stated (without indicating how the KGB obtained its information) that the KGB knew KEYSERS had not told American authorities of having received the letter, KEYSERS did so before leaving Moscow; this conversation took place in an Embassy room where a KGB microphone was then located.

(b) Information from NOSENKO

NOSENKO first spoke of the case, without naming KEYSERS, on 12 June 1962: "Now I remember. He came to Moscow, to the Embassy. He was to replace the military cipher clerk [STORSBERG].^a We sensed at once [that he was a homosexual]. Well, everything was thrown at him. I stayed with this case constantly. I didn't spend time on anything else. We chased him all over Moscow but were late. We were in an operational car. It happened like this. When there was traffic, you couldn't get through. Whether we went up the left side or on the sidewalk where people were walking, in the opposite direction, no matter. Therefore we were late, late [i.e., could not catch him at anything]. But such

^a Although KEYSERS trained in Moscow to assume back-up cryptographic duties, he was not STORSBERG's replacement; Mathew ZUJUS, who arrived in September 1961, was. KEYSERS was assigned to Moscow as a replacement for Staff Sergeant J.C. BRADLEY, who had earlier been returned from Moscow for reasons of homosexuality.

things happen. But we were not mistaken about this fellow. He proved to be a homosexual. He sold himself, so to say. The American ice ballet (Ice Capades tour) arrived. There were many such fellows (homosexuals) with it, and he was extremely drunk, and was embracing and kissing a man. The Americans also saw this. And decided not to... I thought, what to do? Let's write him a letter, in real English, on an English typewriter. We'll send this letter to his room. We knew that he was supposed to leave today, today. And we wrote it: 'Listen, they know about you. You have been caught. It will go very badly for you back there. Come on. Stay here. We are waiting for your answer.' Well, as is customary, you had someone accompany him. The Assistant Military Attache escorted him. I don't remember who right now. Perhaps it was NIXON, NIELSON, a lieutenant colonel. What was his name? He accompanied him to Finland and then returned by plane. Well, there was no answer from him to this letter. And it was already the last moment, and suddenly--'Listen, they are taking you away. wait, they know who you are, what you are, it's all over. If that's the way it is, stay here.' No answer. What to do? Here's what happened: We got into a car. They (KGB surveillance) had reported that he and the Assistant Military Attache had pulled out from Kropotkinskaya Naberezhnaya (America House) for the airport to take the plane. So we put on all speed to get there first. We got there first, in order to have got to him. No. It was WILSON." The interview then continued: NOSENKO was asked who had accompanied KEYSERS to the airport. He replied:

"Yes, Lt. Col. WILSON, I believe. He didn't leave him for a moment at the airport. I am turning around here, walking there. There is coffee there and cognac. He didn't leave him. I must separate them. O.K. So I said: 'What about their documents? Make some pretext to separate them.' They were separated for two minutes. I approached him and said: 'Hello, hello, what about the letter? You think about it?' He said something to the Assistant Military Attache, that 'they tried to approach me.' So he was in Moscow in all only three or four months. He gave himself away you see. If this ice ballet had not come we would have worked on him. At the start we did not know who he was or what he was, i.e., we knew that he came to replace the military code clerk, on whom we had spent much time." NOSENKO then moved on to a description of the STORSBERG operation without naming KEYSERS.

After describing the recruitment approach to STORSBERG, NOSENKO reported on 24 January 1964: "Then his replacement came. It was ZUJUS.** We began to study him carefully and it appears that both ourselves and the Americans, primarily in the person of the Security Officer, discovered that he

* This officer's name is MASON.

** See NOSENKO's statements on 28 January and 2 February 1964 (below). ZUJUS did in fact replace STORSBERG, who completed his Moscow tour in November 1961, five months after KEYSERS was removed from Moscow.

was a homosexual. It appears that there was some visiting ballet troupe in which some of the male members were homosexuals. He met them in the America House and his behavior towards them was reported to the American Security Officer and at the same time our agent had reported him to us. We wanted to mount an operation against him but the Americans had already decided to give him up. All we could do was to have a letter delivered to him; the letter warned him that he was being sent out because he was a homosexual and that he would get into consequent trouble, and an offer was made to him to stay in the USSR. He did not answer the letter and it was just prior to his actual departure. He was escorted to the airport by two officers of the Military Attache's office. At the airport--I even went there with a group of assistants to see if we could get a few words to him to change his mind. He left his group for a moment to get a drink of water. When I made this offer to him that he would not regret it if he stayed, that he would receive great benefits, he panicked and ran back to his group and shortly thereafter he flew off. If he were not spotted by you possibly we would have been able to get at him."

While reviewing a list of personnel assigned to the American Embassy in Moscow in 1963, NOSENKO said on 28 January 1964: "Matthew ZUJUS--how come? That man can't be in Moscow. That's the homosexual code clerk I told you about, [the] homosexual who was urgently sent back to the States with military guards. How come he is back in 1963? In August 1963? He couldn't be there. It is impossible" He was asked whether he was sure of his facts, and NOSENKO answered: "Yes, this must be the same man, but this must be an error in your document. He just cannot be in Moscow."

NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safehouse on 2 February 1964 and said that he wanted to come right over as he had something important to say. The meeting with CIA opened as follows: "I was thinking last night and I realized that I have made a mistake and it bothered me, so I wanted to be sure to call it to your attention today. Remember when I told you we were working on Jim STORSBERG, the code clerk, and after that a replacement came for him? And I said that we wanted to get a hold of him because he was a homosexual? It was not ZUJUS, but it was KEYSERS. In other words, everything I said about ZUJUS applies to KEYSERS."


"I don't remember having any face-to-face encounters [with Americans] except when KEYSERS was leaving," NOSENKO stated on 17 April 1964. "When he was being taken to the airport we decided, 'Why not try, in case he's alone; why not approach him and ask him if he wants to stay?' And sure enough he stood there with these two officers and then he walked into the restaurant alone... So I immediately approached him right there in the restaurant. 'I don't remember what his name was--I think it was Jim.) So I said 'Jim, did you think about staying perhaps? Because you know what will happen to you when you return. Say, please.' He looked at me and turned around and without saying a word he went into the waiting room and started talking rapidly with the officers."



When questioned on the HITCHCOCK approach in February 1965, NOSENKO added no new details except that, at the time of the approach, he understood HITCHCOCK had not reported the KGB letter to his superiors at the American Embassy; he said that there was no information to this effect from the microphones or telephone taps in the U.S. Embassy.

(c) Information from Other Sources

In Moscow prior to his removal and in subsequent debriefings, HITCHCOCK admitted homosexual tendencies and his involvement in three homosexual incidents during his tour in Moscow, all at America House; one of these was an approach to a Marine security guard in March 1961, which was rebuffed, and the two others were homosexual acts with members of the Ice Capades troupe visiting Moscow in May 1961. He denied that he ever made any public display of his homosexuality; but said he could not be sure that someone had not entered his room at America House while he and a homosexual partner had been asleep following their homosexual relations.

During a detailed debriefing at West Germany on 26 June 1961 HITCHCOCK related the incidents leading up to the approach made at America House in March 1961 as he was leaving the Soviet Union.






Microphones were subsequently placed in Colonel TREBAY's office and in the office of the Minister Counsellor. NOSENKO has reported that both were being monitored on a simultaneous basis in 1961.


This is not an accurate description of NOSENKO who was 34 years old at the time, is several inches taller, and is not rotund.

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A memorandum sent by WOODMAN, the Deputy Security Officer, to Colonel JRAAY, the Army Liaison Officer, indicates that EYSEN'S behavior had been a subject of concern for some months prior to his removal from office.



In a report to U.S. Army authorities on the date of EYSEN'S removal, Colonel WOODMAN stated the following:



See Part V.E.3.g., referring to Colonel WOODMAN'S statement on security losses as a result of KGB microphones in this office.

NOTE: Part VI.D.2., a tabulation of NOSENKO's leads involving American cases, includes several operations against U.S. code clerks for which he was the supervisor; their names are Frank DAY, Robert DWELLY, Joseph GAFFSY, John TAYLOR, and Maurice ZWANG.

d. NOSENKO's Responsibility for Coverage of ABIDIAN

(i) Introduction

John V. ABIDIAN served as the U.S. Embassy Security Officer in Moscow from 2 March 1960 until February 1962, approximately the same period as NOSENKO's claimed service in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate. During his Moscow tour, ABIDIAN was coopted by CIA to perform a number of operational tasks, including clandestine letter mailings to several CIA agents inside the Soviet Union and servicing a dead drop to be used only for receiving two special types of communications* from the source in the GRU, Colonel O.V. PENKOVSKIY.

During his 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENKO mentioned ABIDIAN on several occasions, identifying him as the Embassy Security Officer and as a CIA officer. In 1962 he described ABIDIAN's letter-mailing activities, and he said he was himself concerned (zanimat'sya) with ABIDIAN. After recontacting CIA in Geneva in January 1964 NOSENKO divulged that he had been the KGB case officer responsible for coverage of ABIDIAN in Moscow; for the first time he described then a visit made by ABIDIAN to the PENKOVSKIY dead drop site.

The discussion below is divided into three parts: NOSENKO's case officer responsibilities and the information he learned about ABIDIAN, NOSENKO's knowledge of clandestine letter mailings by ABIDIAN, and NOSENKO's statements on ABIDIAN and the Pushkin Street dead drop.

(ii) Duties as Case Officer

On 17 April 1964 when asked to describe his transfer from the Tourist Department to the American Department in January 1960, NOSENKO said that when he reported for duty and was interviewed by V. A. KLYPIN, Chief of the American Department, and V.M. KOVSHUK, Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, he was told that as one of his duties he would be the case officer in charge of ABIDIAN, whose arrival in Moscow was expected in the near future. NOSENKO was the only KGB officer responsible for coverage of and activities against ABIDIAN and, NOSENKO said, ABIDIAN was the only American target for whom he, personally, was officially accountable while in the U.S. Embassy Section.

NOSENKO was questioned in detail concerning ABIDIAN for six days in January and February 1965. He produced the information in the following paragraphs at that time.

When NOSENKO began to work in the U.S. Embassy Section, ABIDIAN had not yet arrived in Moscow. The section, however, already had received some information on him, and this was given to NOSENKO by KOVSHUK. Among this material was ABIDIAN's visa

* One type was early-warning information, the other notification of his forthcoming absence from Moscow. Otherwise, as of this time, PENKOVSKIY submitted information in Moscow via contacts with the British Embassy and the British businessman Greville WYNN. The PENKOVSKIY case is discussed at greater length in Part VI.D.7.b.

application, the negative results of checks of KGB Headquarters files, and a report prepared by the American Department of the First Chief Directorate. According to this report, based on correspondence from the KGB Legal Residencies in the United States, ABIDIAN had served as a Department of State Security Officer concerned with the personal safety of Premier KHRUSHCHEV when he visited the United States in 1959; from the way ABIDIAN had acted at that time, the Legal Residencies concluded he was an intelligence officer, probably with CIA.* NOSENKO remarked that the report, combined with the fact that ABIDIAN was replacing the known CIA officer Russell LANGELE as Security Officer, made ABIDIAN one of the most important counterintelligence targets of the U.S. Embassy Section and therefore of the entire Second Chief Directorate.

NOSENKO personally opened the KGB file on ABIDIAN and later assigned him the cryptonym "ARSEN," since this cryptonym had been used by personnel of the Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate, KGB Second Chief Directorate, who were working against him.

NOSENKO was unsuccessful in his attempts to learn more about the life and career of ABIDIAN. He visited the Chief of the American Department of the KGB First Chief Directorate, but this unit had no information in addition to that already included in the original information report. NOSENKO requested that the KGB Legal Residencies in the United States be asked for further details, but they were never received. For these reasons, NOSENKO said that he did not know and never obtained details about ABIDIAN's education and study abroad, date of entry into the Department of State, promotions, personal rank, previous foreign assignments, military service, or status as Foreign Service Reserve, Staff or Officer (FSR, FSS, FSO).**

* CIA records indicate that ABIDIAN studied in Paris in 1949-50 and then secured employment with the Department of State as a clerk/typist. He remained in Paris until 1954. After special training at the CIC school at Fort Holabird and the Secret Service School, ABIDIAN served from 1956 until leaving for Moscow in 1960 as a special agent in the State Department's Office of Security. A large part of his work in this period was arranging the security of and accompanying foreign dignitaries visiting the United States. These included the visits of Soviet Foreign Minister SHEPILOV in November 1956, MIKOYAN in the spring of 1959, and KHRUSHCHEV at the end of 1959. These duties undoubtedly brought ABIDIAN into contact with a large number of KGB officers stationed in New York and Washington. One of the members of the KHRUSHCHEV entourage was KOSOLAPOV who, according to NOSENKO, joined the U.S. Embassy Section in late 1959 and, as of January 1960, became NOSENKO's subordinate in operations against American code clerks.

**NOSENKO was unaware of the meaning of the initials FSR, FSS, and FSO. When asked whether he had checked the Department of State Biographic Register for information on ABIDIAN's background, he replied that this publication is not available in the U.S. Embassy Section. He subsequently recalled that the Chief of the Section, KOVSHUK, did have a copy dated about 1956, which was of no use in gathering information on ABIDIAN.

Because ABIDIAN was considered to be a CIA officer, he was made a "special target" of surveillance from the date of his arrival. He was always under 24-hour surveillance by at least two and often three KGB teams, so that at any hour a team was available to cover him if he left the U.S. Embassy. The only time this intensity of coverage might have been reduced, NOSENKO said, was during a period of about one and one-half months in 1961, when surveillance of the Embassy was generally reduced in order to allow increased coverage of British targets.* As the responsible case officer, NOSENKO directed the surveillance of ABIDIAN and evaluated the operational possibilities offered by pertinent information in the surveillance reports.

Prior to ABIDIAN's arrival in Moscow, the decision was reached not to work aggressively against him with agent contacts or provocateurs unless he first demonstrated some personal vulnerability, NOSENKO stated. It was considered better to concentrate on surveillance coverage in the hope that, as LANGELE's successor, he might lead to another PCPOV.** Therefore, no operational plan was written on ABIDIAN until about October 1960. This plan, which NOSENKO wrote, called for no direct action but did specify that:

- ABIDIAN's maid, Tatyana FEDOROVICH, an operational contact of the U.S. Embassy Section, was to continue to apply metka to ABIDIAN's clothing and NEPTUNE-80 to his shoes.*** (She put metka on ABIDIAN's clothing approximately every 14 to 21 days throughout the time she was employed by ABIDIAN.) The only item of operational interest from her during this period was evidence that ABIDIAN was having intimate relations with a female employee at the embassy. FEDOROVICH was unable to find personal mail or personal papers in ABIDIAN's apartment.

- [REDACTED] KOSOLAPOV's agent, was to try to cultivate ABIDIAN and report whatever he learned concerning him. [REDACTED] never obtained significant information on ABIDIAN's personal life. ABIDIAN, NOSENKO said, was developing [REDACTED] as an informant on American personnel at the Embassy, but NOSENKO did not recall any specific report of his to ABIDIAN that would have been of interest to the U.S. Embassy Section. NOSENKO told CIA in 1962

* In another context NOSENKO said that KGB surveillance of British targets in 1961 led to the discovery of PENKOVSKIY.

** The PCPOV case is discussed in Part VI.D.7.a.

*** Metka and NEPTUNE-80 are surveillance techniques described by NOSENKO. The former, a "thief powder" applied to clothing, leaves a trace on anything with which it comes into contact; its use in detecting clandestine letter mailings is described in greater detail below. NEPTUNE-80, a substance applied to a target's shoes, leaves a trace on the ground wherever he walks and permits the KGB to carry out surveillance long after the target has travelled a particular route. Dogs are used to follow the target's trail.

that ABIDIAN had recruited ~~him~~ for an unspecified intelligence mission in France shortly before ~~he~~ left the Soviet Union in December 1960 and that the KGB's U.S. Embassy Section thereupon turned the case over to the KGB First Chief Directorate.*

- Two Embassy chauffeurs were to apply NEPTUNE-80 to the floorboards and foot pedals of ABIDIAN's car if necessary.

- All other agents and operational contacts of the section were to be instructed to report every detail about ABIDIAN (see below).

- Surveillance teams were to be instructed to check all places where ABIDIAN might be mailing letters.

- Coverage of ABIDIAN's mail was to be continued.

Apart from those specified by the operational plan, the only two KGB agents or operational contacts who met ABIDIAN were Lyudmila GROMOKOVA and "KAMO" (KGB cryptonym, name not remembered by NOSENKO). GROMOKOVA, a language instructor for U.S. Embassy personnel, was a KGB agent handled by the U.S. Embassy Section officer N.A. GAVRILENKO. ABIDIAN took "only several" Russian language lessons from GROMOKOVA and NOSENKO did not know whether these were private or class lessons. He did not learn anything of operational significance from GROMOKOVA's contacts with ABIDIAN, and there was no regular reporting from her. "KAMO" was an agent of the Moscow City KGB organization who accidentally met ABIDIAN at the

* ~~He~~ claimed he concocted this story for the KGB in order to extricate himself when the KGB attempted to recruit him shortly before his departure from Moscow.

** NOSENKO first identified GROMOKOVA as a KGB agent when viewing Embassy employee lists on 28 August 1964. The list on which her name appeared indicated she was a Russian language teacher, and NOSENKO said she was handled by N.A. GAVRILENKO during 1960 and 1961. NOSENKO was later shown GROMOKOVA's photograph and failed to recognize it; when told her name, however, he again said she was GAVRILENKO's agent and that she was valuable because she had a good education and was able to provide personality sketches on her students. He did not associate her with ABIDIAN until he was told by his interrogators in February 1965 that ABIDIAN had been one of her students. NOSENKO then made the above statement concerning these lessons. ABIDIAN reported that he took regular language lessons from GROMOKOVA, normally three one-half hour lessons a week, beginning shortly after his arrival in Moscow and continuing until his departure. The first few lessons were with a group of other Embassy personnel, and then ABIDIAN switched to private lessons for the remainder of his tour in the Soviet Union. In reporting his contacts with GROMOKOVA, ABIDIAN said he refused to be drawn into talking about his Embassy responsibilities during Russian language conversation but kept the topic limited to his past personal life, travel, education, his fiancée, and his trips on which he saw his fiancée. ABIDIAN also reported that on 23 June 1960 GROMOKOVA attempted to persuade him to pass a letter to departing personnel officer Mary GORINHA for forwarding to Jean LIEBERMAN, a former student. When ABIDIAN refused, saying that this is against Soviet law, GROMOKOVA tore up the letter.

Baku Restaurant. When informed that ABIDIAN gave "KAMO" his telephone number, NOSENKO recommended that "KAMO" try to develop a relationship with ABIDIAN. After arguing that this was against the policy of taking no aggressive or provocative action against ABIDIAN, KOVSHUK and KLYPIN finally agreed, and "KAMO" phoned ABIDIAN twice on KGB instructions. ABIDIAN, however, refused to meet him, and no further action was taken.*

NOSENKO did not know the room number of ABIDIAN's office in the Embassy or on what floor it was located, but said that he could check the room number if necessary since he had a copy of the Embassy telephone list published monthly with the office number of each American employee. ABIDIAN's office was in the "Zone of Security" (i.e., secure office areas). A report from some agent, whose name NOSENKO did not recall, indicated that there was a sign on ABIDIAN's office door which said "Security Office." NOSENKO did not know and said he was unable to determine whether ABIDIAN had a secretary. No dictation or conversation was heard from ABIDIAN's office because no KGB microphone was there, and NOSENKO said that he did not remember any specific interesting or important information about ABIDIAN from other microphones in the Embassy.**

NOSENKO did not know the location of ABIDIAN's apartment in the Embassy building, nor how it was furnished. He said that he did not consider data of this nature to be operationally significant unless the target had shown vulnerabilities or was under active development.

Aware that ABIDIAN travelled from the USSR two or three times while stationed in Moscow, NOSENKO did not know to which countries he went or the time of year when the trips were made.** Such information, he stated, would have been of interest to him as ABIDIAN's case officer since, like LANGELLE's earlier trips abroad, ABIDIAN's trips were presumed to be for operational purposes. There was, however, no possibility for the KGB to find out where ABIDIAN had gone;*** even if the U.S. Embassy Section did establish where ABIDIAN would travel, nothing could be done

* See below for ABIDIAN's account of a similar incident involving a Soviet he met while on a trip to Armenia.

** In 1960-61 the Security Officer occupied a room where an inoperative microphone was discovered in 1964.

*** ABIDIAN made at least three trips abroad during his two years in Moscow. In August 1960 he took personal leave to visit his fiancée, a French girl, in the south of France and met with a CIA officer while there. In February 1961 he flew on the Ambassador's plane to Paris for meetings with CIA and then took personal leave to visit his fiancée. In September 1961, at CIA request, ABIDIAN again flew to France and to New York City and Washington for briefings connected with the handling of PENKOVSKIY in Moscow.

**** When CIA interrogators suggested that the KGB could have photographed ABIDIAN's passport on his return to Moscow, NOSENKO replied that the Second Chief Directorate does not photograph passports of foreign diplomats entering the Soviet Union. While this procedure would not be impossible, NOSENKO added, it was not considered so important as to justify the special effort involved.

about it because the foreign Legal Residencies of the KGB First Chief Directorate would not accept a request for operational action against an American diplomat coming from Moscow.

In February 1965 NOSENKO was asked a number of times whether he knew of any occasions on which ABIDIAN took trips in the Soviet Union outside of Moscow. He replied each time that he knew of no such trips and that if ABIDIAN had made such a trip or trips he would have known of them and would remember them as it would have been his responsibility as case officer to take certain actions. Among the latter he listed:

- Receiving notification of ABIDIAN's request to travel from the UPRK (the Soviet Government organization which provides services to the diplomatic community in Moscow).

- Notifying the UPRK of KGB approval for the trip.

- Notifying appropriate local KGB offices on ABIDIAN's itinerary and giving them instructions for surveillance and other operational activity if desired.

- Receiving, reading, and filing all surveillance reports and reports of other operational activity carried out by local KGB units.

NOSENKO was certain that he took none of these steps. He stated further that even if he were absent when such a request for travel was made, he would have seen all documents upon his return and that he did not remember seeing such documents in ABIDIAN's file.

NOSENKO's interrogators then told NOSENKO that ABIDIAN travelled out of Moscow from 5 to 9 October 1960.* Thereupon NOSENKO stated that he specifically recalled having been on leave in October 1960. He said that he could not recall exactly the dates of this leave (which he had not mentioned before), but he did remember that he was away exactly 30 days since he stayed at a dacha near Moscow and therefore was not allowed any travel time. NOSENKO said further that he also remembered that he had

* ABIDIAN made a trip with Paul A. SMITH, the Embassy's Publications Procurement Officer, to Armenia between 5 and 9 October 1960. (ABIDIAN is of Armenian origin, and speaks the Armenian language with a high degree of proficiency.) While there ABIDIAN visited with various churchmen and their parishioners and an Armenian who had repatriated from Greece in 1946. They attended a service in Echmiadzin celebrating the anniversary of the accession of the Katolikos VAZGEN I, and ABIDIAN also visited some relatives of his in or near the city of Yerevan. After returning to Moscow, an Armenian whom ABIDIAN had met on this trip tried to contact ABIDIAN at the Embassy, but ABIDIAN refused to see him. When NOSENKO was told that on 7 October 1960 ABIDIAN attended a service celebrating the fifth anniversary of the Armenian Katolikos, VAZGEN I, NOSENKO recalled that ABIDIAN had gone to Echmiadzin and that an agent had reported a contact with him there. This agent, NOSENKO recalled, was a priest or a monk, and the report concerned only his conversation with ABIDIAN; the agent had no further contact with him. NOSENKO said that this was his sole recollection concerning ABIDIAN's trip, and that he remembered no other details.

left the Soviet Union for Cuba two or three, but not more than five, days after his return from leave; he could not recall the date of his departure for Cuba *

Except for the American woman with whom ABIDIAN was thought to have been intimate, NOSENKO could not name ABIDIAN's close American friends in Moscow or his close friends and professional contacts with foreigners there.

NOSENKO received and read transcripts of all telephone calls that ABIDIAN made or received at his office and apartment via the Moscow city telephone system. He did not remember the names or nationalities of people whom ABIDIAN called or who called ABIDIAN because there was nothing of interest in these conversations. NOSENKO did not learn anything from telephone transcripts about ABIDIAN's relationship with any foreigner in Moscow.

* NOSENKO departed Moscow for Cuba on 15 November 1960 and therefore, by his own statement, would have been back from leave by 10 November at the earliest (five days before departure). It was pointed out to NOSENKO that, in this case, his 30 days of leave could have begun no earlier than 10 October and that he must therefore have been on duty on 5 October 1960 when ABIDIAN left Moscow. In October 1966, however, when the subject of his leaves again came up in interrogation, he volunteered that he had lied in February 1965 when he said he had taken this leave. He said he had no reason for this lie other than he had claimed to be on leave "in conditions of interrogation when lies and truths were all a porridge." He told CIA again for the first time, that his 1960 leave was taken in January of that year, immediately after joining the U.S. Embassy Section. Additional details on this January leave period are given below, in discussion of NOSENKO's claimed responsibility for operations against U.S. military attaches in 1960.

(iii) ABIDIAN's Letter Mailings

During the 1962 meetings in Geneva, NOSENKO reported KGB knowledge of one type of operational task performed by ABIDIAN in Moscow in addition to his recruitment of ~~POPOV~~ (see above). This task, NOSENKO said, involved mailing at least three clandestine letters, in each case to KGB double agents.

According to NOSENKO on 11 June 1962, the KGB detected all the letters mailed by ABIDIAN; he said that this was achieved through the use of peaks: "Stop mailing letters from the Embassy, by Embassy employees. After LANGELLE you didn't mail letters for a year and a half, and then you began again. ABIDIAN mailed several.* ABIDIAN, John ABIDIAN the Embassy Security Officer. Listen, we have this cold /i.e. complete coverage of clandestine mailings/. We have a machine, and the machine finds the letters which are mailed. Without surveillance. The machine itself. This is a big, big secret. Here's how it works. They enter your room - you live in Moscow, work and even live in the Embassy. They /Soviet maids/ clean up the room and simply pour a powder or apply it with a rag /to your clothes/. A rag, even like a handkerchief. There is no smell. They put it in the pockets where you might put a letter. And there is a special little machine at a station in Moscow... All letters which are mailed in Moscow pass through this machine, under a fotoapparat /literally a camera; NOSENKO probably means some sort of light-sensitive device/. We now have 12 /machines/ and hope to have 100 in Moscow. And all the letters pass through the apparatus and the machine itself selects the letter which was mailed by you or him. Do you understand? The machine itself finds it... This is how it was with the letters that ABIDIAN mailed. We had them all because this machine gave them /to us/. I even would phone surveillance and say: 'He's out walking around. ABIDIAN is out walking around, checking, checking.' I would say: 'Drop him. But give me all the letters today.' The machine determines whether there is a special letter there."

Three days later, at NOSENKO's fifth and final meeting with CIA in 1962, he was asked whether he knew to whom these letters were addressed. NOSENKO replied: "To whom did ABIDIAN mail letters? First he mailed a letter to a guy in Odessa. Then ABIDIAN mailed one to still someone else. He mailed two or three letters. One letter was to the Baltic area. The same kind, that is we had planted this man on you. I think it was to Riga, to our double agent. And still, I think, two or three other letters, also to double agents.** But we

* NOSENKO's information is substantially correct. LANGELLE was declared persona non grata in connection with the arrest of CIA agent POPOV in October 1959. Two letters were mailed, one on 9 December 1959 and the other on 22 February 1960 (one of which was to an agent now known to have been under KGB control at the time); no more letters were mailed until 1 April 1961, when John ABIDIAN mailed one, again to a KGB-controlled agent. LANGELLE's arrest, however, was not the cause of this break in letter-mailings; the suspension resulted from other considerations.

**In 1961 ABIDIAN mailed three operational letters for CIA, one to an agent in ~~██████████~~ on 1 April, the second to an agent in ~~██████████~~ on 2 July, and the third to a ~~██████████~~ agent on 1 September.

didn't uncover any agents on the basis of letters he mailed. There weren't any. I was concerned with ABIDIAN; therefore I know. I can't tell you anything about the agent in the Baltic area because he was handled by the Second Section of the American Department, the 'Active Line - penetration.'*

NOSENKO has described in greater detail how ABIDIAN was detected mailing the letter to Odessa. While discussing personnel assigned to the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate, he said on 24 June 1964: "I first saw Aleksey Konstantinovich SUMIN in the Second Section in 1960, although I heard that he was there in 1959... He is considered a specialist on working against letters containing secret writing... SUMIN sees all the letters mailed by Americans, even the American tourists. The letters are caught either by surveillance or by use of metka. There are several types of metka, with different colors, and one type will be used on American Embassy personnel, another type on British Embassy personnel, and another type for tourists.** The same type is not always used against the same group. They are switched around. An example is in 1961 when ABIDIAN mailed a letter to an agent in Odessa. This was a 'game' /igra - double agent operation/. The agent was 'ARK-HANGELSKIY' /KGB cryptonym/ I think. ABIDIAN used to park his car and walk around, visiting many shops on Gorkiy Street. He went to one commission shop where there was a large mirror in the shop window, and he would check for surveillance. He was even followed to a post office and one of the surveillance men got in there ahead of him, but he didn't do anything. Then

* NOSENKO has explained that the so-called "Active Line" Section of the American Department was concerned with the penetration of U.S. Intelligence, primarily by serving up KGB-controlled agents for recruitment.

** CIA has conducted a series of tests designed to determine whether a substance such as metka was being used as a KGB control device. For the purpose of these tests, articles of clothing worn by members of the U.S. Embassy and those of other selected Western embassies were sent back to CIA Headquarters. The clothing in each case had been sent to Soviet dry-cleaning establishments or had been permitted to hang unattended in unrestricted areas of the Embassy or in the apartments of Embassy employees. Special filter paper was applied to these articles of clothing. The same paper was applied in Moscow to desk tops, safe drawers, and the like. The paper was then subjected to ultra-violet, chemical, and microscopic analysis as well as to examination for traces of radioactivity. Results have been consistently negative

he walked by a post box on the street and was checking it. Two or three times he was followed by this post box but the surveillance never saw him mail a letter. Still, the KGB would remove the contents of the letter box and send it in. On the second or third time SUMIN found the letter he mailed with metka. He had also mailed a cover letter to his parents. Of course, SUMIN also knew the address of the agent, since it was a 'game'."

Under interrogation in January 1965 NOSENKO described how metka had been applied to ABIDIAN's clothing by his maid and how, in particular, this led to the discovery of the letters ABIDIAN mailed to the agent ARKHANGELSKIY in Odessa and to his parents in the United States. The following is taken from the protocol of these interrogations which NOSENKO signed as being accurate on 4 March 1965:

"ABIDIAN's maid in Moscow was Tatyana FEDOROVICH. ~~She was an operational contact reporting to ARTEMOV.~~ She started to work for ABIDIAN a few months after his arrival, perhaps three months but no longer than six months after his arrival. I met her shortly after she began to work for ABIDIAN in order to get acquainted with her, in order to evaluate her and give her general instructions about her work for ABIDIAN. I do not know the exact date of this meeting but it was before the fall of 1960. I wrote the operational plan on ABIDIAN in circa October 1960. At this time FEDOROVICH was already working for ABIDIAN. This operational plan stated that FEDOROVICH would continue to put metka regularly on ABIDIAN's clothing.

"FEDOROVICH put metka on ABIDIAN's clothing during the entire period that she worked for him. She did this every two or three weeks except for a few times when she was sick or on leave. No one else had access to ABIDIAN's apartment and therefore no other person had the possibility of putting metka on his clothing.

"I have said that ABIDIAN mailed an operational letter to the KGB double agent ARKHANGELSKIY. He mailed it at the mailbox on Tverskaya Yamskaya where he had gone several times earlier. Surveillance did not see ABIDIAN mail the letter but the mailbox was controlled and the letter to ARKHANGELSKIY was found, along with a letter to ABIDIAN's parents. Both of these letters had metka on them, as I was told by SUMIN. I cannot remember the date that ABIDIAN mailed this letter except that it was sometime in 1961."

* In a CIA interview on 8 December 1964, ABIDIAN identified a photograph of Tatyana FEDOROVICH as a maid who worked for Marion ALBAMONTE and Myra KEMMER, Embassy secretaries, until KEMMER departed Moscow in approximately July 1961. Thereafter FEDOROVICH worked part-time for ALBAMONTE and part-time for ABIDIAN. ABIDIAN explained that he had no maid at all for the "first year or so" of his Moscow tour and that FEDOROVICH was the only maid he employed there. When ABIDIAN left Moscow, she began to work for the Embassy

(continuation of footnote from preceding page)

code clerk JOHN GARLAND (Part V.E.3.c.i.). CIA records show that ABIDIAN mailed the first of his clandestine letters on 1 April 1961 and his second, the one to "ARKHANGELSKIY", on 2 July 1961. If ABIDIAN's recollection is correct (a review of Embassy phone lists shows that KEMMER was in Moscow in June 1961, but was not there in August of that year), it appears that FEDOROVICH could not have been responsible for the metka which, NOSENKO said, led to discovery of the first of these letters; also, it is possible that she was not employed by ABIDIAN at the time the letter to "ARKHANGELSKIY" was mailed. ABIDIAN's third clandestine letter was mailed on 1 September 1961, apparently after FEDOROVICH came to work for him. When NOSENKO was told in January 1965 that FEDOROVICH could not have been applying metka regularly to ABIDIAN's clothing at the time of the "ARKHANGELSKIY" letter-mailing, he repeated that no one but FEDOROVICH had the possibility of doing so and that he was sure she had. When his interrogators suggested that FEDOROVICH may have occasionally cleaned ABIDIAN's apartment on an informal basis before being formerly hired as his maid, NOSENKO said that this was possibly the case. (CIA does not know whether this was so or not, but ABIDIAN gave his interviewer the impression in December 1964 that he did his own housekeeping until hiring FEDOROVICH.)

v) ABIDIAN's Servicing of the Pushkin Street Dead Drop

In 1964 NOSENKO told CIA for the first time that KGB surveillance had observed a visit by ABIDIAN to a probable dead drop on Pushkin Street in Moscow at the end of 1960. This dead drop figured prominently in the PENKOVSKIY case.

