C

Classification

TASKING CONTROL FORM

OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DOCUMENT DATE	DOCUMENT NO.		
(b)(3) 10 USC 424	DATE RECEIVED 01/31/91-1715	DATE TASKED 01/31/91-1715	DATE REVISED	CONSUMER CODE

DIA SUSPENSE: 02/04/91-0600 TASKING CONTROL NO: 4013

ORIGINATOR'S SUSPENSE: COLLAB SUSPENSE:

COORDINATION SUSPENSE:

SUBJECT ED TASKING

INTERNAL ROUTING			PREVIOUS ACTION OFFICER
ACTION	COLLABORATION	COORDINATION	INFORMATION
OICC			

INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE

Cover sheet for your use.

SUB ELEMENT INSTRUCTIONS

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

SIGNATURE

RETURN WITH COMPLETED ACTION TO: FINAL DISPOSITION

KEYWORD SEARCH ENTRY:

THIS FORM BECOMES UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)

DIA FORM 311 (REV. 9-84)

C

CLASSIFICATION

DIAR 12-16

~~Confidential~~ ~~SECRET~~ OICC

(CLASSIFICATION)

Date 27 Jan 91

Product Validation Plan (U)

Title: Iraq's Potential for Chemical Warfare Use (C/NF) ( )

Focus/Scope: (DIM 37-91) ~~(S)~~ Based on bomb damage assessments, a 40- to 50-percent degradation in Iraq's chemical production and filling capabilities has been realized to date.

~~(S)~~ Iraq is likely to retain a significant chemical weapon stockpile for some time. The principal threat of a chemical attack is from artillery and multiple rocket launcher fire against coalition ground forces.

Format: (Circle/fill in one type)

Type	Level	Consumer
DIB	I	Senior Policymakers, Commanders, or Senior Staffs
DIA/DIM	II	Senior and Midlevel Staffs
(Specify type)_____	III	Operators/Planners/Scientists/Engineers/Other Intel Analysis
Special Periodicals	IV	Varied
Management Publications	V	Varied

Desert Storm

Administrative Information: (Fill in/circle as appropriate)

Justification/Requester: (IPR, organization, individual, etc.) MG CARR, UP

Primary Consumers: (OSD, Joint Staff, U&S Cmds, etc.) U+S CMDS, SECDEF/OSD, JCS

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

[redacted]

Section Chief Complete:

Country Code(s): IZ

FY91 NIT #(s): 46, 47

IPSP Codes/Priorities (Include Prefix): PTA.00

FIRCAP(DCID 1/2)/Priorities: 3.5.5 4.5.4

Support from RTS-5 Required (Circle): Maps/Charts/Photos/Other None "Camera Ready" Product?: None

Comments: Extra 10 copies to (b)(3) 10 USC upon Dissemination

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(CLASSIFICATION)

DIA Form 223-24 (1-90)
(OPR: VP-S1)

ED TASKING (OICC WILL GENERATE TASK)

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

1. Provide assessment of Iraqi C3 To include key target nodes, DESERT STORM objectives achieved to data, description of residual capabilities/capacities per 25X1 coordinated assessment.

- DONE
25X1

b. Guidance: Products needs to be coord with 25X1 and should be a 25X1 product with tri-logos if possible.

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

2. Iranian Involvement in supporting Iraq

a. Must address kinds of support Iran could provide: political, transfer of Iranian equipment purchased from Soviets, conduits for Iranian off-shore procurement to the benefit of Iraq, i.e. F-1 parts, weaponry, SCUDS from North Korea, intelligence, etc. (b)(3) 10 USC 424 and Services coordination)

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

PAPER WORK STRODE

b. Potential/realities of Soviet support of Iraq through Iran ; assess if, how SOVs might provide military material to Iraq through Iran. Assess the potential/realities of Sov elements providing such support without knowledge/sanction of Gorbachev. What SOV groups would have interests/equities in such support? What would be their motives? (Mil, political, economic from a SOV domestic and SOV foreign policy/mil strategy/policy perspective. (b)(3) 10 USC 424 and Services).

