

S/AF

TASKING CONTROL FORM

Classification

OFFICE OF ORIGIN (b)(3) 10 USC 424	DOCUMENT DATE	DOCUMENT NO.		
	DATE RECEIVED 02/04/91-1820	DATE TASKED 02/04/91-1820	DATE REVISED	CONSUMER CODE
DIA SUSPENSE: 02/10/91-1809		TASKING CONTROL NO: 4167		
ORIGINATOR'S SUSPENSE:		COLLAB SUSPENSE:		
COORDINATION SUSPENSE:				
SUBJECT ALLEGED IRAQI INVOLVEMENT IN SUDAN/DESERT STORM				
INTERNAL ROUTING				PREVIOUS ACTION OFFICER
ACTION OICC	COLLABORATION	COORDINATION	INFORMATION	
INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE				
<div data-bbox="850 1115 1539 1327" data-label="Text"> <p>Declassified Under Authority of the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel, E.O. 13526, sec. 5.3(b)(3) ISCAP Appeal No. 2015-002, Doc. 9 Declassification Date: April 12, 2024</p> </div>				
SUB ELEMENT INSTRUCTIONS				
<div data-bbox="1019 1391 1234 1425" data-label="Text"> <p>(b)(3) 10 USC 424</p> </div>				
<div data-bbox="1096 1500 1226 1527" data-label="Text"> <p>SIGNATURE</p> </div>				
RETURN WITH COMPLETED ACTION TO:				FINAL DISPOSITION
KEYWORD SEARCH ENTRY:				
THIS FORM BECOMES		UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)		

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41167

~~NOFORN~~

PAGE:0001

ENVELOPE

CDSM = LGX743 MCN = 91034/10036 TOR = 910341544
PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS2254 0341542-SSSS--RUEALGX.
ZNY SSSSS

HEADER

P 031542Z FEB 91
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUFGAID/USEUCOM AIDES VAHINGEN GE
RUQYSDG/FOSIF ROTA SP
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUCJACC/USCENTCOM REAR MACDILL AFB FL //CARA//
RUEATAC/CDRUSAITAC WASHINGTON DC//KT//
RHEPAAB/TAC IDHS LANGLEY AFB VA//IDHS//
RUFTAKA/USA INTEL CENTER HEIDELBERG GE
RUFTAKC/UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//N24/N22//
RUDOGHA/USNMR SHAPE BE//SURVEY//
RUEALGX/SAFE

RUEADDS/DITDS

P 031629Z FEB 91

FM (b)(3) 10 USC

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC// (b)(3) 10 USC 424

INFO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC

BT

CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~ (b)(3) 10 USC 02254
USC

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BODY

SUBJECT: ALLEGED IRAQI INVOLVEMENT IN SUDAN/DESERT STORM
(U)

1. (S/NF) THERE IS AN INCREASING AND ARTICULATE LEVEL OF CONCERN WITHIN THE GOE ABOUT THE THREAT POSED TO EGYPT BY IRAQIS--REAL OR IMAGINED--OPERATING OUT OF SUDAN. THIS TAKES SEVERAL FORMS, FROM SCUD MISSILES IN SUDAN TO IRAQI AIRCRAFT ALLEGEDLY EITHER IN PLACE IN SUDAN OR PREPARED TO DEPLOY FROM IRAQ TO OPERATE OUT OF SUDAN.

2. (S/NF) EGYPT HAS ALREADY DEPLOYED TWO SQUADRONS OF MIG-21S TO THE SOUTH AND RUMORS OF OTHER MILITARY ACTIVITIES ARE IN THE WIND. ONE WIG-21 REPORTEDLY FIRED OFF TWO AIR TO AIR MISSILES LAST WEEK, OSTENSIBLY FOR TRAINING.

3. (S/NF) YOU WILL RECALL THE PREVIOUS PERIOD OF SUCH EXAGGERATED CONCERN IN AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER OF LAST YEAR. WELL, ONCE AGAIN WE APPEAR TO BE BACK AT THAT LEVEL IF NOT EXCEEDING IT. WHAT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL WOULD BE SOME UP TO DATE INFORMATION ON THE SITUATION IN SUDAN, TO INCLUDE THE STATUS OF IRAQI AND ALSO LIBYAN ACTIVITIES AS WE KNOW THEM. IT SEEMS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO SET THE

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RECORD STRAIGHT BEFORE THE GOE GOES OFF ON A TANGENT THAT
AT LEAST MAY NOT BE WARRANTED BECAUSE OF AN ALLEGED IRAQI
SITUATION IN SUDAN.