NOSENKO's first remarks on this subject were made on 20 April 1964: "I left the U.S. Embassy Section in 1962. There was an interesting move. This address where JACOBS* was caught in the PENKOVSKIY case - the same address was visited by ABIDIAN in 1960, or at the beginning of 1961. And at that time I went there together with V. A. KOZLOV, the Chief of the Surveillance Directorate. M. G. MATVEYEV Deputy Chief of the American Department also went there with us. We went to that address several times, at Pushkin Street. It was very interesting, this radiator and everything, but the only thing we did there was to place an observation post there, and that post was there for about three months after ABIDIAN's visit... That was in 1960, 1961... They watched for three months. The surveillance teams had to be occupied there for 24 hours every day. I was there then in the U.S. Embassy Section for the entire time that surveillance was watching the Pushkin Street site... At the beginning I came there two or three times. I came there with MATVEYEV once, twice with KOVSHUK; we came there with Venyamin KOZLOV... But no one appeared here and so they were not writing anything meaning that the Surveillance Directorate was not submitting written reports. No one appeared. That's why, only orally, KOZLOV was saying 'nothing.' A week passed - 'nothing,' the next week passed - 'nothing'... I shall tell you why I didn't mention this to you in June 1962/. Because I had occasions where there were many such places, and they were watched for nothing. And it would just pass away and in a month it would be forgotten... So we waited a month, two, three. Nothing. So they let it go at that and had forgotten. Of course, the surveillance team had it all recorded, but we had forgotten about that in the First American Department... In 1962, I was in the Seventh Tourist Department. I transferred in January 1962."

On the basis of information supplied by NOSENKO during April 1964, he was questioned during January and February 1965 on ABIDIAN's visit to Pushkin Street. The following, which is consistent with and somewhat more detailed than earlier statements not recorded here, is taken from these 1965 interrogations:

- In 1961, while NOSENKO was the responsible case officer, the KGB followed ABIDIAN from the U.S. Embassy to a residential building on Pushkin Street in Moscow. A stationary surveillance post at the Embassy saw ABIDIAN leave with the Publications Procurement Officer of the Embassy in a chauffeured automobile, rather than in the car he normally used. The surveillance team assigned specifically to ABIDIAN thereupon followed the car to a bookstore. Both Americans entered the bookstore, but

* Richard JACOB, a CIA officer, was apprehended while servicing the Pushkin Street dead drop on 2 November 1962.

shortly thereafter ABIDIAN left alone. He walked around the corner and entered a residential building next to a meat market on Pushkin Street. ABIDIAN emerged after a few seconds. The surveillance team saw him go in but did not follow him. This unusual incident was reported by the surveillance team to the KGB Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate, and the building was inspected that same day by the Chief of the First Department of the Surveillance Directorate, KOZLOV, together with the Deputy Chief of the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, MATVEYEV. Taking into account the character of the building and its inhabitants, the duration and circumstances of ABIDIAN's visit, and the suitability of the hallway - particularly the radiator in it - for use as a dead drop site, it was decided by the leadership of the Second Chief Directorate and the Surveillance Directorate that a stationary surveillance post should immediately be set up to cover this location. Because of the short time available, it was not possible to place this post inside the building, so it was set up across the street. In addition, the radiator was checked daily to see if anything, such as a magnetic container, had been concealed behind it. This stationary post was maintained around the clock for 30 days, after which it was maintained from 0800 until midnight for another two months. If a package or magnetic container had been found behind the radiator, which was checked every morning, it was planned to attach to it very thin wires to trigger a signal should someone remove the package. At the same time a member of the surveillance team would be stationed on the landing of the staircase in this building, out of sight from the hallway below. During the three months that the post was maintained, nothing was found concealed behind the radiator, nor were any suspicious persons seen entering or leaving the building. The post was then discontinued, but the address was placed on a list of suspicious places inspected daily by the Surveillance Directorate. The true significance of this location became known to the KGB only later, after the arrest of PENKOVSKIY in 1962.

- NOSENKO first heard of ABIDIAN's visit to the suspected dead drop site on the day it occurred. He was sitting in KOVSHUK's office when he received a telephone call from MATVEYEV telling him of the incident. Although NOSENKO was ABIDIAN's case officer and KOVSHUK was Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, the decision to place the stationary surveillance post on this location was made at a higher level; neither of them was involved in it or in the later decision to discontinue the post. NOSENKO himself visited the building on Pushkin Street the following day or the day after, but he remained only a few minutes and did not recall any details of the hallway, except that there was a radiator there.

- As ABIDIAN's case officer, NOSENKO recalled receiving the surveillance report of his visit to the Pushkin Street building and placing this report in ABIDIAN's file. (This is the case file which NOSENKO

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turned over to his successor, GRYAZNOV, about 28-28 December 1961, just before he transferred to the Tourist Department.)

- NOSENKO received no written reports on the results of the stationary surveillance post, but he did discuss this matter with KOZLOV on an almost daily basis during the first month of surveillance, periodically after that. These discussions took place either by telephone, or when KOZLOV was visiting NOSENKO's office, or when NOSENKO visited KOZLOV's office in KGB Headquarters. From KOZLOV or perhaps someone else, NOSENKO learned that the post had been discontinued after 90 days. On the basis of these conversations with KOZLOV, NOSENKO knew that nothing of interest occurred during the period of the stationary surveillance.

- NOSENKO was in the U.S. Embassy Section during all the period that the stationary surveillance post was watching the Pushkin Street site and was there when he heard from KOZLOV that the post had been replaced by periodic inspections.

- NOSENKO did not report this incident of surveillance on the Pushkin Street dead drop site to his CIA contacts in Geneva in June 1962 because the post had already been discontinued by this time without anything unusual or suspicious having been noted. Therefore he thought that this incident would not be particularly interesting to the CIA.

CIA records show that ABIDIAN visited the Pushkin Street dead drop site only once, on 30 December 1961, a year later than NOSENKO says, in response to an apparent signal from PENKOVSKIY. The sequence of events was as follows: On 27 December 1961, following receipt of what seemed to be the prearranged signal from PENKOVSKIY that the drop had been loaded, Air Force Captain Alexis DAVISON drove from his apartment to the U.S. Embassy to alert ABIDIAN. At about 2100 hours the same night, ABIDIAN left in his own car for Spasso House, the Ambassador's residence where a dance was in progress, to tell the CIA Chief of Station, Paul GARBLER, about the signal. ABIDIAN and GARBLER left Spasso House with the other guests at about 0200 on 28 December in ABIDIAN's car and drove past the telephone pole where, as part of his "drop loaded" signal, PENKOVSKIY was to leave a mark. Later in the morning of 28 December, ABIDIAN, again in his own car drove from the Embassy to DAVIDSON's apartment, where he first checked the telephone pole visually from the window and then walked by it for a closer examination. Although it was not certain that the telephone calls received on 27 December had, in fact, been a signal from PENKOVSKIY and although no supplementary mark was found on the telephone pole, a decision was reached to check the drop. Therefore, at 1115 on 30 December 1961, ABIDIAN with Julian F. MacDONALD, an Embassy Economics Officer, left the Embassy in an official car with a Soviet driver and proceeded to a bookstore on the corner of Pushkin Street. At 1130 ABIDIAN entered the building where the drop site was located, determined that the drop was empty, and left one minute later. The pair then returned to the Embassy.

These facts were outlined to NOSENKO during the February 1965 interrogations. It was pointed out that, by his own most

recent account, NOSENKO had transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section to the Tourist Department about 28 December 1961 and that his participation in a Tourist Department approach to American citizen W. E. JOHNSON on 5 January 1962 had been confirmed by JOHNSON himself. Therefore, NOSENKO was told, much of what he had told CIA about his own role in the Pushkin Street affair became untenable. NOSENKO's response to this observation is described in Part V.F.3., which discusses NOSENKO's approach to JOHNSON.

Also during the February 1965 interrogations NOSENKO refused to sign the page of a protocol which read as follows:

"I have been told by my interrogators that ABIDIAN's only visit to the Pushkin Street site took place on 30 December 1961. Therefore, I was told that:

a. I could not have placed the surveillance report in ABIDIAN's case file because I had already turned over the file to GRYAZNOV.

b. I could not have received reports about the stationary surveillance while still ABIDIAN's case officer, since I was already in the Seventh Department in January 1962.

c. The three month period in which the surveillance post was watching the Pushkin Street site did not expire until 30 March 1962 - more than two weeks after I left for Geneva.

Thus I could not have known in June 1962 that the surveillance of the dead drop site had failed to produce results or that it had been discontinued."

Although he acknowledged having reported to CIA on his involvement with ABIDIAN as summarized in the protocol, NOSENKO said the way in which the protocol was prepared made him "look silly." On no other occasion has NOSENKO refused to sign protocols dealing with other subjects.

NOSENKO was questioned further during October 1966 concerning ABIDIAN's visit to Pushkin Street. NOSENKO reaffirmed that ABIDIAN was under special surveillance coverage throughout his Moscow tour and that this surveillance detected his travel from the U.S. Embassy to Pushkin Street and back; he would date this only as "sometime in 1961." NOSENKO was asked whether KGB surveillance had detected any unusual movements by ABIDIAN during the period just preceding his visit to the PENKOVSKIY drop site (a reference to his movements on 27 and 28 December 1961 as described above). He replied that he knew definitely that surveillance had reported nothing unusual and added that ABIDIAN had not succeeded in losing the KGB surveillance at any time during this period.

On 20 October 1966 NOSENKO was asked why, in his opinion, ABIDIAN had gone to Pushkin Street at the time he did. In response, he told CIA for the first time that in about 1960 an

American tourist or delegation member had gone to the Pushkin Street address and that it was the "opinion of the Second Chief Directorate" that this American had selected it as a dead drop site,* it was thought that ABIDIAN went there merely to check the suitability of the proposed site.

When he was asked on 20 October 1966 whether he had visited the Pushkin Street address several days after ABIDIAN had been seen there, as he had earlier said, NOSENKO replied: "I don't remember. I do not want to say that I visited the dead drop. I don't remember now whether I visited it or not. It seems to me that I visited it, but I don't remember. It seems that I visited it with KOZLOV, but I cannot say 'yes,' and I cannot say 'no.'"

As previously indicated, NOSENKO said that on the same day ABIDIAN was observed on Pushkin Street (i.e., on 30 December 1961) the Chief of the KGB Surveillance Directorate, KOZLOV, inspected the Pushkin Street building. The FBI had reported, however, that KOZLOV was on TDY in the United States from 15 November 1961 until leaving New York City on 30 December 1961, travelling via France. The timing of ABIDIAN's visit to Pushkin Street, at 0330 hours New York City (Eastern Standard) time, would appear to preclude the possibility of KOZLOV's having gone to the dead drop site on the day NOSENKO said he did.

* The Pushkin Street dead drop site was proposed by PENKOVSKIY himself in the August 1960 letter by which he initially contacted CIA. The only known visits by Americans to this address and the only ones connected with its use as a dead drop location occurred on 12 November and 4 December 1960, when CIA officer Eugene MAHONEY checked the address from the outside, and on 21 January 1961, when MAHONEY returned and entered the building to check the precise dead drop location. See Part V.E.3.f. for a discussion of NOSENKO's knowledge of MAHONEY.

e. Supervisor of Activities Against American Service Attaches

At the beginning of the interrogation session on 29 January 1965, NOSENKO was asked to list the duties he assumed upon reporting to the U.S. Embassy Section in January 1960. As he had on a number of earlier occasions, NOSENKO replied that he was given responsibility for the supervision of code clerk operations, was made the KGB case officer for American Security Officer John ABIDIAN who was to arrive in the near future, and was charged with the Second Chief Directorate file on the security of the U.S. Embassy and his section's file on the materials from microphones in various Embassy offices. Later in this same session NOSENKO recalled--and told CIA for the first time--that he was also given the duty of supervising activities against officers assigned to the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force Attache offices. The pertinent portion of the 29 January 1965 interrogation was as follows:

Question: Who briefed you or gave you instructions on what was expected of you in the Section?

NOSENKO: I was speaking with GRIBANOV and KLYPIN.

Question: What did KLYPIN say?

NOSENKO: That "you are Deputy Chief of Section, but I consider that you must also pay special attention to code clerks. We must study them and make an approach to one of them. It's necessary to work on this." KOVSHUK was in KLYPIN's office and I remember also that he raised the question: "O.K. He will supervise this kind of work, but maybe he can also take the military. All three attaches." Well, KLYPIN did not say yes and did not say no. I couldn't say anything because I had not begun; I didn't know how much work this would involve. I couldn't say. And, you see, KLYPIN said: "Let's try it a short period of time." It was that way. It was decided that I will supervise the code clerks and then the three attaches. And KOVSHUK took the diplomats and a whole pile of work. But, of course, in the absence of KOVSHUK I must take everything and in my absence, KOVSHUK must take everything. But later, 1,2,3 -- I don't remember dates -- later I was not supervising the military attaches but concentrated only on code clerks.

Question: Later you were not supervising military attaches, but only code clerks?

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: What do you mean you were supervising military attaches?

NOSENKO: What does it mean? If the case officers of the three attaches have any questions or any papers to report to the Chief of Section, they go to

me, not to KOVSHUK. They were deciding all questions with me. This is what supervising the work on these three attaches means. They were deciding all questions with me. For example, the case officers who were working against diplomats -- KUSKOV, ARTEMOV, FEDYANIN, CHEREPANOV -- they were reporting any questions, any papers, to KOVSHUK. You see, there was such a division [of labor].

Question: Am I correct that by military attaches you mean Army, Navy, and Air Force?

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: Attaches and their assistants?

NOSENKO: Yes, yes, yes.

Question: And enlisted personnel?

NOSENKO: DEMKIN was handling enlisted personnel, and he was also coming in to me for advice.

Question: Roughly how long did you have the responsibilities for the attaches?

NOSENKO: (pause) I don't remember. Several months.

Question: By several, you mean...?

NOSENKO: Five or six.

Question: And why was this responsibility removed from you?

NOSENKO: I didn't have time. No time. No time. You see, besides this, which is simple to explain, there were too many other questions which...

Question: What occupied most of your time?

NOSENKO: Day-to-day matters. An order from the Chief of Department to study and develop this question, then this question, then this question. Then something to prepare for GRIBANOV, then something to prepare for KLYPIN, for his report, then something to prepare for myself...

Question: To which of the major responsibilities you have mentioned did you devote the most time?

NOSENKO: I don't know.

Question: What was most important?

NOSENKO: They were all important.

Question: Can you tell me where you were spending most of your time to cause the removal of your responsibility for military attaches?

NOSENKO: No. I can't tell you.

Question: Who was given the responsibility for military attaches?

NOSENKO: Just a moment. I think he was... I don't remember how, or what date, when there appeared in the First [American] Department a Deputy Chief of Department. It was either before I came, or it was in January, or it was a little bit later.

Question: Who was this?

NOSENKO: ALESHIN.* And his job was such -- it was a new one -- supervision of work against military intelligence officers, not only Americans, but of other departments also, the First, the Second, the Third, the Fourth, the Fifth. Coordination of the whole work against all military intelligence officers. And that's why, later, KLYPIN and KOVSHUK said: "Well, why are you supervising this? Let ALESHIN do it. You are the Deputy of the Chief." It was not only because of the lack of time. Also it wasn't convenient to the case officers. They were reporting to me. Then ALESHIN would invite them in and they would have to report the same thing to him.

Question: Who were you supervising?

NOSENKO: ...GAVRILENKO had the Air Force attaches and assistants; KURILENKO had the Army Attache and assistants; and BELOGLAZOV the Naval Attache, assistants and marines.**

During interrogations on 20 October 1966, NOSENKO changed his earlier statement that the only operational file he held in the U.S. Embassy Section was that on ABIDIAN. At the same time, he described a leave period that he had not mentioned earlier. NOSENKO said: "When I began to work [in the U.S. Embassy Section], after a month or so, I took the files on the Naval Attaches. And

* NOSENKO had mentioned this earlier. On 18 June 1964 he was asked to list the names and functions of U.S. Embassy Section officers in 1960. He said: "In 1960 the Chief of the First Department was KLYPIN. MATVEYEV was still there as First Deputy. The Second Deputy was Yevgeniy Nikolayevich ALESHIN. He was given the special assignment of coordinating the activities of the Second Chief Directorate against all foreign military intelligence activity but was assigned to the First Department... In the First Section, KOVSHUK was the Chief and I was the Deputy Chief. In addition to general functions, I had the responsibility for supervising the work against code clerks and the Embassy Security Officer."

** In June 1964 NOSENKO explained that Nikolay DRANOV was responsible for the Naval Attache's office in January when NOSENKO arrived, but he was transferred and his duties were taken over by BELOGLAZOV who had been working with him against this target.

then after two months I gave them to BELOGLAZOV. I immediately went on vacation after I came.* After two weeks I went on leave for a month. I took over the files either before or after the leave.*** NOSENKO was asked why he had assumed responsibility only for the Naval Attaches and replied: It was decided by KOVSHUK. I should take only the Navy while I was getting acquainted with the section. At the same time, the case officer DRANOV was retiring and he handled only Naval officers. I didn't take the Army or Air Force."

NOSENKO was asked again on 25 October 1966 why he was responsible only for the Naval Attaches during early 1960. He answered: "I took the files only on the Navy, but I was working on all of them."

* In other contexts NOSENKO has always equated custody of a file with case officer responsibilities. Therefore, he seems to have indicated here that for the approximately two months when these files were in his name, he was officially the KGB case officer charged with the American Naval Attaches.

** During a subsequent interrogation session, NOSENKO was asked to describe the leaves he took during 1960 and 1961. He repeated that he took a month's leave immediately upon joining the U.S. Embassy Section, "part of January and part of February" 1960; He had gone, he said, to the Caucasus with his wife and mother. He then added: "You want me to say I was not telling the truth in February [1965] when I said I was on leave before I went to Cuba [in November 1960]. I know this." (See Part V.E.3.d., which describes this November 1960 leave and its relationship to NOSENKO's responsibilities as case officer for John ABIDIAN.)

f. Knowledge of the Target

(i) Introduction

His position and duties as Deputy Chief and sometimes Acting Chief gave NOSENKO access to, and required him to know, the extent of the U.S. Embassy Section's knowledge of its target. He has therefore been questioned at length by CIA about the locations and occupants of the Embassy offices as well as about the Embassy personnel whom the KGB had identified as CIA officers. The information from NOSENKO on these two topics is presented below.

(ii) Physical Premises

NOSENKO has said that his knowledge of the physical layout of the Embassy derives both from his general supervisory function during 1960 and 1961 and from his responsibilities as the officially registered custodian of the KGB's file on the security of the Embassy. According to NOSENKO, he received the latter from his chief, KOVSHUK, when he arrived in the section in January 1960; shortly thereafter he arranged by a phone call to the Secretariat of the Second Chief Directorate to have custody transferred officially to his name from that of M.F. BAKHVALOV, his predecessor as Deputy Chief of Section. NOSENKO explained that BAKHVALOV had already left the section by this time but that, under KGB procedures, it was permissible for an officer to remain official custodian of a file belonging to the U.S. Embassy Section, even after leaving the American Department, so long as he remained in the Second Chief Directorate. Until he turned this file over to GRYAZNOV approximately during the period 25 to 28 December 1961, no one else had access to it other than KOVSHUK, Chief of the section, and GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV, who shared the office and safe where this file was kept.

NOSENKO stated in February 1965 that he had never studied the contents, nor had he paid any special attention to this file. Since he would necessarily have been in a position to know, NOSENKO also said he is certain that no operational analysis or planning by himself or others was done on the basis of this file during his two years in the section. The file consisted of two volumes, one for the old building on Mokhovaya Street and the second--about one inch thick--concerning the new Embassy building on Chaykovskiy Street, which was occupied in 1953. It was used only for reference purposes, for the KGB had concluded that it was impossible for a Soviet citizen to penetrate the secure areas of the Embassy because of the security precautions in effect. Apart from these file-custodial duties, NOSENKO was generally interested in the floor plans of the Embassy by virtue of his position as Deputy Chief of the section. NOSENKO's knowledge of the Embassy premises is reflected in the CIA debriefing of February 1965, and these statements are given in the next paragraphs.

All KGB employees who went into the secure areas ("Zone of Security") of the Embassy on the seventh through tenth floors*

* The seventh floor is not one of the secure areas; the eighth, ninth, and tenth are.

were carefully questioned on what they saw, because these areas were of special interest to the KGB. NOSENKO knew no KGB employees who entered the secure areas during 1960 or 1961 and had no personal contact with any of them. He did not remember any information that such KGB employees ever reported to the KGB, except that Dmitriy I. KUKOLEV, an electrician whom he personally handled in 1954-1955, had observed antenna wiring in the attic; the details or significance of the wiring were unknown to NOSENKO as of 1965.

NOSENKO personally placed some reports by KGB agents in the Embassy security file while he had custody of it. None of the information, he said, was interesting, important, or useful enough for him to remember, and he could not name the agent sources of the KGB. In another context and at another time, however, NOSENKO said he had received a report from some agent (name unknown) that there was a sign "Security Office" on the office door of John V. ABIDIAN, the Embassy Security Officer.*

NOSENKO did not study the Embassy security procedures in detail and did not remember where the classified trash was burned. He said that nothing could be done with this information operationally, because the trash was always burned by a U.S. sergeant or a Marine guard accompanied by an officer.**

The Embassy office or floor where any section was located or any individual worked during the years 1960 and 1961 was not remembered by NOSENKO. This reply was also given when he was asked about the rooms and floors for the offices of the ambassador, the political officers, ABIDIAN, and the code clerks.*** NOSENKO said that he either knew these locations at the time he was Deputy Chief of the section or could have found them in the in the monthly Embassy phone lists; the KGB received these regularly from agent sources, and the lists gave office numbers and phone numbers.****

* There never has been such a sign; NOSENKO's responsibility for the KGB coverage of ABIDIAN is discussed in Part V.E.3.d. All Soviets who enter the top three floors of the Embassy have a marine escort.

** A check with two former Embassy security officers indicates that there has never been such a regulation. The trash is burned by the marine on duty who "invariably does it alone." One of the security officers questioned said: "I can think of no reason why the Soviets would think this to be the case, since whatever collateral information they have on it would point to the truth."

*** Part V.E.3.c. reviews NOSENKO's knowledge of and participation in KGB operations against U.S. code clerks.

**** The telephone lists give only phone numbers, not office numbers. They do, however, provide apartment numbers.

In 1960 a "metallic chamber" (acoustical room) arrived at the Embassy for President Eisenhower's use and for secret conversations. NOSENKO was not certain where it was located or whether it was ever used, but he heard from an unknown source that in 1960-1961 meetings were held in a secure room in the "Zone of Security." He did not know any of the technical details of this room.

The KGB accomplished only one theft of classified material in any form from the U.S. Embassy during 1960 and 1961. A charwoman (name or cryptonym not recalled), who worked as an agent for the KGB officer Viktor BELOG-LAZOV, stole a bag of papers from the office of the Naval Attaches. Most of the papers were torn or crumpled. They included a draft of a report of the Naval Attaches' sighting of ships and factories while on a trip to Leningrad. Since this report was of only routine interest to the KGB, NOSENKO said, he was unable to recall any other details of the theft, including the date, except that the charwoman was granted a cash award.

(iii) CIA Personnel Under Embassy Cover

According to NOSENKO, the Americans at the U.S. Embassy of greatest counterintelligence interest to the KGB section were the identified CIA officers. When questioned on 2 September 1964 concerning his knowledge of intelligence personnel assigned to the Embassy in 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO stated that the KGB immediately listed any officer associated with the offices of U.S. Armed Forces Attaches as a member of American Military Intelligence and any diplomat as "suspect American Intelligence," the latter notation always meaning CIA. One of the tasks of the section was to determine which of these diplomats was the CIA "Resident" (KGB nomenclature for Chief of Station), which were CIA case officers, and which were the CIA agents or cooptees. The KGB knew that code clerks would not be used to fulfill intelligence missions and that the same probably held true for the Ambassador and the Marine guards. NOSENKO on 25 February 1965 signed a protocol which included his statement that, as Deputy Chief and occasional Acting Chief of the section, he would "necessarily know whom the KGB knew or suspected to be a CIA officer in the Embassy."

NOSENKO has been shown lists of the names of all American personnel assigned to the embassy during 1960 and 1961 and on a number of occasions has been asked to select those known or suspected by the KGB to be CIA officers. The persons he so identified, together with his comments concerning them were:

-Boris KLOSSON: Considered to be the CIA "Resident" in Moscow during this period. NOSENKO did not know why KLOSSON was considered as such but said: "Every officer in the First [U.S. Embassy] Section thought he was the Resident." KLOSSON may have taken David MARK's job, NOSENKO said, and MARK had been suspected of being the CIA Resident on the basis of his behavior under KGB surveillance and of his letter mailing.* NOSENKO did

* MARK was a CIA cooptee while in Moscow, not a CIA officer; see Part II.B.

not recall the names of KGB agents working specifically against KLOSSON and never read any agent or surveillance report indicating that KLOSSON was engaged in clandestine activity. NOSENKO did not know KLOSSON's position in the Embassy, where he had been previously stationed, what trips he took inside the Soviet Union, where he lived in Moscow, about KLOSSON's wife or whether he had children with him in Moscow, anything about his personal life, the names of close American friends and his Soviet contacts. "I didn't read the file" on KLOSSON, NOSENKO said on 3 February 1965. The responsible KGB officer, A.M. MIKHAYLOV, "was reading [the file]. I can't tell you why [we believed KLOSSON was the CIA Resident]. There was opinion--his previous position, attitude. Little, little details. I don't remember."*

-John ABIDIAN: Considered to be a CIA officer on the basis of his conduct as a U.S. Department of State security officer in connection with Premier KHRUSHCHEV's 1959 visit to the United States and because he replaced known CIA officer Russell LANGELE in Moscow. Surveillance established the fact that he mailed operational letters and visited a possible dead drop site in Moscow (see Part V.E.3.d.).

-George WINTERS: Known to be a CIA officer and was given special attention because of his operational activity in the POPOV case.** WINTERS was in personal contact with KOVSHUK, who used the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as cover. The KGB case officer responsible for covering WINTERS was V.A. KUSKOV.

-Steve WASHENKO: Known to be a CIA officer. As far as NOSENKO was aware, the KGB identified WASHENKO as a CIA officer on the basis of his mailing one or two letters to KGB-controlled double agents in the Baltic area. In addition, from a KGB microphone he was overheard dictating an intelligence report shortly after he returned from a trip in the USSR.

Lewis BOWDEN: Suspected of being a CIA officer, but NOSENKO could not recall the reasons why.*** KOVSHUK, under Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover, was in contact with BOWDEN.

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- * See below; William MORELL was identified by KLOSSON to the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs as a CIA officer before MORELL arrived in Moscow.
 - ** The case of GRU Lieutenant Colonel POPOV is discussed in Part VI.D.7.a.; further KGB information on WINTERS is reviewed in Part VI.D.7.c.
 - *** The CHEREPANOV document, which sets forth a KGB plan for operations against BOWDEN, lists several reasons why he was believed to be an FBI representative in the Embassy. NOSENKO, when reading this document in Geneva in February 1964, concurred in this opinion; he referred to BOWDEN as FBI on later occasions also. See Part VI.D.7.c. on CHEREPANOV.

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- Richard FUNKHOUSER: Suspected of being a CIA officer because he is a specialist on the Soviet Union, particularly economics. NOSENKO did not remember the names of any agents working against FUNKHOUSER nor any derogatory information concerning him.

- William HORBALY: Suspected of being a CIA case officer* because the KGB heard him, by means of microphones in the Embassy, discussing a report he had written, or dictating it, about his observations on a trip he had taken in the Soviet Union. NOSENKO said that he did not know the names of agents working against HORBALY or whether the agents obtained derogatory information concerning him. As far as NOSENKO knew, there had been no operational approach to or recruitment of HORBALY.

Of the seven U.S. Embassy officers designated by NOSENKO as known or suspected CIA personnel, three--WINTERS, WASHENKO, and HORBALY--were in fact CIA officers. When HORBALY was first assigned to Moscow, however, he was detached from overt employment as an economic analyst in CIA. In January 1962 he severed his connections with CIA to become a full member of the Foreign Agricultural Service of the Department of Agriculture. When HORBALY first arrived in Moscow he openly discussed the fact that he had come to the Embassy from CIA. While in Moscow he had no connection with or knowledge of CIA clandestine activities. WASHENKO was similarly detached from overt employment as an economic analyst with CIA when he was assigned to Moscow, but was coopted by CIA for limited operational support activity, chiefly mailing agent letters. After his return from Moscow he reverted to his overt CIA employment. John ABIDIAN was a State Department officer coopted by CIA; although not a CIA staff employee, he was for all intents the CIA "Resident" in Moscow from February 1960 until November 1961. The remaining three--KLOSSON, BOWDEN and FUNKHOUSER--had no affiliation with CIA.

During the time NOSENKO said he belonged to the American Embassy Section there were stationed in Moscow two CIA officers, Eugene P. MAHONEY and Paul GARBLER, whose status as such was subsequently found to have been known to the KGB before their arrival in the Soviet Union. In addition, one officer (William MORELL) was openly identified as a CIA employee to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs before arriving in Moscow. Furthermore, Francis STEVENS (see Page 374) reported having been asked by one of the two KGB officers trying to recruit him whether MORELL was a CIA employee; when STEVENS replied that he did not know, the KGB officer stated: "He openly says he does." Another officer (G. Stanley BROWN), an overt CIA employee, had transferred to the U.S. Department of Agriculture shortly before being assigned to the Embassy. The latter two were not engaged in clandestine activities in Moscow on behalf of CIA, but the first two CIA officers were.

NOSENKO indicated that he did not know about the intelligence affiliation of any of these four persons:

- NOSENKO was shown a photograph of MAHONEY, whom he did not recognize. He was then given MAHONEY's name, which he recognized as being that of an employee of the Administrative Section of the Embassy. NOSENKO

* Earlier NOSENKO had said the KGB classified HORBALY as a CIA cooptee.

said that, other than this, he did not know anything about MAHONEY--his previous career, his knowledge of the Russian language, when he arrived in Moscow, when he departed, where he lived, his activities there, or evidence that he was an intelligence officer. "It wasn't known he was a CIA officer," NOSENKO said on 3 February 1965. "If there was evidence I would have known. But there was none." NOSENKO was told that MAHONEY's CIA status had been revealed to the KGB by a KGB penetration of British intelligence [George BLAKE]. He replied that he was certain that the U.S. Embassy Section's file on MAHONEY contained no information from such a source concerning MAHONEY, and that had there been such information available, he would have been a special target and would have been handled by one of the best officers in the section. NOSENKO added that he could not understand why this information about MAHONEY was not given to the section by the KGB First Chief Directorate.

- NOSENKO identified Paul GARBLER as a naval officer who worked in the office of the Naval Attache and the case officer working against him as BELOGLAZOV. He said that he could provide no other details on GARBLER. NOSENKO specifically said that he did not know the names of any agents working against GARBLER, that he knew of no unusual or interesting information concerning GARBLER contained from concealed microphones, telephone taps, or surveillance, and that he did not know whether he had read GARBLER's file or other "materials" concerning him.

- NOSENKO did not identify William MORELL as a CIA officer.* Nor did he know that while MORELL was in the Soviet Union, he was under direct cultivation by NOSENKO's superior, KOVSHUK, and by K.N. SMIRNOV, a case officer of the KGB First Chief Directorate.

- NOSENKO did not recognize the name of G. Stanley BROWN. As shown on a list which NOSENKO brought to CIA, BROWN shared an office with HORBALY, whom NOSENKO said was a suspected CIA officer; in this office was a KGB microphone with good reception but insignificant production, according to NOSENKO.** Reportedly BROWN and another member of the Embassy staff were under constant surveillance during a trip within the USSR during 1961, and in the same year he travelled to Leningrad with WINTERS, correctly identified by NOSENKO as a CIA officer.

CIA records show that, as a staff officer, MAHONEY served in Frankfurt during 1955 and 1956 and was connected with a joint [redacted] project which handled the NTS, a Russian emigre organization. His work brought him into liaison in true name with both [redacted] he was known to [redacted] personnel by his true first name only.

* See first footnote, Page 243.

** An operative microphone was found in this office in 1966. In discussing the microphones in the Embassy, NOSENKO said that in late 1960 or early 1961 the U.S. Embassy Section had decided to withdraw the requirement for continuous monitoring of the microphones in the Embassy and SPYAN's office so that this monitoring could be concentrated on targets of higher priority. See also Part V, Ch. 4.

[REDACTED]

George BLAKE, the KGB penetration of MI-6, was arrested in London on 14 April 1961. In his confession he said that he had passed the KGB a master list of the names of persons connected with the joint U.S.-British project with which MAHONEY had been connected in Frankfurt, as well as other materials on this project. On this basis, MAHONEY was relieved shortly thereafter of further duties connected with support of the PENKOVSKIY operation; he was withdrawn from Moscow in September 1961, less than a year after his arrival.

CIA records indicate that GARBLER was detailed to CIA by the Navy in April 1952 and served [REDACTED] from January 1953 until July 1955. In the fall of 1955, he resigned his naval commission, and in May 1956 [REDACTED]

On 3 June 1961, he returned to active duty with the Navy, and on 31 August 1961 his appointment was announced as Assistant Naval Attache to Moscow, with the rank of Commander. In September 1961 his official biographic data was forwarded to the office of the Soviet Naval Attache in Washington, who had requested this information, and the same month GARBLER made an official call at the Soviet Embassy. GARBLER arrived in Moscow on 29 November 1961. He was the CIA Chief of Station there.

Prior to his affiliation with CIA, GARBLER served in Korea and there was acquainted with George BLAKE. In April 1960 GARBLER was a participant in joint CIA-MI-6 discussions in Washington on the question of tourist operations into the Soviet Union (see Part V.D.8); BLAKE, who had access to information on the agenda and participants for these talks, admitted after his arrest in 1961 that he had photographed the minutes of this meeting and had passed them to his Soviet handlers. On this basis CIA presumed that GARBLER was identified to the KGB prior to arriving in Moscow at the

end of 1961. (BLAKE was arrested the previous April.) He was definitely identified as such in an article carried in the Soviet Government newspaper Izvestiya in October 1963. This article, entitled "A Cruel Lesson," was allegedly written by Arthur HAMAN, an Estonian who defected to the West in 1955 and returned to the Soviet Union in 1963; in it HAMAN attempted to expose how "the U.S. Secret Service, riding roughshod over Swedish sovereignty, recruits agents for subversion and espionage against the Soviet Union and other countries...making active use of the official U.S. missions in Stockholm, newsmen, tourists..." HAMAN named GARBLER as having been involved in this work. This article, which appeared at about the same time as the arrest of WENNERSTROM, described a number of fabricated activities of CIA in Sweden and, in fact, GARBLER had no connection with HAMAN or with anything which HAMAN describes.*

GARBLER's part in ABIDIAN's visit to the PENKOVSKIY dead drop site on Pushkin Street is discussed in Part V.E.3.d.

* See Page 394 for other KGB operational use of HAMAN.

g. Electronic Operations Against the U.S. Embassy

(i) Introduction

NOSENKO had three basic pieces of information on KGB audio and other electronic operations against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow: The presence of microphones in the chancery building, the absence of audio-technical devices in the north wing of the Embassy, and the existence of a beam which monitors and jams transmissions from the Embassy. These are discussed separately below. Except for knowing that a resonant cavity (wireless) microphone had been found in the American Ambassador's residence in 1953, NOSENKO said he was unaware of audio surveillance devices and techniques (other than the chancery microphones) in use against the Embassy, nor did he know of any material produced by such measures. NOSENKO told CIA on 14 May 1964 that, to the best of his knowledge, there were no wireless microphones (i.e., carrier transmitters and radio transmitters) in the Embassy.* His information on KGB electronic operations against this target dated mainly from the period when he was Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, in 1960-1961 and derives from his special responsibilities in this period; from his 1953-1955 service in the American Department, NOSENKO said, he learned only that audio installations existed.