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

- AIR FORCE

c. Pakistani involvement in supporting Iraq: (This can be a stand alone product or, if Pak support involves Iran, fold into Iranian assessment). Paper must cover Pakistani position on DESERT STORM, potential/real support being provided, intelligence, equipment, etc. (b)(3) 10 USC 424 (b)(3) 10 USC 424 and Services coord)

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

3. CW/BW Employment: Describe various methods and scenarios for Iraqi employment of CW/BW weaponry. Include best assessment of CW/BW weapons effectiveness to include the last fill/agent deterioration factors. Include indicators of impending employment near term and imminent based on past practices during Iraq-Iran war; i.e. when CW munitions are moved forward, indications CW munitions have been issued to artillery etc. (b)(3) 10 USC 424 and Services coord).

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

4. Potential Coalition Disintegration: Cover all coalition members commitments, domestic pol/econ factors, any changing perceptions/steadfastness as conflict continues, conditions which might cause selected partners to opt out, etc., (b)(3) 10 USC 424 and Services coord).

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

5. Combat Potential of Iraqi forces in Iran: Assess the (ANAL combat potential/capabilities of Iraqi forces dispersed in Iran. What kinds of operations could be launched from Iran considering the mix of fighter/strike/ tanker aircraft now present or being added. (b)(3) 10 USC 424 and Services coord).

6. Additional Guidance:
   - DIM Format
   - DIA Coordinated draft by Sun
   - SVC and NSA coordinated by Mon
   - Published ASAP at least finished drafts by 1000 hrs Tuesday to (b)(3) 10 USC
   - Final DIMs are not to be published or disseminated until command level approval has been given and passed with approved distribution list.

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-0001

2/5/91

(b)(3) 10 USC 424 [redacted]

The enclosed 7 DIMs are in varying stages of completion:

1 - "Iraq's C^3" (Paperwork in)
- DIO now reviewing
- Service coord still pending
- 25X1 [redacted] ... checked on ✓

2 - "Iranian Support of Iraq"
- Fully coordinated with DIO & services

3 - "Moscow Covertly Assisting Baghdad"
- DIO now reviewing
- Service coord still pending (Paperwork in)

4 - "Pakistan: A Shift Toward Iraq"
- Coordination complete with everyone ~~except Marine Corps?~~ done

5 - "Iraq Chemical & Biological Weapon Employment"
- DIO now reviewing
- Done by 1400 2/5 ~~Service coord still pending~~ (Paperwork in)

6 - "Will the Coalition Against Iraq Remain Unified?"
- Fully coordinated with DIO & services.

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-0001

7 - "Iraq's Options for Employing Its Combat Aircraft Deployed to Iran"
- DIO now reviewing
- Service coord still pending (AIR)

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(b)(3) 10 USC 424 [redacted]

NAVY O.K. [illegible]

[illegible]

Army

AIR

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-0001

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

2/5/91

The enclosed 7 DIMs are in varying stages of completion:

1- "Iraq's C3" Paperwork in
- DIO now reviewing
- ~~Service coord still pending~~
- 25X 1 ~~[redacted]~~ ✓

2- "Iranian Impact on Iraq"
- Fully coordinated with DIO & Services

3- "Moscow Covertly Arming Baghdad"
- DIO now reviewing
- Service coord still pending Paperwork in

4- "Pakistan: A Shift Toward Iraq"
- Coordination complete with everyone ~~except Marine Corps~~ done

5- "Iraq Chemical & Biological Weapons Explosives"
- DIO now reviewing
- ~~Service coord still pending~~ Paperwork in

Done by 1400 2/5/91

6- "Will the Coalition Expect Iraq Remain United?"
- Fully coordinated with DIO & Service.

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-0001

7- "Iraq's Options for Employing Its Combat Aircraft Deployed To Iran"
- DIO now reviewing
- ~~Service~~ Coord still pending AIR)

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[redacted] (b)(3) 10 USC 424

Page 6 of 53

Defense Intelligence Memorandum

Iraq's Command, Control, and Communications: An Assessment of Capabilities and the Impact of the Air Campaign ~~(C)~~

Key Judgments

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(3) 10 The Iraqi political and military command, control, and communications system is of simple design but has some sophisticated and redundant components. The Intelligence Community has identified 20 primary and 35 secondary leadership facilities in the immediate Baghdad area. Supporting this array of facilities is a robust communications network that employs coaxial and fiber-optic cable, microwave, troposcatter, radio-relay, and satellite communications technologies. A total 32 primary and 7 secondary facilities constitute the backbone nodes supporting the Iraqi leadership.