4. (U) YOUR ASSISTANCE IS APPRECIATED. REGARDS DLL.
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

ADMIN
DECL:OADR

BT

#2254

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4755

S:\DATA\SHARED\ITF\TASKERS\TASKER4.167
1400\8 FEB 91 SENT BY BJN

POC: (b)(3) 10 USC 424

DOCUMENT ALREADY COORDINATED WITH (b)(3) 10 USC 424 HAS RELEASED ALL TO EGYPT.

SUBJECT: ALLEGED IRAQI INVOLVEMENT IN SUDAN/DESERT STORM

1. ~~(S/REL-EG)~~ OVERALL ASSESSMENT: THERE HAVE BEEN NO IRAQI MILITARY DELIVERIES TO SUDAN SINCE THE 2 AUGUST 1990 IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT. NEVERTHELESS, THERE ARE PERSISTENT REPORTS THAT IRAQ HAS DEPLOYED SCUD MISSILES/LAUNCHERS, AIRCRAFT, SOUTH AFRICAN MANUFACTURED G-5 ARTILLERY, AND MILITARY PERSONNEL TO SUDAN. EVEN IF IRAQ HAD MANAGED TO EVADE THE UNITED NATIONS EMBARGO, WHICH IS UNLIKELY, THE AMOUNTS OF EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL IN SUDAN WOULD BE MINIMAL AND WOULD NOT POSE A THREAT TO U.S. OR ALLIED FORCES IN THE PERSIAN GULF. HOWEVER, THERE IS A HIGH TERRORIST THREAT AGAINST ALLIED PERSONNEL IN SUDAN.

2. ~~(S/REL-EG)~~ OVERVIEW: PORT SUDAN IS ONE OF THE HORN OF AFRICA'S BUSIEST PORTS AND MAJOR ARMS TRANSSHIPMENT POINTS; AS MANY AS TEN SHIPS PER WEEK UNLOAD IN PORT SUDAN. HOWEVER, ALMOST ALL OF THESE SHIPS CARRY NONMILITARY CARGOS. AFTER ANALYZING IRAQI SHIPS CALLING AT PORT SUDAN SINCE THE 2 AUGUST 1990 IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT, 25X1 ANY REPORTS THAT IRAQ HAS DEPLOYED MILITARY EQUIPMENT OR PERSONNEL TO SUDAN. WITH REGARD TO LIBYAN SHIPS, 25X1 AT LEAST FOUR LIBYAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE DELIVERIES TO SUDAN SINCE NOVEMBER 1990. HOWEVER, NONE OF THIS EQUIPMENT APPEARS RELATED TO THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS. BELOW ARE UPDATES ON IRAQI AND LIBYAN ACTIVITIES IN SUDAN:

3. ~~(S/REL-EG)~~ STATUS OF IRAQI ACTIVITIES IN SUDAN: THERE HAVE BEEN NO IRAQI MILITARY EQUIPMENT DELIVERIES TO PORT SUDAN SINCE THE 2 AUGUST 1990 IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT. NEVERTHELESS, THERE HAVE BEEN NUMEROUS UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT BAGHDAD HAD DEPLOYED MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL TO SUDAN VIA SEA AND AIR. REPORTED MILITARY DELIVERIES HAVE INCLUDED SCUD MISSILES/LAUNCHERS, FIGHTER AIRCRAFT, CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AND MILITARY PERSONNEL:

