

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYPAT	PROCESSING ACTION
	TO Chief, WH/Cuba	MARKED FOR INDEXING
	INFO COS, JMWAVE Chief, DOD	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	FROM Chief of Base, New York	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT TYPIC/AMCLOCK/1 Transmittal of Contact Reports for First Two Meetings with	AMCLOCK/1	MICROFILM
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES		

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE: DO BASE/NEW YORK 3346, et seq.

1. Transmitted herewith are one copy for each addressee of the contact reports prepared by Peter J. DI GERVENO concerning his first two meetings with AMCLOCK/1. Report #1, New York Memorandum (NYM)-2233, deals with a meeting held 26 September 1967; Report #2, NYM-2234, deals with a meeting held 27 September.

2. IDENTITY Sheets for each of the two reports follow under separate cover enclosure to this dispatch.

3. Contact reports of later meetings will follow by dispatch.

Howard G. FIGALAN

ATTACHMENTS:

- 1-Contact Reports as stated para 1, h/w
- 2-IDENTITY Sheets as stated para 2, USC

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2-C/WH/Cuba, w/atts. #1 & 2 as stated
- 2-COS, JMWAVE, w/atts. #1 & 2 as stated
- 1-DOD, w/o att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UNDA-3263	DATE 13 October 1967
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYPAT	HQS FILE NUMBER 201-009239

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

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CONTACT REPORT NO. 1

8 October 1967

TO: AMCLOCK/1 File

NYM-2233

FROM: Peter DI GERVENO/JMWAVE

Distribution:

SUBJECT: Meeting with AMCLOCK/1,
26 September 19671-Unit A Chrono DUMMY
1-Unit B Chrono DUMMY
4-AMCLOCK/1 File

(Original via ELMARD)

REFERENCES: DO BASE/NEW YORK 3346
and 3352Introduction

445-554?


1. AMCLOCK/1 arrived in New York on 19 September 1967. He had been given instructions to call a JMWAVE operational number (Iden A) next time he was out in a friendly country in order to receive contact instructions. When he failed to call soon after his arrival it was decided to try to establish visual contact with him at HTBASTE, same as was done successfully in 1966, to move him to call for contact instructions. For that purpose DI GERVENO was taken to HTBASTE on 21 September carrying a match folder from Iden B with his alias, Iden C, and room number. The plan was to make sure AMCLOCK/1 recognized DI GERVENO, who also met him in 1966, and to pass the match folder to AMCLOCK/1 only if this could be done securely. DI GERVENO was able to make definite visual contact on four different occasions: once at Iden D twice at Iden E and a fourth time on the corridor between Iden D and Iden F. AMCLOCK/1 quickly recognized DI GERVENO and tried to keep himself available for a possible contact. However this was not possible and the contacts on 21 September were limited to visual recognition only.

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2. During this time the operational number of the Beekman site (Iden G) was also manned in case AMCLOCK/1 had retained this number and attempted to call DI GERVENO there instead of JMWAVE, but he failed to call either place for contact instructions. It was then decided to attempt to contact the agent again on 26 September at HTBASTE. While attempts were being made to locate AMCLOCK/1 the case officer surveilled the building where AMCLOCK/1 is staying (Iden H) and saw him go in by himself at 1310 hours to leave his briefcase. At 1330 hours, AMCLOCK/1 left the building alone to go for lunch and DI GERVENO followed him. AMCLOCK/1 recognized the case officer and after exchanging safety signals DI GERVENO passed the match folder to the agent while both were waiting on a crowded street corner for the red light to change, at which time AMCLOCK/1 told DI GERVENO that he had no way to contact him and would see him after lunch.

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Operational Chronology

3. On 26 September AMCLOCK/1 met DI GERVENO from 1500 to 1830 at Iden B. AMCLOCK/1 appeared to be in good health and rested and in high spirits. He was very glad to see DI GERVENO again and to be able to discuss things openly. He criticized bitterly the living conditions in PBRUMEN but does not seem to be affected by it or by the fact that he had to live under a regime he obviously hates. In fact, he seemed quite sure of himself and plans to return to PBRUMEN at the end of the HTBASTE session. He is scheduled to remain in New York until December 1967 but may return to PBRUMEN before then for a short visit to look after his ailing mother and his wife, who had a baby girl two weeks prior to his departure. This may have influenced AMCLOCK/1 not to think about a possible defection at this time, which came as a surprise to the case officer who expected the agent to have second thoughts about return to PBRUMEN where he is not happy.