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(3) 10 As of 1 February 1991, Coalition forces have attacked 19 primary leadership facilities and 1 secondary one. Although attacks have destroyed or severely damaged many key government and administrative buildings (including the Ministry of Defense, the Baghdad Presidential Office Complex, and the Military Computer Center), a number of critical underground command posts remain undamaged. Of the key communications facilities, five of the six major switches in Baghdad, the two satellite communications earth stations, and three regional facilities have been damaged severely.

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(3) 10 These attacks have disrupted the government's normal operations; therefore, the Iraqi leadership must turn to lower capacity and less efficient communications. Although Saddam Husayn has maintained direct control over the armed forces through other dedicated means, he gradually and systematically is losing use of the preferred means of commanding the Iraqi nation and its military assets. Destroying the remaining priority facilities should significantly degrade the residual command, control, and communications capability he still employs...

Overview

(S/NF) (b)(3) 10 Since coming to power in 1979, Iraqi President Saddam Husayn has devoted enormous resources to building a modern command, control, and communications infrastructure. This structure is centered in Baghdad and provides administrative control of the country and the armed forces. In addition to a standard array of government office buildings, headquarters, and complexes that host such elements as the Ministry of Defense, the Air Force, and the Ministry of Information and Culture, Baghdad sits atop an array of bunkers and a tunnel complex that could function as underground wartime command facilities. Similar facilities are scattered throughout the country, creating a robust and redundant communications network providing connectivity between the government, the armed forces, and the outlying regions.

Leadership Facilities

(U) The central node of the Iraqi command and control system is Saddam Husayn himself. As President, he exercises strict control over the Iraqi nation and its armed forces and is served by an executive branch that manages the day-to-day operations of the government and civil administration. The Ministry of Defense and its General Staff control the armed forces; these government elements normally operate out of a number of government offices in downtown Baghdad.

(S/NF) (b)(3) 10 At the highest political and military level, a number of palaces, residences, offices, and hardened command posts are available to Saddam Husayn. Key government elements are located in large office buildings and complexes that sometimes are collocated with bunkers and underground command posts. A total 20 primary facilities in the immediate Baghdad area host key political and military operations.

(S/NF) Estimates of these facilities' hardness vary considerably. Analysis indicates hardness ranges from relatively soft aboveground facilities to hardened reinforced concrete bunkers underground or directly beneath aboveground facilities. 25X1

25X1 All of these facilities are vulnerable to conventional weapons, but single weapons are insufficient against the largest and hardest facilities.

(S/NF) For example, Al Taji Unidentified Command Post Bunker and North Taji Command and Control Bunker are large standalone national-level leadership bunkers constructed of reinforced concrete. Current estimates indicate the bunkers were constructed with Soviet techniques. 25X1

25X1



(U) Major Components of Iraqi Command, Control, and Communications System in Baghdad.

Facility	25X1
Government/Military Facilities With Bunkers/Shelters	
Baghdad New Presidential Palace	
Abu Ghurayb Presidential Grounds	
Baghdad Baath Party Headquarters	
Baghdad National Air Force Headquarters Bunkers	
Bunker at Ministry of Defense	
Government/Military Facilities	
Baghdad Presidential Office Complex	
Baghdad Royal Palace	
Taji Presidential Retreat	
Baghdad Government Control Center	
Baghdad Director of General Intelligence Security Headquarters	
Baghdad Directorate of Military Intelligence Headquarters	
Baghdad MOD National Computer Center	
Iraqi Intelligence Service	
Al Aziziyah Probable PLO Training Camp	
Ministry of Information and Culture	
Ministry of Industry and Military Industry	
Other Key Hardened Command Facilities	
Al Taji Unidentified Command Post Bunker	
North Taji Command and Control Bunker	
Baghdad Presidential Residence and Bunker	
Abu Ghurayb Presidential Bunker	

(S/NF/(b)(3) 10 The GBU-24 A/B and the GBU-27 (BLU-109 laser-guided bombs) are designed to penetrate 1.83 meters of concrete. During testing, two GBU-27s used the same aim point against a 3.6-meter-thick reinforced concrete target. The second weapon completely penetrated before detonating behind the target. This combination is recommended for each bunker compartment separated by heavy internal walls.