A. SCUD MISSILES/LAUNCHERS: SUPPOSEDLY, IRAQ DEPLOYED EXTENDED RANGE SCUD MISSILES/LAUNCHERS TO VARIOUS SUDANESE LOCATIONS, INCLUDING WADI SAYIDNA AIR BASE (154900N/0323055E); PORT SUDAN MILITARY BASE (193735N/0371050E); AROUS, MARSA (2000N03711E). AND ERKOWIT (184600N/03707E). 25X1 EVEN IF IRAQ HAD DEPLOYED SCUD MISSILES TO ANY OF THE AFOREMENTIONED LOCATIONS, THEIR RANGE (600 KILOMETERS) WOULD BE INSUFFICIENT TO POSE A SIGNIFICANT THREAT TO EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA, OR TO COALITION FORCES; SUGGESTED TARGETS SUCH AS THE ASWAN DAM WOULD BE OUT OF RANGE FROM SCUD MISSILES SITES IN SUDAN. THE ONLY EGYPTIAN TERRITORY WITHIN RANGE OF SCUD MISSILES IN SUDAN WOULD BE IN THE REMOTE SOUTHEASTERN PORTION OF EGYPT. MOVING SCUD MISSILES/LAUNCHERS CLOSER TO THE SUDANESE-EGYPTIAN BORDER TO COME WITHIN RANGE OF TARGETS SUCH AS THE ASWAN DAM IS IMPRACTICAL AS SUDAN'S ROAD SYSTEM ALONG THE BORDER IS NONEXISTENT

OR INADEQUATE TO SUSTAIN THE HEAVY MILITARY TRAFFIC NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THE DEPLOYMENT OF SCUD MISSILES/LAUNCHERS. ADDITIONALLY, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL COST TO SUDAN AND THE RISK OF RETALIATION BY U.S. OR ALLIED FORCES WOULD OUTWEIGH ANY BENEFIT SUDAN WOULD DERIVE FROM IRAQ.

B. FIGHTER AIRCRAFT: 25X1 THE DEPLOYMENT OF ANY IRAQI FIGHTER AIRCRAFT TO SUDAN. ADDITIONALLY, 25X1 THAT IRAQ PREPOSITIONED ANY HIGH PERFORMANCE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT TO SUDAN PRIOR TO THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES. THE RECENT REPORT OF THREE IRAQI MIG-29 FULCRUMS DEPLOYING TO SUDAN IS FALSE. FLYING AT LOW ALTITUDE TO AVOID RADAR DETECTION AND INTERCEPTION, THE MIG-29S LACK THE RANGE (340 NAUTICAL MILES) TO FLY FROM IRAQ TO SUDAN. ALTHOUGH THEY COULD FLY FROM IRAQ TO SUDAN AT HIGH ALTITUDE (RANGE: MORE THAN 1,000 NAUTICAL MILES), THE MIG-29S WOULD HAVE HAD TO HAVE OVERFLOWN SAUDI ARABIA, SYRIA, JORDAN AND ISRAEL, OR EGYPT AND WOULD HAVE HAD TO EVADE U.S. OR ALLIED RADAR EN ROUTE. SUCH A SCENARIO IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY.

C. CHEMICAL WEAPONS: THIS ISSUE HAS A LONG HISTORY. OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS, THERE HAVE BEEN MANY REPORTS THAT IRAQ HAS DEPLOYED CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO SUDAN TO HELP KHARTOUM SCORE A MILITARY VICTORY OVER THE INSURGENT SUDANESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (SPLA) IN SOUTHERN SUDAN. THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH WEAPONS NEVER HAS BEEN CONFIRMED; MOREOVER, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT THE SPAF HAS USED CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST THE SPLA. SIMILARLY, SINCE THE 2 AUGUST 1990 IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT, SPLA REPORTS THAT IRAQ HAS SHIPPED CHEMICAL WEAPONS (I.E. HYDROCYANIC ACID, CHLORINE, COSIGEN, PHOSGENE (CX), TABUN (GX), AND MUSTARD (HG)), WHICH SUPPOSEDLY ARE STORED AT SINKAT (18500N036500E), FOR USE IN SOUTHERN SUDAN AGAINST REBEL POSITIONS AND/OR REFUGEE CAMPS CANNOT BE CONFIRMED. ADDITIONALLY, WITH THE PLETHORA OF INTERNATIONAL RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS IN SOUTHERN SUDAN, USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS WOULD QUICKLY GAIN INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION.

D. SOUTH AFRICAN MANUFACTURED G-5 ARTILLERY: THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT BAGHDAD HAS SHIPPED SOUTH AFRICAN MANUFACTURED G-5 ARTILLERY PIECES TO SUDAN AFTER THE 2 AUGUST 1990 IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT. HOWEVER, NON-IRAQI SHIPS CARRYING G-5S, DIVERTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL EMBARGO AGAINST IRAQ, COULD HAVE OFFLOADED IN SUDAN. IF THIS IN FACT OCCURRED G-5S IN SUDAN WOULD NOT POSE A SIGNIFICANT THREAT TO U.S. OR ALLIED MILITARY TARGETS.