4. AMCLOCK/1 explained that he could not make contact as instructed because he had destroyed the phone number and both accommodation addresses we had given him for him to report from inside PBRUMEN. He destroyed them in the toilet at the airport upon his arrival in PBRUMEN in late December 1966 after observing a number of uniformed individuals at the airport which he considered to be suspicious, although they had nothing to do with AMCLOCK/1. This may have been a convenient excuse for his failure to make contact as instructed but DI GERVENO did not press the issue. Instead he was given the operational numbers of the Beekma site and of the Base in New York (Iden I) and told he could always call there if he could not locate DI GERVENO at Iden B. He was also given the JMWAVE number for emergency contact. AMCLOCK/1 said he tried to make contact by calling Iden J to inquire about MIDDAGH in true name, but after much probing he was told that MIDDAGH was in Washington and was given a phone number for him to call direct. AMCLOCK/1 was planning to call Washington at a later day if he had not been contacted.

5. AMCLOCK/1 reported that he has had no security problems and has not been molested inside of PBRUMEN. He was treated "royally" by the AMTHUG regime in early 1967 and everybody seemed pleased to see him back. Apparently his return surprised some individuals who privately thought he would defect rather than return to PBRUMEN to live. During this time he enjoyed special privileges and received frequent invitations to official functions with foreign diplomats. However, by mid 1967 the special privileges and invitations were gradually suspended for no apparent reason. (For example, he was no longer allowed to take his private car to a government garage for repairs and he had to arrange for the maintenance of his house, which was given to him and kept up by the government at first). AMCLOCK/1 believes that this was due to his being under "observation" while going through a reorientation period after his long stay abroad. There is nothing to indicate that AMCLOCK/1 is not trusted or accepted by other government officials. The fact that he was sent out again is a strong

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indication that he enjoys a favorable position in the AMTHUG regime. He hopes that in 1968 he will be assigned to another permanent post abroad.

6. In reference to his wife AMCLOCK/1 stated that he is now convinced that she is totally against the AMTHUG regime. After their marriage in late 1966 he was not sure of her true political ideology but during the past year he has been able to confirm her disagreement on a number of occasions. He feels confident that she would follow him in any movement against the regime, such as defection, but has not told her about his work for WOFACT. *GENERAL DIAZ Diaz*

7. Regarding the trip to New York, AMCLOCK/1 reported that with them came (Iden K), a known intelligence type, and four other individuals not known to him but believed to be intelligence types. Later AMCLOCK/1 identified these individuals as Idens L, M, N and O. In answer to specific questions AMCLOCK/1 said that the crate they brought contained only a vase for (Iden P). AMCLOCK/1 is not aware if any weapons or special instructions have been sent to (Iden P) in connection with racial disturbances in WOLADY. The routine instructions given to (Iden P) were to oppose LNHARP actions in HTBASTE whenever possible and to try to bring all debatable matters to HTBASTE, where they have better support.

8. AMCLOCK/1 was not seen going in or out of the room and the meeting was conducted without interruption under most secure conditions. DI GERVENO established immediate rapport with AMCLOCK/1 and their relations remained most cordial throughout the meeting. Only DI GERVENO and AMCLOCK/1 were present.

Finances

9. DI GERVENO was careful not to mention salary payments to AMCLOCK/1 who is not aware of his salary increase to \$1,000 a month effective 1 January 1966. However, he requested \$500 to buy books and baby items for his daughter. DI GERVENO told him that he would bring him the money in their next meeting. All payments to AMCLOCK/1 will be T/A'd to JMWAVE together with the agent's signed receipts.

Intelligence Production

10. Although most of the meeting was used to discuss operational matters, AMCLOCK/1 reported disseminable information on the following requirements given in DIRECTOR 37960.