(S/NF/(b)(3) 10 USC In addition to the primary government facilities discussed, scattered throughout Baghdad are a number of secondary command and control facilities, including 25X hardened bomb shelters 25X1 25X1 These shelters, which are designed to hold as many as 1,500 people, provide significant protection against chemical, biological, and conventional attack. 25X1

these shelters are for use primarily by key government and Baath Party officials and [redacted].

(S/NF/(b)(3) 10 USC 424) As of the first half of 1990, Iraq had modified the 25X1 [redacted] 25X1 to house some military equipment. 25X1 [redacted] 25X1 all had been electromagnetic pulse hardened, ceilings on the upper floors had been reinforced with steel plates, and "considerable communications and other electronic equipment" was present. These 10 shelters may have been converted for hardened military command, control, and communications (C^3) shelter use, as well as for leadership protection.

(S/NF/(b)(3) 10 USC 424) 25X1 [redacted] 25X1

(S/NF/(b)(3) 10 USC 424) The exterior surface of these 25X [redacted] bunkers was designed to resist a direct hit from a 250-kilogram gravity bomb, and the lower level is protected by the floor, which is 0.25-meter thick. In addition, each shelter has a skirt or deflecting slab, 2 to 5 meters of ferroconcrete and rubble filling, to protect it from near misses.

(TS/(b)(3) 10 USC) One additional secondary facility of note is the Abu Ghurayb Underground Command Control Facility west of Baghdad. This facility consists of two partially aboveground bunkers covered with dirt. The large one may be a fairly large command bunker with multiple wings, and the smaller one may be a communications bunker. 25X1 [redacted] 25X1

Possible Tunnels

(S/NF/(b)(3) 10 USC 424) 25X1 [redacted] 76 kilometers (40 miles) of tunnels connect the key leadership facilities in the Baghdad area and link them with the Baghdad International Airport and the Camp Taji Presidential Retreat Complex. If the reported tunnels exist, they probably are modified utility tunnels that could function as a conduit for coaxial and fiber-optic communications and electrical cables but may be large enough to accommodate a small vehicle or cart to move VIPs about underground.

Impact of the Air Campaign

(S/(b)(3) 10 Since the beginning of the air campaign, Coalition forces have flown multiple missions against 19 of the 20 primary facilities and 1 of the secondary facilities. The overall effect on the Iraqi leadership has been to partially degrade the National Command Authority's ability to maintain command and control of the Iraqi military. Several key government and military administrative buildings have been destroyed or severely damaged. The Ministry of Defense, the Baghdad Presidential Office Complex (reportedly the Husayn government's working center), and the Military Computer Center have been severely damaged. Other key military and government facilities have suffered damage, impairing normal command and control functions. These include the Baghdad National Air Force Headquarters, the Baghdad Directorate of General Internal Security Intelligence Headquarters, and the Iraqi Intelligence Service. Damage to these buildings probably has forced the Iraqi government to transfer all or most of its activities to underground bunkers and ex-urban facilities. These facilities generally are believed to accommodate a smaller cadre of workers; consequently, some government functions, normally operating out of the larger aboveground offices, probably are being carried out at much-reduced efficiency or not at all. The loss of electric power in Baghdad and the collapse of the civil telecommunications network have exacerbated this situation.

(S/(b)(3) 10 USC 424 Current bomb damage assessment indicates Coalition forces need to restrike 14 of the primary leadership facilities to ensure their destruction and to destroy collocated bunkers. Of the secondary facilities, only the Abu Ghurayb site has been struck, resulting in moderate damage; therefore, it is assessed as partially functional. This facility and 11 other secondary facilities also should be attacked. Because a number of key wartime facilities remain fully or partially operational, critical command and control operations related to the war effort are continuing at both aboveground and bunkered installations.

