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8 November 1960

NEMORANDUM FOR THE RUCORD

SURVECT: Contact Report on Meeting with AMRUNO_1 201-170613

1. On 5 November at 1130 hours, AMRUNG-1 and FINIFCKER were met at the Washington Airport by undersigned. They were then taken by taxi to the Mayflower Fotel, where a room had been reserved ... for their use. After having lunch at the hotel, the party adjourned to the room, where AGNING-1 was given a short briefing on Francisco of the 7T operator who was scheduled to meet AMRIG-1 at 1400 hours.

- 2. At 1400 hours, the undersigned went to the lolly of the hotel where Francisco was waiting with May Carcial his escort officer.

 Garcialwas instructed to bring Francisco up to the room. It was agreed in advance of this that all principals would with draw from the room to give AVAING-1 an opportunity to talk with Francisco alone. Powever, it was suggested that Garcial Feturn a half hour before the interview was terminated to clear up any points as to the nature of Francisco's training, or any aspects that AMEUNG-1 might wish to clarify. The interview with Francisco was terminated about 1510 hours, as AMEUNG-1 stated he would be pleased to have Francisco assigned to him. All indications were that a happy rapport was established between the principals and a complete understanding was reached as to the future role of Francisco as the W/T operator for the AMYUM group in Cuba.
 - at the room and was introduced to AMRUNGLI as Mr. Fodrick. Prior to this meeting, WRUNGLI was told that Mr. Fodrick was the coordinator for operations and would like to discuss some of the more specific aspects with him, prior to his return to Cuba. [Cecil Cartwright], who discuss with him, prior to his return to Cuba. [Cecil Cartwright], who discussed with him and the fally informed on whatever operational matters were discussed with AMRUNGLI for more effective future coordination between Headquarters and MASS.

 indicated no objections to this and stated he was glad to have

him sit in at this meeting.

4. In substance, covered most of the highlights dealing with previous attempts to supply the ANTOM group with arms and ammo, and air-maritime operations currently being planned. In this connection, ANNOCA was highly pleased to learn that a 4,000 pound

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shipment had been successfully infiltrated to his group during his absence and Arain urged that more such soluments should be stepped up in the future. then briefly discussed the SINNr.s operation and asked ANEUNG-1 if he grant think this area for the 52 was already "blown" due to the number of people who already knew of his operation. (This includes 5 other people besides ANAUN-1 and ANAUNG-1.) AMRUNG-1 stated he was not sure, but would investigate this upon his roturn. However, he felt that this was an excellent DZ site and should be utilized for any sursequent airdrop scheduled in informed AMRUNG-1 that his overlays on the Pinar del Rio province various LZ's and LZ's had been received and were being reviewed by the operations people. He complimented AMAUNG-1 on the excellent work of his cartogrupher and expressed the view that these CZ areas would be gut to good use. Finalry, he assured AMAUNG-1 that no stone is being left unturned to provide his group with the necessary material support which is critically needed and that this sup ort will be step ed up as our infiltration capabilities are increased both by air and sea. In parting, he cautioned AMRUNG-1 not to take any unnecessity chances when he resumed operational activities in Cuba, since his leadership in the APNUM group was vital to our overall interests. The meeting was terminated about 1720 hours as and Peters took their departure.

- 5. Some of the more significant highlights of the conversations which took place between AVNUNG-1 and the undersigned prior to his meetings with the W/T operator (Francisco) and are noted herewith:
 - a. Security: Castro has taken stringent acti n in tightening up his internal security a ainst counter-revolutionary forces inside Cuba. The militia are being used to search houses for concealed weapons (usually by a block system), and anyone failing to produce proper identification is removed for questioning by the DER. Hence, ANRUNG-1 and his organization are largely confining their activities to the daylight hours from 0700 to 2000 hours. He considers night operations particularly on the streets of Havana as highly dangerous inasmuch as the DER (security organs) are constantly on the alert to stop individuals on the street to check their identification documents.
 - b. Documentation of A. ents in Cuba: AFRUNG-1 surgested using an identification card issued by the Havana University for their students. He had a sample copy in his possession, which he claims was readily accepted by Castro security forces as being valid. Similarly, a driver's license properly authenicated along with a health certificate were considered to be good "cover" documents for a ents operating in the Havana area. A supply of blank identification cards will be turned over to the Station by AFRUNG-1 for transmittal to headquarters for any subsequent documentation of

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agents who can be passed off as students at the Havana University. (He suggested preparing one for his W/T operator (Francisco).