(ii) Microphones in the Chancery

Frequently described by NOSENKO as his most important information, the microphones in the chancery building were first mentioned by him during the 1962 meetings in Geneva. In these and subsequent debriefings NOSENKO reported in detail on the ways in which he acquired this information, on the number and locations of the microphones, the quality of reception, and the value of production. He has not given the date when the microphones became operative, but presumed (in agreement with the KGB defector GOLITSYN) that they were installed prior to 1953, when the chancery was occupied by U.S. Government representatives.** Of the 16 microphones listed by NOSENKO, he has stressed the importance of the one in the office of the Minister Counsellor, the existence of which was earlier reported by GOLITSYN and subsequently confirmed by technical investigations. In 1962 NOSENKO said that the audibility of the nine-year-old

*NOSENKO stated that the KGB knew the identity of American counter-audio technicians and therefore turned off the microphones whenever any of them arrived at the Embassy. Since a microphone-and-wire system cannot be turned off, this remark suggests either that there was an external power source for the microphones, which NOSENKO has not mentioned, or that NOSENKO himself did not have rudimentary knowledge of such matters.

**The investigations by American technicians leave no doubt that the microphone-and-wire system would have had to be in place at the time of occupancy.

system varied from very clear to zero; he said in 1964 that the quality was deteriorating and that "in a year or two they [the microphones] will be completely inoperative."* Although the microphones produced a great deal of political intelligence, NOSENKO said, he found nothing worthwhile for use against U.S. code clerks or others of operational interest to him.** All pertinent details from NOSENKO and other sources on the microphone system in the chancery building is presented in the following portions of this paper.

(a) NOSENKO's Sources

Nearly all of NOSENKO's knowledge about the microphone system in the chancery building was, he said, derived from two circumstances: First, his responsibility as Deputy Chief of the KGB's U.S. Embassy Section, for receiving and disseminating transcripts of conversations there; and second, a special meeting which he attended in his dual capacity as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section and custodian of the microphone information. Additional information was obtained by NOSENKO in 1962 and 1963 from G.I. GRYAZNOV, his former subordinate and his successor as Deputy Chief of the Section. In several discussions with GRYAZNOV during this period NOSENKO learned that some of the microphones were dead while others had become less efficient since NOSENKO's reassignment to the Tourist Department in January 1962. NOSENKO's statements concerning his major sources of information on the microphones are presented in chronological order below.

"We are listening to everything the military attaches say in Moscow, the Military, Navy and Air Force Attaches," NOSENKO said on 11 June 1962. "All the reports go through me. I read them....Only a limited group of people read these reports. They are all in the First Department of the Second Chief Directorate. Who are they? The Chief of the Department (we don't give them to his deputies), the Chief of the [U.S. Embassy] Section, and I--altogether three people. Sometimes we report to GRIBANOV things we consider important. We conceal the fact that we are listening to the Americans from our workers in other departments, from the English Department, from the French Department....We are listening to the three attaches and the Minister Counsellor. Don't even send coded cables about me (to Moscow). If you do it will be the end of me....Only three people know that we are listening to you. Even within the Second Chief Directorate it is a tremendous secret that we are listening to you."

NOSENKO was asked on 12 June 1962 about the form in which he received the audio intercept reports and whether these reports were delivered to his office. He answered: "No. Here's how it is done. We have a special unit concerned

*Tests of the KGB equipment by the American technicians later in 1964 resulted in recordings of high intelligibility in certain instances.

**Vulnerability data on Americans in Moscow could be obtained from the microphone system, according to the damage report by the Security Committee of the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB) and according to the views of the U.S. Army Attache whose office in the Embassy was the site of a microphone.

with this function which is called the Second Special Department. It is a part of the Operational Technical Directorate [OTU]. The Special Department has several sections within it. Take, for example, the section under Colonel [N.Ya.] KUZMIN. He has the entire English line, everything. He has young girls and boys there who have an excellent command of English. They all sit in a room with special equipment and listen continuously. Besides this, everything goes on tape and later they transcribe it. They listen to it two or three times so as to get every word.... [They prepare the materials.] The materials from the American Embassy used to come to me...and I decided what to keep and what not to keep. Why? A summary report would come to me with the notation that the information in it was Top Secret or Confidential. This was all nonsense, but I was required to return the report within two days' time. So, I would read through the materials to see what was useful and what was not. It's not all suitable. And I would underline this [the significant items] with a pencil. No, [I was wrong]. The report first went to the Chief of department and then I underlined with a pencil what was necessary and gave it back to them [the Second Special Department, OTU]. They collected it. I signed a receipt that I had received it from them and they gave me a receipt when I returned it. And then they gave me extracts. From these extracts alone one cannot tell where the material came from, but from the report one realizes that the Americans are being listened to. It is necessary to have these extracts to place in the files. We have a file on each person working in the Embassy, the so-called delo-formulyar [developmental file]. We keep one on every Embassy employee."

During the second of the 1964 series of meetings in Geneva, on 24 January, NOSENKO took a number of notes from his wallet. Pointing to one of them, he said: "This piece of paper was kept in my operational file and it represents the statistics for the years 1960-1961, listing those microphones which are actively used in monitoring conversations in the U.S. Embassy." This list named eleven offices and apartments in the chancery which contained microphones. When asked whether he had copied the list from records or had drawn it up from memory, NOSENKO explained that it came from an operational review of what "listening points we had in the U.S. Embassy."

A detailed explanation of his acquisition of the written list was supplied by NOSENKO on 14 May 1964:

Question: How did this list come into your hands? What caused you to write it?

NOSENKO: I came to KLYPIN [Chief of the American Department] with my working notebook. KOVSHUK [Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section in the Department] was writing and he put the list on my book. KOVSHUK said this one [microphone] is working well, this one badly, and so on.

Question: What was the date of this? What year and month?

NOSENKO: Oh, I don't remember, 1960...maybe the beginning of 1961.

Question: At the end of 1960 or the beginning of 1961 you and KOVSHUK met in KLYPIN's office?

NOSENKO: Yes. Or maybe it was at a meeting. It is difficult to say. Maybe we went to report to KOVSHUK in his room or maybe KOVSHUK was writing in KLYPIN's study room. I don't remember.

NOSENKO then described the purpose of the meeting: To discuss the possibility of releasing monitor positions from some of the chancery microphones and of assigning these released positions to Vladimir [patronymic unknown] PETROV, Chief of the American Department's section for work against American tourists and delegates suspected of being connected with American intelligence; PETROV had earlier requested English-language monitoring positions from the Chief of the English-Language Section of the OTU's Second Special Department but had been told that all such interpreters were already engaged on priority targets. At the meeting KOVSHUK and KLYPIN reviewed the microphone coverage of the chancery to decide which rooms offered information of little value and which monitoring positions could be released to PETROV. KOVSHUK drew up a list of the Embassy offices and apartments then being covered on a full-time basis and indicated those of lesser importance. At the end of the meeting, KOVSHUK gave the list to NOSENKO, who retained it in his safe until bringing it to CIA in 1964. NOSENKO has added nothing further on the locations of microphones in the chancery building, and much of his information concerning the quality and value of the production by these microphones came from this meeting.

Since his defection, NOSENKO has spoken further on his responsibilities in connection with the daily transcripts received from the Second Special Department. He said on 14 May 1964: "All the materials after they were read and signed were returned to the Second [Special] Department of the Operational Technical Directorate. Some of the material from this was put in the individual file, but anyone who read it would never know where it came from. He wouldn't know that it came from mikes.... KOVSHUK and I read all of this. From this we gave information to those who needed it, depending on their interest. If there was something interesting, it was given to KLYPIN to read. If KLYPIN saw something interesting he could take it and give it to GRIBANOV. Tatyana GRISHNYAT [from the Second Special Department] came by car with this material. She went to KLYPIN. Sometimes she left them with me."

A protocol signed by NOSENKO in 1965 states: "One of my duties as Deputy Chief, First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, was to receive, review, and give to appropriate case officers the production from microphones in the American Embassy on a daily basis. I also maintained the control book (journal) for these transcripts. These transcripts were prepared by the Operational Technical Directorate of the KGB. Every day a female worker of the OTU brought me the transcripts of conversations in the Embassy from the previous day. I regularly returned all of the original transcripts to this female worker; they were usually in my possession for one day. In my absence this duty was performed by [my superior] KOVSHUK or [my subordinate] GEYAZNOV."

(b) Number and Locations of Microphones

The information from NOSENKO on the number and locations of the KGB microphones in the chancery building in the U.S. Embassy is separated from that furnished by other sources.

NOSENKO's Information

11 June 1962: [NOSENKO has just been assured that none of the information he had given CIA would be used without first consulting with him.] "Well, because you are such good guys, I will give you even more. Have the Minister Counsellor stop dictating to himself in his office.... Listen, move the Minister Counsellor from his present office to the north wing of the Embassy [where NOSENKO said there were no listening devices; see below]. We are not listening to the Ambassador. But move the Minister Counsellor.... And we are listening to all your military attaches there. All of them--the Military Attache, the Naval Attache, the Air Force Attache.... We have four or five points [from which we are getting intercepts]. We hear the Minister Counsellor, all three attaches--that's four points--and the fifth is where one of the State Department employees sits. And yes, there's another, a sixth point. We are listening to the Agricultural Attache. [C. Stanley] BROWN is working there now and someone else, a young man [William HORBALY]. So, we are listening to these six points. This is our biggest secret. Only a few people know this. I was Deputy Chief of the section and received this information. I decided what to give the Chief of Department and what not to give him. Do you understand? This is to say nothing about the other departments and the [U.S.] Embassy Section itself."

12 June 1962: "We lost the microphone in the private residence of the Ambassador. This was not TROMPSON, but the one before him. BOHLEN was there then. We once had something there, but you found the [Great] Seal where it was located. But in the Embassy itself, in the Ambassador's office, we have nothing. The one we hear now is [Minister Counsellor] FREERS. Bill FREERS, in particular, walks around his office and dictates. All this is recorded. Well, this is important material."

14 June 1962: "When I was Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section I received reports on the microphone material daily. If there was something important in it, I reported to the Chief of the department. The rest KOVSHUK and I read and then distributed to the workers the parts that concerned them. Well, the workers who were operating against the three attaches knew about this [microphone] equipment.... Nothing was received from the code room. These machines were working and there were no conversations. He was sitting alone and there was nothing. [NOSENKO is evidently describing the military code room.].... There is a point there from which we hear the Agricultural Attache. But there is nothing there. They talk about what interests them in the field of agriculture. Nothing interesting."

24 January 1964: The late 1960/early 1961 list which NOSENKO brought to CIA (see above) showed that the following offices and apartments in the chancery contained microphones:

"Office of the Minister Counsellor, FREERS;
 "Office of the Naval Attache, HOUGHTON;
 "Office of the Military Attache, URBAN;
 "Office of the Air Attache, NEILSEN;
 "Office of the Assistant Air Attache, WINDSOR;
 "Office of the Assistant Air Attaches, SENIO and SACHANEN;
 "Office of the Assistant Military Attaches MASON, REITZ
 and WILSON;
 "Office of the Political Officer, GLEYSTEN;
 "Office of Agricultural Attaches, HORBALY and BROWN;
 "Military Code Room;
 "State Department Code Room and Teletype Office;
 "Apartments of FREERS, HOUGHTON, URBAN and NEILSEN;
 "Eighth Floor Bar (Marines)"

Altogether, sixteen spaces are listed, but of these NOSENKO said that the microphone in one (the Marine bar) had never worked and that nothing of importance was learned from the microphones in the four Embassy apartments. This leaves eleven; when presenting the list to CIA, NOSENKO said that while he was in the U.S. Embassy Section, "there were a total of eleven listening posts." (In discussing the late 1960 or early 1961 meeting at which KOVSHUK and KLYPIN received the microphone coverage, NOSENKO said on 14 May 1964 that it was decided to release the microphone positions in the GLEYSTEN office, the HORBALY-BROWN office, the State Department code room and the teletype office. This would leave a total of eight "listening posts.")

14 May 1964: Questioned on the total number of microphones in the U.S. Embassy, NOSENKO said that "many" were installed in the chancery building before the Americans moved in, but that he did not know how many were installed in all, how many were in any one of the rooms included in KOVSHUK's list, or where they were located in specific rooms. He did recall that most of the microphones were placed in the outside wall, the wall nearest Chaykovskiy Street, as most of the offices faced this street and the placement of the microphones near the outer wall would make it more difficult for American technicians to find them if they examined only the inner walls.

January 1965: NOSENKO volunteered that there were no fixed microphones in America House, the residence of enlisted men at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. He said that there was discussion during 1960 and 1961 of using the KGB agents employed there to place temporary audio devices for one or two days at a time in the rooms of the Americans as well as in the Embassy garage. These plans were vetoed, however, because such devices are too easily found. For the same reason, NOSENKO said, there was no attempt made in this period to place temporary devices in Spasso House (the Ambassador's residence) or in the apartments of such Embassy officers as John ABIDIAN. The KGB was "afraid that they will be detected and that there will be a scandal."

Information from Other Sources

In 1956 [redacted]

[redacted] submitted a written report to the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow with the cautionary remark: "Do not speak about this information in the rooms of the American Embassy." The report itself contains a portion reading as follows: "Because all rooms in the American Embassy in Moscow are being monitored by the KGB, I strongly ask that there be no conversations and discussions concerning this information in the American Embassy. The flap involving the American direction-finding specialists* in Stalingrad during the summer of 1955 was organized by the KGB because conversations were overheard in the rooms of the American Embassy. As you know, as a result of this flap, the KGB seized valuable direction-finding equipment from the American intelligence officers. The KGB did not possess this type of valuable equipment, and it would have been necessary for Soviet technicians to work and experiment for a long time in order to acquire such valuable equipment. The listening devices are so skillfully installed in the walls, floors, and ceilings of the rooms of the American Embassy that it is impossible to find them, even with special-purpose instruments."

GOLITSYN, who defected in late 1961, reported the existence of a microphone in the office of the Minister Counsellor and said that many more had been installed in the chancery prior to 1953. (GOLITSYN was debriefed in early 1962 and his information on this subject was disseminated within the U.S. Government approximately two weeks before NOSENKO's initial contact with CIA.) GOLITSYN said he had learned of the microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office when by chance he happened to see a particular document in an office at KGB Headquarters. According to GOLITSYN, during one of his visits to the American Department in 1960** he heard and saw

*This is a reference to the arrest of U.S. Military Attaches BENSON, MULE, and SPROUD and the seizure of sensitive electronic equipment they had with them in Stalingrad in the summer of 1955. NOSENKO reported that the KGB seizure of this equipment was based on information obtained from microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. See Part V.C.3.b.(viii).

**GOLITSYN has reported that he visited the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department on a number of occasions in the spring of 1960 as part of his preparation for assignment to Helsinki in July of that year; he has also said that he returned on temporary assignment to Moscow and again consulted with U.S. Embassy Section officers in December 1960. With regard to the latter visits, however, GOLITSYN's passport [redacted] indicate that he was in Moscow on temporary duty for two weeks in January 1961 and that he is therefore a month off in his estimate of when these visits took place. On this basis it appears that by his statement that this incident occurred in 1960 (he has not been more specific), he could have been referring to either his visits to the American Department in the spring of 1960 or his visits in January 1961.

that a report or reports concerning the results of audio-surveillance in the U.S. Embassy had been misplaced. While GOLITSYN was in the office, the Chief of the American Department ordered all personnel present to search for these papers, and all the KGB officers searched again through their files, without success. GOLITSYN noted a large number of reports with red stripes across their covers, indicating that they were the property of the Operational Technical Directorate. The only office in the U.S. Embassy that GOLITSYN recalled being mentioned in connection with this search was that of the Minister Counsellor.*

No technical investigations were undertaken as a result of GOLITSYN's information, and so it was largely on the basis of NOSENKO's reports that American technicians inspected the chancery building for the presence of microphones in the spring of 1964. The results have been described in the damage report submitted by the USIB Security Committee on 7 October 1964: "On 23 April 1964, a low-impedance dynamic microphone and associated seven-inch probe tube were discovered in the wall behind a radiator in Room 1008 of the Chancery of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The cable to this microphone was traced to a major cable run which lay several inches under the outside surface of the east face of the Chancery. This major cable run consisted of a single twenty (20) pair and a single thirty (30) pair, lead-sheathed audio cable which ran along the east face of the Chancery to the roof area of the North Annex of the Embassy. At this point, these cables were spliced into a one hundred and one (101) pair cable along with two ten (10) pair cables.... A number of vertical cables were found to run from the ten, twenty, and thirty pair cables to the various microphone installations. Fifty (50) microphones have been positively identified.** Two (2) microphones not physically located

*On 28 January 1965 NOSENKO volunteered an account of the loss of one of the intercept reports which the U.S. Embassy Section had received from the Second Special Department of the Operational Technical Directorate "in 1960 or 1961." This document, according to NOSENKO, was "one of the reports with [Minister Counsellor] FREERS dictating"; as a result of its loss, "the month of December, the whole month, the U.S. Embassy Section was in a turmoil" searching for the document. The month-long search and investigation was unsuccessful, however, and, in the end, the case was closed with the conclusion that the document had probably been burned inadvertently, without a record of destruction having been drawn up. In this account NOSENKO appears to date the incident in December 1960, which approximates GOLITSYN's second series of visits to the U.S. Embassy Section (and duplicated GOLITSYN's erroneous estimate of when these visits took place). NOSENKO has never reported that GOLITSYN was present in the offices of the U.S. Embassy Section during the search for this document and, in fact, has denied that GOLITSYN visited the section either in the spring of 1960 or in late 1960 or January 1961. The only visit by GOLITSYN to the U.S. Embassy Section reported by NOSENKO was one in the spring or summer of 1961, at which time NOSENKO claims to have been on leave; GOLITSYN was not in Moscow at the time.

**Four more were subsequently located, for a total of 54.

can reasonably be presumed to be in apartment 6J based on the symmetry of the known installations. The microphones located were situated so that all microphones and probes were behind radiators. The microphone system discovered covered every outside room on floors six through ten, with the exception of those offices with doors entering onto balconies and when exterior building constructions were adjacent to outside wall sections bearing radiators."

The first microphone found was in Room 1008, in what is now the Army Finance office and which in 1960-1961 was the office of the Military Attache, where NOSENKO reported a microphone to be. All other microphones were ultimately traced from this discovery. There were microphones in all rooms identified by NOSENKO, and in others besides. Two of the latter were inoperative when found--one in the Ambassador's office where NOSENKO said no conversations were being heard in 1960-1961 and the other in the Security Office where NOSENKO said there was none. The damage report concluded that all the microphones were installed before the U.S. Government took possession of the chancery building in 1953.

(c) Receptivity and Audibility of Microphones

NOSENKO made the following evaluations of the quality of intercept received from the chancery microphone installations:

11 June 1962: "They are dying, the microphones, and we cannot do anything about it, because we can't get into the Embassy [to make new installations]. In that respect your Embassy and the British Embassy are the only ones we can't get into."

14 June 1962: "The most interesting materials, of course, are from the...[Note: one or two words on the tape are unintelligible here; from earlier and subsequent remarks, particularly one on 24 January 1964 (see below), it is clear that NOSENKO is speaking of the microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office.] And I tell you honestly that it is becoming increasingly difficult to work with this. The shayba [microphone], as we call them, is fading and only two or three people are able to make out what is being said. That is, the tape sounds as if somewhere far, far away, somewhere in the cellar, someone is speaking in a whisper. It is very difficult to hear, very difficult when it is fading. But, what can you do? They tell us categorically and directly--KUZMIN, the Chief of the section of the Second Special Department responsible for this, tells us that soon we will not have anything there. There are a great number of microphones there, but they don't work. I know that there are about 20 microphones there that don't work. They have all gone deaf."

24 January 1964: "Now, we also listened to the code room and the teletype office, but we could never get anything out of the teletype office because of interference [probably speaking of machine noise]. From this point [pointing at the list, but not stating which microphone he was speaking about] the reception became progressively weaker until it finally stopped: evidently it wore out. Yes, there was another point in the bar on the 8th floor. This one never worked even though it was installed. Thus, out of the eleven points, nine were working...[NOSENKO then referred to information he learned in 1962 and 1963, after leaving the U.S. Embassy Section.] GRYAZNOV said that the equipment is deteriorating and they are only getting snatches of conversation and that in a year or two they will be completely inoperative. GRIBANOV is insisting on getting to [recruiting] code clerks at all costs."

31 January 1964: "Here in HORBALY's and BROWN's room [office of the Agricultural Attaches], there is no acoustical [sic] and nothing comes from here. I'll come back to this, but they complained that they're not getting anything. [These microphones were installed] when this building was being built. It wasn't later after you had moved into the building, but when the building was under construction...[NOSENKO was asked whether more or fewer than nine microphones are now currently active.] It couldn't be more, anyhow."

14 May 1964: Very interesting information was heard from MINISTER Counsellor FREERS' office, NOSENKO said, "but for the last years, even in 1960 and 1961, it was very

difficult to hear. I was sitting with [S.G.] DMITRIYEV [Deputy Chief of the English-language Section of the Second Special Department] and they told me how difficult it was. The mike was dying. Only very experienced interpreters were sitting on this. They listened 10, 15, even 20 times to the same place [on the tape]....[After 1961] GRYAZNOV was telling me that they were getting almost nothing from this point. [He said this] in 1962, 1963. I was thinking you had given a command [had cautioned FREERS]. We were getting almost nothing. I heard this from GRYAZNOV several times in 1963. The mikes were working not bad at all in 1960 and 1961 in the attache rooms--Navy, Air Force.... I don't know [how reception was in 1962]. I know only that GRYAZNOV was telling me in 1962 and 1963 that they were getting little, little, and almost nothing. He said we are losing everything. We have no materials. We have little, little pieces, but nothing...in general [from all of the microphones]." NOSENKO then speculated that one reason for this was the fact that the Americans in the Embassy were not saying anything significant, but he said he did not know this to be the case. Speaking of the microphone in GLEYSTEN's office, he said: "There was something heard. In 1960 and 1961 it was working I remember. Reception was good but there was no secret information. The mike in HORBALY's room was good in 1960 and 1961....1960 and 1961--good reception." According to NOSENKO, reception was good from the State Department code and teletype room "only always the sounds of [teletype] machines. In 1960 and 1961--machines only....Reception was good when conversation came through. I don't know [about reception in 1962 and 1963]....Reception was good [from the military code room] in 1960 and 1961."

On-site tests made by American technicians after the 1964 discoveries determined that the following microphones in the chancery (the occupants listed are those as of December 1960) were inoperative or unintelligible, but the USIB damage report emphasized that it had not been possible to determine how long these microphones had been inoperative:

- one microphone in the apartment of the senior Naval Attache;
- three microphones in the apartment of the senior Air Attache;
- one microphone in the apartment of the Economic Counselor;
- the microphone in the office of the Publications Procurement Officer;
- the microphone in the Marine bar;
- the microphone in the Internal Affairs office
- the microphone in the Ambassador's office;
- the microphone in the office of the Security Officer;
- the microphone in the office of the Chief of Chancery;
- the microphone in the office of the Air Attache;
- the microphone in the office of the Assistant Air Attache;
- the microphone in the office of the Assistant Naval Attaches;
- the microphone in the Navy administrative office;
- the microphone in the Air Force administrative office.

This list includes the office of the Ambassador (from which NOSENKO said no intercepts were being received in 1960 and

1961) and the office of the Security Officer (where NOSENKO has said no microphone was installed).* On-site recordings made from twelve selected microphones in 1964 indicate that the microphone in the office occupied by the Minister Counselor in 1960 was capable of producing tapes of "high intelligibility" as of 1964. The 1964 tests of the microphones in the military and State Department code rooms in the office of the Naval Attache also produced recordings of high intelligibility. As pointed out below, however, the possible production by the code room microphones would have been sharply reduced by the installation of acoustical rooms during 1962.

*As noted in Part VI.D.3.e., NOSENKO reported that the U.S. Embassy officer Richard HARMSTONE did not report his having been approached by the KGB for recruitment in May 1959. HARMSTONE did, in fact, report the approach, and the report was made in the office of the Security Officer.

(d) Amount, Type, and Value of Production

Evaluations of the quality of production have been given by NOSENKO as well as U.S. authorities concerned with the microphones in the chancery building.

NOSENKO's Statements

11 June 1962: "Well, perhaps, there would be some kind of fitness report [kharakteristika]. Sometimes there the Counsellor, FREERS, who was there before McSWEENEY, dictated something; he said that so-and-so has such-and-such weaknesses. We had not known that. We are listening to your military attaches there. We know where they intend to travel, what they want to find-out. We know what machinery and what targets interest them--always....They chatter sometimes. Some of the things they say are surprising [from the point of view of security]. They discuss, among other things, where to go, what to see, what to take with them--electronic equipment or not. And we are hunting for this electronic equipment and now have permission, if we are absolutely certain that one of your people is taking electronic apparatus with him on an intelligence trip outside Moscow, to take it, to steal it. We now have authorization to take any necessary steps to steal it. Because you now have improved your equipment. We stole some equipment in Stalingrad in 1955, but now you have better apparatus....What do we do [when we know the attaches are taking special equipment]? Well, they are getting ready to go and we hear that such-and-such data interests them. We give them disinformation; we make them think, for example, that there are rockets there. And there's absolutely nothing there, understand? Absolutely nothing. We make it appear on the radio [by spurious transmissions] that there are rockets there; we even have patrols standing there and everything....They talk about interesting things, but never in my life have I heard a conversation about agent operations, not once."

12 June 1962: [Speaking again about coverage of the U.S. Service Attaches] "They say: 'Today, let's go to such-and-such a place.' They go to the military attache, the two assistants, and say: 'This region is interesting. They have something there.' We know it at once. I personally telephone surveillance at once and tell the Chief of the department to come at once. He arrives and I say: 'Throw in three, four, five brigades [surveillance teams].' We work almost openly against the attaches....FREERS, Bill FREERS, in particular, walks around in his office and dictates. All this is recorded. Well, this is very important material. We do not know the cipher, but he dictates Top Secret and Confidential cables [in the clear]. We receive the clear text and decide at once whether there is anything serious there or not. If we decide that this must be reported to the [KGB] Chairman immediately, GRIBANOV may call him right away."

24 January 1964: "Now, we also listened to the code room and the teletype office, but we could never get anything because of interference [teletype machine noise]....We didn't get much out of the [military] code room; we could hear [the code clerk James] STORSBERG swearing on occasion, and then he would mention a group of numbers.* This was, of course,

*See Part V.E.3.c. on the STORSBERG case.

all recorded, and we turned it over at once to the Eighth Directorate, dealing with coding and decoding."

14 May 1964: Discussing the list drawn up by KOVSHUK and the decision to withdraw U.S. Embassy Section requirements for full-time monitoring of certain microphones, NOSENKO quoted KOVSHUK: "We are getting information from the rooms of the attaches, the Counsellor, and the Agricultural Attache. The flats [Embassy apartments]--no; the bar--nothing. Of course, I know it is necessary to keep the room of the code clerks in spite of the fact that there is seldom anything received except several numbers. The code clerk is saying aloud several numbers. But the flats you can take, not permanently, but temporarily." NOSENKO then continued: "KOVSHUK said to give them these flats....But you see, nothing was going on in these flats. They weren't speaking or were talking about steak and eggs. There was nothing of interest from an operating standpoint. Sometimes we heard there would be guests. Okay. There is a possibility to hear something. In this case we would call DMITRIYEV [English-language Section of Second Special Department] and say: 'This evening, this day, this flat. Maybe we will get something.' The mikes were working not bad at all in 1960 and 1961 in the attache rooms--Naval, Air Force. When the man was alone we heard nothing. But when two or three men were sitting in the rooms, the assistants, we heard. For example, when they returned from a trip and discussed what they had seen or when they were preparing for a trip.... But we heard nothing about agents."

Later on this occasion the following dialogue took place:

NOSENKO: GRYAZNOV was telling me in 1962 and 1963 that they were getting little, little, almost nothing. He said we are losing everything. We have no materials. We have little, little pieces, but nothing.

Question: Was he talking about the Military Attaches?

NOSENKO: In general. I think they were speaking very little. God knows. Then, you see, we were thinking they were taking new measures. GRYAZNOV, FEDOSEYEV, and KOVSHUK considered that there was a room-in-a-room--a room [acoustic] for the meeting.

Question: When did you first hear about the room-inside-the-room?

NOSENKO: First it was known when, I think, Eisenhower was going to come.* In 1960 or 1961 we had information that the Embassy had such a chamber made out

*President Eisenhower's trip to the USSR was scheduled for the summer of 1960 but was cancelled over the U-2 incident on 2 May 1960.

of steel....In 1960 and 1961 the mike in GLEY-STEEN's office was working, I remember. Reception was good, but there was no secret information. I don't know [about reception from this mike in 1962].

Question: What about GRYAZNOV's statement [concerning diminishing production of the Embassy microphones]?

NOSENKO: This was only one common phrase. He didn't tell which room. I think he was speaking about the group...

Question: How was production from the mikes in HORBALY's office?

NOSENKO: Not good, but we did get something which made us suspect he was connected with intelligence. HORBALY.

Question: What about the code room and teletype office?

NOSENKO: At State, yes. Only always the sounds of machines in 1960 and 1961. Machines only. Three times during these two years maybe somebody said one phrase or one of the guys said several numbers.

Question: What about the military [code] area?

NOSENKO: The reception was good. He [STORSBERG] seldom spoke. Sometimes he repeated numbers to himself. And sometimes a mechanic of code machines came to him, a military guy, a sergeant [William HURLEY, an Army Warrant Officer]. They said two or three phrases. "Did you check this?" "Yes." "This side good." Et cetera.

Question: In all this time that you read all this material, there must have been something that impressed you as extremely valuable.

NOSENKO: Extremely valuable--nothing. A little was interesting from FREERS' room. It was given to the special group of GRIBANOV. They were writing special information to the [KGB] Chairman to the [CPSU] Central Committee. There were political questions, for example.

26 January 1965: The following is taken from an interrogation protocol signed by NOSENKO: "I regularly reviewed all of the transcripts from microphones in the American Embassy for a period of approximately two years, from January 1960 to January 1962. The following is the only information which I can remember as being important, interesting or operationally useful to the KGB:

a. From the microphone in the office of the Minister Counsellor, FREERS, I remember that he occasionally dictated cables about the Embassy's evaluation of certain declarations or acts of the Soviet Government and advised the State Department on positions for negotiations with the USSR. This information

was of such importance that special reports were written to the Central Committee of the CPSU. However, I cannot remember any specific incidents or events which these cables reported nor any specific evaluations or recommendations made in these cables.

b. Also from the microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office, I remember that he dictated fitness reports (*kharakteristiki*) on about twelve officers in the Embassy. I cannot remember who any of these officers were or any details from the reports. There was nothing in these reports which was interesting or useful to the KGB.

c. From the microphone in the Military Attache's office I remember that the Military Attaches regularly discussed plans for trips within the USSR and the targets that they wanted to cover. They also discussed the results of these trips after their return. However, I cannot remember any information about specific trips planned by specific Military Attache personnel or any specific targets that they planned to cover or any specific results from any trip. I do not remember any specific operational activity taken by the organs of the KGB against Military Attaches on trips within the USSR which was based on information obtained from this microphone. There was no interesting, important, or useful information about the personal or professional lives or about the vulnerabilities of anyone in the Military Attache's office (Army, Navy, and Air) obtained from this microphone.

d. I remember that from the microphones in the State Department code room occasionally a code clerk would read numbers. These numbers were only of interest to the Eighth Directorate (Communications and Cryptology) of the KGB. I do not remember any conversations from this microphone. There was no information from this microphone on any of the code clerks which was interesting, important, or useful to the U.S. Embassy Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, KGB.

During the approximately two years in which I daily reviewed the production from all the microphones in the American Embassy I do not remember any information on any American in the Embassy which was interesting, important, or useful to me as the Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section except the points noted in the above paragraphs."

28 January 1965: "In 1960 and 1961 I don't remember any report from the mikes about agents. Never. Nothing about work with agents or work with contacts. But FREERS or WALMSLEY [Minister Counsellor 1954-1956] were dictating interesting opinions of the Embassy concerning the political situation and this material was looked at by the information group and then they were preparing special reports for KHRUSHCHEV."

Evaluation by Others

Theodore F. HOFFMAN, Army Attache in Moscow from May 1959 to May 1961, has been interviewed concerning the microphone discoveries. (In the spring of 1961, Colonel HOFFMAN was succeeded by Colonel URBAN as Army Attache.) While in Moscow, Colonel HOFFMAN occupied room 1008, where the first microphone was found and his statements below relate to matters presumed to be of general and specific interest to the U.S. Embassy Section during the period when NOSENKO claims to have been its Deputy Chief.*

"James H. STORSBERG [military code clerk] was dating a foreign national, I believe a secretary in the British Embassy, name not recalled. On one or two occasions, he was needed either to decode or to encode for dispatching a message and was not available. He would be off with his girl friends, and we couldn't find him. He was verbally reprimanded in my office in regard to the two incidents of absenteeism.

"M/Sgt. Peter BINDER [manager of America House] and I discussed frequently the administrative problems encountered in his operation of the America House. We also discussed the importance of his keeping me informed of the conditions, personality problems, drinking habits, and any other incident of importance that might occur in the America House or the America House club. All discussions were conducted in my office.

"In May or June 1961, James C. KEYSERS [military code clerk] was found to have allowed one or more male members of...a U.S. ice review entertainment group touring the Bloc countries to spend the night in his room at America House. He was suspected of homosexual activities, and he admitted to me being a participant in homosexual activities. I believe these admissions and my entire discussion with KEYSERS took place in room 9, identified now as the shielded code room, located on the ninth floor of the Embassy. I gave SAVAGE [his enlisted administrative assistant] verbal instructions in my office to immediately prepare the necessary paper work for removing KEYSERS from the station and instructed him to inform ACSI by cable as to the details of the incident.

"I remember...a discussion I held with the U.S. Air Attache in his office [where a KGB microphone was located] concerning homosexual activities on the part of two of the Air Force enlisted personnel on station... The discussion in his office concerned the administrative procedures necessary in removing the individuals from Station.

*Apart from his general duties as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, NOSENKO bore special responsibilities for each of the persons mentioned by Colonel HOFFMAN: He supervised the KGB officers operating against code clerks and the residents of America House, and he personally participated in approaches to the two code clerks named, STORSBERG and KEYSERS. The STORSBERG and KEYSERS cases are discussed in Part V.E.J.c.

[Summing up] "To be perfectly frank, I would assume that...some of our modus operandi, some of our targets, some of the results, and all of our personal weaknesses were compromised. This is not a very definite answer; however, it is the best estimate I can make."