(S/(b)(3) 10 Some other important facilities, such as the Ministry of Defense and the Air Force Headquarters, have suffered damage to the aboveground buildings but none to collocated bunkers. In addition to these bunkers, standalone bunkers provide the National Command Authority the necessary facilities to prosecute the war. Destroying these bunkers and attacking the supporting communications systems, acts essential to a successful counter-C^3 campaign, would reduce Iraq's command, control, and communications further.

Remaining Primary and Alternate Leadership Facilities

Name	25X1
Primary Leadership Bunkers	
Al Taji Northwest Command and Control Bunker	
North Taji Command and Control Bunker	
Baghdad Presidential Bunker and Residence	
Abu Ghuyayb Presidential Bunker	
Primary Palaces	
Baghdad Royal Palace	
Taji Presidential Retreat	
Abu Ghurayb Presidential Grounds	
Primary Military	
Bunkers at Ministry of Defense	
Baghdad National Air Force HQ Bunkers	
Al Aziziyah Probable PLO Training Camp	
Secondary Leadership/Military	
Ash Shab District Bunker	
Al Quds District Bunker	
Saba Nisan District Bunker	
Al Khansa District Bunker	
Al Hurriya District Bunker	
Arabatash District Bunker	
Al Fudos District Bunker	
Babil District Bunker	
Al Jihad District Bunker	
Along Kut Highway Bunker	
VIP Bunker	
Abu Ghurayb Underground Probable Command and Control Bunker	
Primary Government/Party	
Baghdad Baath Party Headquarters	
Ministry of Information and Culture	
Iraqi Intelligence Service	
Baghdad Directorate of Military Intelligence Headquarters	

Remaining Communications Facilities

Name	25X1
Al Kut Automatic Telephone Exchange Postal, Telephone, and Telegraph (PTT)	
An Nasiriyah Radrel Station	
Al Amara Automatic PTT-Radrel Terminal PTT	
Tallil Fiber-Optic Repeater Station	
Al Hillah Automatic Telephone Exchange PTT	
Baghdad Automatic Telephone Exchange Shemal PTT	
Pump Station 4 Stragetic Pipeline	
Baquba Automatic Telephone Exchange-Radrel Station PTT	
Samarra Automatic Telephone Exchange-Radrel Station PTT	
Kirkuk Automatic Telephone Exchange Radrel Station PTT	
Tikrit Automatic Telephone Exchange-Radrel Station PTT	

Iraqi Communications

National Telecommunications Network

(S/NF/(b)(3) 10 U.S.C. 424) A robust communications network links the administrative facilities and hardened command posts described in the previous section. Husayn has a range of available communications capabilities, from cables to microwave and satellite communications. In general, all recent improvements to the Iraqi communications network had military requirements as a design priority. Degrading this system would severely hamper Husayn's and the Iraqi High Command's ability to control their military forces in a time-sensitive and efficient manner.

(S) Modern, high-capacity coaxial cable routes installed for the national backbone system have upgraded Iraq's telecommunications transmission capability significantly, replacing the high-capacity radio-relay network as the primary civil and military transmission system; Baghdad is at the system's hub. Two cable routes parallel each other along the country's northwest-southeast axis, with interconnections at Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul. Mosul links with Baghdad via Kirkuk and continues to Basra via Ad Diwaniyah or Al Kut. A radio-relay network provides a high-capacity backup system for short- and long-haul communications and can link directly to numerous military sites (probably through dedicated leased

circuits). This network of cables and microwave circuits ensures a high degree of [illegible] support full military operations. The coaxial cable routes in particular have dedicated military lines and carry an undetermined amount of military traffic from General Headquarters in the capital to installations in the north, west, and south.

~~(S)~~ With the assistance of Western telecommunications technology, overall total communications capability for military command and control has improved considerably in the past few years. However, whereas Iraq no longer is using exclusively Soviet equipment, the same problems plague it that traditionally have hampered its communications capability – namely an inability to maintain equipment effectively and the subsequent reliance on foreign technicians for maintenance. Following the 2 August invasion of Kuwait, most of the Western technicians left the country. Assessments indicate major damage to any switch in Iraq cannot be repaired or replaced by incountry assets and will have to wait until hostilities are over before the overall communications system can be reconstructed.