- c. Operational Expenditures: Quesied on this aspect, LVETKG-1 stated his organization would need a minimum of 50 to 60,000 peace a month to cover their overall operational expenses. These funds are being used for safehouse maintenance, travel expenses, purchase of vehicles and gasoline, allocation of funds to various subdivisions of the AMTUM organization located in various provinces of Cuba, and purchase of food and support of various agents whose families may be in dire need of food and medical supplies.
- d. W/T overators: To date, both MYPANIC-14 and AvGLEX-1 have net met the requirements for effective communication with us on ANTIM operations. However, AFRENG-1 feels that AFPARIC-14 has not been compromised or turned by the DIER and once he rets ever his nervous state, it is possible he can still be used. Similarly, although A! GLEN-1 is considered to be a go d W/T operator, APRING-1 feels his usefulness to him has been considerably negated by the nature of his assignment at the Naval base and his recent restrictions to this base by orders of the Castro regime. In stort, AVKUNG-1 feels communication is the weakest link in his current operations and that direct com unications with the Embacsy is growing incroasingly hazardous, due to the fact that Embassy personnel are under close surveillance by the Castro security forces. For this reason he feels that Francisco will fill a serious wid in this respect, once he is infiltrated into the AMYUK organisation in Cuba.
- e. Support for other anti-Castro groups in Cuba: AFAUNCI stated that all material support arould be funneled directly to his organization for distribution to other anti-Castro groups in Cuba. In his view this would serve as a centrol factor in unifying the overall effort of the various splinter groups seeking such support in Cubs and ould also enhance the prestige of the MRR as the spearhead for the FRENTE. He then went on to add that he was fully aware of our efforts to support other groups in Cuba, which he assumed we were operating with on a unilateral basis. (i.e., he sited Nino Diaz in Oriente). AMAUNG-1 felt this was a serious mistake, as this unilateral support would affect the leadership and direction now being provided by the MRR Phroughout Cuba. The undersigned told AMMUNG-1 that he agreed on the desirability of a coordinate d effort on the part of all counter-revolutionary groups seeking to overthrow Castro using the FRENTE as the rallying center. However, the question of support being cive ted through one channel namely: his organization in Cube, was neither feasible nor practical. The fact that Castro had tightened up security throughout the various provinces of Cuba, would make it difficult or impossible for the APTUM group to ship arms and other equipment from Havana to the eastern most provinces (i.e., Las

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Villas, Casaguay or Oriente) without jeopardizing both shipments and person el. Hence, the need for unilateral action on our part to supply those fighting groups in these provinces. This explanation appeared to satisfy AMENG-1, however he still insisted that his organization should at least be appraised of any materiel support provided other groups in Cuba. He was assured that we would take his request under consideration.

- f. ANDIDY-1: AMRUNG-1 feels that no useful purpose would be served in sending his a sociate to join forces with him in Havana. He feels that AFBIDDY-1 should continue to represent the AMYUM faction in the FAD and when the counter-revolutionary forces are fully prepared to eventhrow the Castro regime, AMBIDDY-1 will be brought into the Pinar del Rio to direct the AMMY forces in this province.
- E. Manolo Ray: Attaung-1 considers RAY as a highly dangerous individual because of his great ambition to play a prominent role in any subsequent Cuban government following the overthrow of the Castro regime. In his opinion, RAY poses a serious threat to VARCHA's lesdership and the FRD inside Cuba. He is attempting to draw various dissident groups to his banners and appears to have support from the widdle class represented by business interests, politicists, and the professional class. Should RAY be persuaded to join forces with the FRD, AMBUNG-1 thinks he will continue to operate on a unilateral basis while seeking to supercede the FRD with his own organization in Cuba.
- h. Tony Varona and the FRD: Although APRUNG-1 recognizes the need to support the FRD as a political front for rallying counter-revolutionary groups against the Castro regime, he nenetheless feels that the FRENIE and Tony VERCNA have lost considerable face in Cuba by inaction and political maneuvering. He further pointed out that he is aware that thousands of dollars had been poured into the FRENIE, but dissident groups in Cuba have seen no evidence of any of this money to sup ort their efforts to everthrow Castro. Hence, confidence in the FED is at a relatively low ebb among the people in Cuba and a new shot in the arm in the form of material and financial support is needed to restore this confidence. According to APRUNG-1 this support must be forthcoming soon because such people as Eanolo RAY are taking the initiative and will soon control the entire counter-revolutionary movement in Cuba.

John D. Peters