In its general introduction, the USIB damage report states: "Although there has been no observable indication that the Soviets have acted in any manner to the detriment of the United States based upon information considered possibly compromised, it must be concluded that due to the extensive period of penetration, the cumulative effect has resulted in serious damage to the United States. The Soviets have gained considerable knowledge as to the effectiveness of United States operations within the Soviet Union, particularly the military attache collection program. Soviet knowledge of U.S. emphasis upon certain intelligence collection areas has made it possible for them to identify priority intelligence and probable Soviet targets and thereby permitted them to implement specific counteractions. The Soviets over the years must have amassed considerable information concerning the personal habits, problems, attitudes and weaknesses of personnel assigned to the Embassy which can be used by them for purposes of exploitation at any time of their choosing in the future."

The following extract from the USIB damage report concerns the declining value of the production from the microphones in 1962 and 1963.*

"The security practices and procedures appear to have followed a pattern from April 1953 to May 1960, at which time the first plastic room was installed. A change occurred in the work habits in that the more senior State Department officers utilized the plastic room for sensitive discussions and dictation. The room could accommodate only a limited portion of the Embassy classified discussions and accordingly, a number of classified discussions were held outside this secure area. In the April 1953-May 1960 period it was an accepted practice for the Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission to discuss openly in their offices routine classified operations of the Embassy and to dictate classified documents and telegrams....In September 1962, the second acoustic room was erected for the typing section for the handling of sensitive classified material. From December 1963 to date it was indicated that no classified telegrams have been dictated

*As previously indicated, NOSENKO said that in 1962 and 1963 he learned there was almost no production from the Embassy microphones. One reason was the natural decline in efficiency of equipment installed ten years previously; the KGB believed that other reasons were the installation of acoustic rooms in the Embassy and tightened security procedures.

outside of the acoustic rooms....The military attaches reported that most cables were drafted in longhand or typed by the originator and then turned over to the code clerks for transmission. In certain instances cables were dictated in the offices. There were many discussions in the offices relating to official duties, office routine, proposed travel, personal observations and normal office talk not specifically in themselves considered classified. From 1953 to 1959, sensitive classified matters were discussed in whispers or to the accompaniment of external noises, such as radios and street noises....In 1959 a secure inner room was constructed in the attache section and has since been utilized for classified discussions and debriefings...."

(iii) Microphones in the North Wing

According to NOSENKO, no microphones or other audio devices were installed in the north wing (as distinct from the chancery) of the U.S. Embassy prior to its occupancy in 1962. (For this reason, NOSENKO advised CIA in 1962 to transfer its sensitive offices gradually--to protect NOSENKO's security--from the chancery to the north wing at the Embassy.) He has commented several times on this subject, and these remarks are presented below.

11 June 1962: "The Embassy is now located on Chaykovskiy Street. When they decided to give the north wing to the Embassy, I wrote an entire report about it. SHELEPIN was still there then [as KGB Chairman. I proposed that] equipment be installed in the walls, gave the justification for this, etc. SHELEPIN wrote: 'Is it worth it?' At the time there was an improvement in mutual relations (between the Soviet Union and the United States). SHELEPIN was a good lad, but feared that...and before this you found 18 or 20 microphones in the new building in Warsaw.* SHELEPIN wrote: 'Is it worth it? We now have good relations with America. It isn't worth it.' He didn't want complications. And then time was lost. Two or three months passed and we again wanted to try it. SHELEPIN also wanted to, but it was already too late. ABIDIAN was going there all the time, the Security Officer. It was already too late because this can be done only while the building is being built. When the windows and doors have been begun it is already too late... The north wing was almost ready. We don't have anything there. So, you should move the Minister Counsellor there. Move him to the north wing from his present office... Don't do it at once. Do it slowly. Don't hurry; don't be in a hurry. Have him say that he doesn't like this room and wants to move there... We hear all the military attaches--the Military Attache, the Naval Attache, and the Air Force Attache--in Moscow. Everything is recorded. But again, don't do anything at once. Don't make any (sudden) changes. Quietly transfer one and then another there (to the north wing), the attache himself and his assistants... You must be very, very clever and very, very foxy... Gradually, gradually move them to the north wing of the building, to the north wing, in which we have absolutely nothing and won't have anything."

31 January 1964: "When the construction of this right (north) wing had begun, when you started the right wing, the new addition to the building, there was a plan to install as many (microphones) as possible--thirty, forty--stick them everywhere. It really wasn't important how many of them would really work. The Committee (KGB) Chairman at that time was SHELEPIN. He didn't go for this. Whether it was the flap with the Poles that happened just before that* or whether it was something else or whether it was the international situation, they were afraid that this may be uncovered. But then, later, when the building was finished, and when you were finishing or putting up the addition yourself, at that point it was too late to put these things in. It was impossible to do it."

* NOSENKO is referring to the discovery in June of 1960 of 19 microphones in the new U.S. Embassy in Warsaw.

After being told by CIA on 31 January 1965 that a lead cable had been found in the north wing, NOSENKO said: "I personally can assure you that nothing was done in that right wing. Nothing, absolutely nothing. There was nothing done there, so it must have been something else."

No extensive counter-audio checks have yet been carried out in the north wing of the U.S. Embassy, and no wired microphones have been found there. Investigation of the microphones in the main section of the Embassy led, however, to the discovery of other Soviet technical equipment installed in the north wing. The USIB damage report stated: "Three-coaxial cables were discovered running parallel to the one-hundred-and-one pair audio cable from the North Annex roof area to the basement of the North Annex...[All three cables were severed by American technicians in 1964.] The cable runs were as follows:

"1. The first coaxial cable...terminated under six inches of reinforced concrete in the North Annex attic. The center conductor was connected to the lead sheath of the 20-pair and of the 30 pair cable which in turn come from the east face of the chancery. The shield of the coaxial cable was unconnected.

"2. The second coaxial cable...followed the same path as the first coaxial cable. The shield was unterminated. The center conductor was terminated in an insulated metal grill. The grill is located in the upper crust of the North Annex attic floor with the long dimension in juxtaposition to the old common wall between the Chancery and the North Annex. The long dimension is normal to the street in front of the Embassy. The grill is made of one centimeter steel reinforcing rods spot welded into a mesh of 15 cm. (5.9 inches). The overall dimensions of the grill are 14'4" by 4'7". The coaxial cable was connected to one corner of the grill....The grill is located as close as possible to the old common wall and is about thirty feet below the State Department code room. The grill 'points' in the general direction of the code room as the plane of the grill is parallel to the plane of the ground.

"3. The third coaxial cable ran along the approximate path of the other coaxial cables to the block of reinforced concrete that contains the grill mentioned above. This coaxial cable terminated in a four-inch piece of fine Lits wire. The shield of the coaxial cable was unterminated..."

The damage report added: "The coaxial cables appear to be of recent installation probably prior to Russian evacuation of the North Annex. The outer shields of all the coaxial cables were carefully insulated."

The coaxial cables and their terminations were evaluated as follows in the damage report: "All tests that have been performed indicate that the grill work and the lead sheaths [of] the cables 20 and 30 pairs were used as antennas.... No function has been determined for the third coaxial cable which terminated in a short piece of Lits wire....The location

of the grill in such close proximity to the State Department Code Room indicated that an operation was directed against that area....The lead sheath may have had other uses. The possible uses that have been suggested are listed below. The most likely use is as an antenna although the other possibilities have not been completely discarded.

- "a. Antenna for collection effort directed against code room.
- "b. Antenna for use in connection with some other surveillance device or technique.
- "c. An alarm system to 'protect' the microphone system.
- "d. Part of a hum removal system connected with the microphone installation.
- "e. Not in use."

(iv) Monitoring/Jamming Beam

NOSENKO was questioned on 31 January 1964 about the so-called "Moscow Signal." (This is an "S" band signal that has been directed against the top floors--the "secure area"--of the U.S. Embassy since the early 1950's from an apartment building located about 200 feet away. Detailed investigation of the signal has been underway since October 1962, but its exact nature and purpose have not yet been established. Although there is some speculation that the signal is meant for harassment purposes only, the view now generally accepted by U.S. technicians is that it has some intelligence-collection function. No change in the signal has been noted since the discovery and the cutting of the cables referred to in the preceding section.) The interview went as follows:

NOSENKO: There is a beam, there is a ray which works against the Embassy. I know.

Question: Do you know what it is?

NOSENKO: No, I don't. But I know that they work and they put things in, and they listen and they do something, and they...

Question: (Interrupting.) Is it successful, is it working?

NOSENKO: Yes, they keep working all the time. Perhaps periodically, but it's working. Yes, there is something in the back of the Embassy on this Chaykovskiy Street, and there is something in front of the Embassy, too.

Question: And it is for listening in?

NOSENKO: No, it's in order to deprive you of working with stationary equipment.

Question: What do you mean--so that our receivers wouldn't operate properly?

NOSENKO: Look, I'm not a specialist. I don't know the details. I know only that the work is being done in this particular area, in this particular direction. But what they do, I don't really know.

Question: But this is not for the purpose of obtaining information?

NOSENKO: Let's say you go on the air. So we find out whether you're listening in on some of our communications or something like this.

Question: To what extent would you in your [American] Department, in your [U.S. Embassy] Section, know about these technical aspects? Would you have to know it? Would you know the details of these things?

NOSENKO: No. No. This is something that the members of the [KGB] Eighth Directorate [responsible for communications and ciphers] should concern themselves with, the ones who work in OTU. This doesn't concern us in the American Department, in the U.S. Embassy Section.

Questioned again later, NOSENKO said that the signal was used to jam U.S. equipment working in the Embassy building. It was this system, he said, which had determined that the Americans had intercepted some GRU agent radio communications. The beam was designed "both to monitor and to jam" transmissions from the Embassy. NOSENKO repeated that "not being a specialist" he was ignorant of the technical nature of the job, or any further details.

Because NOSENKO's true name and photographs had been submitted to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in connection with this visa request, NOSENKO added, it was henceforth necessary for him to use his true name for all travel abroad.

c. The Cuba TDY (1960)

In November 1960, after and as a result of the cancellation of his planned trip to the United States, NOSENKO travelled with a delegation of nickel industry experts to Cuba. He first mentioned this trip on 11 June 1962, during his second meeting with CIA. His account of his activities was given in answer to the question of whether he had ever visited Germany: "I have been in Germany. Yes, yes. I was in Cuba in '61. Well, as NIKOLAYEV. I was there a month and a half. This was when your Embassy was there and we wanted to prepare*... Well, I looked it over to see what kind of people you had working there. They asked me to prepare, so to speak, an accounting on how things were going. I arrived there and asked how they were working against you, just on you. Everyone there is working for you. One, two, three, five days went by... I had unlimited funds, any amount. I could go to any restaurant, any show. So that's how it was with me. The fellows reported: 'He [an American] is there.' My mission was to get a general picture. Not for one, two, or three days, but for a month or two, to provide an opinion... I worked pretty cleverly on them. He [the American] would go to a restaurant. They would say to me: 'He is at such-and-such a restaurant and can be observed there.' I would go and observe him in the mirror or somehow. I am sitting in the restaurant, drinking, and that's all. But I would watch him to see how he behaves, etc., etc. That is, I would begin to feel if he has the mark of an intelligence officer. ...But this was not enough for me. I would go again and again. I would see that, yes, he is an intelligence officer... We were asked to share our experiences with them [the Cubans]. They didn't know a thing... They had turned all intelligence work over to the Communist Party. The Communist Party complicates it."

In the final minutes of NOSENKO's last meeting with CIA in 1962 the subject of his trip to Cuba came up again; NOSENKO recalled that he had used the name NOSENKO for his trip to Cuba and that his function there was that of security officer.

Question: When did you travel to Cuba?

NOSENKO: 1960, November and December 1960.

Question: Under the name NIKOLAYEV?

NOSENKO: No, as NOSENKO, NOSENKO, NOSENKO. I will explain how this happened. I was supposed to go to America, sometime in November, with a group from Gosplan, automotive specialists, etc. Data had already been submitted for coordination and, in particular, my name had been given to the American Embassy there [Moscow]. But the American Embassy announced that this delegation could be accepted, but a little later. And my passport had already been issued. My passport had already been signed authorizing travel abroad, but it was a service passport, not a diplomatic one. And at this moment a delegation was supposed to

* The U.S. Embassy in Havana was officially closed on 3 January 1961.

Her job was simply to inform us in case something interesting happens and somebody interesting comes to the library, but practically nobody ever went to the library. Then, what could she tell us about these sergeants that were taking Russian lessons, that she was supposed to be reporting on? In the first place, they were lazy bums. They would go to a lesson once and then miss the next two and then perhaps go again, and again miss one or two.* In September 1964 NOSENKO added that LEVINA had never been targetted against any particular individual and had never provided any interesting reports on her American contacts. At the end of 1960 or in the beginning of 1961, NOSENKO said, she was released from the Embassy by Paul SMITH, possibly because she was a little deaf and one had to speak loudly to her to be understood.* NOSENKO turned LEVINA over to another officer before he returned to the Tourist Department, and later the British Department was planning to use her in either the British or Canadian Embassies.

* CIA records show that LEVINA was employed at the Embassy as a librarian from January 1958 through January 1962, when she was released. Paul SMITH was Second Secretary of the Embassy in charge of the Cultural Affairs Section and Publications Procurement Officer from May 1959 until approximately September 1961, when he left Moscow.

4. Overseas Assignments

a. Attempt to Obtain Assignment in Ethiopia (1960)

During the first half of 1960, NOSENKO said, he applied for a permanent overseas assignment to Ethiopia because doctors had prescribed a change of climate for his daughter Oksana's asthma. O.M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, approved his request, but then the KGB Personnel Department turned it down when a file review revealed potentially dangerous character weaknesses.

NOSENKO described this matter on 14 April 1964 as follows: "Gennadiy GRYAZNOV came to the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate in 1958. Before 1956 he was studying in the Higher School of the KGB and when he finished the school in 1956 he was assigned to the KGB Personnel Department, and then he came to the American Department in 1958. So GRYAZNOV had very good connections in the Personnel Department. So in 1960, when I wanted to leave, to go abroad on permanent assignment I said to GRIBANOV: 'Let me go for two years to Ethiopia.' When the Personnel Department refused to let me go, I decided I'd just have to know what was there in my personal file. I had to learn what it was that was causing all this. By that time GRYAZNOV was in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate and happened to be the head of the Party Organization of the entire directorate, and he at one time had worked in the Personnel Office himself. He said: 'Give me this thing and I'll see what I can find out about it.' So he went to the Personnel Department and through his friend there got my personal file. Then he gave me a call and said to come over. I went to his office and he locked the door. Of course, he couldn't give me this file, couldn't let me hold it in my hands so to speak. So he read this case to me, this 1954 case to me, about the woman and so forth,* and then said that at that time they made an investigation of my previous residence. And they found out that while I was studying at the Institute [of International Affairs] and was living on Pervaya Meschanskaya Street, all sorts of girls visited me; different girls, a new girl would visit me almost every week. This was in my file. Then this case that took place in 1954. And then in 1960--and, incidentally, GRIBANOV mentioned this to me also--the file said that I was drinking quite a bit, and for this reason I had many fights with my wife. And that was all that appeared in my file. Nothing else, whatsoever, besides these things that I just mentioned."

b. U.S. Visa Application (1960)

NOSENKO's true name appeared with 11 others on a 20 October 1960 request to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow for visas for members of a Soviet automotive exchange delegation which was scheduled

* NOSENKO is referring to the incident he says took place in 1954 when he used KGB alias documentation to conceal his true identity while seeking treatment for venereal disease. See Part IV.B.

to visit the United States in mid-November 1960.* NOSENKO was listed as an engineer employed by the State Scientific-Technical Committee (GNTK). After defecting, NOSENKO told CIA that he had been scheduled to accompany this delegation as a security officer but that the delegation's visit to the United States had been postponed at the last moment. He therefore did not travel to this country.

He further explained, on 17 April 1964, why his visa application had been submitted in true name and under a different cover: "In 1957 and 1958 I went to London as NIKOLAYEV representing the Ministry of Culture. Then in 1959 I didn't go anywhere. Then when this question came up of my going to the States in 1960, I said: 'I'm not going. I've been going under the Ministry of Culture [cover] and with sports delegations. This has to be changed somehow at this point.' So we thought about it and finally somebody said: 'Look, how about this? Perhaps [you can use] this committee of RULNEV's [GNTK].' So I said: 'Well, it's up to you. You decide.' By that time my passport was ready, but the Americans and the Soviets hadn't come to an agreement yet. It was decided that this delegation would go to the U.S. in 1961." NOSENKO was then asked why he could not have used the NIKOLAYEV name for his trip to the United States. He replied: "Sure, I could have gone as NIKOLAYEV, but I just didn't want to. Because, look, it was known to us that the British and American Intelligence exchange information on people they suspect of being KGB, and that the British, of course, had probably watched me when I was in England [in 1957 and 1958] and probably there it was noticed that here's this man under the cover of Ministry of Culture. He's not a sportsman. It kind of looks suspicious. Then he goes to the Soviet Embassy. Also suspicious. So then I have to go to the States. And if I go as NIKOLAYEV I couldn't use--in that case I couldn't use the same cover of Ministry of Culture because of the type of the delegation. I'd have to use a different cover. So I'd go there and they'd say: 'Aha, here's NIKOLAYEV under different cover now.' But if I go as NOSENKO, the British never heard the name. Nobody knows the name. Everything would be O.K." NOSENKO was then asked why he could not have travelled under some other alias. He answered: "That's the way it was decided. I guess so as not to get all mixed up they decided to send me as NOSENKO anyway. It's up to the people who are in charge of these operations. They are the ones who decide."**

* This visa application was submitted approximately six months after the KGB rejected his request for PCS assignment to Ethiopia.

** With regard to his trips to England in 1957 and 1958, NOSENKO said that he had been forced to use the name NIKOLAYEV because this was the name he had used with British citizens [redacted] when they visited the Soviet Union in the summer of 1957; he could not, he said, have shown up in England with another name as [redacted] upon their return from the USSR (see Part V.D.4.d.). This apparently was not a consideration when selecting a name for the U.S. visa application, for NOSENKO had used the name SERGEYEV in his approach to American George DREW in 1959 (Part V.D.4.h.) and the name PETERSON when he recruited Professor Gerard MERTENS, also in 1959 (Part V.D.4.i.). NOSENKO was in contact with Arsene FRIPPEL under the name NIKOLAYEV during this period. NOSENKO and other sources have said that the KGB suspected that FRIPPEL was an American agent (see Part V.D.5.).

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^u The U.S. Embassy in Havana was officially closed on 3 January 1961.

go to Cuba. GRIBANOV's deputy [S.G.] BANNIKOV, said that a worker [KGB officer] should be sent. But they decided not to send a worker to Cuba. "Why bother?" [they said]. "Is Cuba worth it?" Suddenly there was a phone call from the Central Committee [of the Communist Party]. Someone from the Central Committee said: "No, there is a directive that one of our workers must go nevertheless." And only two days remained before the departure of the delegation. Who could they send?

Question: The first person they come across.

NOSENKO: Those who have passports. I had a passport. I was ready. And they decided: "Get going immediately." We flew through Amsterdam, through Geneva. We spent a night in Amsterdam and then made a short stop in Geneva, then the Azores, Santa Maria Island, then we were supposed to fly to Curacao. But we had a headwind and the pilots were evidently afraid that we wouldn't have enough fuel. So the plane went out of its way and made a landing on the island of Barbados. This was not a Soviet plane, but KLM. We flew to Amsterdam on a TU-104 and then went by KLM. Then from Curacao we flew to Aruba. We also spent a night in Aruba, an interesting island; the water and natural surroundings are beautiful. From Aruba we flew through Kingston, through Jamaica, and then to Cuba. And we flew the same route back, but we did not spend the night in Curacao. From Curacao we landed in Caracas for about 40 minutes, and through Parararic--Dutch Guiana--across the ocean, some island or another there, and from there again Lisbon, Geneva, and Amsterdam. But here the entire delegation flew [to Moscow] after a day or two and I took a train through West Germany [to East Berlin].

All of NOSENKO's accounts since contacting CIA in 1964 have been generally consistent with that given on 14 June 1962. His story has been as follows: In the latter part of 1960, at the same time as he was preparing for his intended trip to the United States, a special delegation of nickel industry experts from Gosplan, the Soviet State Planning Commission, was preparing for departure to Cuba. The delegation was a routine one, consisting mostly of engineers from various sections of the Soviet Union, and since there was no one under any sort of suspicion, the Eleventh (Soviet Travellers Abroad) Department of the Second Chief Directorate had decided that it would not be necessary to include a security officer. Two days prior to the departure of the group, however, the Central Committee of the Communist Party decided that a Second Chief Directorate case officer must go along. Because of the short time remaining before the scheduled departure of the delegation, the Eleventh Department protested that it would be impossible to find a suitable person and get all the necessary papers ready in time. At this point, A.I. KUZNETSOV of the Eleventh Department said: "Just a minute. We have a man who has his passport all ready. His passport has been formalized. NOSENKO. He was supposed to go to the States... and his foreign passport has been issued and signed. Why don't you take him?" NOSENKO's statement continued: "So somebody said: 'How about a visa?' And KUZNETSOV

says 'Never mind. The Cubans will give him an entry visa.' And then I had to get a transit visa because we were flying through Amsterdam. And this whole thing was taken care of in two days. The Cubans gave their visa immediately and The Netherlands issued their visa also right away."

NOSENKO has reported that his functions with this delegation were purely of a security nature. He flew with the delegation to Cuba in October or November and spent about a month and a half there. During this time he accompanied the delegation everywhere it went: "I was with the delegation. They go to a plant--I go with them to the plant. I was with them all the time. They went to different plants, to watch the production. They met with some representatives of the so-called Institute of Agrarian Reform. They would meet with these people and they would have many discussions about how to increase production." NOSENKO's cover assignment was deputy chief of the delegation and shortly before departing Moscow he was introduced to the other members as such. He had one agent within the delegation and developed several "confidential contacts" during the trip, which turned out to be entirely uneventful and, for NOSENKO, somewhat long and dull. He explained that he would not have accepted the assignment had he known how long the trip was to be, and that he had really wanted to go only to the United States.

On his return trip to Moscow, NOSENKO was given a special mission. As he was leaving from Havana Airport, the KGB Legal Resident in Cuba, A. I. ALEKSEYEV, handed him a package with instructions to deliver it to Moscow. NOSENKO did not know the contents of the package until he arrived in Amsterdam en route home. There the wrappings became loose (it was bound only by thin string) and NOSENKO took the opportunity to determine that it contained copies of "letters between MIKOYAN and KHRUSHCHEV concerning the prices of sugar" and drafts of agreements between the Soviet Union and East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. Arriving with his delegation at the airport in Amsterdam, NOSENKO was told that a message had been received from the Central Committee of the Communist Party instructing that the package was to be delivered "urgently" to Che GUEVARA, who was touring the Satellite countries and was then in Berlin. While the delegation continued on to Moscow, NOSENKO therefore was driven to the Soviet Embassy in The Hague, and in the late evening of his second day in The Netherlands he left by train for East Berlin. When he arrived, however, he found that GUEVARA had left Berlin for Hungary. NOSENKO refused to go any further. The package was delivered to GUEVARA's deputy in Berlin, and NOSENKO then returned to Moscow.

CIA travel records show that NOSENKO, listed as a mineral engineer, transitted Amsterdam en route to Cuba on 15 November 1960; and that he transitted Caracas from Amsterdam on 17 November 1960; and that on 19 November 1960 he went through Caracas en route to Havana.* Our records also show that NOSENKO again arrived in Amsterdam en route to Moscow from Havana on 13 December 1960 and that he left for Moscow on 15 December. There is no record that he travelled to Berlin.**

* CIA obtained a photocopy of NOSENKO's passport while he was passing through Amsterdam and again through Caracas.

** It appears possible that his name was not removed from the original passenger manifest for the 15 December flight to Moscow and that his train trip to East Berlin went unnoticed.

d. The Bulgaria TDY and the LUNT Case

In the spring of 1961, four months after returning from Cuba, NOSENKO was sent on temporary assignment for about a month to Sofia, the only trip he took in other than a security "watchdog" capacity. According to NOSENKO, it happened this way: "I think I first heard that I was going to Bulgaria, a week or so before I left, from S.I. YEGOROV, Chief of the section having contact with the counterintelligence representatives of the Countries of the Peoples' Democracies in Moscow... He said: 'You must go to Bulgaria. GRIBANOV has decided.' He asked, 'Do you know about this?' and I said 'No.' He said: 'KLYPIN [Chief of the American Department] must tell you.' But this was the first I had heard about it. YEGOROV said that the Minister of the Bulgarian MVR had requested the Chairman of the KGB to send an officer from the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate to Bulgaria for consultation with the American Department, Second Directorate of the MVR of Bulgaria. After one or two days KLYPIN told me about it. He repeated the same thing and after about one and a half weeks I flew to Sofia." The discussion continued as follows:

Question: What plans were made for this trip in Moscow before you left? What briefings or discussions were held concerning what you were to do in Sofia?

NOSENKO: I was told: "You are going for consultations. There are KGB advisors there. They will discuss it with you." No one was speaking with me about my trip.

Question: What discussions did you have with your department chief, KLYPIN, about what you were to do on this trip?

NOSENKO: Nothing. He told me: "You will go. You will see what they are doing. You will tell them how to work."

Question: Did you have any meetings or discussions with the representatives of the Bulgarian MVR in Moscow before you left?

NOSENKO: No.

Question: What discussions did you have with YEGOROV or his section about what you were going to do in Sofia?

NOSENKO: YEGOROV said: "You will go. You will tell us what they are doing."

Question: Before you left Moscow for Sofia did you know anything about the size of the American Department of the Bulgarian MVR?

NOSENKO: No. Nothing.

Question: Did you know the names of any of the officers of the American Department of the Bulgarian MVR?

NOSENKO: No.

Question: Did you know what any of their particular problems were?

NOSENKO: No. Nothing.

Question: Did you know just what was the area of responsibility of the American Department of the Bulgarian MVR?

NOSENKO: No. Nothing.

NOSENKO flew from Moscow in early April 1961 and was met at the airport in Sofia by A.S. KOZLOV, a former Second Chief Directorate officer whom he had known in Moscow.* The following morning he was picked up in an official vehicle and was taken to KOZLOV's office in the Bulgarian MVR building, not far away. NOSENKO asked KOZLOV what was expected of him and was told that "they want to know about how to work against the American Legation. He said he wanted me to tell them everything about how to work, right from letter 'A.'" NOSENKO was then introduced to the Chief KGB advisor in Sofia, Mikhail YEGOROV, and to the Chief of the MVR's American Department, after which he was assigned an office in the MVR building. During the ensuing weeks he discussed both general matters and particular cases with individual Bulgarian officers working against the American target. On one occasion he lectured interested MVR officers on the principles of operations against foreign military personnel in Moscow, and on another he visited an MVR surveillance post opposite the American Legation. He discussed KGB methods of operations against foreign tourists. He also addressed the entire American Department for about five hours and told them "what is necessary, what to pay attention to, how to work." At the end of his visit, some time in mid-May, NOSENKO conferred with the First Deputy Minister of the MVR about what had been accomplished and his recommendations for improving operations against Americans.

As an outgrowth of his TDY to Bulgaria, NOSENKO has provided one lead to a case in which he said he took personal part. About two weeks after arriving in Bulgaria, around the end of April 1961, NOSENKO was going over lists of foreigners who were scheduled to visit Bulgaria in the near future, and he came across the name Horace G. LUNT. NOSENKO recalled that a man named LUNT who was a Slavic linguist had been reported to him in 1958 or 1959 by one of his homosexual agents, VOLKOV or YEFREMOV, as a possible homosexual. He asked the Bulgarians whether this man was a specialist in Slavic languages. When the Bulgarian officers replied in the affirmative, NOSENKO decided to check his recollection against KGB records and an immediate phone call was placed to Moscow, asking for traces.

* NOSENKO had earlier reported that KOZLOV had served as the Chief of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate, until 1953 and that, until about two years before going to Bulgaria as a counterintelligence advisor, he had been Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department. For the two years immediately prior to his Bulgarian assignment, he had been Secretary of the Party Organization of the Second Chief Directorate and was relieved of all other duties. Asked why KOZLOV was unable to "advise" the Bulgarians in this instance, NOSENKO said that he was too busy advising on higher levels and that he had been away from the work for a number of years.

A reply was received almost at once: "Yes. This is the same LUNT who was in Moscow. Homosexual." NOSENKO told CIA that the KGB had never done anything with its knowledge of LUNT's homosexual proclivities and that the Bulgarian MVR had not previously known of them.

NOSENKO's description of what happened next is as follows: "KOZLOV and the Chief of the American Department were very interested. KOZLOV said: 'George [NOSENKO], you must help them. They never recruited an American.' I said that I would do what I could. The three of us went to see General DUMKOV, the Chief of the Second Directorate, Bulgarian MVR. I asked them if they had a homosexual agent. They checked and said they had one who is an operational contact. O.K., I said, acquaint them, prepare a flat, make the pictures. This is the first stage. I also told them, of course, to find out how long he had been there, why, who his acquaintances were, etc. Then we went to YEGOROV, the senior Soviet advisor, and KOZLOV called GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV, I later found out, was in a meeting with the department chiefs of the Second Chief Directorate and was not in a good mood. Why, I don't know. He didn't understand what KOZLOV was saying. GRIBANOV thought that I, myself, wanted to make the approach to LUNT. KOZLOV got confused on the phone. GRIBANOV asked to speak to me. I took the phone. 'What are you doing?' he said. 'You are not at home, you are abroad. You were sent only for consultations, but you are living as if you were at home.' I said: 'O.K., O.K. I wasn't going to do anything.' He hung up. I told KOZLOV that even if the Bulgarians were to ask me, I could not do it myself. YEGOROV became upset. He thought our position was bad because the Bulgarians were asking. 'What they ask, I will tell,' I said, 'but I am not leaving the office to go any place or do anything. I can only advise them on how to make the record entries after he is caught. I can dictate the questions to be asked. But the approach and recruitment I cannot do myself.'

"The Bulgarians never said anything to me about active participation, but they didn't know what to do. I told them to get two agents. Maybe LUNT wouldn't like the first one. The Bulgarians reported that LUNT wouldn't be there long. I told them that if they wanted to take pictures and make a pitch later, that's one thing. But if they wanted to do it all in one step, that is another. I told them they should consider the time element... The Chief of the American Department, KOVACHEV, and the chief of the section dealing with tourists and American delegations were to make the recruitment. The approach was made at the end of April, I think."

NOSENKO went on to say: "I was in the office during the approach. I told them I would not leave. 'If you need my advice,' I said, 'come to me.' KOZLOV and I were sitting in his office. It was the end of April, I think, and the next day I went on holiday. I don't know where or how they approached LUNT. I only advised them that after the first conversation with him they would know if he would be willing to cooperate. I said they should have an apartment ready... not far from Sofia. I told them that if he agreed, they should change the place right away. Take him some place nice to finish the conversation. That's what I suggested."

The outcome was not known to NOSENKO, for he said: "I didn't read any report of the results, and I didn't ask to see one. I took a neutral position. They said everything was O.K. The next day LUNT was to meet KOVACHEV and the section chief. I went on a little trip, the May holidays, part of 30 April, 1, 2, and 3 May. When I returned they said everything was O.K. and that he [LUNT] had left. I asked them what they had decided for the future, a contact in the United States or not. They said they decided against it because he was to come to Bulgaria in 1962 or 1963 for a Slavic conference."

This account, which NOSENKO gave on 6 October 1964, differs somewhat from what he had said earlier, on 11 June 1962, during his second meeting with CIA. NOSENKO claimed then that he personally participated in the recruitment of LUNT against GRIBANOV's wishes: "They sent me in '61 to Bulgaria. The Minister of Internal Affairs there asked for a specialist to help them. I went to help. An [American] professor arrived, a very prominent specialist on the Slavic countries... They [the Bulgarians] had never tried [to recruit] an American. 'Let's try,' I said. The Soviet adviser in Bulgaria telephoned GRIBANOV and reported that NOSENKO had decided that it is possible to get this American. GRIBANOV was in a conference at the time. GRIBANOV said: 'Where the hell's NOSENKO? Let me talk to him... What the hell are you doing? I sent you only as an advisor.' Then he hung up. What could I do? The Bulgarians had already made all preparations... I was embarrassed, but what could I do? I left the office of the advisor and they were waiting for me... I decided to go ahead. I was sure that it would work. I felt that it could be done, that this American could be firmly recruited... I spit on everything and went ahead with the Bulgarians. I told them to grab him. If it will be difficult for you, tell me and I myself can recruit him. Well, they began and I came there. He [NOSENKO is speaking of himself] was under the guise of a Bulgarian and spoke in English, although my English was poor... I said: 'You are a pederast.' He also proved himself to be a homosexual there [in Bulgaria]... 'Well, what will society think of you, those whose know you?' Well, what did this person decide? He agreed."

The first time NOSENKO said that he had not participated directly in this operation was on 2 February 1964, while still in Geneva. He volunteered the following: "In Bulgaria in April and May 1961, although I did not personally participate in this, I went there, and I helped them there with the whole process of recruitment of this professor. I helped the Bulgarians with what to do and how. He was the professor of philology, LUNT."

NOSENKO has also varied on the timing of the operation against LUNT. In the account quoted above, he said that the approach was made the day before he left on his May Day holiday. On 24 April 1964 he said: "I remember that it was at the very beginning of May that this name came up. And we got the information from Moscow the same day, telling us it was the same LUNT. I went on a trip the 1st, 2nd, 3rd of May. That is the 30th of April, 1st and 2nd of May, and the 3rd of May in the morning I was back. So it was in the very beginning after the night of the trip. And Moscow was called right away,

given all the data, and they called back right away and said: 'Yes, this is the same LUNT who was in Moscow...' As soon as this was established, the next day the Bulgarians planted this homosexual on him. They planted this man either next to him or in the restaurant and, well, he met LUNT and they got together and decided to meet with each other the same day or the next day. This was all done very rapidly."

According to Professor LUNT, the approach actually took place on 5 May 1961, following a visit to Moscow where he had contacted an official in the U.S. Embassy. He travelled on 9 May directly from Sofia to Yugoslavia, where he at once reported the incident to U.S. Ambassador George KENNAN, an academic acquaintance. LUNT told the Ambassador, and later CIA, that he had visited Sofia on one earlier occasion, from 8 to 28 November 1960. During this first trip he became involved with one Georgi Velev ALEKSIEV, with whom he engaged in homosexual relations on at least five separate occasions and to whom he gave U.S. travellers checks, which ALEKSIEV intended to sell on the black market. On one occasion during the first visit ALEKSIEV was recognized and stopped by the Bulgarian civil police while walking on the street with LUNT. After leaving Bulgaria in November 1960, LUNT received two letters from ALEKSIEV and prior to his next visit, on 25 April 1961, LUNT wrote ALEKSIEV saying he would be returning.