Fiber-Optic Cable Networks

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ Since the early 1980s, Iraq has attempted to obtain fiber-optic communications technology. This network was installed to further the national leadership's control of the military, not solely for civilian purposes.

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ In the mid-1980s, a Western firm installed a mixed fiber-optic and coaxial cable network within Baghdad that appears to be for leadership communications. The network's central node is in the basement of the Al Rashid Hotel in central Baghdad; the fiber-optic cable links connect the hotel to the Presidential Palace on the Tigris River, the Baath Party Headquarters, and the Conference Palace. One coaxial cable connects the Al Rashid Hotel to the Baghdad central switch, the International Airport, and the VIP bunker near the airport. Another coaxial cable connects the hotel to four hardened bunkers throughout the city and the major civil switch at Jenoub, which reportedly is the Baghdad connection for the major cable line running south to Basrah.

~~(S)~~ (b)(3) 10 USC 424 25X1

25X1 [redacted]

25X1



International Satellite Networks

~~(S/NF,~~ (b)(3) 10 USC 424 Prior to the war, the Iraqis had satellite communications (SATCOM) through the two earth stations near Baghdad; the Ad Dujayl SATCOM stations 60 kilometers north of the city and the Latifiyah SATCOM station 40 kilometers to the south. The Ad Dujayl station provided access to the services of the INTELSAT network and the Soviet INTERSPUTNIK system. Latifiyah served as the ground terminal for the ARABSAT system. The Iraqis also had access to the INMARSAT system through shipborne and land-mobile terminals.

25X1



~~(TS~~ (b)(3) 10 USC Although Iraq's international satellite assets were not designed specifically for military use 25X1 the satellite assets could have significant command and control capabilities. The potential exists to substitute SATCOM for the cable links running between Baghdad and the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations but cannot be realized until Iraq repairs the battle damage to its SATCOM terminals.

Communications Vulnerabilities

25X1



25X1

Impact of the Air Campaign

~~(S/NF)~~ As of 1 February 1991, five of the six major switches in Baghdad, the two earth stations, and three of the regional targets had been attacked. Imagery of the major switches in Baghdad shows five of six major switches received severe damage. 25X1

25X1

~~(S/NF)~~ It is important to recognize that Iraq's civil communications system must be viewed as a complete system. To date, this system has been destroyed only partially. Five of the six recommended switches in Baghdad have been destroyed, but only one of seven regional telecommunications sites recommended for destruction has been struck successfully. Because of the high level of redundancy within the civil system and the interconnectivity between the oil pipeline fiber-optic cable system and the civil telephone system, military communications probably are not experiencing any severe loss of capacity. Successful destruction of 11 other facilities probably will severely disrupt the high-capacity fixed communications between the Iraqi leadership in Baghdad and the deployed military forces. This will leave the military tactical communications such as the R404, a 24-channel radio-relay system currently deployed, and a low-capacity battle cable, which can be deployed, to connect Baghdad with the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations. Loss of the civil communications system probably will not affect dedicated communications such as the KARI air defense system employed.

~~(S/NF)~~ If the system's subsequent degradation is successful, the major civil cable and microwave lines to Jordan and Kuwait could be severed. Destroying the Shemal switch in Baghdad would isolate the capital area. The destroyed postal, telephone, and telegraph at Falujah has blocked civil communications from Baghdad to the west; however, the postal, telephone, and telegraph system from Baghdad north remains unaffected. The civil system to the south remains operational, with only the switches at Ad Diwaniyah destroyed and Basrah damaged. If other regional countries become involved, additional communications targets will be recommended.

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(3) 10 Destroying the 11 facilities and eliminating the remaining switch in Baghdad (Shemal) should sever high-capacity communications connectivity throughout Iraq. This would force the Iraqi leadership to use lower capacity and

less efficient communications and would tend to undermine any military planning [illegible]

Outlook

~~(S/NF)~~(b)(3) 10 The attacks on the Iraqi C^3 structure have damaged or destroyed a number of key government facilities and have begun to degrade key communications networks. The damage to a number of important buildings in Baghdad has forced the Iraqi government to transfer all or most of its activities to underground bunkers. However, Husayn and his General Staff retain the ability to maintain command and control of the armed forces from bunkered facilities. His communication options are being limited gradually to lower capacity and less efficient means. Destroying the remaining 12 primary and 12 secondary leadership facilities and 11 communications facilities would deny Husayn and his General Staff these residual capabilities.