- a. Present attitude of the PBRUMEN government towards the United States; expectation of a military attack on PBRUMEN supported by the United States; formal military training being given to all PBRUMEN army officials (DO BASE/NEW YORK 3382)

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AFRO-ASIAN - LAGIM - AMERICAN PEOPLE'S SOLIDARITY
ORGANIZATION - AALPSO
LATIN AMERICAN ORGANIZATION
SOLIDARITY (LAOS)

- b. PBRUMEN views regarding Idens (Q) and (DO BASE/NEW YORK 3390)
- c. Replacement of PBRUMEN Ambassador to the USSR and PBRUMEN views regarding the Soviet Ambassador to PBRUMEN (DO BASE/NEW YORK 3392).
- d. Main objectives of the Foreign Policy of the AMTHUC regime (being disseminated).

Future Plans

11. The next meeting was scheduled for the following day, 27 September, for lunch at the Beekman site.

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Identities to NYM-2233

Iden A - 445-5547

Iden B -

Iden C -

Iden D -

Iden E -

Iden F -

Iden G - 8-4683

Iden H -

Iden I -

Iden J -

Iden K -

Iden L -

Iden M - Gonzalo DIAZ Diaz

Iden N - Rogelio ^{TR} RODRIGUEZ Lopez

Iden O -

Iden P -

Iden Q - Afro-Asian- Latin American Peoples Solidarity Organization - AALAPSO

Iden R - Latin American Solidarity Organization - LASO

Handwritten initials

Handwritten notes

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Identities to 2234

Iden A

Iden B

Iden C

Iden D

Iden E

Iden F


Iden G

Iden H

Iden I

Iden J

Iden K



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REPRODUCTION CARD REPRODUCTIONS

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CONTACT REPORT NO. 2

9 October 1967

TO: AMCLOCK/1 File

NYM-2234

FROM: Peter J. DI GERVENO/JMWAVE

Distribution:

SUBJECT: Meeting with AMCLOCK/1,
27 September 1967

1-Unit A Chrono DUMMY
1-Unit B Chrono DUMMY
4-AMCLOCK/1 File
(Original via ELMARD)

REFS: DO BASE/NEW YORK 3362 and 3359;
DIRECTOR 37254 and 37960

Operational Chronology

1. On 27 September 1967 AMCLOCK/1 met DI GERVENO from 1130 to 1530 for lunch at the Beekman site. The agent was not seen entering or leaving the site and he stayed out of sight when food was brought up from the restaurant downstairs. The meeting was conducted under secure conditions and without interruptions. Only AMCLOCK/1 and DI GERVENO were present at the meeting.

2. AMCLOCK/1 reported that he had been assigned to work in Iden A with Iden B same as last year. A few days before his departure from PBRUMEN, Iden C told AMCLOCK/1 to watch out for Iden B who is a member of the intelligence service and will be reporting on AMCLOCK/1. The implication was that AMCLOCK/1 was still under observation by the AMTHUG regime and Iden C actually told him to bend backwards in every way possible to prove himself while in New York. AMCLOCK/1 explained that this meant to live a model life while abroad and to perform extra work whenever required, without complaining. AMCLOCK/1 believes that Iden B is being trained to take over AMCLOCK/1's position as an expert in economics for the AMTHUG regime. If this is the case, this may be the last time AMCLOCK/1 is sent to Iden A. Still, under much probing, AMCLOCK/1 could not come out with any clear indication that he was suspected or was falling out of grace with the AMTHUG regime. Although the agent has a tendency to emphasize his "delicate" position, the case officer believes that he is not mistrusted and still enjoys a favorable position in the government, although probably considered too bourgeois to be completely integrated with their communist philosophy.

3. Regarding the recent changes made in PBRUMEN diplomatic personnel abroad, AMCLOCK/1 was not aware of any security shake up taking place in the Foreign Ministry. He regarded these changes as a routine matter in accordance with their policy to bring back to PBRUMEN for a reorientation tour all those diplomats stationed abroad for three consecutive years or more. AMCLOCK/1 actually

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appeared not to be aware of any major purge and not to be concerned about it. However, if this is true the chances for AMCLOCK/1 to be reassigned abroad in the near future appear doubtful at this time.