5. Transfer to the Tourist Department in January 1962

In the autumn of 1961 a decision was reached, on the basis of NOSENKO's own request, to return him to the Tourist Department. GRIBANOV had originally wanted to promote NOSENKO from the position of Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section to the post of Deputy Chief of the American Department; NOSENKO's superior and friend KOVSHUK had long had his eye on this job, however, and was the personal choice of the Chief of the American Department for it. (In fact, NOSENKO said, KOVSHUK had once held the job, losing it in 1959 because of some misbehavior.) NOSENKO did not want to be placed in the difficult situation which his own promotion to this post would have created. NOSENKO described his transfer in the February 1965 interrogations. The following is from a protocol signed on 26 February 1965:

"The decision for me to return to the Seventh [Tourist] Department in January 1962 was actually made in about September or October 1961. GRIBANOV planned to appoint me Deputy Chief of the First [American] Department, but the new Chief of the First Department, FEDOSEYEV, wanted KOVSHUK to take this position. Since I did not want to be placed in this position by GRIBANOV's order against the wishes of FEDOSEYEV, I went to GRIBANOV and requested that I be transferred back to the Seventh Department, in any position. I had already spoken to [V.D.] CHELNOKOV, who was then Chief of the Seventh Department, about this matter and he had suggested that I go to GRIBANOV and ask to be returned to the Seventh Department as Chief of the First [American-British-Canadian] Section with the understanding that I would be appointed Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department as soon as this position would be vacated by [B.A.] BALDIN [who was retiring in July 1962]. ...GRIBANOV did not tell me his reasons... for wanting to appoint me Deputy Chief of the First Department in late 1961 or for appointing me Section Chief and later Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department in 1962. He did not discuss with me my personal qualifications for each of these positions."

Aware of his impending transfer NOSENKO took the opportunity during December 1961 to spend several hours each day in the Tourist Department. There he talked with Department Chief CHELNOKOV, familiarized himself with certain files of the American Tourist Section, and discussed current operations and operational possibilities with the officers assigned to this section. The formal order for the transfer was signed by GRIBANOV on 24 or 25 December 1961 and NOSENKO officially signed over the ABIDIAN case file and the U.S. Embassy security file to his successor as Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section, G.I. GRYAZNOV, within the next few days.* As he had when he transferred from the Tourist to the American Department in 1960, NOSENKO said, he took his active agents and his safehouse on Vorovskiy Street with him when he returned to the Tourist Department in 1962.

* These specific dates were arrived at under interrogation in February 1965. On all earlier occasions NOSENKO had said that he was transferred in January 1962 (or some later date); he said in February 1965 that he was "officially" transferred at the end of December and reported to his new position at the beginning of January (see below).

F. January 1962 to January 1964 (Tourist Department)

1. Date of Transfer

NOSENKO has given different dates for the time when he left the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department to become Chief of the American-British-Canadian Section of the Tourist Department. During the Geneva meetings of 1962 he said on different occasions that this occurred in January 1962 and in February 1962; in 1964 he timed the transfer as falling between 15 and 20 January 1962; and in February 1965 NOSENKO gave the date as 2 or 3 January 1962. He has also reported that he was in the U.S. Embassy Section for three months after John ABIDIAN serviced the Pushkin Street dead drop (on 30 December 1961, thus placing NOSENKO in the U.S. Embassy Section until late March 1962) and that he had transferred to the Tourist Department by the time GOLITSYN defected (which NOSENKO placed in mid-January 1962 but which actually occurred in mid-December 1961).* W.E. JOHNSON, the target of a Tourist Department operation** confirmed that NOSENKO approached him in Moscow on 5 January 1962.

In February 1965 NOSENKO said he recalled that the correct date of his approach to JOHNSON was on 5 January 1962. The CIA interviewer then reminded NOSENKO that he had earlier described on several occasions his visit to the dead drop site on Pushkin Street and his receipt of reports from the surveillance post for three months afterwards; during all of this period, NOSENKO had said, he was in the U.S. Embassy Section of the First Department. NOSENKO was told that CIA records show that ABIDIAN made only one visit to this dead drop site, on 30 December 1961, six days before the approach to JOHNSON. He answered only that he might have been confused, but despite any contradictions the "facts" (his emphasis) were the important thing, not any correlation of dates.

2. Functions and Activities

As Chief of the American-British-Canadian Section of the Tourist Department (hereafter in Part V.F. referred to as the American Tourist Section) from January to July 1962, NOSENKO said, he was responsible for planning and coordinating all KGB activities against such tourists in the USSR as well as for supervising the operational work of 15 subordinate case officers. He had no deputy. NOSENKO told CIA that he required several months at the beginning of 1962 "to get the feel of things"; "there were no accomplishments" on his part in the initial period on this new job, and plans for handling the influx of American tourists during the forthcoming 1962 season consisted of studying files and continuing to work against the tourists as in the past. NOSENKO was asked in February 1965

* Statements by NOSENKO about GOLITSYN are reviewed in Part VI.E., and ABIDIAN's servicing of the Pushkin Street dead drop is discussed in Part V.E.3.d.

** See Part V.F.4. for details on this operation.

whether, in his first several months in the Tourist Department, he had originated any new methods for operations against American tourists. He replied that during this period he had proposed a study of representatives of foreign tourist firms in Moscow with an eye toward the KGB attempting to recruit them.* This suggestion, NOSENKO said, had been accepted.

In March 1965, NOSENKO was asked what new knowledge concerning the use of tourism for espionage purposes by foreign intelligence organizations had been acquired by the KGB during his two-year absence from the Tourist Department. He replied that the KGB had noted an increase in automobile tourism and that American Intelligence had increased its use of multinational tourist groups. NOSENKO was then asked what new information concerning the use of tourism as a cover for espionage activity had been obtained by the KGB from any agent source during this period. NOSENKO answered that he neither knew of any such new information nor had he heard of such an agent.**

NOSENKO has said that, in line with the wishes of the Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, O.M. GRIBANOV, he was promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the entire Tourist Department in July 1962, immediately after his return from Geneva. A year later he was made First Deputy Chief of the Department, a promotion which involved only a change in title as there was no Second Deputy Chief at the time. Apart from saying he was V.D. CHELNOKOV's second-in-command from July 1962 to January 1964 and as such general supervisor of all KGB tourist operations, NOSENKO has not detailed the functions attached to this position; NOSENKO has not been questioned specifically concerning these duties.

NOSENKO's first operational activity after transferring to the American Tourist Section was supervision of a homosexual approach to W.E. JOHNSON on 5 January 1962. Additionally, during the 1962-64 period in the Tourist Department NOSENKO took part in the recruitment approach to Horst BRAUNS, in the interrogation of Yale University Professor Frederick BARGHOORN, and in the arrest of the American tour guide Bernard KOTEN. For a short time in 1963 he handled the KGB agent Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, owner of a tourist agency in New York City*** and a Russian language bookstore in Chicago, Illinois. By virtue of his

* NOSENKO said at another time that he made the same proposal in 1958-59, forming the basis of the FRIPPEL operation (see Part V.D.5.).

** See Part V.D.7.b., which discusses the KGB agent George BLAKE, a staff officer of MI-6, who confessed after his arrest in April 1961 that he had passed to his Soviet handlers the complete minutes of joint meetings held by CIA and MI-6 in London in June 1959 and in Washington during April 1960. These meetings were held to coordinate the American and British programs for legal travel operations, mainly with tourists, into the Soviet Union. Part V.D.7.c. describes a top secret KGB document on western tourist operations in the Soviet Union which was prepared in 1961 in the Tourist Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. This document, which the defector GOLITSYN gave CIA, quoted verbatim certain portions of the minutes given to the KGB by BLAKE.

*** KOTEN was frequently employed as a tour guide to the USSR by this tourist agency.

supervisory position in the Tourist Department NOSENKO also became involved with John SHUBIN, a GRU agent. (These six cases - JOHNSON, BRAUNS, BARGHOORN, KOTEN, SVENCHANSKIY, and SHUBIN - are discussed below.) NOSENKO reported that his planned role in the approach to Natalie BIENSTOCK (see Part VI.D.2.) was prevented by his preparations to leave for Geneva in March 1962. Finally, NOSENKO said he participated in the KGB investigation of Lee Harvey OSWALD after President KENNEDY's assassination in November 1963 (see Part V.D.6.).

NOSENKO has indicated that his own operational work in 1962 to 1964 was limited to those cases cited above because of the considerable amount of time spent on temporary duty assignments outside Moscow during these two years. In mid-February 1962, soon after assuming the duties of Chief of the American Tourist Section, he began to prepare for his first trip to Geneva, which lasted from 14 March until 15 June 1962 (see Part III.B.). NOSENKO estimated that he had spent a total of six months outside Moscow in 1963 on temporary assignments. These included a two-day trip to Odessa to meet FRIPPEL, an inspection tour of the Leningrad KGB organization, a five-day trip to Leningrad for a conference on border control, a week-long trip to Alma-Ata for a conference on tourist travel with KGB representatives from the Soviet Central Asian republics, and an eight- or ten-day inspection trip to the Caucasus as a member of a team headed by GRIBANOV. NOSENKO said he travelled to Gorkiy Oblast on 16-17 December 1963 to assist in the search for CHEREPANOV, who had passed top secret documents to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow (see Part VI.D.7.c.).

3. NOSENKO's Agents

When NOSENKO returned to the Tourist Department in the first days of 1962, he took with him the agents whom he had been handling as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section. These agents are listed below with a summary of NOSENKO's comments concerning their use in 1962 and 1963.*

a. Arsene FRIPPEL:

FRIPPEL had been reassigned from Moscow in early 1961, but NOSENKO continued to be the Second Chief Directorate case officer in charge of any future KGB contacts with him. (FRIPPEL had no KGB contacts in New York City.) Describing FRIPPEL's past service for the KGB on 15 June 1962, five months after he said he transferred to the Tourist Department, NOSENKO said: "FRIPPEL was afraid and gave practically nothing... He was a weak agent... I recruited him but, speaking honestly, he was not an agent." Nevertheless, NOSENKO said, the KGB hoped that FRIPPEL would be reassigned to the USSR at some future date. When FRIPPEL returned twice to the Soviet Union in 1963, NOSENKO met with him, once in Odessa and once in Moscow,

* The only other agent whom NOSENKO handled during this period was the American Alexander SVENCHANSKIY. (See Part V.F.6.).

but FRIPPEL provided nothing useful on these occasions.*
 Whereas NOSENKO had normally met FRIPPEL in the company of
 CHELNOKOV during FRIPPEL's Moscow tour, he went alone to the
 two 1963 meetings.

b. Johan PREISFREUND:

After GOLITSYN's defection, NOSENKO said, the KGB considered
 PREISFREUND compromised to American Intelligence and therefore
 ineligible for further use against Americans at the Embassy in
 Moscow. For this reason NOSENKO was told by the U.S. Embassy
 Section to continue to handle PREISFREUND while serving in the
 Tourist Department, but as PREISFREUND spoke only Finnish and
 Russian, he was of no use against English-speaking tourists.
 Although NOSENKO met with PREISFREUND on the latter's visits to
 Moscow in 1952 and 1953, this agent was not used operationally.

c. VOLKOV and YEFREMOV:

NOSENKO's two homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV took
 part in the entrapment approach to W.E. JOHNSON several days
 after NOSENKO returned to the Tourist Department. This was
 their first operational activity since 1959, for they had not
 been used in any homosexual operations while NOSENKO was in the
 U.S. Embassy Section. It was, according to NOSENKO, the last
 time they were engaged in KGB activity. At the end of 1962 or
 the beginning of 1963 they were terminated, and their files were
 sent by NOSENKO to KGB archives. NOSENKO explained that VOLKOV
 and YEFREMOV had become too well known for their operational
 activities to be of further use to the Second Chief Directorate.

d. [REDACTED]

When NOSENKO was transferred to the Tourist Department,
 he was instructed by the American Department Chief, S.M.
 FEDOSEYEV, and V.M. KOVSHUK, Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section,
 to continue to handle [REDACTED]
 studying in Moscow. NOSENKO had personally recruited [REDACTED]
 and had used him in the development of U.S. military code
 clerk Matthew ZUJUS (see Part V.E.3.c.) in 1961, an operation
 which was still underway at the time of NOSENKO's transfer.
 NOSENKO continued to meet [REDACTED] during the first months of
 1962, and he recalled that in February or March of that year
 he instructed [REDACTED] to attempt to arrange a social meeting
 with ZUJUS in a Moscow restaurant so that another KGB agent
 could be introduced to the KGB target. This meeting had not
 taken place by March 1962, when NOSENKO left for Geneva. Just
 before leaving Moscow, around 12 March 1962, NOSENKO turned
[REDACTED] over to G.I. GRYAZNOV, according to NOSENKO, then the
 Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section. [REDACTED] was scheduled
 to finish his studies in Moscow in May 1962, and NOSENKO be-
 lieved he left at that time to return to Syria.

* FRIPPEL reported a meeting with NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV
 in Odessa in early 1962, and the records of the State
 Department Passport Office indicate that FRIPPEL intended
 to visit the USSR at that time. NOSENKO said there was
 no such meeting. See Part V.D.5.

e. Marina RYTOVA:

Marina RYTOVA was turned over to NOSENKO by I.A. KONSTANTINOV of the Tourist Department in 1956 or 1957. At that time she was working as an interpreter at the Russian Permanent Exhibition in Moscow. In 1960 or 1961 she became an instructor of the Greek language at the Institute of International Relations, and some time in 1962 she got a job at the school of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Thereafter she ceased all agent work. NOSENKO was officially registered as her case officer until his defection in 1964. He did not indicate that RYTOVA took part in any operations from January 1962 until she began work for the Central Committee.

4. Approach to W.E. JOHNSONa. NOSENKO's Information:

NOSENKO first referred to his approach to the American tourist Wallace Everett JOHNSON on 11 June 1962. He did not name JOHNSON at this time: "In January of this year I recruited an American. I cannot remember his name. He is from California, a Baptist, a young guy, healthy, somewhat fat, and he turned out to be a homosexual.* He loved men. I have an agent network capable of anything and, in particular, although I head a section there, I have a good agent apparatus, i.e., I have beautiful girls... and I have young pederasts, homosexuals. In particular, I have one special pair VOLKOV and YEFREMOV - I'm afraid that they are known to you and the English... Here is what happened. He gave me a signature. I told him: 'Write it yourself.' So he typed it on a typewriter. I said: 'No, I don't want it typed. Write it out longhand.'... He had a very reactionary attitude toward the Soviet Union. His attitude was such that he insulted us terribly. He visited Baptist groups, churches and... insulted us, Russia, and the government horribly. He sent letters, and we read them all - awful letters, i.e., the government is lousy and everything here is poor. I said to him: 'Write, damn it, that the best country in the world is the Soviet Union, that the best government is the Soviet Government. Write, write.' In general he did everything I asked but then, right away, he ran to the Embassy and told everything. This was in January of this year 1962. He told everything. I know that he told. But he gave me his signature that he would help the Soviet security organs, etc. I know this. I was there. I decided to go to the hotel where he was staying. I sat down and waited. Surveillance was on the job. 'Tell me when he comes,' I ordered. I sat down. 'He has come,' the surveillance team reported. 'Where is he?' I asked. 'In his room,' they said. 'We'll wait,' I replied. They reported that he had gone to eat in the restaurant and I went there at once. He was sitting alone. I approached him: 'Hello, how are you?' I didn't say anything to him. I knew that he had told everything in the Embassy. I said: 'How are you? How about our connection in the States? And our work in the States? What do you think about it?' I said to him: 'Will you work? Can you give us something important or not?' He answered: 'I have nothing.' I said: 'And if I

* Other sources, personal acquaintances of JOHNSON, have reported JOHNSON's having homosexual tendencies.

make it public that you are a pederast, what will happen then?' 'No,' he said, 'I will do anything you want.' But I couldn't tell him that I knew that he had reported everything. I said: 'Listen, brother, I don't believe you. You are a bad person.' We decided that we couldn't do anything with him. 'Go home, damn you,' I said. 'But if you write one insulting article about Russia I will find you, even in the U.S.' He is a Baptist and writes articles, a bright guy. And I left. He pushed aside his food and ran to a pay telephone and called the Embassy: 'This afternoon in a restaurant George was frightening me.' We know he called the Embassy. We heard everything."

NOSENKO's first reference to JOHNSON in 1964 was at a meeting on 2 February, when he produced a note bearing that name and the date 5 January 1962. "Here I have a name jotted down, Everett Wallace [sic] JOHNSON," NOSENKO said. "The date was 5 January 1962, but what took place I have absolutely no recollection. I don't think it was a recruitment, but it was some sort of contact, or he was being studied or worked on, or something like that. But I remember nothing."

NOSENKO next mentioned his approach to JOHNSON on 17 April 1964. Although not immediately recalling JOHNSON's name, he eventually remembered that "it was something like JOHNSON, JOHNSTON, or something that starts with a 'J'" and that he was a Baptist from the California coast. NOSENKO placed the operation sometime in the summer of 1962, after his return to Moscow from Geneva, because he also remembered wearing "just a coat, no overcoat at the time." JOHNSON, who had come to the Soviet Union as a tourist, was known to be a socialist, and on this basis the KGB Second Chief Directorate considered him as a recruitment target. When the Second Chief Directorate checked whether the KGB First Chief Directorate would have any use for JOHNSON as an agent, however, it learned there was no interest in JOHNSON: He had no access to important information, and he lived too far from the KGB Legal Residencies in the United States for convenient contact.

Several days later KGB surveillance observed JOHNSON mailing some letters in Moscow. When read by the KGB they were found to be "so bitter toward the Soviet Union, angry, critical, that they [the KGB] decided something had to be done" to stop him from writing letters and making anti-Soviet statements on his return to the United States. At about the same time there was some sign that JOHNSON was a homosexual, and it was decided to entrap him on this basis. The sole reason was to halt JOHNSON's criticism of the USSR - no recruitment was attempted, because neither the First nor the Second Chief Directorates had any use for him as an agent and because the KGB had determined that he probably would not accept a recruitment proposal anyway. NOSENKO did not know why he was selected to make the approach to JOHNSON, except that "BOBKOV said I should go." (F. D. BOBKOV, a Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, supervised the activities of the Tourist Department.) NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV were selected to compromise JOHNSON.*

* In 1962 NOSENKO implied that the KGB received its first indication of JOHNSON's homosexuality from one or both these agents.

JOHNSON became acquainted with VOLKOV and YEFREMOV at the Metropol Hotel. They told JOHNSON that they had recently arrived in Moscow and invited JOHNSON to visit their hotel room. JOHNSON agreed because "they understood each other right away. They knew they were the same (i.e., homosexuals) and so he came, and when they were engaged in their business, our people walked in on them under the disguise of the hotel administrator and one militiaman." Photographs of the incident had been taken, but these had not been developed at the time of this, the first confrontation of JOHNSON. A report describing the circumstances (an akt) was prepared, and JOHNSON was then transferred to another room. By this time, NOSENKO had arrived at the hotel from his office, and he went into the room where JOHNSON was waiting in accordance with KGB orders. NOSENKO discussed the situation with JOHNSON, then asked him to type and sign a statement that he would "not say anything derogatory about the Soviet Union." JOHNSON did as he was told.

The following day, after the incriminating photographs had been developed, NOSENKO approached JOHNSON in the cafe of the Metropol Hotel and asked him whether he intended to keep his promise. When JOHNSON said that he planned to do so, NOSENKO presented him with an envelope containing copies of the photographs and said that they would be leaked to the foreign press if JOHNSON were to break his promise. The KGB later learned that JOHNSON had visited (or phoned, according to a later version) the U.S. Embassy and assumed that he had reported the approach. NOSENKO did not recall what name, if any, he had used during this operation.

Questioned further on 24 April 1964, NOSENKO said that, upon his arrival at the hotel immediately after the compromise, the militiaman described the incident to him in JOHNSON's presence. Addressing JOHNSON, NOSENKO had said: "How come? How could you do such a thing? What are we going to do now? After all, this is punishable by court and... people are given from five to eight years for such relations. It used to be three to five, not it's from five to eight." Frightened by this, JOHNSON had written and signed his promise not to denigrate the Soviet Union in the future.

NOSENKO was asked whether the KGB would mount such an operation against any foreigner who wrote uncomplimentary letters and articles about the USSR. He replied: "They don't jump on everyone, and not everyone writes this way. And not everything that is written this way gets into their hands. In this case there was a coincidence. There was something we could hit him on. For instance, if the fact that he is a homosexual didn't come to our attention, they would probably just say: 'All right, to hell with him. We have to get rid of him. Let's see that his trip is cut off.'"

While discussing the approach to JOHNSON on 30 January 1965, the following dialogue took place:

NOSENKO: This (the approach) took place in the summertime of '62 or '63.

Question: In your notes, you have the date 5 January 1962.

NOSENKO: No, it doesn't concern JOHNSON at all. I remember it was summer; I think it was '63.

course, because we haven't seen him yet. But even that first signal is very helpful. So if he goes on a Soviet plane, they will start watching him from the time the flight starts. Now, as soon as he crosses the border, he will be watched by the border guards; he will be watched the entire route of his travel. This is a very important business, because the main task in regard to tourists is to uncover within the general flow of tourists those persons who are of interest from the operational point of view... Let's just say that this person is processing a group of American tourists who are going to the Soviet Union, and, when the processing is almost finished, another person is added to the group. Nobody knows this person in the group... but he was added at the last minute. So this is an indication. This is what he /the agent/ was taught to pay attention to when he was being trained in Moscow... Now, if some official government agency makes a request that a man be sent to the Soviet Union as a tourist, this immediately arouses suspicion, of course... In such things he has been trained... He comes to Moscow once or twice a year. You know, such a little Jewish fellow - an emigre from Russia - in the past, you know, scared of everything. The last time he came he told us: 'You know, I'm thinking about it all the time,' he says. So they asked him: 'Are you afraid? Why are you shaking?' He says, 'Well, I'm not afraid; I'm not shaking. But why should I be caught like an idiot...' His pseudonym is 'ANOD' and his last name is SVENCHANSKIY. Well, I'll give you all this later."

NOSENKO told CIA on 14 February 1964 that SVENCHANSKIY was recruited in 1961 and that in 1963 he, NOSENKO, had taken over the handling of this agent from Tourist Department case officer Ye. N. NOSKOV.* SVENCHANSKIY had sent the KGB many open code messages such as those described above, and a number of these messages have been considered to have been of definite operational interest. NOSENKO identified SVENCHANSKIY as the president of "Afton Tours" in New York City and the owner of a Russian-language bookstore in Chicago.

There was some concern on the part of the KGB at the time of the recruitment in 1960 or 1961, NOSENKO reported on 1 March 1965, because SVENCHANSKIY had had contacts with AMTORG in New York City. The KGB suspected he was an FBI agent, but in contacting SVENCHANSKIY in 1960 or 1961, NOSKOV decided that this was not so and therefore recruited him. (Asked how it was determined that SVENCHANSKIY was not an FBI agent, NOSENKO replied: "NOSKOV felt it;" he had no further explanation.) The recruitment was based mainly on an agreement that Inturist would send more business to SVENCHANSKIY if he cooperated. NOSENKO also said SVENCHANSKIY had been arrested for black-marketeering, but he did not elaborate on this statement. NOSENKO took over the case from NOSKOV in September 1963, and his name was entered in the single-volume file of SVENCHANSKIY as the handling officer as of that date. Together with NOSKOV, NOSENKO subsequently had two meetings with SVENCHANSKIY when the latter travelled to the Soviet Union, one in September and one towards the end of 1963.

b. Information from Other Sources:

CIA records reflect that Alexander SVENCHANSKIY was born on 6 March 1909 in Theodosia, Russia. He immigrated to the United States in 1923 and became a naturalized citizen on his

* At this time, NOSENKO has stated, he (NOSENKO) was First Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department.

father's papers in 1929. His earliest employers were the "All-Russian Textile Syndicate" from February 1928 to March 1931, by AMTORG in New York City from April 1932 to May 1942, and by the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission in Washington from May 1942 until December 1942. During the Second World War, SVENCHANSKIY served in the U.S. Army Air Force as "official translator" at the White Horse Air Base in Alaska, where he had frequent contacts with members of Soviet aircraft crews. From October 1946 until December 1952, when he was dismissed for refusing to answer questions by the McCarran Committee concerning alleged subversive activity, SVENCHANSKIY was employed at United Nations Headquarters as a radio officer, broadcasting to the USSR. As of early 1965, SVENCHANSKIY was listed as president of Afton Tours, Inc., New York City, and president of Cross World Books and Periodicals, Chicago. Afton Tours is a branch of the Package Express and Travel Agency, which is a registered agent of Inturist. Cross World Books and Periodicals was registered in 1961 as an agent of *Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga*, the Soviet Foreign Trade Administration dealing with the distribution and sale of Russian-language books, periodicals, films, and visual aids. SVENCHANSKIY has made numerous trips to the USSR, including one in August and September 1963.

Allegations of SVENCHANSKIY's Communist sympathies and probable Soviet espionage activities date back to his U.S. Air Force service in Alaska, [REDACTED] of his strong pro-Soviet bias and suspiciously close contacts with Soviets. In August 1950 Harry GOLD, then in prison as an admitted Soviet agent, linked SVENCHANSKIY to the Soviet espionage network in the United States.* GOLD stated that in March 1942 SVENCHANSKIY, under the name of SWAN, had been instrumental in introducing his "co-conspirator" Abraham BROTHMAN to "another AMTORG man to engage in industrial espionage." A CIA report of 14 November 1950 cites a "tested source" (a Czech national employed at the United Nations) as stating: "I believe that Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, employed in the Radio Section of the Russian Division of the United Nations, is a Communist and possibly a Communist agent." [REDACTED]

Identified as a Soviet agent by Elizabeth BENTLEY, KAZNEVICH has since emigrated to the Soviet Union; he was identified as an agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate by COLITSYN and by NOSENKO. Virtually all the individuals with whom SVENCHANSKIY has entered into business arrangements since leaving the United Nations have or had connections with the U.S. Communist Party or with the Soviet Intelligence Services. His business dealings have also brought him into frequent contact with Soviet officials in this country, including a number of identified intelligence officers (two of them reported on by NOSENKO).

* The 21 October 1953 edition of the New York Times carried the story of GOLD's testimony under the headline "Ex-U.N. Aide linked to Spy Ring by Gold;" the Times reported that GOLD had executed an affidavit to this effect the week before.

An FBI report
SVENCHANSKIY

2364

7. KOTEN's Arrest and the KGB Agent

a. Information from NOSENKO

NOSENKO was asked in Geneva on 26 January 1964 whether he had been involved in the arrest of an American tourist in the USSR in the fall of 1963. Almost at once, NOSENKO recognized this as the case of Bernard KOTEN, a guide for Alton Tours in New York City (and hence an employee of Alexander SVENCHANSKIY - see below) who had been apprehended on homosexual charges in Kiev. NOSENKO explained that, while he had not personally participated in the arrest and had never met KOTEN, he had supervised the case from KGB Headquarters and "the case was reported to me."

NOSENKO said that KOTEN had long been a member of the American Communist Party and was a frequent visitor to the Soviet Union after World War II. On these trips he had a large number of contacts with dissident literary figures and with Soviet citizens in general, particularly among Russian Jews.** Because of these many suspicious contacts, both the KGB First and the Second Chief Directorates had come to the conclusion that KOTEN might well be a provocation agent planted in or recruited from the ranks of the Communist Party of the United States. Moreover, on the eve of KOTEN's 1963 trip, the Tourist Department learned from V.B. BARNOVSKIY of the First Chief Directorate's Scientific and Technical (S&T) Directorate that KOTEN was carrying with him the address of relatives of an important agent of the KGB's Legal Residency, and that KOTEN intended to visit them while in the USSR. NOSENKO said he did not know the name of this agent

This agent was a naturalized American citizen, about 40 to 45 years old, an engineer born in Russia, who was employed in an "interesting industrial company or technical organization in the New York City area." For some time he had been working

* CIA told NOSENKO of this information about SOKOLOV in March 1965. He recalled that a woman named Sonya worked for SVENCHANSKIY but said that "we considered that he (SVENCHANSKIY) was doing it (spotting the tourists)." NOSENKO did not know of any Soviet Intelligence ties to SOKOLOV.

** NOSENKO has explained in another context that the Second Chief Directorate is wary of foreign contacts with Soviet Jews because the Israeli Intelligence Service has frequently sponsored such contacts.

actively for the [redacted] Legal Residency and had provided the KGB with "good, solid information" with "very valuable material for technical intelligence;" at the same time the agent had been asking to be repatriated to the USSR, to become a Soviet citizen, but the KGB had been putting him off in order to continue to exploit his access. Since the amount and quality of the agent's production had recently deteriorated, the KGB decided to accede to his request for repatriation. Now, however, the agent declined, saying that "he was not ready to go just yet. First he was practically begging to come to the Soviet Union and now he was balking." This by itself appeared suspicious to the KGB, but in addition, it was about this time that the agent came into contact with KOTEN. NOSENKO learned from BARKOVSKIY that KOTEN "used to go to some bookstore that sells Soviet literature and through a saleslady in this story whom KOTEN knows, he became acquainted with the agent, who also used to go to this store. After that, he used to meet with the agent without the saleslady."

On the basis of these incidents the First Chief Directorate suspected that KOTEN had been directed specifically to this store in order to meet and "work on" the agent and that, having learned that the agent had relatives "in Stantsiya Loo, about 17 kilometers from Sochi... he had evidently received the assignment (to visit the relatives) from American Intelligence. Evidently they had gotten on the trail of this agent and were checking on him." The KGB also had suspicions concerning the relatives, former kulaks who were still well-off financially. It was known to the KGB, for example, that the agent had written his sister in Stantsiya Loo that he wanted to return to the Soviet Union, and she had replied: "Is there any sense in your coming here?"

KOTEN arrived in Moscow and then travelled to Sochi. From there he sent a telegram to the agent's sister and her husband in Stantsiya Loo, asking them to come to Sochi to see him. When they arrived at KOTEN's hotel, however, the hotel administrator told them that KOTEN was on an excursion and refused to allow a meeting. KOTEN then took it upon himself to travel to Stantsiya Loo where he eventually contacted and spoke to the relatives. In the course of this meeting KOTEN took photographs of the sister and her husband and recorded a message from the sister to the agent on a tape recorder he had brought along. From this the KGB deduced that "U.S. Intelligence wants to get documentary data" and it therefore decided to "try to get hold of KOTEN."

There had already been some indication during KOTEN's earlier trips to the USSR that he was a homosexual, but the KGB had taken no action because KOTEN was believed to be a loyal Communist Party member. With these recent developments, the situation had now changed. Although NOSENKO's superiors were absent from KGB Headquarters at the time, immediate action was required. NOSENKO consequently "took the whole thing on myself because everybody got excited. Everybody said: 'Let's go. American Intelligence is active, none of our bosses are here, the situation is right, the decision must be made right now.'" By this time KOTEN had travelled to Tbilisi, and there a homosexual KGB agent managed to entice him into relations in a public park. These were suitably documented, and he was then picked up by the local Militia. (In the absence of his

superiors and fearing the possible repercussions, NOSENKO had insisted that the illegal acts take place in a public place, and that the KGB not participate in KOTEN's apprehension.) After questioning by the Militia, KOTEN was permitted to continue his itinerary to Kiev, where he was scheduled to stay for two days before leaving the USSR.

Meanwhile, the First Chief Directorate, which was growing increasingly concerned that the ~~agent~~ agent of the ~~United States~~ Residency would be apprehended by the FBI, wanted to get him out of the United States before this happened. To "establish the true purpose" of KOTEN's presence in the USSR and whether he was an American agent, as well as to hold him until the ~~agent~~ agent had arrived safely in the USSR (as NOSENKO told the FBI on 24 February 1964), it was requested that KOTEN be detained in the Soviet Union. The decision was made to arrest him at once on the basis of the compromising materials obtained in Tbilisi. Following the arrest by the Kiev Militia, KOTEN was turned over to the KGB for interrogation; the purpose, NOSENKO said, was to "break him," to secure the admission that he was an American intelligence agent. At the same time ~~agent~~ the ~~agent~~ agent had failed to keep a number of scheduled meetings with his KGB case officer, and the Legal Residency feared that something had gone wrong. He did eventually appear, however, and NOSENKO has described the subsequent meetings as follows: "They asked him: 'Are you going to leave the States?' He said: 'Well, I don't know. I have to think about it some more.' So we said: 'No, you have to leave or else we will wash our hands of the whole affair.' So he said: 'You know I was thinking of leaving with my wife, but my wife does not want to leave.' To make a long story short, they spent three meetings trying to talk him into leaving, and he kept hesitating. He didn't seem to want to leave, so then they told him: 'Look, we are breaking off contact with you. If you decide to go, you know how to do it. You are to go from the United States to some place in Europe and go to the Soviet Embassy there. They will give us a signal and the visa will be issued to you. But as far as we're concerned, we're breaking contact with you.'"

After this, according to NOSENKO, the KGB released KOTEN when the American Communist Party and other organizations strongly protested his arrest and imprisonment.

b. Information from Other Sources Concerning KOTEN

At the time of his arrest KOTEN was an instructor of Russian at New York University, director of the Library for Intercultural Studies, and a regular contributor to the New World Review and the magazine Jewish Life. Both the Library for Intercultural Studies and Jewish Life have been designated "Communist fronts" by the House Committee on Un-American Activities; the New World Review has been cited as a propaganda organ of the Soviet Government. KOTEN has said that, despite his arrest and imprisonment in the USSR, he hopes to return there in the future and that he "still loved the Russian people and believed in the basic humanitarianism of the Soviet Government."

Regarding the arrest, the New York Times on 29 August 1963 carried an article under the headline "U.S. Guide Missing

After Soviet Trip;" the article stated that "an American tour of the Soviet Union ended today (23 August) at Kiev with the apparent arrest of the New York guide identified as Bernard L. Koten of Afton Tours." A second article dated 29 August, Moscow, reported that "an official of the Soviet Inturist travel organization said today that Bernard L. Koten... had been arrested on charges of homosexual activities with a Soviet citizen. He said that Mr. Koten... was arrested in Kiev Tuesday night (27 August) and was being held in Tbilisi (Tbilisi)... where the alleged offense took place." A third Tager article, filed in Moscow on 28 September 1953, stated that KOTEN, who had been arrested on 26 August, had been released on 28 September and was enroute to Vienna; the article also noted that "officials of Inturist reported Mr. Koten's release, but declined to comment on the reasons and circumstances of his arrest."

Several of KOTEN's friends have also commented on his arrest:

- Isadore Gibby NEEDLEMAN, a New York lawyer, self-avowed Marxist, and allegedly a Soviet espionage agent in the past, was reported by an FBI source [REDACTED]

- Eda GLASER, a "close associate of KOTEN" and the office manager of the Four Continents Book Store, a Soviet book outlet in New York, termed the entire incident as "fantastic" and a "fabrication." [REDACTED]

- SVENCHANSKIY, who returned to the United States from Moscow while KOTEN was still being held, stated that the morals charge against him was true but he (SVENCHANSKIY) had been assured that the matter would be cleared up and that KOTEN would be released.

