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16 July 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Schweiker Report Review

1. Yesterday afternoon I met with Bob Wall (CI Staff), Bill Sturbitts (LA Division), and Jerry Brown (Office of Security). The purpose of the meeting was to get an idea of the work involved to review the issues raised in the Schweiker report and to review what the Agency did in relation to the Warren Commission.

2. I reported that Mr. Knoche did not wish us to seek access to the Warren Commission proceedings at this phase of our review.

3. Bill Sturbitts said that ^{o3}(Judy Cline,) now with CI Staff, is very familiar with the LA Division files on much of this subject, particularly Mexico. Speaking on the provocation/retaliation aspect of this, he observed that the Miami Ops and CI files ran some 5,000 to 10,000 linear feet. There was agreement that this posed a massive research problem on just the question of provocation. It was noted that we were discussing "provocation" in its broadest sense, in terms of the government policy and Agency program; we probably know the details of the so-called assassination plots and the files in question would be unlikely to turn up anything new in this respect. Sturbitts noted that a detailed paper had been prepared commenting on the information in the book given by Castro to Senator McGovern.

4. Bob Wall noted that he was Deputy Chief of PM in Miami for three years. He raised a question as to whether the broader program was relevant to the issue of provocation, in the terms posed by the Schweiker report. Later in the discussion he expressed the opinion that whatever we wrote on the subject might be a prejudiced interpretation. I expressed the view that the overall program established a context for what happened and that

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we should consider providing a statement of it. Until we have tried we wouldn't know what we had. Sturbitts was asked if there was a JMWAVE history. When he said that there was I undertook to review the history to see if some general statement of the overall program could be extracted.

5. Jerry Brown raised the question of what Castro could have assumed, as distinguished from what he knew, observing that a lot of the Cubans were planning things. Sturbitts observed that the Agency did support "fronts" that did things we didn't know. He observed that, in fact, we are making payments to the families of some of the people involved. There was brief consideration of what the Agency's responsibility would be for people that it paid but did not control or direct. The point was also made that there were Cuban exile organizations, with which we had no connection, that had programs of their own.

6. There was some general discussion about what the files would show on incidents questioned in the Schweiker report. The two aircraft flights from Mexico City to Havana were mentioned, it appearing that we know quite a bit about the individual involved in one of them but nothing about the other; in the latter instance there had been no follow-up.

7. Jerry Brown raised a question about Frank Sturgis, aka Frank Fiorini. He said that it would take further study, but there are some indications that Sturgis at one time worked for Castro in connection with the gambling concessions. This would have brought him into contact with Trafficante. This connection might also explain the role of Orta in the original plot, Orta having also had something to do with the gamblers. Brown pointed out that if a careful review of this established this connection, it might represent a security flaw in the original Castro plot. As these possible connections were unknown previously, and as they have not yet been researched, it was agreed that this was an important subject for study. Sturbitts noted that none of this showed in Sturgis' 201 file and it was agreed that Security and LA Division should study this together. Brown emphasized that this is only a possibility and might not stand up under study. It was noted that this is one of those things that might have been turned up at the time of the Warren Commission had the Agency done a more thorough job.

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8. It was noted that Lonnie Zeibell, now working in OGC on FOIA, is familiar with much of this. At present he is working on the Fensterwald FOIA request. It was noted that Fensterwald claimed that he knew who the man was in the photographs taken in Mexico, some of which have been made public although cropped to obscure the background. Larry Houston wrote a memo in 1971 on Fensterwald's claim. Fensterwald, however, has declined to reveal who the person was. It was suggested as a "long shot" that the man's photograph ought to be compared with those of known Soviet couriers.

9. Bob Wall said that there were 95 files on Oswald. Angleton had a dozen folders on the Oswald case including such things as press reports of the Castro interview on 7 September 1962, and correspondence concerning possible connections with the Kennedy assassination. He cited a 23 May 1975 memorandum by Ray Rocca for David Belin, saying in effect that while there are nuances subject to interpretation, there was no evidence; this had been laid before the Warren Commission in 1964.

10. It was noted that Tony Sforza, a former career agent, had served under the Havana Station prior to the Castro takeover. Gambling had been his cover. He might be able to provide some information on the Trafficante/Sturgis question.

11. Bob Wall thought that it would be helpful if there were written terms of reference for this study. I indicated that I wasn't sure that the results of this first review had told us enough to do this very well. I undertook to write a first draft which I said would be "all-encompassing." I noted that there are two time-frames to be covered--what happened before the JFK assassination, and what CIA did after the assassination to collect information and provide it to the Warren Commission, as it applied to the Cuban connection. There also were two general subject areas--one of these having to do with the question of assassinations, as provocation for retaliation, as well as the broader question of provocation, and the other having to do with whether the Agency did all it should have in reporting to the Warren Commission. I said that I would write a first draft on this and have it to them early next week for discussion. As we did not yet really know much that we needed to know I was sure there would be problems with this first draft.



S. D. Breckinridge

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