E. MILITARY PERSONNEL: FOR MORE THAN A YEAR, THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF UP TO 150 IRAQI PILOTS SERVING IN THE SUDANESE AIR FORCE (SAF); AND AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF IRAQI MILITARY PERSONNEL SERVING IN SUDAN AS INSTRUCTOR PILOTS AND ARTILLERY AND AIR DEFENSE OFFICERS. PRIOR TO THE 2 AUGUST 1990 IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT, THERE WERE LESS THAN 12 IRAQI MILITARY TECHNICIANS WHO WORKED ON SAF AN-12S, AND POSSIBLY ON SAF AN-24S. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THESE PERSONNEL IS UNKNOWN.

4. ~~(S/REL EG)~~ STATUS OF LIBYAN ACTIVITIES IN SUDAN: SINCE EARLY NOVEMBER 1990, LIBYA, SUDAN'S PRIMARY MILITARY SUPPLIER, HAS SENT FOUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE SHIPMENTS TO SUDAN, ALL OF WHICH APPEAR UNRELATED TO THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS. THESE SHIPMENTS INCLUDED AT LEAST 45 TANKS, 40

SALADIN ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLES, 17 FERRET ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLES, AND AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF OTHER MILITARY VEHICLES. THE SUDANESE PEOPLE'S ARMED FORCES (SPAF) PROBABLY WILL USE THIS EQUIPMENT IN THEIR WAR AGAINST THE SUDANESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (SPLA). THERE ALSO ARE 15-20 LIBYAN MILITARY PERSONNEL STATIONED IN SUDAN AS TECHNICIANS AND INSTRUCTOR PILOTS FOR MIG-23 FLOGGER AIRCRAFT. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF LIBYANS, MANY OF WHOM MAY BE MILITARY PERSONNEL, IN DARFUR PROVINCE. SINCE THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT, LIBYA HAS MAINTAINED A LOW PROFILE TOWARD THE PERSIAN GULF CONFLICT. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT QADHAFI WOULD RISK FURTHER CHALLENGING THE U.S. OR ITS ALLIES BY SENDING MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO IRAQ VIA SUDAN. ADDITIONALLY, GIVEN THE UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL EMBARGO AGAINST IRAQ, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO TRANSPORT IN A COVERT MANNER LARGE AMOUNTS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM PORT SUDAN TO IRAQ.

5. ~~(S/REL-EG)~~ CONCLUSION: DESPITE THE PROLIFERATION OF REPORTS ABOUT IRAQI MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO SUDAN SINCE THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT, IRAQI-SUDANESE MILITARY COOPERATION EFFECTIVELY ENDED WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS EMBARGO. 25X1 THESE REPORTS ARE BASED ON DISINFORMATION, MISINFORMATION, OR RUMORS. LIBYAN MILITARY SHIPMENTS TO SUDAN CONTINUE; SINCE NOVEMBER 1990, THERE HAVE BEEN FOUR DELIVERIES TO PORT SUDAN. HOWEVER, THE SHIPMENTS ONLY HAVE INCLUDED COMPARATIVELY SMALL NUMBERS OF GROUND EQUIPMENT SUCH AS TANKS AND ARMORED VEHICLES. THE SPAF UNDOUBTEDLY WILL USE THESE WEAPONS IN SOUTHERN SUDAN AGAINST THE SPLA. 25X1 LIBYA IS SENDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO SUDAN TO INFLUENCE EVENTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF; RATHER, TRIPOLI IS PURSUING ITS OWN INTERESTS IN SUDAN.

TASK RECORD OF ACTIONS

DAY/TIME

RECORD OF ACTION (notes, problems)

2.4 2045 Feb Pass to (b)(3) 10 USC 424 (Cover) Trans AT1. 97

2.8.91 1400 : ~~SA~~ Job J (b)(3) 10 USC 424
P430 On shared + closed with ITF, SA

2-20-91 Copied as response to #4755.
Verified that nothing has changed since 2 Feb.