FBI sources reported that KOTEN later made the following remarks concerning his arrest and imprisonment:

[REDACTED]

After his release, KOTZ told that he would return to the Soviet Union. He stated that he could have returned to the Soviet Union if he had so wished. The arrest by the British was a mistake, and the mistake had been corrected.


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

8. Arrest of BARGHOORN

a. Information from NOSENKO

At the first of the 1964 meetings in Geneva NOSENKO described the provocation and arrest of Yale University Professor Frederick BARGHOORN in late 1963; he was questioned further on this case on 3 February 1964 and again while waiting in Frankfurt to leave for the United States. NOSENKO's most comprehensive statement, from which the following paragraphs were largely drawn, was made on 9 June 1964.* On this last occasion NOSENKO said that the purpose of the KGB operation against BARGHOORN was to retaliate for persona non grata action taken against three Soviets in New York City in the case of John W. BUTENKO and to secure a hostage in exchange for a fourth Soviet in the BUTENKO case who was jailed. In Geneva, however, NOSENKO maintained that the operation against BARGHOORN "was to discourage future arrests such as that of IVANOV [the jailed Soviet], not because of any special importance of IVANOV himself."

NOSENKO said that in 1963 four KGB First Chief Directorate officers assigned to the New York Legal Residency were caught in operational activity in the United States. Of the four, three had diplomatic immunity, but one was a chauffeur and had only a service passport. The three Soviet diplomats were held three or four hours by the American authorities and then released. IVANOV, the chauffeur, was arrested since he did not have diplomatic immunity.**

GRIBANOV, Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, learned of this arrest probably the next day and was directed by KGB Chairman SEMICHASTNYI to take "necessary measures." GRIBANOV thereupon called to his office NOSENKO; A.G. KOVALENKO, Chief of the Tourist Department; and G.I. GRYAZNOV and Ye.M. RASHCHEPOV, both Deputy Chiefs from the American Department. After explaining the arrest, GRIBANOV asked what information the Second Chief Directorate had on any American--U.S. Embassy employee or tourist--that could

*The detail of NOSENKO's information on the BARGHOORN case reflects both the extent of the CIA debriefings and the depth of his knowledge of this case. He did, in fact, furnish much of this information during his first 1964 meeting with CIA. NOSENKO was also able to describe at length BARGHOORN's professional background, which gave rise to KGB suspicions of intelligence affiliation, and he provided the general outlines of other operational activity centering around BARGHOORN during his 1963 trip to the Soviet Union.

**Three Soviets were arrested in Englewood, N.J., on 30 October 1963 during a clandestine meeting with the KGB agent, BUTENKO, an American engineer. Two of the Soviets, G.A. PAVLOV and Yu.A. ROMASHIN, were members of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations; they claimed diplomatic immunity and were released; a few days later they were declared persona non grata along with a third Soviet, V.I. OLENEV, who was named in the charges by the U.S. Government, but was not arrested. Another Soviet citizen, I.A. IVANOV, a driver for AMTORG, did not have diplomatic immunity and was jailed. All have been identified as KGB officers.

serve as material for an arrest. RASHCHEPOV and GRYAZNOV said that at that very moment there were three or four American military attaches in Rostov and that, in the opinion of the American Department, these officers might be carrying electronic apparatus. It was known that they had cameras, that they had been taking photographs, and that they had been observed taking notes. If permitted, they could be arrested in Rostov before they took the return plane to Moscow. GRIBANOV wanted to know what other possibilities existed and instructed the two representatives of the American Department to write a report on this. He also told them to request permission to arrest and search the military attaches.

GRIBANOV then asked what pertinent information was held by the Tourist Department. He was told that there were relatively few American tourists in the Soviet Union at that time;* these included BARGHOORN, who was mentioned to GRIBANOV along with one other (name not recalled). NOSENKO and KOVALENKO reported, however, that the KGB had no "strong" materials against them. They were ordered to make an immediate study of the situation and to report back to GRIBANOV as soon as possible.

Returning to the Tourist Department, NOSENKO and KOVALENKO gathered the entire American Tourist Section in their office. In a general discussion, it was decided that BARGHOORN was the only American on whom the KGB had anything worth consideration. All the materials on BARGHOORN were gathered together, and NOSENKO and KOVALENKO took them to GRIBANOV, explaining that he was the only possibility. GRIBANOV read all the materials and was pleased with them; he was sure that BARGHOORN was connected with American Intelligence. He then asked what could be done. NOSENKO and KOVALENKO reported that BARGHOORN was then in Tbilisi and that, in fact, Ye.N. NOSKOV (case officer, American Tourist Section) was in Tbilisi with a woman doctor from the KGB Operational Technical Directorate for the purpose of working against BARGHOORN; the doctor had some special item which had been used to make BARGHOORN so violently sick to his stomach that he had to be hospitalized. While he was in the hospital, a careful search had been made of his belongings, but nothing of operational interest had been found. In addition, a KGB agent was placed in BARGHOORN's room as a patient; he made anti-Soviet statements and offered BARGHOORN "materials," but BARGHOORN did not rise to the bait. At the time of this meeting with GRIBANOV, BARGHOORN was scheduled to fly from Tbilisi to Moscow the following morning, and the KGB knew from a phone tap that he had an appointment with Theodore ORCHARD of the British Embassy at the Hotel Metropol the following evening.

It was GRIBANOV who raised the possibility of giving "materials" to BARGHOORN in Moscow. NOSENKO said that this would be a provocation, but GRIBANOV replied that this made no difference to him. He instructed NOSENKO and KOVALENKO

*On another occasion, NOSENKO estimated their number at "about 60."

to locate an agent who could be used to pass the damaging materials to BARGHOORN and told them to write a summary of BARGHOORN's background with a proposal that the Second Chief Directorate arrest him "when he obtains materials which are of interest to American Intelligence." This was to be sent in letter form to SEMICHASTNYI over GRIBANOV's signature; the letter was not to indicate how BARGHOORN was to receive the materials (i.e., the fact of provocation was not to be mentioned).

GRIBANOV took a one-page letter on BARGHOORN, along with a similar letter from GRYAZNOV and RASHCHEPOV concerning the military attaches, to SEMICHASTNYI. While the four--NOSENKO, KOVALENKO, GRYAZNOV and KOVALENKO-- were waiting in GRIBANOV's office for his return, GRYAZNOV received a telephone call from the local KGB organization in Rostov informing him that the military attaches were in the air on their way back to Moscow. Shortly thereafter, GRIBANOV returned with the news that the Chairman of the KGB had approved the arrests of the military attaches as well as BARGHOORN. (KHRUSHCHEV was absent from Moscow at the time, but SEMICHASTNYI had called BREZHNEV and secured his approval.*)

When GRIBANOV learned from GRYAZNOV that the military attaches were already on their way back to Moscow, he became furious and sent GRYAZNOV out "to do the job or die." Meanwhile, arrangements were made with the "Department D" (the KGB element responsible for disinformation, subordinate to the First Chief Directorate) to provide some materials on rockets which could be passed to BARGHOORN. While these were being picked up, NOSENKO and KOVALENKO returned to their office to plan the provocation.

BARGHOORN was placed under immediate surveillance upon his arrival in Moscow. At 1810 hours a radio message was received from one of the surveillance cars that BARGHOORN had gone to the U.S. Embassy, and it was decided that the agent (name not recalled, aged 25 to 30 years) would be placed in contact with him as soon as he came out. The KGB knew BARGHOORN had an appointment with ORCHARD of the British Embassy at 1900 hours, but at 1900 hours a report was received that BARGHOORN had left the U.S. Embassy in the American Ambassador's car. He was alone but for the Soviet driver. Nothing could be done while BARGHOORN was in the moving car. A check on ORCHARD established that he was in the downstairs hall of the hotel waiting. It was therefore decided to approach BARGHOORN when he left the car at the hotel.

*NOSENKO placed these events on the day before BARGHOORN returned to Moscow from Tbilisi and on the day before BARGHOORN was arrested. As indicated below, BARGHOORN returned from Alma-Ata to Moscow on 25 October 1963 and was arrested on 31 October 1963, six days later. CIA records show that on 30 October, the day before the arrest, KHRUSHCHEV greeted Laotian Premier SOUVANNA Phouma on his arrival in Moscow and later in the day attended a luncheon in his honor. On 31 October, the day of the arrest, KHRUSHCHEV and SOUVANNA attended a performance of Swan Lake in Moscow. BREZHNEV was not seen in Moscow from 29 October until 2 November 1963.

No sooner had BARGHOORN stepped out of the car than the agent approached. "You are an American?" the agent asked. "Yes." "Please take it," the agent said. The agent put the packet containing the materials on rocketry in BARGHOORN's inside coat pocket and then ran off.

BARGHOORN had taken only one or two steps when he was seized by NOSKOV and Petr POPTSOV, another case officer of the American Tourist Section, and told he was under arrest. A surveillance car pulled up. BARGHOORN was placed in the car, handcuffed (on GRIBANOV's orders, because the Soviets arrested in the United States had received similar treatment) and driven to the 50th Section of the Militia, where a room had been prepared.

L.I. YEFREMOV and K.G. KRUPNOV from the American Tourist Section were waiting at the Militia station, KRUPNOV to interrogate BARGHOORN and YEFREMOV to be the interpreter. When BARGHOORN was brought into the station, an "incident report" form was filled out, and a resolution was prepared requesting permission to hold him 48 hours. Between 0200 and 0300 hours BARGHOORN was taken to the KGB inner prison. At 0400 hours the Tourist Department case officers were released with instructions to report for duty at 0930 hours. NOSENKO and the others went home.

KRUPNOV began the questioning in Russian at 1000 hours the next day. Although BARGHOORN speaks good Russian, YEFREMOV remained in case he would be needed to interpret. NOSENKO entered the room several times during these sessions. (Although NOSENKO did not want to reveal his face to BARGHOORN because he knew BARGHOORN would be released, GRIBANOV had told KOVALENKO that NOSENKO should be there when they reached the point where BARGHOORN was to tell how he obtained the damaging materials.) The first sessions concentrated on general matters, such as BARGHOORN's life history.*

After one and one half hours of questioning, BARGHOORN agreed that the materials were on him when he was arrested, but he maintained that they had been placed on his person. He said that he thought they were "newspapers or something," that he did not know what they were. The closed package was then opened and shown to BARGHOORN; it contained about 20 to 25 pages of information on missiles. "BARGHOORN was not, of course, given a close look" at the materials.

*In October 1966, NOSENKO stated his certainty that he had been present on the day after the arrest. At this interrogation NOSENKO said KRUPNOV questioned BARGHOORN "concerning personal background, employment, etc." Then NOSENKO asked BARGHOORN whether he had had the incriminating materials on his person at the time of his arrest. When BARGHOORN admitted this, NOSENKO left. As noted below, BARGHOORN reported that the materials were not discussed at this particular interrogation.

*Apart from 5th
the USSR in 1936
to the Soviet Union

The CIA interviewer then read to him the report which fixed the date of the approach as 5 January 1962, the date contained in NOSENKO's notes, and indicated that NOSENKO used the name NIKOLAYEV (see below). Acknowledging that "maybe" he had used the name Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV with JOHNSON, NOSENKO said: "I don't know why I made this mistake with the dates. I think it (the approach) was the first or second day that I was in the Seventh (Tourist) Department. I saw myself that he had (homosexual) intercourse... Your date is absolutely right, but this reminded me that it was soon after I had come in the Seventh (Tourist) Department. Is this important?"

Question: How long had you been in the Seventh Department?

NOSENKO: Now I remember that it was immediately - one or two days. I know I returned in January 1962. I knew I would be going to the Seventh (Department) already in December. I was visiting the Seventh already then. I had not too many papers to turn over to the First (American Department), and now I remember that I moved to the Seventh immediately (NOSENKO's emphasis) after 1 January 1962.

b. Information from JOHNSON:

JOHNSON reported to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow on 5 January 1962 that he experienced an "incident with Soviet plainclothesmen in the Hotel Metropol earlier that day." JOHNSON, who arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961, told the consular officer that "he was dining alone in the Hotel Metropol restaurant the evening of 4 January when he was joined at his table by a Soviet citizen who identified himself as a doctor from Riga. (This was NOSENKO's homosexual agent VOLKOV.) According to JOHNSON, little conversation transpired because the Riga 'doctor' spoke English poorly. Before JOHNSON left, however, the 'doctor' said he would like to chat with him and knew a student who spoke English well. JOHNSON then agreed to come by the 'doctor's' room at the Metropol at 10:00 a.m. the next day. JOHNSON said that he dropped by the 'doctor's' room about 10:00 the morning of January 5. Soon after he entered, the 'doctor' and his 'student' friend (NOSENKO's homosexual agent YEFREMOV) began to make homosexual advances to him. He stated that he protested and was rising to leave when two plainclothesmen suddenly appeared in the room and announced that all were under arrest. JOHNSON was then taken to another room where he was asked to sign a statement in Russian... He signed this statement and was taken to a man in a third room who identified himself as the Chief of Police, Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLOV.* The police chief first told him that Soviet law had been violated and that he, JOHNSON, could be imprisoned for three, five, or perhaps even eight years. After proceeding in this vein for

* NOSENKO frequently used the operational pseudonym Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV. He has said that he was normally called Georgiy, a variation of Yuriy, by family and friends in Moscow.

a few minutes, the police chief remarked that it was in his power to dismiss the whole affair, provided JOHNSON would do him a favor. The favor turned out to be a signed commitment that he would not speak ill of the Soviet Union when he returned to the United States."

In the afternoon of 8 January, JOHNSON called the Embassy to say that he had been recontacted by the Chief of Police, who reminded him of his pledge and showed him four pictures. JOHNSON said: "I don't know where they got them, but they were dillies." During the interviews by the FBI ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ 1965, JOHNSON repeated substantially the same story, continuing to deny that he had actually been compromised. In addition to letters to his parents, JOHNSON said he wrote to about 20 other people, mostly "minister friends" abroad; apparently he did not tell the FBI of their content. Shown pictures of VOLKOV and NOSENKO on 13 May 1965, JOHNSON said he had seen VOLKOV "somewhere" and suggested that the photograph of NOSENKO was that of a younger man whom he had seen in Djakarta in 1962-1963.

5. Attempt to Recruit BRAUNS

a. Information from NOSENKO:

NOSENKO made the following statement on 2 February 1964: "In 1962 some U.S. citizen by the name of Horst BRAUNS came to the Soviet Union. I mentioned him to you in 1962 but at that time could not recall his name.* We tried to recruit him but did not succeed. He lived somewhere in Leningrad, and in 1942 he went back with the German troops to Germany. And he served in the German Army, and after the war he changed his name and went to the USA and became a U.S. citizen. He is either a skilled mechanic or a worker. His real name is different.- it is Russian - because he changed his name when he was in Germany."

NOSENKO went into the operation against BRAUNS in greater detail on 17 April 1964: "This was /K.G./ KRUPNOV's case. This fellow was a Russian and lived prior to the war in Leningrad. In 1942 he was in Tikhvin, near Leningrad, when the Germans came, and when the Germans were retreating they took him along and some other people, local people, and so he found himself in Germany. Now, in Germany, as he told his story, he was kept in various prison camps and when the war was over he worked in West Germany and then, in 1956 or 1957 or 1958 - I don't remember /which year/ - he came to the United States and settled down. Why we became interested in this fellow... /NOSENKO thought his name was something like 'BRUNKS' or 'BRONX' is because he came from Russia. So, according to Soviet law, he never lost his Soviet citizenship... Leaving with the Germans is interpreted as treason, as being a traitor of your country. So there was something to talk to him about. Besides, KRUPNOV found out either in the Information Section or some other section /of the KGB First Chief Directorate/ that the man is working in some very interesting company that makes computers or adding machines or some other instruments. But when I talked to him he already left the company. He wasn't working with this company any more.


* BRAUNS did not arrive in Moscow until after NOSENKO had returned to the Soviet Union from Geneva in 1962, according to travel records.

"They called him to Inturist. They gave him a room in the Inturist Hotel. Then KRUPNOV transferred him from the Inturist to another hotel, put him in a room in the hotel, and started talking to him. Then he left him in his room and called us up - said that he needed help, that he can't do anything with the man. I thought that he would be able to handle him all by himself, so I said to KOVSHUK:* 'I'm sorry. I thought he'd be able to handle it. He tells me that he doesn't seem to get anywhere, so I guess I'd have to go help him.' I got there and I see that the man is scared stiff. He doesn't talk about anything, doesn't want to listen to any of these reasons. He was told that, after all, he is a traitor to his country, that he went with the Germans... This fellow was a coward, a real coward, so he gave his consent, he agreed to help us.


"The next day he went to Leningrad. So I felt that this agreement wasn't very firm, reliable. So the next day KRUPNOV and I went to see CHELNOKOV /Chief of the Tourist Department/. And I told him: 'I feel that this agreement of his is quite shaky. I'm not sure about it. So are we to follow through? If we decide to do so, then we'll have to go to Leningrad. So KRUPNOV went and called the man, and the man refused to talk to him. So then I was told to go. So I went to Leningrad and... I went to his hotel room. He locked the door, and he wouldn't let me in. The only thing, fortunately for us, the lock in the door wasn't a very good one, so we called a locksmith, and he found a key that opened the door. So we entered the room, and we started talking to him. The fellow was terribly scared, he was shaking, so it was quite obvious that he would never work for us. So we finally decided: 'Look, it's okay. We don't want anything from you. Go ahead, leave. Goodbye.' And that was all; that was the end of it. I don't know whether it was BROCKS or BRONX or some name like that which he used in the States, but his true name was IVANOV."

In February 1965 NOSENKO said he had forgotten how he came to be involved in the BRAUNS case. He also said that he did not know why BRAUNS had visited the Soviet Union, and that he could not name any Soviet citizens with whom BRAUNS was in contact in Moscow.

b. Information from BRAUNS

Interviewed by the FBI 

* NOSENKO is apparently in error. At this time, he has reported, V.M. KOVSHUK was not in the Tourist Department but in the American Department. He may mean V.D. CHELNOKOV, Chief of the Tourist Department.



6. The SVENCHANSKIY Case

a. Information from NOSENKO:

NOSENKO provided the lead to Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, KGB cryptonym "ANOD," on 16 January 1964 in the course of discussions of KGB use of foreign travel bureau personnel to spot tourists of possible operational interest. "Well, here's an example! One of our agents is the director of a small tourist agency," NOSENKO said, "he takes the tourist's application form which has a photograph, and if he suspects the tourist of having ties to American Intelligence, he will move the photo slightly, for example. Further, on the fifth line, where it says 'nationality,' he can make a small pinprick. And at the end, where the stamp of the tourist agency is placed, he can make a checkmark with a pencil. That's all. He indicates an agent to us... but why he/the tourist/ is suspected we don't know yet. of

Following BARGHOORN's admission, another resolution was drawn up by KRUPNOV and signed by KRUPNOV, KOVALENKO, and GRIBANOV. NOSENKO and KRUPNOV then took it to the office of the Chief Prosecutor where the incident report, the first interrogation, and the first and second resolutions were reported to (fnu) MISHUTIN (or MISHUSTIN), the First Deputy to the Chief Prosecutor. GRIBANOV further directed that all materials on BARGHOORN, including information from KGB Archives, be given to the Department of Prosecution of the KGB so that they could begin the legal proceedings against BARGHOORN. After this, all interrogations were conducted by this department; KRUPNOV was dropped from the case, but YEFREMOV continued to act as interpreter.

b. Information from BARGHOORN

BARGHOORN, who had made five earlier trips to the Soviet Union since 1956, arrived there on 2 October 1963. The purpose of his visit, as stated in his visa application, was to gather information for a book on how effectively the Soviet Union was operating as a result of its political education and political system. His itinerary took him to Leningrad from 2 to 7 October, to Moscow from 7 to 10 October, Tbilisi from 10 to 17 October, and short visits to Tashkent, Bukhara, Samarkand, and Alma-Ata from 17 to 25 October. He flew from Alma-Ata to Moscow on 25 October and was scheduled to leave for Warsaw on 31 October. On the latter date he was arrested and held by the KGB until 16 November when, at President Kennedy's intervention, he was released and left the Soviet Union. BARGHOORN had no intelligence mission.

Upon his return to the United States, BARGHOORN was debriefed by the U.S. Department of State and by CIA. His information indicated a high degree of KGB operational interest in him throughout the trip, including encounters with at least five probable KGB agents during his first week there: an attractive waitress who invited him to "do the town," a disenchanted intellectual in Leningrad, an attractive unattached girl who sat next to him on the flight from Moscow to Tbilisi, and two young Armenians whom he met his first day in Tbilisi.* The two Armenians were instrumental in the drugging described by NOSENKO. At dinner in his hotel on the day he arrived in Tbilisi, BARGHOORN met a young man claiming to be a student at the Leningrad Music Conservatory. They left the hotel for a walk and ran into a friend of the student, a second young Armenian, and the three of them went to a cafe for coffee. None was available,

*Questioned about this in February 1965, NOSENKO said that BARGHOORN, as a suspected American Intelligence agent, was of operational interest throughout the trip. He vaguely recalled the girl on the plane but either did not know or had forgotten details of any other specific activity. NOSENKO said that none of this activity was directly related to the provocation operation, which was based on a last-minute decision.

but the young student went to the kitchen "to arrange things," and shortly thereafter "three foul-tasting coffees" appeared. Within an hour, BARGHOORN was in the hospital, acutely ill. He was assigned to a room where there was another patient, and a woman doctor took care of his case. He was in the hospital for four days. During this period his clothes, notes, and other possessions were held by hospital authorities.

Upon his return to Moscow by air on 25 October, BARGHOORN checked into the Metropol Hotel. The next six days were occupied by sightseeing and appointments connected with his research. In the late afternoon of 31 October he called on friends at the U.S. Embassy for cocktails, and at 1910, already 10 minutes late, he left in the Ambassador's car for a dinner appointment (prearranged by telephone) at the Metropol with Theodore ORCHARD, a British diplomat.

BARGHOORN's account of the subsequent events closely parallels NOSENKO's. Having been handed the incriminating materials, he was arrested, handcuffed, and taken to Militia Station No. 58, where he was questioned briefly by a uniformed Militia officer. The KGB was called. Within 30 minutes a KGB captain (BARGHOORN thought his name might have been GORBUNSKIY) arrived and began to question him, assisted by an interpreter named YEFREMOV.* All questions were asked in Russian, and BARGHOORN answered most of them in English. The package of materials was opened and contained, according to BARGHOORN, 13 or 14 photographs of rockets. This session lasted until about midnight and centered around BARGHOORN's possession of the photographs and his "intelligence mission." He was then taken to the Lyubyanka prison.

Interrogations were conducted the next morning by the original KGB officer together with his "chief," whom BARGHOORN subsequently identified by photograph as NOSENKO. The questioning concerned BARGHOORN's biography, and nothing was asked about the compromising materials. The following day the case was turned over to a KGB colonel identified as (fnu) PETRENKO, and BARGHOORN did not see NOSENKO or the other KGB officer again. At this and subsequent sessions, BARGHOORN was questioned further concerning the circumstances of his arrest. BARGHOORN described NOSENKO as "clever and quick-witted" and as giving "the impression that he was not a dedicated careerist, but opportunistic and adaptive; he seemed not to care about what he was doing, but doing a good job nevertheless."

*Asked why YEFREMOV used his true name during the interrogations, NOSENKO said this was necessary for legal reasons, that he had to sign documents connected with the interrogations. BARGHOORN confirmed that YEFREMOV had participated throughout the entire series of interrogations and had signed interrogation reports attesting to the accuracy of translation.

John Andrew SHUBIN

John Andrew SHUBIN and his year of birth
 which NOSENKO brought to the 1964
 in Geneva. NOSENKO identified SHUBIN as a
 of Russian extraction, a Russian speaker,
 professor in New York City. According to
 personally involved in SHUBIN's fourth trip
 1962 or 1963. SHUBIN had become known to
 agent during his third visit to the Soviet

professor of economics at New York Univer-
 sity, previously known to the FBI

The following paragraphs
 information from NOSENKO and other sources on

information

been imprecise in dating SHUBIN's third
 to Union. He said on 25 January 1964 that
 occurred some time during the period 1959 to
 1964 NOSENKO said he was unsure of the
 trip by SHUBIN but thought it occurred in
 any event, prior to 1960 and while he was
 on tour of duty (June 1955 to January 1960)
 in the Department. NOSENKO indicated on 26 June
 1964 that VELITSKIY was the case officer in the Tourist
 Department responsible for SHUBIN, and since at another time
 VELITSKIY transferred from the department
 would appear that he was placing the date
 of the trip as some time before the transfer.

NOSENKO reported that SHUBIN was placed under surveil-
 lance during the third trip. He has offered
 an explanation as to why: On 25 January 1964 NOSENKO
 stated that SHUBIN had visited the Soviet
 Union; on 2 February 1964 he explained the
 surveillance as having been founded on the KGB's

NOSENKO's explanation for this trip, as variously given by
 NOSENKO, conflicts with the fact that SHUBIN had no
 travel documents from 1940 and 12 June 1961, according
 to NOSENKO's explanation for this discrepancy, however,
 SHUBIN went to the USSR without valid docu-

NOSENKO's own admission about having gone to
 the USSR, there is no other evidence of his travel
 to the USSR prior to 1961.

[REDACTED]

d. Information from Other Sources

The G-2 Director in Chicago, James [REDACTED], supplied the lead which resulted in the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SHURIN, whose father was a native of Russia, was born in Los Angeles on 20 February 1915. [REDACTED]

After receiving [REDACTED] the NOSENKO information of 1957, the FBI interviewed a SHURIN [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

10. BOLSHAKOV, Robert Kennedy, and the Cuban Missile Crisisa. Introduction

NOSENKO volunteered at his second meeting with CIA in January 1964 that G.N. BOLSHAKOV was his "old friend" and that he was a colonel in the GRU. On 26 January, 1 February, and 19 August 1964 he again raised BOLSHAKOV's name, emphasizing that he was a GRU officer and a "good friend." In the 1 February interview, after displaying an initial reluctance to discuss with CIA such a "sensitive" subject, he provided a number of details on BOLSHAKOV's alleged relationship in 1962 with the then Attorney General, Robert Kennedy. His information on this subject, he said, derived from his friendship with BOLSHAKOV in Moscow, where BOLSHAKOV was reassigned (in December 1962 following a tour in Washington as Novosti correspondent and editor of the magazine USSR). NOSENKO claimed a personal role in this affair, in that he personally proposed to the KGB leadership that the KGB take over BOLSHAKOV's former (GRU) contact with Robert Kennedy.

NOSENKO claimed that an information channel of communication between BOLSHAKOV and the Attorney General had developed at Kennedy's initiative. He described in detail the circumstances of their introduction at a social function by a journalist (whom he did not name). He said that he "thought" that the Kennedys knew that BOLSHAKOV was a "military intelligence officer," and he implied that they regarded these private conversations with BOLSHAKOV as a useful instrument of diplomacy. According to NOSENKO, the KGB knew that CIA was not aware of this relationship--it was "obvious" that Robert Kennedy wanted it that way. NOSENKO claimed that after BOLSHAKOV left the United States "during the Cuban missile crisis,"* no one took over his role as a confidential channel to the White House. After the assassination of the President, NOSENKO continued, the Kennedy family tried to reestablish the relationship through their close friend, the artist William WALTON, during the latter's visit to Moscow in December 1963. NOSENKO reported that he had urged that the KGB try to take over the Robert Kennedy operation from the GRU and that he had proposed two plans which would have enabled this to take place, the second involving WALTON. Neither came to fruition, however. Referring to the Cuban missile crisis, NOSENKO said that the GRU had "played dirty" with BOLSHAKOV by forcing him to "tell Robert" that there were no offensive missiles in Cuba whereas there actually were such weapons there.

According to other sources, BOLSHAKOV left Washington for Moscow on 3 August 1962 and returned on 2 October 1962. On 23 August, about the time that CIA was reporting urgently to the President that "something new and different" was going on with respect to Soviet aid to Cuba, Ambassador DOBRYNIN assured Theodore SORENSEN (Special Counsel to the President) that the United States had no need to fear Soviet

*The Cuban missile crisis occurred during October 1962, and as indicated above, BOLSHAKOV was not reassigned from Washington until two months afterward.

activity in Cuba. On 4 September DOBRYNIN gave Robert Kennedy "an unusual personal message from KHRUSHCHEV for the President": KHRUSHCHEV pledged that he would not stir up any incidents before the upcoming U.S. elections. On the same day, the President stated publicly that the United States had no proof of a Soviet offensive missile capability in Cuba. Also on the same day, the Soviet Union sent a harsh note to the U.S. Government concerning the (unintentional) violation of Soviet airspace by an American U-2 plane on 30 August; the note threatened "appropriate retaliatory measures" against U-2 bases should such incidents be repeated. The following day (5 September) U-2 flights over Cuba were temporarily suspended, and they did not resume until 14 October. On 6 September DOBRYNIN again told SORESENSEN that the Soviets had "done nothing new" in Cuba and gave his assurances that all their steps were defensive in nature and did not represent any threat to...the United States." On 13 October DOBRYNIN informed Chester BOWLES (a Special Representative and Advisor to the President) that the USSR would never send offensive weapons to Cuba. Similar assurances were given by KHRUSHCHEV to U.S. Ambassador KOHLER in Moscow on 16 October (the same day that the President was shown the U-2 photographs which revealed the presence of offensive missiles) and by Foreign Minister GROMYKO to President Kennedy in person on 18 October.

Also on 18 October, the FBI reported, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Two days later BOLSHAKOV told Washington correspondents Joseph ALSOP and Charles BARTLETT that the Soviets had no offensive weapons in Cuba, and said he had been instructed by KHRUSHCHEV and MIKOYAN on 1 October (the day before his departure from Moscow) to inform President Kennedy of this fact. CIA has no indication that BOLSHAKOV delivered this message to the President, or even directly to the Attorney General, or that, prior to his meeting with BEGLOV in New York City, he made any remarks about Soviet weapons in Cuba. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] There is no report of BOLSHAKOV's having played any role in the Cuban missile crisis beyond making these remarks to ALSOP and BARTLETT. Discussions at the White House, State Department, and Defense Department about the crisis culminated in the decision to impose a blockade on Cuba; this decision was announced by President Kennedy over nationwide television and radio on 22 October 1962. Soviet overtures for a peaceful settlement of the situation were initiated on 26 October by the KGB Legal Resident in Washington, A.S. FEKLISOV,** in contacts with the American journalist John SCALI. FEKLISOV's proposals were along the same lines as those received

*BEGLOV came to the United States to attend the "Third Unofficial US-USSR Conference of Public Figures," held at Andover, Massachusetts, from 21 to 27 October 1962. Also present at this conference was Boris BELITSKIY, identified by NOSENKO four months earlier as a KGB-controlled source of CIA (see Part VI.D.6.). BELITSKIY indicated at that time that BEGLOV might be affiliated with the KGB.

**FEKLISOV, who served in Washington under the alias FOMIN, was the author of one of the documents among the CHEREPANOV papers (see Part VI.D.7.c.).

at the White House late that night in a secret letter from KHRUSHCHEV. At a farewell party for BOLSHAKOV in December 1962, Presidential Press Secretary Pierre SALINGER asked BOLSHAKOV who would "do his work." BOLSHAKOV replied that no one would do precisely the same job, but that if SALINGER had "anything special to say," he might contact A.I. ZINCHUK.*

b. Soviet Sources During the Crisis

NOSENKO has not indicated that BOLSHAKOV had an information-collection role during the Cuban missile crisis. As for Soviet sources at this time, NOSENKO stated on several occasions in 1964, in different contexts, that the KGB "had not had luck in getting intelligence from high places in the U.S. Government" in October 1962. On more than one occasion he said that the KGB agent "SASHA"*** was unable to furnish any information of value in this regard. He said this on 25 February 1964 and again while being questioned about "SASHA" on 4 August 1964. On the latter date NOSENKO said: "During the Cuban missile crisis the [KGB] First Chief Directorate, the Intelligence, couldn't tell what the U.S. will do. KHRUSHCHEV*** was not satisfied with the work of the Intelligence. No agents were producing information on this." NOSENKO continued by saying that "SASHA" reported nothing to the KGB during the Cuban missile crisis. In fact, "he couldn't know anything. I heard that this was very tightly held information. There were just a few people around President Kennedy who knew the plans, and they were sworn to keep it secret."

*ZINCHUK was identified by DERYABIN by name and photograph in October 1954 as a KGB staff officer. NOSENKO has said that ZINCHUK was a KGB cooptee rather than a staff officer.

**For a discussion of the "SASHA" case, see Part VI.D.3.d.

***Speaking before the Supreme Soviet on 12 December 1962, KHRUSHCHEV said that the decision to negotiate with the United States for a peaceful settlement of the Cuban situation had been influenced by "information from our Cuban comrades and other [unspecified] sources." This information had been received, KHRUSHCHEV stated, on the morning of 27 October 1962 (Moscow time). As previously indicated, however, KHRUSHCHEV's secret and conciliatory letter to the President was received at the White House on the night of 26 October 1962.

c. NOSENKO's Statements on BOLSHAKOV

NOSENKO repeatedly emphasized BOLSHAKOV's GRU affiliation and the fact that the KGB was in no way involved in this channel to the U.S. Government via Robert Kennedy. He first volunteered BOLSHAKOV's name during a discussion of the use of Novosti as a cover organization for Soviet Intelligence officers. "Yuriy BOLSHAKOV of the GRU also sits there," he said. "He is a colonel and a friend of mine." Two days later, out of context with the preceding discussion, he introduced the name again: "Then there is this BOLSHAKOV. He is from GRU who was in the United States." NOSENKO then commented that this was "a very interesting case" and added: "We shall talk about it later." When his case officer thereupon turned to another topic, NOSENKO immediately interrupted to say: "I know BOLSHAKOV very well. He is my old friend...I met him through Yuriy GUK...[who] was with him in the United States...and we are now very good friends. He calls me up and consults me for advice..." On 1 February 1964 NOSENKO said he thought the Kennedy family knew BOLSHAKOV to be a military intelligence officer; "yet for some reason they chose him" as a channel between the U.S. and Soviet Governments. BOLSHAKOV, NOSENKO added, "reported directly" to the Chief of the GRU concerning his exchanges with Robert Kennedy.

NOSENKO said BOLSHAKOV was introduced to Robert Kennedy by an American journalist (unnamed) at a reception in the United States. The journalist invited BOLSHAKOV to go for a walk, and as they strolled "down an alley," there was a man sitting on a bench directly ahead of them. "The journalist said: 'Listen, George [BOLSHAKOV], are you acquainted with Robert Kennedy, the brother of the President and the Chief of the Department of Justice?' BOLSHAKOV said: 'No. Of course, I have heard of him.' 'Would you like me to introduce you?' 'Of course,' BOLSHAKOV said, 'please do.' He led him to the man on the bench. There was this feeling that all this had been pre-arranged."