4. When DI GERVENO asked AMCLOCK/1 about his work and how the recent changes may affect him, the agent then reported the following information about his position in the Foreign Ministry. After his return in late December 1966 he was given four months vacation, during which time he went by the ministry from time to time but had no job assigned to him. He used most of this time for a honeymoon and to relocate in his new home furnished by the PBRUMEN government. In the spring of 1967 (Iden C) considered him actively as a substitute for (Iden D) whom (Iden C) does not like. However, the job did not materialize because (Iden C's) plans to send (Iden D) as Ambassador to Canada were not accepted by (Iden E) whom (Iden C) was going to send as Ambassador to Switzerland. At that time AMCLOCK/1 was also considered for a position in (Iden F) which was the position the PBRUMEN President wanted him to take, but AMCLOCK/1 avoided the position although it implied frequent travels abroad. The reason AMCLOCK/1 gave for not taking the position at (Iden F) was that he did not want to break away from his diplomatic career and felt he would be better protected among his friends in the Foreign Ministry. Consequently, after his vacation AMCLOCK/1 went back to work in the Foreign Ministry but without any specific duties. He is actually doing odd jobs for (Iden C) like economic studies. In mid 1967 AMCLOCK/1 and (Iden G) were proposed by (Iden C) and accepted by (Iden H) as members of a four-man committee (the other two members have not been selected yet) which is to be created in the Foreign Ministry to make specific area studies and recommendations to (Iden H). Since both AMCLOCK/1 and (Iden G) have been assigned to the HTBASTE mission, it is concluded that the creation of said "Advisory Committee" is not contemplated until early 1968. According to AMCLOCK /1 the creation of this "Advisory Committee" has been discussed at the highest levels only and it may have some influence in the policy making decisions of (Iden H) which is the main body that dictates present PBRUMEN foreign policy.

5. It may be well to record here that we should take with a grain of salt the selection of AMCLOCK/1 to such a sensitive source of information as an "Advisory Committee" to (Iden H) would be. The agent may be trying to build up his importance to us. It is of interest to note that in the past year that AMCLOCK/1 has been residing inside of PBRUMEN he has made no clear effort to obtain and develop new sources of information and to bring out with him intelligence of particular interest to us. For example, he has no information on the specific requirements we gave him in 1966 prior to his return to PBRUMEN and when asked to identify his main sources of information he said they were his contacts in the Foreign Ministry and (Idens I, J, and K) who

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are old friends of AMCLOCK/1. (Iden K) is also a cousin of AMCLOCK/1's wife. (AMCLOCK/1 is a difficult individual to debrief on hard intelligence.)

6. Regarding internal security in the PBRUMEN mission in New York, AMCLOCK/1 reported that the entire third floor of the mission is used only by members of the intelligence service. Not even the Ambassador is allowed in that area. Besides (Iden B), AMCLOCK/1 correctly identified the known members of the intelligence service permanently assigned to the PBRUMEN mission.

Finances

7. AMCLOCK/1 was given \$500 he requested from his escrow account and signed a receipt for this amount, which will be T/A'd to JMWAVE.

8. During the meeting AMCLOCK/1 was debriefed on the following information which was disseminated as indicated:

- a. Changes of PBRUMEN diplomats abroad; expected internal reorganization in the PBRUMEN Foreign Ministry (DO BASE/NEW YORK 3373)
- b. Advisory Committee on PBRUMEN Foreign Policy (DO BASE/NEW YORK 3376)
- c. Informal message sent to PBRUMEN Prime Minister by Mexican President (DO BASE/NEW YORK 3375)
- d. Appointment of PBRUMEN Ambassador to the Congo (Brazzaville) (DO BASE/NEW YORK 3374)

Future Plans

9. Next meeting is tentatively scheduled for 29 September between 1300 and 1400 hours. With the assignment of AMCLOCK/1 to (Iden A) his free time will be more restricted from now on for future meetings. However, the agent agreed to contact DI GERVENO, as often as possible.

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