~~(S/NF)~~(b)(3) 10 USC Based on the intelligence currently available, this completed mission will reduce the Iraqi government to using an assortment of very small mobile command posts and fixed facilities that are not designed to operate as major government or military command centers. Husayn will be forced to maintain command and control from an extremely disadvantageous position, severely degrading his military forces' operations and greatly reducing the Iraqi state's ability to support those forces.

~~(C)~~ *This memorandum contains information as of 1 February 1991. It was produced jointly by* (b)(3) 10 USC 424 (b)(3) 10 USC 424 *DIRNSA/P7; and the Technical Production Office, Directorate for Research, Defense Intelligence Agency. Questions and comments may be addressed to the Technical Production Office, Directorate for Research, Defense Intelligence Agency* (b)(3) 10 USC 424 (b)(3) 10 USC 424

DIM 44-91
February 1991

~~NOFORN~~

~~Special Intelligence Material~~

Defense Intelligence Memorandum

The Possibilities for Iranian Support of Iraq (U)

Key Judgments

(S) For the near term, DIA assesses active Iranian support for Iraq could do little to enhance Iraqi prospects for success or to threaten Coalition forces or operations. Active Iranian combat support to Iraq could provide Baghdad some limited political and military benefits but would subject Iran to Coalition military retaliation – a prospect Iran appears eager to avoid. Any military equipment it could funnel through the Soviet Union or offshore sources would be too limited in quantity to provide Iraq any significant short-term increases in combat capability.

(S) Iran probably will increase its cooperation with Iraq over the coming weeks to placate strident Islamic radicals within Iran in ways that would avoid Coalition retaliation. As the Gulf war continues, the radicals' power may increase, and Rafsanjani's range of policy options may shrink. DIA expects any expanded cooperation to be limited, incremental, and nonmilitary.

Copy No. 6

SI-428501/91

The Possibilities

(C) Since the beginning of the Gulf crisis, Iran has professed a policy of neutrality while condemning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Despite these pronouncements, Iran has pursued a policy best described perhaps as "calculated ambiguity," supporting UN sanctions while allowing food and medicine to cross its borders into Iraq. Tehran appears to have been playing both sides against the middle for its own benefit. Iran recently provided a shelter for Iraqi transport and fighter aircraft – possibly an indicator that Tehran is shifting its "neutrality" toward Iraq. Recent pronouncements from the Iranian government's highest levels have reaffirmed Iran's commitment to neutrality and its intentions to impound the Iraqi aircraft until the end of the crisis.

(C) If sheltering Iraqi aircraft does represent an Iranian shift to Iraq's side of the conflict, despite its statements to the contrary, what support Iran might provide Iraq and what its effect would be on US/Coalition interests are important considerations. DIA believes that Iran would have to be circumspect in any decision made to support Iraq. Any Coalition retaliation against it or possible international sanctions would put its long-range goals and interests in jeopardy. Iran would evaluate its possible options based on the risks of detection and retaliation, as well as deniability. Such support could fall into several categories.

(C) *Political and/or Islamic Support to Iraq.* Iranian political or Islamic support (soliciting worldwide and regional Islamic opposition to Coalition efforts by framing the conflict as an assault on Islam) for Iraq is a plausible Iranian policy option because it requires no deniability, does not militarily violate Iranian neutrality, and is not inconsistent with UN resolutions.

(C) *Political.* In the near term, Iranian political support rendered to Iraq would have no major effect on Coalition efforts because Iran has little political influence in the Arab world. The only Arab countries in which Iranian political support might be meaningful are those that already are outside the Coalition and exert little influence on it. Arab and European Coalition members are unlikely to be influenced by any such Iranian political support for Iraq. Iran may have broader political influence outside of the Middle East, specifically in the Nonaligned Movement (NAM). In this context, Iranian actions could enhance support for a NAM-sponsored UN cease-fire, although this would have only remote prospects for success in the United Nations.