This contact "was at the personal desire of Bob Kennedy... BOLSHAKOV was called in for this. As you know, the whole idea of this contact was to pass information to Kennedy from KHRUSHCHEV and from Kennedy to KHRUSHCHEV...It happened to be BOLSHAKOV, but it was not BOLSHAKOV who sought to have the meeting...Then the relationship grew. BOLSHAKOV was a visitor in Robert Kennedy's house. They would first talk about ordinary things, and then the conversation turned to other matters...Robert Kennedy did not say: 'Please tell KHRUSHCHEV so-and-so.' He would say: 'You know, some of these problems seem insolvable.' And BOLSHAKOV would say: 'And you know, at home they think this and that way...' without actually saying that this was coming from KHRUSHCHEV. But, of course, this was clear without explanations. It was an exchange of views on important political questions of the moment. He was like an intermediate point..." NOSENKO commented that he personally thought that it was a "case of mutual 'feelers' being sent out by both sides--exploring some given current political situation."

After BOLSHAKOV left Washington, NOSENKO stated, no one replaced him as a channel to the U.S. Government. Asked whether ZINCHUK could have taken over upon BOLSHAKOV's

departure, NOSENKO said: "Oh, no. There is no contact like there was before. It was broken at the time BOLSHAKOV left. ZINCHUK was an agent or a cooptee....No, there is no such contact since BOLSHAKOV left. He passes no more messages."

Referring to the Kennedy-BOLSHAKOV contacts, NOSENKO told CIA on 26 January 1964: "You have shown considerable interest in him [BOLSHAKOV], even after his return to the Soviet Union...because all this was done by by-passing CIA." He said on 1 February 1964: "It was pretty obvious that this relationship between BOLSHAKOV and Robert Kennedy had nothing to do with CIA, and CIA was not witting of it. It was at the personal desire of Bob Kennedy." The KGB determined that CIA was unaware of the exchange between Kennedy and BOLSHAKOV, NOSENKO reported, because when BOLSHAKOV was subsequently invited to a reception at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, two CIA officers--Kenneth A. KERST and Malcolm A. TOON*--tried to elicit information from him about his relationship with President Kennedy. "The most important thing" they had tried to find out, according to NOSENKO, was whether the President and BOLSHAKOV had met personally. Although BOLSHAKOV did not admit the fact to them, he did have one meeting with President Kennedy--"he was brought in a car...and was taken through a back door into the White House," NOSENKO said.

NOSENKO reported that William WALTON visited Moscow in December 1963 and at that time went to BOLSHAKOV, whom he had previously met at the home of Robert Kennedy. Part of their conversations, he continued, related to Robert Kennedy's future political plans: "WALTON said that Bobby...did not expect at present to become a candidate for the vice presidency. He was, perhaps, according to WALTON, thinking of running for Governor of Massachusetts..." NOSENKO said he felt that there were "some feelers sent out on the part of WALTON--not exactly questions, but just a passing of opinion. WALTON was trying to sound them out, but I think that everything was left without an answer....My personal opinion was that these things were told to WALTON so that he could pass them on as, so to speak, Bobby's plans for the future." Another topic covered in the WALTON-BOLSHAKOV discussions, NOSENKO added, was the assassination of President Kennedy.** "As I remember, it was WALTON's opinion--and his opinion reflected the opinion of the Kennedy family--that there was no Russian involvement in the murder of the President. No suspicion at all."

NOSENKO proposed two plans whereby the KGB could take over the GRU's channel to President Kennedy. Under the first of these plans, the Soviet Minister of Justice would personally invite the Attorney General to come to the Soviet Union. There the KGB would "set him up in private living quarters, give him everything he wants...so that he would be

*Neither KERST, who NOSENKO said was suspected by the KGB of being the CIA Chief of Station in Moscow, nor TOON was affiliated with CIA in any way.

**See also Part V.D.6. on NOSENKO's information concerning Lee Harvey OSWALD.

pleased....Not to make an agent or cooptee out of him, but just to promote a rapprochement." In addition, on the basis of what BOLSHAKOV had told NOSENKO about Robert Kennedy's interest in a Soviet ballerina, this plan called for the two to be brought together, and the ballerina, who "is quite free in her behavior with the opposite sex," would do "everything necessary for the State." Before NOSENKO's superiors could make a decision on this plan, the President was assassinated and the matter was dropped. NOSENKO conceived his second plan during WALTON's trip to Moscow in December 1963: "BOLSHAKOV told me that he was going to meet WALTON, and asked me whether we had an interest in it....I told the chiefs about it and said: 'Let's utilize WALTON ourselves. Why should we let the GRU use him?'" NOSENKO suggested that the KGB "tell BOLSHAKOV that we are working on WALTON--that this is a Number One target as far as we are concerned. BOLSHAKOV will do anything we ask him." However, "the boss said: 'Well, you know, it will worsen relations between the KGB and the GRU. As long as they are working on it, let them do it.'"

NOSENKO indicated that if the KGB had actually assumed authority for the operation in Moscow from the GRU, as he had proposed, the KGB Legal Residency in Washington would have then taken over, and "someone new" probably would have been sent from KGB Headquarters to develop the association. This KGB officer would have been "someone with a broader outlook who could carry himself well in social contacts."

d. Information from [REDACTED]

In addition to NOSENKO, one other Soviet source had identified BOLSHAKOV as a GRU officer. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] reported that another member of the GRU Legal Residency [REDACTED] had "recently" turned over to BOLSHAKOV an informant who was an American correspondent based in Washington. This journalist, [REDACTED] had accompanied Vice President Nixon to the USSR in July 1959 and while there had agreed to cooperate by "furnishing political information." BOLSHAKOV was to "concentrate all of his efforts on this one contact."*

FBI [REDACTED]

Committee for State Security
Under the Council of Ministers
USSR

15 December 1963

Issued to: Lieutenant Colonel
NOSENKO,

Yuriy Ivanovich

For duty to: UKGB of Gor'kaya
Oblast'

Length of tem-
porary assign-
ment: 15 days

through: 30 December 1963

Authorization: directive of
Chief of a Chief Directorate

Effective on presentation of
identity document No.: NK-2513

Chief s./GRIBANOV of Directorate
of Department

Committee for State Security
under the Council of Ministers, USSR

Front

TDY authorization for Lieutenant Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
in connection with the search for CHEREPANOV

NOTATIONS OF PRESENCE IN PLACES
OF TEMPORARY DUTY

"Arrived in city of Gor'kiy 16 December 1963"

"Arrived in city of Shakhun'ye 17 XII 1963
Did not use free quarters"

s./Chief of Shakhun'ye Chief Militia
Section, Militia Major (illegible)

"Departed Shakhun'ye 17/XII-63
Did not use free quarters"

s./Chief of Shakhun'ye Chief Militia
Section, Militia Major (illegible)

"Left Gor'kiy 17 December 1963
Did not use free quarters"

s./ (illegible)

Reverse (endorsements only)

G. NOSENKO's KGB Promotions and Awards

1. Rank

NOSENKO has been questioned at length concerning his progress through the KGB ranks, from lieutenant to lieutenant colonel. He has volunteered additional information on this subject himself. His various statements follow in chronological order.

11 June 1962: "As a Chief of Section, I now receive 2,500 [rubles per month], plus 700 for my rank, for major, plus pay for longevity. I receive more than 4000, i.e., 450-470-480 [rubles per month] in new money. This is enough for me...I am now a major but I should receive lieutenant colonel soon. I have already completed my time in grade. We have a system of time in grade. From major to lieutenant colonel it is necessary to have four years... My time in grade was up in December, in December of last year [1961]."

23 January 1964: At the first of his 1964 meetings with CIA in Geneva NOSENKO had in his possession the temporary duty authorization which he said he had been issued in December 1963 to travel from Moscow to Gorkiy Oblast in connection with the search for CHEREPANOV.* This official KGB paper had been signed by O.M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, and authorized "Lieutenant Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO to visit the local KGB organization in Gorkiy Oblast on official business between 15 and 30 December 1963." It bore official stamps of arrival and departure in December 1963, as attested by officials in the town of Shakhunya.

10 February 1964: In Frankfurt, while awaiting ex-filtration to the United States, NOSENKO was asked to review a biographic statement which had been prepared by his case officers on the basis of statements he had made during the 1962 and 1964 meetings in Geneva. NOSENKO went over the biography carefully, noted several changes, and then stated that it was correct. The biography included the information that NOSENKO had served in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department as a senior lieutenant from 1952 [sic] to 1955, that he was promoted to captain in 1956, to major in 1959, and to lieutenant colonel in November 1963, shortly before leaving Moscow for Geneva.

8 April 1964: NOSENKO was questioned about the date when he became a senior lieutenant, and he replied: "I think in the end of '53 or the beginning of '54 I got the senior lieutenant."

Question: That's less than a year after you entered the service [KGB].

*See Part VI.D.7.c. for a description of this search and of NOSENKO's claimed part in it.

NOSENKO: Well, I had the GRU service. That counts two years, as military service, of course. It was considered as a continuance of military service.

Question: So you got it when? At the end of 1953?

NOSENKO: At the end of '53 or beginning of '54. Then I got captain in 1956.

Question: When in 1956?

NOSENKO: I don't remember. You see, they are not given exactly in February or in March. Sometimes the scheduled time passes before they give it. So, '56--Captain, '59--Major, and '63--....

16 June 1964: Asked to list in chronological order the date of his promotions within the KGB from the date of entry, NOSENKO stated: "I began in the GRU as a junior lieutenant. While in the GRU I became a lieutenant, and I entered the KGB with this rank in 1953. Not long after I entered the KGB I became a senior lieutenant, but I don't know the month. It was still 1953. In 1956 I was promoted to the rank of captain. I don't know the month. I became a major in 1959. I don't know the month. In October 1963 I was made a lieutenant colonel.... Personnel called me on the telephone and said I had been promoted. Later I was told that GRIBANOV wanted to see me. I went to his office, but, of course, I didn't let him know that I already knew that I had been promoted. He gave me his congratulations. You never see the attestation. It goes into your official file."

26 January 1965: While discussing his role as case officer for U.S. Embassy Security Officer John ABIDIAN, NOSENKO volunteered out of context that he had never officially been a major. He explained this situation as follows: Having been promoted to the rank of senior lieutenant in April 1953, he became eligible for the rank of captain in 1956. When this time came, however, he was not promoted because a senior KGB official held against him his illegal use of KGB documents to cover treatment for gonorrhoea in 1954. NOSENKO therefore remained a senior lieutenant until 1959, when he would have been eligible for promotion to the rank of major had he received his captaincy on schedule. Although GRIBANOV had promised NOSENKO that he would be promoted directly from senior lieutenant to major, skipping the rank of captain, an administrative error was made by the KGB Personnel Office, and NOSENKO found when the orders were issued that he had instead been promoted only to captain. Instead of rectifying this mistake, GRIBANOV persuaded NOSENKO that it would be to his advantage to remain a captain until he became eligible for promotion to lieutenant colonel in 1963. NOSENKO therefore was a captain from September or October 1959 until October 1963 when, as promised by GRIBANOV, he was promoted

directly to the rank of lieutenant colonel. In this manner it turned out that he never officially held the rank of major.*

10 August 1965: Under questioning by DERYABIN, NOSENKO repeated the chronology of his promotions given on 26 January 1965. He again explained that he was put up for captain in 1956, but this time said that the promotion had been blocked on the grounds that he should be made to wait because of shortcomings in his work. Asked why he had told CIA that he had been a major during the 1962 meetings and again in the biography prepared in Frankfurt, NOSENKO replied that he thought the true story would not be believed.

17 April 1966: In a voluntary statement, NOSENKO wrote the following: "In March 1951, with the rank of junior lieutenant, I started service in Naval Intelligence of the Seventh Fleet in Sovetskaya Gavan.... From August 1952 until 1953, I worked at the intelligence base of the Naval Intelligence of the Fourth Fleet in Sovetsk, where I received the rank of lieutenant of the Administrative Service.... In 1958 I received the rank of senior lieutenant [in the KGB], in December 1959 the rank of captain, and at the end of 1963 I was recommended for the rank of major. I have never held the rank of lieutenant colonel and the travel order which you know of, with the rank of lieutenant colonel, was filled out erroneously.**

19 April 1966: In a new version of his autobiography, NOSENKO included the following statement: "in July 1956 I became a candidate member of the CPSU, soon after which I received a promotion at work: I became a senior case officer and was given the rank of senior lieutenant. In August 1957 I was accepted into the CPSU, and during the second half of 1958 was appointed Deputy Chief of the Second Section, Seventh Department. On 29 December 1959 I was promoted to the rank of captain.

26 October 1966: "I lied when I said I was a lieutenant colonel in 1964. I was only a captain." Asked why he had said in 1962 that he was then a major, NOSENKO replied: "There was no conversation about rank in 1962. About my position, I said I was in the Tourist Department. That's all."

To summarize what NOSENKO has said about his ranks while serving in the KGB: He became a senior lieutenant in 1952, April 1953, 1954, or 1956; a captain in 1956 or September/October/December 1959; a major in December 1958 or 1959; and a lieutenant colonel in October/November 1963. (The latter claim was verified by the official KGB document listing him as a lieutenant colonel as of December 1963.) On the other hand, NOSENKO has indicated that his highest rank in the KGB was captain, and that he never advanced to a majority or a lieutenant colonelcy.

*At about this time, in early 1965, [REDACTED] NOSENKO was only a captain and had advanced to his senior KGB position because of his close relationship with GRIBANOV. [REDACTED] shortly after NOSENKO's defection, [REDACTED] reported having received information from fellow KGB officers which made it "appear quite certain" that NOSENKO was a lieutenant colonel.

**See above; NOSENKO was referring to the TDV authorization issued for the CHEREPANOV search in December 1963.

2. Awards and Decorations

Not long after reestablishing contact with CIA in January 1964, NOSENKO mentioned that he had received the Order of Lenin "shortly after the 1962 meetings" in Geneva as a reward for the ideas which he had developed to "enlarge the experience and improve the quality" of KGB Second Chief Directorate staff personnel in Moscow.* During the first series of interrogations, NOSENKO on 6 April 1964 claimed that he was awarded the Order of Lenin in 1963 for his work in the Tourist Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, after receiving the Order of the Red Banner in 1962 for his performances while in the American Department.

The following discussion of the subject took place on 6 April 1964:

NOSENKO: Yes, I received a big gold medal.

Question: It was the Order of Lenin?

NOSENKO: It was at first the Order of the Red Banner--the Red Star, I mean. In '63 I received the Order of Lenin. In '63.

Question: What for?

NOSENKO: GRIBANOV decided that whoever is working a long period in the Second Chief Directorate--[V.D.] CHELNOKOV got one, [A.G.] KOVALENKO got one--many, many [received the Order of Lenin].**

Question: You received the Order of Lenin for this brilliant service?

NOSENKO: No. For working in the Seventh [Tourist] Department, which is considered good.

Question: What is good? Were there recruitments? What recruitments?

NOSENKO: You must know that the main task of the Seventh Department is not recruitments. The main task is countering the intelligence activities of the opposition.

Question: So, the Chief and the Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department got the Order of Lenin?

NOSENKO: Yes.

*NOSENKO has described the Order of Lenin as the highest decoration for which a KGB officer can be eligible.

**In June 1964 NOSENKO said that the only Second Chief Directorate officer whom he knew to have received this award was V.A. CHURANOV, Chief of the British Embassy Section, who recruited William John VASSALL (see PART VI.D.5.b.). On the same general topic, NOSENKO asked his CIA case officer whether he, the CIA officer, had received a medal for his part in the 1962 meetings with NOSENKO. He asked this in January 1964 in Geneva.

Question: CHELNOKOV and KOVALENKO?

NOSENKO: Yes. And CHURANOV got and I got and--who else? [S.M.] FEDOSEYEV got and [V.M.] KOVSHUK also got the Order, the second time. The first time he got it several years ago, and this was the second time.

Question: When did you get the Order of the Red Star?

NOSENKO: Red Star I got--I don't know for what.

Question: But then one year later they gave you another one, because this [Order of the Red Star] wasn't enough?

NOSENKO: Because the awards are given out--now, wait one moment; up until 1961, if there were any awards for the Chekists [KGB personnel] it was very rare, and they were only awarded for a specific thing. Such as CHURANOV, for instance. He was rewarded for a specific deed [the recruitment of VASSALL]. But in 1962, 1963--these first years--whether it was the idea of the Party to encourage the workers, they decided to let SAKHAROVSKIY [Chief of the KGB First Chief Directorate] declare his medals and GRIBANOV to declare his medals. They get together with their deputies and decide to whom they will give them. They don't say to whom--they say, for instance: 'One order to your department; you decide who should have it.' Like that. Then we would get together, I CHELNOKOV, KOVALENKO, and we decided [who would get one]. In our department, [V.I.] YAKOVLEV got a medal. Who else got a medal? In 1962, I got one, and then LEONOV who was Chief of the Second Section--he got the Order of the Red Star. We decided on these individuals. As far as we ourselves were concerned, that decision was made by GRIBANOV and his deputy.

Question: Did the Seventh Department catch any spies?

NOSENKO: Well, as I have already told you, there was this Italian fellow [redacted]. This was considered a good case because the First Department later--the Seventh Department was only involved at the time of the arrest--began meeting with him.

Question: So you got the Order [of the Red Banner] in 1962 because of your work in the Tourist Department?

NOSENKO: I think in 1962 GRIBANOV gave it to me not for the Seventh Department, but for my work in the First [American] Department in 1960, 1961.

Question: You think so?

NOSENKO: I think so.

Question: The Order just came, without any explanation?

NOSENKO: It was just done at the order of the Chairman.

Question: And the Order of Lenin was the same?

NOSENKO: The same. Well, the way it says, "For work well done for the organs of the KGB" there is no indication exactly what it is for.

NOSENKO admitted on 8 April 1964: "In 1964 [in Geneva] I told a lie about the Order of Lenin. Why? It was a boast." NOSENKO then explained what he said to be the true circumstances and gave the reason for which he was to have received this decoration. GRIBANOV, NOSENKO stated, had promised in 1963 that NOSENKO, CHELNOKOV, and KOVALENKO would get the Order of Lenin; "He said: 'I am submitting your names for the Order of Lenin for creating the TsOPS [Central Operational Communications System of the Second Chief Directorate], for this new thing you have tried to create in tourist work.' But December [1963] had gone by. I left [for Geneva] and nothing happened."*

NOSENKO was asked on 15 April 1964 to list the dates, reasons, and types of awards, decorations, and bonuses he had received during his KGB career, as well as to indicate from whom he had received each of these. His reply was as follows: "I received nothing in 1953, 1954, and 1955. In 1956 I received a commendation and one month's pay. SEROV, the Chairman of the KGB, awarded me this for the recruitment of Richard BURGI [see Part V.D.4.b.] while I was working in the Seventh [Tourist] Department of the Second Chief Directorate. It was signed by the Chairman, and GRIBANOV told me about it. As usual, this Order of the Chairman of the KGB was circulated, and I and all case officers saw my name listed. There is no certificate or anything. Personnel just makes a note in your official file that on a certain date you received the commendation from the Chairman of the KGB.

"From 1956 on, I received something almost every year, but it was nothing special. Perhaps it was the KGB anniversary or May Day or Army Day. In 1957 or 1958, I got something from GRIBANOV. Maybe it was the 40th anniversary of the Soviet Army. I don't remember. It was given to me and a group of people in the hall [auditorium] between the third and fourth floors [of the KGB Headquarters building]. PER-FILYEV, Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, made the presentation.

"In 1959 I received a commendation and one month's pay from SHELEPIN, Chairman of the KGB, for several recruitments, among them the professor from Tennessee [MERTENS], DREW, FRIPPEL, and three British people. There were six in

*NOSENKO later reverted to his original statement, which related the award to his efforts to "inspire" the work of the Tourist Department.

all; three Americans and three British. I can't remember the British names just now.*

"In 1960 I got a commendation from GRIBANOV for good work in general. A lot of officers got this. In 1961 I received the Order of the Red Star. With a group of case officers I got this for general good work in the Second Chief Directorate. KOVALENKO and KOVSHUK got this too. IVASHUTIN gave it to me (made the presentation). Personnel makes a note in your official file, but you can take the medal and the little certificate that goes with it and either keep it at home or in your study room (office).**

"In 1962 I got a commendation from GRIBANOV for general good work. I also received the Unblemished Service Award for ten years' service. They counted this from October 1950, when I joined the GRU, and they were late by two years in giving it to me. This is not unusual. SHCHERBAK, Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, gave it to me in the

* See Parts V.D.4.1. and h., Part V.D.5., and Parts V.D.4.1., j., and k., respectively, for descriptions of these recruitment operations and NOSENKO's role in them. NOSENKO also said during interrogation by DERYABIN on 10 August 1965 that, in 1959, his name was submitted for the Order of the Red Banner in connection with these recruitments, but that he did not get it, probably because he was transferred to the First Department at that time (January 1950). NOSENKO has described the Order of the Red Banner as the third highest award a KGB officer may receive. Asked what KGB officers had received this award, NOSENKO said on 10 June 1964 that GRIBANOV, SAKHAROVSKIY, and several other high-ranking KGB officers were awarded it for the important role they played in smashing the Hungarian Revolution in 1956.

** On 15 April 1964 NOSENKO had said that he received the Order of the Red Star, along with a group of other Second Chief Directorate officers, at the end of December 1962. He recalled this because they were planning the presentation for the anniversary of the KGB on 20 December, but the presentation was delayed and was not made until the end of the month. NOSENKO and about 70 other officers of the Second Chief Directorate, including KOVSHUK and G.I. GRYAZNOV, received the award "simply for achievements, for good results in work." NOSENKO told DERYABIN in August 1965 that the order accompanying his award had read: "For exceptional performance of mission." When asked what mission was involved, NOSENKO replied that the award was just for good work in general.

hall along with a certificate.* In 1963 I received a commendation from GRIBANOV for general good work. Also, GRIBANOV told me that I, along with some others, was to receive the Order of Lenin on 20 December 1963, the KGB anniversary date, but I left for Geneva.**I was to receive it for arousing [inspiring] the Seventh Department."

NOSENKO said on 26 October 1966 that he never received any KGB award or decoration for his operational work. The only awards he received during his KGB career, he said, were a Red Army anniversary medal and the award for satisfactory completion of ten years of service.

*NOSENKO's wording here reflects earlier intensive questioning concerning the ten-year service medal. NOSENKO said on 15 April 1964: "In 1962 I had ten years of service in the KGB and got a medal for unblemished service. It is usually given for ten years and to KGB men only....That was in 1962. I had ten years of service then." When it was pointed out that, according to his most recent statement, he had joined the KGB in March 1953 and therefore would have had only nine years of service in 1962, NOSENKO said he did not understand why but that he was certain that he had been given the medal after his return from Geneva in 1962. (The 1962 date is consistent with NOSENKO's earlier statements that he joined the KGB in 1952.) The following day, 17 April 1964, NOSENKO said that he remembered why he had received the medal in 1962 rather than 1963; this medal, he recalled, is awarded to servicemen as well as KGB officers, and prior military service is taken into account in computing the service time for the latter. NOSENKO had entered the GRU in 1950 and therefore should have received the ten-year medal in 1960. Because of a mix-up in the KGB Personnel Department he did not receive it until 1962.

**NOSENKO arrived in Geneva on 19 January 1964.

H. NOSENKO's Relationship with GRIBANOV

1. Information from NOSENKO

a. Summary

From the time of his first meetings with CIA in 1962, NOSENKO maintained that he had a close personal and professional relationship with Major General O.M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO has described recruitment approaches in which he and GRIBANOV took part together, conversations they had on operational matters, the role which GRIBANOV played in his rank promotions and receipt of various awards, and his afterhours carousing with GRIBANOV and First Chief Directorate counterintelligence officer Ye.A. TARABRIN. NOSENKO has also frequently mentioned the role which GRIBANOV played in his, NOSENKO's, professional advancement within the KGB: GRIBANOV was wholly responsible, against NOSENKO's wishes, for his appointment to the position of Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department in January 1960; later, when NOSENKO rejected his offer to make him Deputy Chief of the entire American Department, GRIBANOV arranged his return to the Tourist Department as Chief of the American Tourist Section and his later appointment as Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department.

NOSENKO's remarks concerning his direct involvement with GRIBANOV in operations against Americans are included in other parts of this paper. Among them are his early statements on the approach to code clerk James STORSBERG (Part V.E.3.c.), his 1962 account of the arrest and attempt to recruit CIA officer Russell LANGELE (Part VI.D.7.a.), and his early reports on the attempt to recruit CIA officer Edward Ellis SMITH (Part VI.D.2.). In all three cases NOSENKO subsequently denied having played the role he originally attributed to himself and denied having had personal contact with the Americans involved. NOSENKO has also altered his original accounts to say that he received no awards or decoration for operational activity and that he had not received the promotions he claimed.

b. Details

The statements of NOSENKO given below concern primarily his personal relationship with GRIBANOV and how GRIBANOV assisted his rapid rise within the organization of the Second Chief Directorate.

12 June 1962: "Oleg Mikhaylovich GRIBANOV is a great guy. A real pal. We, so to say, used to meet one another illegally and had women together... GRIBANOV wrote a fitness report on me. It was the very best that can be given, brilliant. GRIBANOV wrote the very best fitness report on me. He had an excellent regard for me, excellent... I am supposed to become Deputy Chief of [the Tourist] Department. I believe that GRIBANOV is promoting young people, new people, who already have experience, good experience, who have made recruitments. I know two or three [of the people he is moving ahead]. I personally have about 12 recruitments, four or five of them were British and the rest Americans. He [GRIBANOV] has his eye on me in particular, and the question of my advancement is right now under consideration... I will be Deputy Chief of Department. You must give thought to the

fact that I have been talking with you. You can ruin everything. I have a career. I have bright prospects. My boss GRIBANOV, my highest boss, has a very high degree of respect for me. He sometimes bawls me out and I-- Well, I make it look like this is unpleasant for me. But, in fact, it is a pleasant thing because, inside, I am glad he is bawling me out and not someone else. I know that if he bawls me out he has a high regard for me. He sometimes calls me personally [to his office] and says: 'You come with me. I have to meet an ambassador.' I go with him. We arrive and have the conversation. He is there all night. He comes out and says: 'Well, where shall we go for a drink?' I know beforehand [that he will say this] and everything is ready at the Aragvi Restaurant. We go there. 'Well, what shall we drink?' [GRIBANOV says]. I answer: 'Well, Oleg Mikhailovich, cognac, of course! He is the highest chief. I don't drink cognac. I'll have vodka,' I say. 'Well, we'll have vodka then,' [GRIBANOV says]..." One of NOSENKO's CIA handlers suggested at this point that GRIBANOV seemed to treat NOSENKO as an older brother would. NOSENKO replied: "That's his attitude toward me."

23 April 1964

Question: Did you ever go to GRIBANOV's house?

NOSENKO: I never went in the house. I have driven to it.

Question: Did he ever come to your house?

NOSENKO: No.

Question: Were you ever out at night with him, after work? If so, how, under what circumstances?

NOSENKO: After work? Yes, once.

Question: Who else was there?

NOSENKO: TARABRIN.

Question: What was the occasion?

NOSENKO: No specific reason. GRIBANOV called me at midnight. I could hear that he was already drinking; he asked me how long it would take me to get dressed and come down to the Praga Restaurant, first private room. Afterwards we wanted to go somewhere else to finish the evening... GRIBANOV was sloppy drunk, lay down to rest, he needed a couple of hours of sleep. I drove him and TARABRIN home, got him there at 6:00 a.m., gave him some pills to help him.

Question: When did you first personally meet GRIBANOV?

NOSENKO: I might have seen him in 1953 or 1954, but I did not have a chance to speak to him then. Once I was in two group operational discussions (about 15 people present) about work against Military Attaches in 1954; that was the first time I ever spoke to him.

Question: When did you first have any personal conversation with him?

NOSENKO: I don't remember. He gathered groups of people. Maybe I was with him with KOZLOV and others in Tourist Department [i.e., between 1955 and 1960].

Question: When did you develop a personal relationship with him?

NOSENKO: It is difficult to say how it got started. I was still working in the Seventh Department. It was in 1958, or maybe 1957. KOZLOV suddenly called me and said I should immediately report to GRIBANOV. I did, and GRIBANOV said I should quickly be ready to go to a reception with him at the Indian Embassy, with him and Vera [Ivanovna] ANDREYEVA.

Question: Why you?

NOSENKO: I don't know... (pause) Oh, yes, this is the story. This is it, this is why he started favoring me. Earlier, some time in 1953, I knew some girls, Nina on Pokrovskiy Boulevard and her girlfriend, Rina GUDKOVA, friends of [Yu.I.] GUK and [V.M.] KOVSHUK and [V.A.] CHURANOV. CHURANOV was a friend of TARABRIN, who was a friend of GRIBANOV. Through TARABRIN he got acquainted with these girls, and TARABRIN brought them to GRIBANOV's dacha one night. The girls were talkative and told me all about it, and said they'd told CHURANOV. I told CHURANOV who warned me not to mention it. I never did, and GRIBANOV learned about this and liked it; he remarked once: "You are not a gossip..."

Question: How did he find out that you knew and didn't tell anyone?

NOSENKO: I don't know, but he did.

Question: Who wrote your fitness reports?

NOSENKO: My last one was written by [V.D.] CHELNOKOV. The one before that by [V.A.] KLYPIN, in the First Department. Before that in the Seventh Department it was written by [K.N.] DUBAS, before him by [V.A.] KOZLOV, then [S.V.] PERFILYEV and before then, in the First Department, by [A.M.] GORBATENKO.

Question: Did GRIBANOV ever write a fitness report on you?

NOSENKO: He may not have actually written them, but he signed them, those reports written in connection with promotions to higher jobs or for trips abroad, or general reviews of personnel.

15 February 1965 (from a protocol signed 20 February 1965):
 "Before I joined the KGB in 1953 I had never heard the name of Oleg Mikhaylovich GRIBANOV and knew nothing about him. As [E.G.] SHUBNYAKOV, rather than GRIBANOV, was the Deputy Director of the Second Chief Directorate responsible for supervising the activities of the First Department of the Directorate, where I worked,

it may have been several months after I began my KGB service that GRIBANOV first came to my attention. I don't know when I first saw GRIBANOV but it may have been approximately 1953 at a meeting before May Day or the 7 November holiday. I would not necessarily remember this as I frequently met much more important people, who were friends of my father, and seeing GRIBANOV wouldn't have been particularly important to me. Sometimes during 1954 and 1955, it was necessary to obtain the signature of a Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate on a cable that I had written and, if SHUBNYAKOV was absent at the time, I would take it to GRIBANOV for approval. Though I was only a junior case officer at the time, I would take the cable, after it had been approved by the Chief of Section and the Chief of Department, directly to GRIBANOV, who would simply sign it with no discussion. I do not remember how many times I took cables to GRIBANOV nor do I remember the contents of any specific one of them. The first meeting with GRIBANOV that I specifically remember was in the summer of 1956. I think it was in June. I had returned from Kiev with KOZLOV and, after writing a spravka on BURGI, PERFILYEV, KOZLOV, and I went to see GRIBANOV. KOZLOV didn't introduce me to GRIBANOV at that time, but GRIBANOV knew that I was NOSENKO because the plan for the BURGI operation said that I would participate and because PERFILYEV had made an appointment for the three of us to speak to GRIBANOV at this time. The meeting lasted about 30 or 40 minutes. GRIBANOV read the report on BURGI's recruitment and asked some questions. KOZLOV answered some of these and I answered others. Other than asking what Ukrainians took part in the operation, I can recall none of GRIBANOV's questions nor do I remember any of the conversation which took place at this meeting. When we were through, KOZLOV and I left while PERFILYEV remained with GRIBANOV. Perhaps the first time I was alone with GRIBANOV was in 1958 when I attended a reception given by the Indian Embassy at the Sovetskaya Hotel in Moscow. Usually [A.V.] SUNTSOV accompanied GRIBANOV on such occasions, but he was sick at the time. I don't know why SUNTSOV usually went with GRIBANOV, why I was selected to go, or what I was supposed to do at the reception. I think GRIBANOV called the Seventh Department and asked whom he could use, but I don't know why he picked me. GRIBANOV told me that, at the reception, I was to refer to him as Aleksey Mikhaylovich GORBUNOV. I was to introduce myself as Yuriy Ivanovich and if anybody asked, would use the last name NIKOLAYEV. Vera ANDREYEVA, who went with us, used the name Vera Ivanovna. After work, I went home to change my clothes and we went in GRIBANOV's car from the KGB to the Hotel Sovetskaya. GRIBANOV sat in front with the driver and I sat in back with Vera ANDREYEVA. I cannot say how many times I have seen GRIBANOV altogether. From 1959 on I saw him more frequently. Sometimes, GRIBANOV would call meetings of chiefs of sections and their deputies and I would take part in these. I had begun to call GRIBANOV by his first name and patronymic in 1958, when I was Deputy Chief of the First Section of the Seventh Department, but at these meetings I called him 'Comrade General.' In 1959 I also went to GRIBANOV's office alone in connection with the FRIPPEL case and, sometime between May and October 1959, took him a report that I had prepared concerning the use of tourist cover by foreign intelligence organizations."

