

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

CI INFORMATION REPORT

⁰²
[PD] STORAGE
SBSR- 1632

THE FOLLOWING REPORT CONTAINS INFORMATION DERIVED FROM A SENSITIVE SOURCE AND REQUIRES SPECIAL HANDLING. IT MAY BE SHOWN ONLY TO PERSONS WITH A NEED TO KNOW AND MAY NOT RECEIVE GENERAL DISTRIBUTION WITHIN RECIPIENT OFFICES. FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH THE ORIGINATING OFFICE.

~~INTRODUCTION~~

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

E-2. IMPDET CL BY: 006682

Handwritten mark

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

⁰²
PSTORAGE
SBSR-1632

Country: USSR
Subject: Anatoliy Mikhaylovich GOLITSYN
DOI : 1966
Source : A KGB Officer

Any dissemination of this information to Field Stations or to officers not on the initial distribution must be coordinated with SE/CI/X. As a general rule, PSTORAGE information is not releasable to foreign or domestic liaison services or to any office outside the DNO.

1. As of 1966, the KGB was attempting to locate former Soviet intelligence officers who had defected, in order to carry out liquidation operations against them. Defectors so targeted were Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, Anatoliy Mikhaylovich GOLITSYN, Nikolay Yevgenyevich KHOKHLOV, and Petr Sergeyeovich DERYABIN. In August 1966 the KGB Residency in Washington, D.C. acquired the addresses of two Soviet defectors. According to source, the KGB was able to locate certain of these individuals by checking city telephone directories after obtaining their assumed names from Congressional records, where they appeared in connection with the defectors' acquisition of United States citizenship.

2. The KGB considered GOLITSYN an average officer. They believed that he probably did not provide American intelligence with much information, as he was working in the Information Department before his defection and therefore did not have access to operational matters and also was assigned to the 14th (Counterintelligence) Department for only a short study of operations. In this regard, they considered NOSENKO's defection much more damaging to the KGB. Although GOLITSYN knew more about First Chief Directorate matters, NOSENKO was in a position to provide information on Second Chief Directorate operations, as well as on the KGB as a whole.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 011340.

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

2/90

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

2

3. Source commented that he suspected that both NOSENKO and GOLITSYN might have been approached by American intelligence prior to their actual defections, because GOLITSYN had had problems "with his Chiefs" and NOSENKO drank considerably and was involved with girls.

COMMENTS:

1. With regard to the statement contained in paragraph 1 above that in August 1966 the KGB Residency in Washington, D.C. acquired the addresses of two Soviet defectors, source stated that he knew that one of the individuals in question was not NOSENKO and that he was 90 percent certain that one was not GOLITSYN.

2. The above information is being made available outside DDO to C/OS/Security Analysis Group in EYES ONLY memorandum form without reference to the POSTORAGE cryptonym.

02

25 June 1975

Distribution:

- 1 - C/SE/CI/X ⁰³
- 1 - SE/CI/X (Grimes)
- 2 - C/CIRA
- 1 - C/SE/CI/I
- 2 - SE/CI/R (Young)

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

2/90