23-24 February 1965 (from a protocol signed 26 February):
 "GRIBANOV was never in my own office, my home, my parents home or my parent's dacha. My father never knew him. I was never in GRIBANOV's home or his dacha. I was never in any KGB operational apartment with GRIBANOV. I never introduced any of my

own agents to GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV knew about agents ~~XXXXXX~~ and 'ARTUR' (FRIPPEL), but I never specifically discussed them with GRIBANOV. I did discuss with GRIBANOV the agent 'PROMIOR' (PREISFREUND). On three occasions I have been with GRIBANOV in social circumstances. On all three occasions TARABRIN was also present. After two of these occasions, we had parties with girls. I don't remember when the first time was, but the last time was in September or October 1963. On this occasion they called me at home late at night and asked me to join them at the Prague Restaurant. I arranged for female companionship and this party lasted until early morning.* It was at this party that I gave GRIBANOV some pills I had for hangovers. I had brought a supply of these back from Geneva in 1962. A few days after this party [GRIBANOV's secretary Ye.S.] KIRPICHNIKOV came to my office with a note from GRIBANOV asking me for some more of these pills. This is the note I gave to my CIA case officers in 1964.** I have ridden in GRIBANOV's cars perhaps four or five times, once when I went with him to an Indian Embassy reception in 1958, perhaps two or three times to meetings with SUSLOV and two or three times in connection with the drinking parties with GRIBANOV and TARABRIN. GRIBANOV played absolutely no part in my entry into the KGB. I think he could not have played any personal part in my assignment to the First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate in 1953 since at that time GRIBANOV was Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate supervising the Second Department and not the First Department. I do not know who made the decision to transfer me from the First Department to the Seventh Department in 1955, but I did not have any personal contact or conversation with GRIBANOV concerning this decision. I do not know if GRIBANOV played any personal part in my appointment as Deputy Chief of Section in the Seventh Department in 1958. I do not remember just who was responsible for my appointment to this position. I did not personally discuss this appointment with GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV decided at the end of 1959 that I would be appointed Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, and this appointment took place sometime in January 1960. DUBAS, the Chief of the Seventh Department in 1959, told me that GRIBANOV planned to appoint me to this position and that he had spoken to GRIBANOV two or three times about it, but had been unable to get GRIBANOV to change his plans. I spoke to GRIBANOV myself about this matter once or twice. GRIBANOV did not tell me who had recommended me for this new position and did not tell me any reason for my having been selected. GRIBANOV did tell me that my appointment was a part of his personal plan to raise to more senior positions a number of younger officers, including myself and Aleksey SUNTSOV. The decision for me to return to the Seventh Department in January 1962 was actually made in about September or October 1961. GRIBANOV planned to appoint me Deputy Chief of the First Department, but the new Chief of the First Department, FEDOSEYEV, wanted KOVSHUK to take this position. Since I did not

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own agents to GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV knew about agents [redacted] and 'ARTUR' (FRIPPEL), but I never specifically discussed them with GRIBANOV. I did discuss with GRIBANOV the agent 'FROKHOR' (PREISFREUD). On three occasions I have been with GRIBANOV in social circumstances. On all three occasions TARABRIN was also present. After two of these occasions, we had parties with girls. I don't remember when the first time was, but the last time was in September or October 1963. On this occasion they called me at home late at night and asked me to join them at the Prague Restaurant. I arranged for female companionship and this party lasted until early morning.* It was at this party that I gave GRIBANOV some pills I had for hangovers. I had brought a supply of these back from Geneva in 1962. A few days after this party [GRIBANOV's secretary Ye.S.] KIRPICHNIKOV came to my office with a note from GRIBANOV asking me for some more of these pills. This is the note I gave to my CIA case officers in 1964.** I have ridden in GRIBANOV's cars perhaps four or five times, once when I went with him to an Indian Embassy reception in 1958, perhaps two or three times to meetings with SUSLOV and two or three times in connection with the drinking parties with GRIBANOV and TARABRIN. GRIBANOV played absolutely no part in my entry into the KGB. I think he could not have played any personal part in my assignment to the First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate in 1953 since at that time GRIBANOV was Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate supervising the Second Department and not the First Department. I do not know who made the decision to transfer me from the First Department to the Seventh Department in 1955, but I did not have any personal contact or conversation with GRIBANOV concerning this decision. I do not know if GRIBANOV played any personal part in my appointment as Deputy Chief of Section in the Seventh Department in 1958. I do not remember just who was responsible for my appointment to this position. I did not personally discuss this appointment with GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV decided at the end of 1959 that I would be appointed Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, and this appointment took place sometime in January 1960. DUBAS, the Chief of the Seventh Department in 1959, told me that GRIBANOV planned to appoint me to this position and that he had spoken to GRIBANOV two or three times about it, but had been unable to get GRIBANOV to change his plans. I spoke to GRIBANOV myself about this matter once or twice. GRIBANOV did not tell me who had recommended me for this new position and did not tell me any reason for my having been selected. GRIBANOV did tell me that my appointment was a part of his personal plan to raise to more senior positions a number of younger officers, including myself and Aleksey SUNTSOV. The decision for me to return to the Seventh Department in January 1962 was actually made in about September or October 1961. GRIBANOV planned to appoint me Deputy Chief of the First Department, but the new Chief of the First Department, FEDOSEYEV, wanted KOVSHUK to take this position. Since I did not

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want to be placed in this position by GRIBANOV's order against the wishes of PFDUSEYEV, I went to GRIBANOV and requested that I be transferred back to the Seventh Department, in any position. I had already spoken to CHELNOKOV, who was then Chief of the Seventh Department, about this matter, and he had suggested that I go to GRIBANOV and ask to be returned to the Seventh Department. GRIBANOV finally agreed that I should return to the Seventh Department as Chief of the First Section with the understanding that I would be appointed Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department as soon as this position would be vacated by [B.A.] BALDIN. In July 1962 I was appointed Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. This decision was made by CHELNOKOV and GRIBANOV in accordance with the intention stated by GRIBANOV at the end of 1961 that I should be appointed to this position as soon as possible. I had no further personal discussions with GRIBANOV about this appointment at this time. In 1963 CHELNOKOV [GRIBANOV's Deputy, F.D.] BOBKOV, and GRIBANOV decided that I should be named First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. They did not discuss this with me beforehand and no order was issued about this appointment. I was simply told that from that time I would be considered as First Deputy Chief of the Department. At this time I was, in fact, the only Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, since KORCOV did not come to the Seventh Department until about November or December 1963. GRIBANOV did not tell me his reasons for appointing me Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department in January 1960, for wanting to appoint me Deputy Chief of the First Department in late 1961, or for appointing me Section Chief and later Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department in 1962. He did not discuss with me my personal qualifications for each of these positions. GRIBANOV had nothing at all to do with my assignment to Geneva in 1962. I think that the kharakteristika written about me for this trip was signed by BOBKOV, since he was the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate who supervised the Seventh Department. I did not personally discuss this trip with GRIBANOV before my departure from Moscow. My candidacy for this assignment was supported by BANNIKOV, the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate who supervised the work of the Eleventh Department which had the investigative file on SHAKOV. BANNIKOV was concerned with the question of who would go as case officer on this trip because SHAKOV, who was suspected of possibly being a Western agent, was to be in the delegation. There was no background or neighborhood investigation conducted on me in connection with my being approved for this trip. My assignment was approved by the Eleventh Department, by the Personnel Office of the Second Chief Directorate, by the Central Personnel Office of the KGB and by the Central Committee of the CPSU. GRIBANOV had absolutely nothing to do with my assignment to Geneva in 1964. The kharakteristika on me for this trip was signed by BOBKOV. For the 1964 trip no decision of approval of the Central Committee of the CPSU was required for me or for any of the other members of the delegation who had been approved for the 1962 trip. KHLOBUSTOV, PANCHENKO, and KOVALENKO supported me for the assignment as a personal favor to me. I did not discuss my 1964 trip to Geneva with GRIBANOV prior to my departure. In fact, I was even afraid that GRIBANOV would find out that I was going and would object to my making this second trip."



23 February 1965: NOSENKO commented further on his social encounters with GRIBANOV and TARABRIN. The following, which was not included in the protocol quoted above, is taken from case officer notes.

Question: Tell me about the occasions when you were with GRIBANOV and TARABRIN.

NOSENKO: Three times--drinking in cafes. Twice afterwards there were girls. The most recent time was in September or October 1963. I don't remember the first time. In 1963 I received a call from TARABRIN at home. Then GRIBANOV got on the phone and told me to take his car and come join them at the Praga Restaurant. I didn't take his car because I didn't want to call the duty officer. I took a cab and went to the Praga. They were sitting there and drinking in a private room. I joined them. They were drinking champagne, but I took cognac. TARABRIN suggested girls about 1230 and GRIBANOV made me go to the office to get my notebook. I called one girl I knew--her and her sister. When I got back to the restaurant it was closed with only GRIBANOV and TARABRIN still there. We went to the girls' (apartment). They weren't prostitutes exactly. I knew her before.

Question: Is this why GRIBANOV called you to the restaurant (i.e., to provide girls)?

NOSENKO: I think so. It was the second time I had participated in this. This last time GRIBANOV told the girl his name. The girl works in the Archives of the First Chief Directorate. At that time of night I wasn't able to reach anyone else. Her name is Galina Mikhaylovna. Her mother works in the Central Committee. I don't remember her last name. GRIBANOV was drinking and she told him that she had quarreled with ZAYTSEV, the Chief of the First Chief Directorate Archives. GRIBANOV told her that he would give her a job and told me to arrange for a job in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate for her. Galina's flat is in the building inhabited by Central Committee workers on Kutuzovskiy Prospekt. GRIBANOV's driver drove him home at 0600 and he was in the office by 0830.

3 March 1965: Speaking of the damage his disclosures must have caused the KGB, NOSENKO said: "I believe they will punish people in the Second Chief Directorate [SCD]... Even GRIBANOV... He was personally responsible, as head of the SCD, for pushing me ahead."

Question: What sort of punishment?

NOSENKO: Even firing.

Question: Do you think any others would be punished, or even fired?

NOSENKO: Maybe KOVALENKO, BOBKOV, and people in the Eleventh Department. Many others, too.

Later in the same session the interrogator returned to this subject. The following is a transcript of the discussion:

Question: You said you think GRIBANOV might be fired. Yet, there is nothing in the protocol you signed [see above] about your relations with GRIBANOV which would seem to make him personally responsible for you. Is there something else, something you haven't told me?

NOSENKO: No.

Question: Why then do you think GRIBANOV would be fired?

NOSENKO: (no answer)

Question: (repeats)

NOSENKO: Don't know.

Question: Well, what is your opinion at least?

NOSENKO: Nothing, nothing. Let's not discuss this.

Question: Why not?

NOSENKO: It's simply my opinion, that's all. I don't know why.

Question: Well, what is your opinion?

NOSENKO: He was responsible for my becoming Deputy Chief of Department.

Question: But you had already gotten ahead before; you said he didn't help you become Deputy Chief of Section in 1958.

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: Did you ever hear any gossip about his help to you?

NOSENKO: It was said in the SCD that he helped me become Chief of Section and Deputy Chief of Department.

Question: Why would BOBKOV be punished?

NOSENKO: He was my supervisor, and in '61 he was Secretary of the KGB Party Organization.

Question: Would others in the Party Organization be punished?

NOSENKO: Yes, also in the Party Organization of the Seventh Department and of the SCD.

Question: Would BANNIKOV be punished?

NOSENKO: No. He did nothing, just supported my candidature for Geneva.

Question: Would KOVSHUK be punished?

NOSENKO: Of course they would speak with KOVSHUK, GUK, GRYAZNOV, who talked to me.

Question: How about the First Chief Directorate and the Seventh Directorate?

NOSENKO: No. I wasn't close to them, except GUK.

Question: How about First Chief Directorate residencies abroad?

NOSENKO: [S.I.] GAVRICHEV might be recalled from Geneva.

Question: You must be withholding something about your relationship with GRIBANOV.

NOSENKO: No, I was telling you I visited his office. He told me: 'I found out you're drinking too much.' I said no, not especially. He said: 'Stop this drinking with KOVSHUK. It's not good for you.'

Question: But this couldn't harm GRIBANOV's position now.

NOSENKO: They would review my file, and find that it contained the report about the woman in '54,* the fact that I was turned down for assignment to Ethiopia, drinking, scandals--GRIBANOV knew about this, but he approved my appointment (to Deputy Chief of Department) anyway.

Question: Why did he promote you?

NOSENKO: GRIBANOV thought I was a young, active guy. Six recruitments--oh, they weren't much, but it sounds great for the First Department, which was having no success with Americans in the Embassy.

Question: But why make you Deputy Chief of Department?

NOSENKO: He thought I was a tough guy, good case officer. In '59 I saw him often and was involved in a lot of operations which were reported to him.

Question: But it was not then, but in 1961, when he made you Deputy Chief of Department.

NOSENKO: (shrugs)

Question: Who would officially approve a Deputy Chief of Department?

NOSENKO: Must be higher than a Department Chief--because GRIBANOV signed. They could get him for his, especially those who are against GRIBANOV.

Question: Who?

NOSENKO: Well, IVANOV, who wanted to get promoted to Deputy Chief of Department in 59-60 but didn't. He was in an inspection group of the Collegium, checking the Seventh Department.

* Presumably this is a reference to NOSENKO's contracting venereal disease (see Part IV.C.2.).

Question: But GRIBANOV must have approved all the other Deputy Department Chiefs, too. Would the same happen if one of them defected?

NOSENKO: Well, if it was from the Second Department, for example, no, because GRIBANOV wasn't personally supervising it. It would be someone else's proposal. In my case it was his own initiative.

Question: Was anyone in the First Chief Directorate punished as a result of GOLITSYN's defection?

NOSENKO: No, absolutely not.

2. Information from [REDACTED]

As indicated in Part III.I., a number of sources have reported that GRIBANOV and other KGB officers were discharged from the KGB in the wake of NOSENKO's defection." [REDACTED]

According to sensitive source [REDACTED]

15 KGB officers had already been dismissed from the KGB because of the defection, and that GRIBANOV and three of his deputies were included in this number. One of the deputies was named "BANNIK" (BANNIKOV). GRIBANOV's guilt was said to rest in the facts that, as Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, he had been ultimately responsible for NOSENKO's flight; that NOSENKO was his personal friend and protegee; and that, therefore, he should have been aware of NOSENKO's intention to defect.

According to sensitive source [REDACTED]

when NOSENKO was being considered for inclusion in the Soviet delegation to go to Geneva, a summary statement of NOSENKO's activities and capabilities was prepared by employees of the Second Chief Directorate and was sent to GRIBANOV... [REDACTED] said he understood this summary contained considerable 'compromising' information regarding NOSENKO and, if acted on properly, would have removed NOSENKO from future consideration for the trip to Geneva. [REDACTED] Sensitive source stated, however, that he understood from conversations with other KGB employees, whom he could not recall specifically by name, that GRIBANOV read the summary material, ran a line through all of it,

* In addition, a Western Ambassador with whom GRIBANOV was in operational contact in Moscow has stated that GRIBANOV disappeared from the scene sometime in mid-1965 and was replaced by another KGB handler. (He has also indicated that GRIBANOV disappeared about the time of KHRUSHCHEV's downfall in October 1964.)

and put the notation on the summary, 'Send him to Geneva.'
 [REDACTED] the general feeling among KGB personnel that GRIBANOV was willing to overlook a lot of deficiencies about NOSENKO because of GRIBANOV's long-time friendship with NOSENKO's father."

According to sensitive source,

[REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] GRIBANOV's dismissal took place immediately after NOSENKO's defection in February 1964 and no less than 50 other officers, most of them from the Second Chief Directorate and many of them close friends of GRIBANOV, had been fired subsequently. [REDACTED] prior to NOSENKO's defection, NOSENKO had been the deputy to a Department Chief in the Second Chief Directorate but that he held only the rank of captain in the KGB. [REDACTED] attributed NOSENKO's high position to the influence which GRIBANOV exerted on his behalf. [REDACTED] rather than being fired, Major General "BANNIK" (BANNIKOV) had been appointed Acting Chief of the Second Chief Directorate in GRIBANOV's stead.*

[REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] after the defection of NOSENKO, the KGB conducted an extensive investigation of personnel in KGB Headquarters to find out which KGB officers knew him. One of these questioned was TARABRIN, who said he was acquainted with NOSENKO, but that their relationship was only casual and was limited to occasional official contacts within the KGB. Subsequent investigation determined, however, that TARABRIN and GRIBANOV were close friends socially and had attended several parties which NOSENKO had arranged and attended. Girls provided by NOSENKO were at these parties.** As a result of his willful concealment of this information, TARABRIN, like GRIBANOV, was discharged from the KGB and dismissed from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

[REDACTED] BANNIKOV was the Acting Chief of the Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO, as noted above, said that BANNIKOV would not be punished as a result of his defection. NOSENKO also said that it was BANNIKOV who sponsored NOSENKO's 1964 trip to Geneva and that GRIBANOV had nothing to do with it or the 1962 trip.

** These evidently were the parties described by NOSENKO (see above). [REDACTED] at the time of his removal from the KGB, TARABRIN was the Chief of the British Department of the KGB First Chief Directorate. NOSENKO said that TARABRIN held this post until 1963, at which time he was promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the newly established "Service Number Two" (counterintelligence) of the First Chief Directorate.

I. Confirmation from Other Sources

1. Introduction

Since NOSENKO's defection several Soviet sources and defectors have provided information supporting NOSENKO's claims of having held certain positions in the KGB at certain times. [REDACTED] a Soviet scientist with suspected intelligence connections who was approached by CIA, Soviet case officers for an [REDACTED] double agent (a NOSENKO lead), and the KGB officer handling Robert Lee JOHNSON (also a NOSENKO lead), a Soviet journalist who contacted the magazine Paris Match with a proposal to write an article on NOSENKO, and two defectors. Some of these sources had supported NOSENKO directly by reporting that he was a Second Chief Directorate officer in the various positions he says he was. Others have offered indirect support by confirming NOSENKO's knowledge of particular pieces of information or confirming the validity of information which NOSENKO said he learned while in particular KGB jobs. As will be noted, the information from one source sometimes contradicts that learned from another or from NOSENKO himself.

2. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has corroborated NOSENKO's story indirectly by his descriptions of the repercussions of the defection within the KGB (particularly the firing of GRIBANOV) [REDACTED] and by his statements concerning the probable effect that the defection would have on KGB operations. [REDACTED] reported at various times that NOSENKO is "more valuable than PENKOVSKIY," that he is "vastly more important than DERYABIN or GOLITSYN," that the KGB "will not be able to operate normally for two years," that it is the "unanimous opinion" of [REDACTED] "NOSENKO could do tremendous harm to the KGB," and that this damage would be severe "for several years to come".

[REDACTED] has also given indirect support to NOSENKO's statement that he was Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section. [REDACTED] NOSENKO as a "chief" had access to details on KGB activities against the U.S. Embassy, and [REDACTED] the loss suffered by the KGB as a result of NOSENKO's knowledge of the microphones installed in the Embassy. (NOSENKO has said that this information was available to him only because he was Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section. [REDACTED] reported that NOSENKO's position as a "chief" in the Second Chief Directorate gave him access to the names and backgrounds

[REDACTED] however, is not known to have stated specifically that NOSENKO was a senior official in the American Embassy Section of the American Department in 1960 and 1961.

of many KGB officers in the USSR and abroad (see Part II.I.) and to sensitive information on KGB organization, operations, and method. This status [redacted] was available to NOSENKO a "30-page personnel [redacted] and a 100-page phone list from Moscow Headquarters of the KGB."

[redacted] supported [redacted] of the operational leads supplied by NOSENKO.

[redacted]

The agent was John RUFF, named by NOSENKO as a person recruited in Leningrad in January 1962 on homosexual grounds; this information NOSENKO said he learned as Chief of the American Tourist Section of the Tourist Department. Further examples of [redacted] supporting NOSENKO in this way are reviewed elsewhere in this paper [redacted] and the CHEREPANOV incident in Part VI.D.7.c).

[redacted]

[redacted] also offered specific although [redacted] confirmation of NOSENKO's claimed positions in the KGB.

[redacted]

[redacted] that from the very beginning of his employment by the KGB NOSENKO worked in the Second Directorate. [redacted] he once worked against personnel of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow; later he was assigned to work against U.S. journalists in Moscow. During his last years with the KGB, he was assigned to the task of working against American and

* NOSENKO has never mentioned these documents.

[redacted]

European tourists in Moscow. His last position, [REDACTED], was that of Deputy to the Chief of the Seventh Department, Second Chief Directorate (Tourists). [REDACTED] NOSENKO secured this relatively high position because of help he received from the [REDACTED] General GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Directorate. [REDACTED] throughout NOSENKO's career GRIBANOV had always helped him and saw that he was promoted..."

With regard to NOSENKO's KGB rank, [REDACTED] "it appeared quite certain that NOSENKO had the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the KGB." [REDACTED] reported having learned from [REDACTED] KGB officer [REDACTED] that NOSENKO was in fact only a captain.**

[REDACTED] was asked if he feels that NOSENKO has actually defected or whether he feels that this might be a 'trick' by the KGB. He [REDACTED] replied that from his own knowledge of this matter, he is convinced that NOSENKO's defection is not a 'trick' by the KGB."

3. [REDACTED] sensitive source.

[REDACTED] said that "he had heard about NOSENKO from various persons in Moscow. He said he had never known NOSENKO personally. He said NOSENKO was an important boss in the KGB. He said he did not know what directorate or department NOSENKO had been in. [REDACTED] continued that when NOSENKO was a young man, he was in the GRU Military Academy*** and then [was] sent to the Information Department of the GRU for a short time; in all,

** Until January 1965 NOSENKO maintained that he had progressed through the KGB ranks in normal sequence, from lieutenant to lieutenant colonel. On 26 January 1965, however, he said that because of administrative confusion and GRIBANOV's advice he had skipped the rank of major and had moved directly from captain to lieutenant colonel in late 1963. In April 1966 NOSENKO told CIA that he had never held the rank of lieutenant colonel and was really only a captain (see Part V.G.1.).

*** The Military-Diplomatic Academy is the strategic intelligence school of the GRU. Although NOSENKO said he attended various naval-type schools before joining the GRU, he insisted that he was never enrolled in a formal intelligence course of any training establishment of the Soviet Navy. He claimed to have turned down an offer to attend the Military Diplomatic Academy (which he called the GRU Military Academy) because it offered too many political courses that he had already taken. See Part IV.B.

perhaps a year. [REDACTED] NOSENKO had been a very undisciplined person while in the GRU and 'not very good.' He was to have been discharged from the GRU. However, his father, who was a very influential person in the Ministry of Shipbuilding, was able to get NOSENKO transferred to the KGB. [REDACTED] It was the opinion of the persons from whom he heard the information about NOSENKO that NOSENKO had given very, very good information to the U.S. after his defection and that NOSENKO had had great access to KGB information which included all means of KGB coverage of people in foreign microwave systems in the embassies, etc. [REDACTED] the U.S. Embassy had found many of the intercepts based on NOSENKO information.**

[REDACTED] confirmed operational information which NOSENKO has reported [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SHEBIN was the only GRU agent named by NOSENKO who sourced his knowledge of SHEBIN to an incident which occurred about 1959, while NOSENKO said he was in the Tourist Department.**

4.

[REDACTED]

*As indicated in Part V.E.3.g., the final sentence is largely but not entirely correct.

**See Part V.F.8.

[REDACTED]

5.

at the time of the defection, NOSENKO was rooming in Geneva with Nikolay RESHETNYAK, a representative of the International Organizations Branch of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. RESHETNYAK told [redacted] that NOSENKO often left his quarters without saying where he was going, but it was assumed that NOSENKO was "intelligence" and had some mission to accomplish.**

[redacted] RESHETNYAK had been interrogated by the KGB in connection with the NOSENKO defection. RESHETNYAK also told [redacted] that he had attended the Moscow trial of NOSENKO, held in absentia, at which NOSENKO was found guilty of treason and was sentenced to death. [redacted] thought the KGB might go so far as to send someone to the United States to locate and kill NOSENKO. Finally, he has reported on the dismissal of large numbers of KGB officers, including GRIBANOV and Yuriy GUK, and other repercussions within the KGB of NOSENKO's defection (see Part III.1.4.)

6. GAMKRELIDZE

NOSENKO's service in the American Department was confirmed in the fall of 1964 by the Soviet mathematician R.V. GAMKRELIDZE.*** At that time an American scientist brought up with GAMKRELIDZE the subject of the ABEL-POWERS exchange****

* See Part VI.D.7.c.

** NOSENKO identified RESHETNYAK as a Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer on the staff of the Disarmament Delegation. Asked on 24 January 1964 whether RESHETNYAK might be suspicious of his absences for meetings with CIA, NOSENKO replied: "He thinks I'm KGB...so of course there's no problem if I come back late." [redacted] reported that RESHETNYAK had been dismissed from the KGB as a result of the defection of NOSENKO. CIA has no other reports of RESHETNYAK having served in the KGB.

*** GAMKRELIDZE is suspected of having connections with Soviet Intelligence because of his statements and actions, as well as his unusual freedom of movement, often alone, while on visits to the United States. When approached by a CIA representative with a recruitment proposal in 1964, GAMKRELIDZE declined but added that he "welcomed the opportunity to meet with an American Intelligence officer... since this enabled him to compare the Soviet Intelligence officers he has met with their American counterparts." During this meeting, GAMKRELIDZE raised the subject of NOSENKO again, describing him as "obviously a traitor to his country."

**** The exchange of the KGB Illegal Rudolf Ivanovich ABEL for Francis Gary POWERS, the U-2 pilot, took place in February 1962.

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and asked whether the Russian people had been told about it. GAMKRELIDZE replied that they had not been told officially but knew it had taken place since there was "quite a grapevine" in Moscow. As an example, he said that it was in this way that he had heard about the NOSENKO defection and its significance. Expanding, GAMKRELIDZE stated that the "grapevine" indicated that the defection "was very damaging to Soviet Intelligence in that NOSENKO was the Chief of the American Section, and he knew the identities of all Soviet agents in the United States."

7. GOLITSYN

The defector GOLITSYN is the only source of information on NOSENKO's KGB career who claims to have been personally acquainted with him. GOLITSYN said that he met NOSENKO for the first time in 1953 when visiting the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate on business, and that he saw and spoke with NOSENKO on a number of occasions subsequently, most recently in 1959. This first-hand information from GOLITSYN, however, is not always consistent either internally or in comparison with that supplied by NOSENKO.

CIA has no record that GOLITSYN, prior to the publicity attending NOSENKO's defection, ever mentioned him by name or in connection with the KGB Second Chief Directorate. On 19 March 1962, prior to NOSENKO's first contact with CIA, GOLITSYN was shown NOSENKO's name among those of other Soviets in Geneva for the Disarmament Conference. He failed to comment on it.

On 26 June 1962, after CIA's initial meetings with NOSENKO and because of the large overlap of NOSENKO's information and contacts with GOLITSYN's, one of the CIA case officers who had met NOSENKO in Geneva met with GOLITSYN to obtain his comments on some of the NOSENKO material. GOLITSYN was told that CIA had received in Switzerland an anonymous letter which reported certain information from within the KGB; the CIA official stated to GOLITSYN that the information so closely overlapped his own reporting, including prominent mention of GOLITSYN's friends GUK, KOVSHUK, and CHURANOV, that the possibility of disinformation was suspected, perhaps in relation to GOLITSYN's own defection. Ten major items from NOSENKO were discussed with GOLITSYN, all pertaining to Second Chief Directorate operations, and a list of 15 names was shown him, identified as names of Second Chief Directorate personnel whom the letter writer had named. Among these names was (fnu) NOSENKO, and GOLITSYN indicated he had previously reported on him; CIA records, however, show that GOLITSYN had reported only on one Aleksandr Fedoseyevich NOSENKO, who had been a KGB officer in Japan when RASTVOROV defected to the U.S. in 1954. GOLITSYN made no further comments on these names, except to say that one identified as KGB had left that organization in 1961 for the MVD. GOLITSYN said that in general, lacking the full details necessary for an assessment, he could say that there were serious signs of disinformation in what he had seen; he wanted to see the full information on the case. Subsequently GOLITSYN made numerous demands for this information, complaining to Attorney General Robert KENNEDY and senior CIA officials because his request had not been granted.

On 10 February 1964 NOSENKO's defection from the Soviet Disarmament delegation in Geneva, Switzerland, was publicized, including his KGB affiliation. When GOLITSYN heard this news he immediately recalled the June 1962 "letter" in Switzerland and linked NOSENKO to it; he thereupon stated that he recalled NOSENKO as a member of the Second Chief Directorate working against American citizens.

GOLITSYN on 11 February 1964 raised the possibility of his participation in efforts to "break" NOSENKO, and at this time he was given some background on the case and an indication of CIA's

reservations about NOSENKO's bona fides. Over the next several months GOLITSYN was provided with material from the 1962 and 1964 meetings with NOSENKO in Switzerland, and at his request was supplied with all the available biographic data to assist him in analyzing the KGB operation. On 29 June 1964, GOLITSYN was interviewed in detail on the subject of NOSENKO. He confirmed NOSENKO's identity as the son of the former Minister of Shipbuilding and said that he was a KGB officer who had worked in the American Department and the Tourist Department of the KGB's Second Chief Directorate. He was shown a photograph of NOSENKO (not buried in a photo spread, but singly) and he said that the photograph depicted NOSENKO. GOLITSYN said he knew this because he was personally acquainted with NOSENKO, having met him two or three times in the U.S. Embassy Section while there on KGB First Chief Directorate business in 1953. He had also seen NOSENKO occasionally at work during 1958 and 1959, and when GOLITSYN asked him where he was working in 1959, NOSENKO told him that he was in the Tourist Department. Finally, GOLITSYN said, he and NOSENKO knew one another through their mutual friendships with Yu. I. GUK, V.A. CHURANOV, and Ye.G. KASHCHEYEV.* According to GOLITSYN, NOSENKO served in the U.S. Embassy Section from 1953 until 1957 or 1958 and was specifically responsible for KGB coverage of American military personnel in Moscow during the first year of this period. For the remainder of his service in the U.S. Embassy Section, until 1957 or 1958, GOLITSYN said, NOSENKO may have had these same responsibilities or he may have been working against other Embassy personnel or correspondents. He was definitely in the American Department during this entire period. In 1957 or 1958, NOSENKO transferred to the Tourist Department and was a senior case officer there as of 1959.** GOLITSYN was certain that NOSENKO did not work in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate at any time during 1960. This he said he knew because he had visited the U.S. Embassy Section on at least three occasions during the early part of 1960 and again in about December 1960 (sic, actually January 1961).*** GOLITSYN said that he knew in detail who was in the section, and that he would have known if NOSENKO had been there, particularly if he were the Deputy Chief.****

* NOSENKO, on the other hand, failed to identify GOLITSYN's photograph and has consistently denied ever seeing or meeting him. After the defection, NOSENKO was asked what he knew of GOLITSYN. He immediately gave a detailed account of an incident which GOLITSYN himself had previously reported to CIA: GOLITSYN and KASHCHEYEV in 1951 or 1952 had written a letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party proposing a reorganization and redirection of First Chief Directorate intelligence activities; as a result of this letter GOLITSYN and KASHCHEYEV had been received by MALENKOV and STALIN, and their proposals were accepted. This was NOSENKO's first mention of KASHCHEYEV, but he added at this time that he was personally acquainted with him, had seen him periodically at KGB Headquarters, sometimes had a drink with him after work, and had once entertained KASHCHEYEV at his dacha in 1953 or 1954. GOLITSYN saw NOSENKO's reply to his question prior to making the above statement, and NOSENKO's claims of friendships with Yu.I. GUK and V.A. CHURANOV were included in the file GOLITSYN studied.

(Footnotes continued on next page.)

(Continuation of footnotes from preceding page.)

** This chronology differs from that provided by NOSENKO and described previously: According to NOSENKO, he served in the American Department to mid-1955, in the Tourist Department from 1955 until January 1960, in the American Department during 1960 and 1961, and again in the Tourist Department from 1962 until his defection. NOSENKO's confirmed 1956 operation against EWELI and his 1957 operations against ██████████ and Gisella HARRIS tend to confirm his connection with tourist operations in 1956 and 1957.

*** GOLITSYN had spoken as early as December 1961 of these visits to the U.S. Embassy Section.

**** GOLITSYN had earlier reported that G.I. GRYAZNOV was acting as the assistant of the chief of section at this time. He has never identified the Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section nor indicated that such a position was on the table of organization.

8.

[REDACTED], a self-professed former KGB Second Chief Directorate Agent, told U.S. authorities [REDACTED] that she did not think NOSENKO was a KGB officer. At the same time, however, [REDACTED] said she knew that NOSENKO had told the Americans about the microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The following is from the transcript of her remarks:

Question: Do you know anything about NOSENKO, the one who defected in Geneva?

[REDACTED]: I didn't have any real information. I heard some gossip, and the gossip was that he is the son of a general, that his mother is Jewish, and that his mother was always involved in some blackmarketing, that his father had great concern over the family. This is, you know, idle talk. I don't really know-- it was just gossip.

Question: Would you say that this idle talk was among KGB people or--

[REDACTED]: You know, I didn't know many KGB people. It was only Mr. SVIRIN.*

Question: But he told you about this?

[REDACTED]: He didn't tell me, he told [REDACTED] husband], ah--you know, they like to think they are all-powerful, that this man of course will be exterminated one day. They always repeat it. Well, somebody committed suicide. The old defector, that GUZENKO, I think. Yes--I read in the paper.

Question: But what were you saying about this Geneva NOSENKO? His mother is Jewish, his father was a general. What was his father in?

[REDACTED]: I really don't know.

Question: Were there others who suffered as a result of this?

[REDACTED]: I really don't know. I never heard. I never knew that defector. I never knew. He wasn't a KGB person.

Question: I beg your pardon?

[REDACTED]: He wasn't a KGB person, NOSENKO.

* V.G. SVIRIN was said by [REDACTED] to have been a KGB officer under cover of the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKKNR) during the period of her husband's employment (1960-1962) there and later head of a unit conducting operations against the U.S. Embassy. He maintained a friendly association with [REDACTED] and her husband to the date of her defection. According to NOSENKO, SVIRIN was a KGB officer who participated in the PENKOVSKIY investigation (see Part VI.D.7.b.).

TOP SECRET

Question: The fellow from Geneva?

[REDACTED] No. He wasn't a KGB person.

Question: No? What was he?

[REDACTED] He was a civilian, I think.

Question: You never heard anything about his family, his friends?

[REDACTED] No.

Question: But you say he was not a KGB person?

[REDACTED] I say I will tell you one thing: They don't have much gossip on these things. It is never safe. So gossip isn't popular. Besides, each of them have their own grudge, sort of department, and he knows very little except gossip, very little gossip from outside. And so, for instance, maybe Mr. SVIRIN wasn't in a position to know about this person straight, so he repeated the tiny scraps he heard.

Question: And that was only that he had a Jewish mother and a general for a father, but nothing about him.

[REDACTED]: Nothing... I don't know. Everybody was saying that he was detestable, when he ran away. He tipped Americans... He tipped the Americans about the microphones and things in the Embassy.

Question: In the Embassy in Moscow?

[REDACTED] In Moscow, yes.


Question: But yet, he was not a KGB person?

[REDACTED] But you know every Russian who is allowed to see foreigners is connected [in some way with the KGB]. You know, a KGB person is considered to be a person who works at this place, as an officer, and everybody else involved is somehow related to the KGB but not KGB persons themselves.

During a later debriefing by CIA, [REDACTED] clarified her sourcing of this information. All of it except that concerning the microphones in the U.S. Embassy came from SVIRIN when he visited the [REDACTED]. The information that NOSENKO had compromised the KGB microphone system to the Americans was also received from SVIRIN during another social visit [REDACTED]. On this occasion SVIRIN remarked to [REDACTED] that NOSENKO had done considerable damage to the Soviets by revealing the fact of the microphones to U.S. authorities.

9. Case Officer for Robert Lee BROWN

In an FBI debriefing


10. Case Officers for ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

Double agent ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~



11. Soviet Journalist KOROLEV

In October 1966, Yu.B. KOROLEV, who said he was a Soviet journalist, offered to write a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret agent" for the French magazine Paris Match.*** The story was to concern NOSENKO's family and their life in Moscow since NOSENKO's defection. A short background statement on NOSENKO which KOROLEV handed Paris Match editors stated in part: "NOSENKO, about 50-58, an officer of the Soviet Secret Police organization, defected to the USA without his family about two years ago and asked for political asylum in the U.S.; it was

* The JOHNSON lead from NOSENKO is discussed in detail in Part VI.D.5.c.

NOSENKO provided information on ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ (see Part VI.D.5.c.).

*** See Part III.H. for more details concerning KOROLEV's offer to Paris Match.

granted to him. That was the most serious defeat of the Soviet Security organs as NOSENKO occupied important positions in espionage and counterespionage departments and also was closely acquainted with the country's leading families and homes."