(C) Iranian religious influence in the Arab Middle East is stronger than political clout. Iranian support for Iraq on an Islamic basis probably would have moderate influence on the nascent Islamic fundamentalist factions in most Arab countries. Over time, this fundamentalism could mobilize more popular Arab support for Iraq against US and Coalition military operations and threaten anti-Iraq regimes. Iranian influence on the worldwide Islamic community could not be expected to generate any short-term effect on Coalition operations. Any Iranian-generated displeasure

would need a venue, such as the United Nations, to express its opposition – but

(C) *Providing Iraq With Intelligence Data on US and Allied Forces.* Iran could provide Iraq with intelligence data on US and allied naval dispositions in the Persian Gulf and northern Arabian Sea. This is a credible option that could be pursued covertly and with deniability. Iran's capability to provide quality intelligence to Iraq is limited to human intelligence, modest signals intelligence, and maritime and aerial patrol reporting. However, such intelligence would be of only marginal value to the Iraqis because all but southern Gulf coverage normally would be available to Iraqi intelligence collectors anyway. Iraq has almost no capability to attack targets south of Qatar. In any case, Iranian intelligence data most likely would not contribute materially to Iraq's war efforts.

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(C) *Terrorism.* Iran has a large and competent terrorist infrastructure. It could employ this asset most effectively in the Middle East and in Western Europe. However, it is unlikely that Iranian terrorism would have any direct effect on Coalition military operations. Iranian terror might contribute to weakening targeted Coalition members' resolve. Terrorism might be an attractive Iranian option for a variety of reasons. First, it offers plausible deniability; conducted carefully, terrorist

operations would not point directly to Tehran, minimizing the risks of Coalition retaliation. Second, and more important than any effects that [illegible] terrorist campaign probably would pacify the radical elements within the Iranian government who are calling for increased cooperation with Iraq in its battle against the "Great Satan." The latter most likely would be the driving factor in an Iranian decision to employ terrorism.

~~(S/NF)~~ *Allowing Iraqi Combat Sorties From Iranian Airspace.* While approximately 75 Iraqi fighter aircraft are still parked in Iran, they represent roughly 10 percent of Iraq's fleet. They also represent the preponderance of Iraq's long-range offensive airstrike capability, including the Exocet-launching Mirage F-1 and Iraq's FENCER aircraft. No intelligence indicates the Iraqi aircraft in Iran have the capability to launch offensive strikes from Iran. It is not known whether the aircraft arrived in Iran with combat loads, what ordnance or materiel were transported on the transport aircraft, or what the disposition of the Iraqi pilots has been. The Iraqi aircraft may have the capability to launch strikes from Iran or return to Iraq to stage strikes.

~~(S)~~ However, many factors would seem to mitigate against this scenario. Most important, Tehran is unlikely to allow or condone Iraqi combat operations launched from Iranian territory, as this would violate its declared neutrality and threaten Coalition retaliation. Launching these aircraft from Iran in offensive strikes against US or Coalition forces would offer Iraq little or no tactical advantage. The Iraqi combat aircraft presence in Iran has increased US concern and vigilance. Ranges to attack Coalition naval targets in the Gulf average 400 nautical miles. Strike profiles generally would require inflight refueling or forward deployment, with the loss of surprise that both would entail. US early warning assets (E-3 and E-2) and defensive systems (carrier and land-based aircraft, Aegis platforms) are sufficiently available to minimize any such threat.

~~(C)~~ *Direct Military Support for Iraq.* At the extreme end of Iran's options would be a military alliance with Iraq against Coalition forces. Iraq would benefit militarily by diverting any Coalition assets needed to engage Iran and from any Coalition losses inflicted by Iran. From an Iranian point of view, this is likely to be a costly endeavor. Iran has no credible ground force capabilities since these were destroyed in the latter stages of the Iran-Iraq war. It does have air and maritime assets that could be used against Coalition naval forces in the Gulf – for example, it could use sea mines again. It probably learned from its engagements with the US Navy during Operation EARNEST WILL that its chances of any success are low. This is especially true now that a much larger US and allied naval presence is in the Gulf. This option also would make Iran subject to a US military response similar to that pursued against Iraq. While the limitations and costs would appear to dissuade Iran decisively from pursuing such a course of action, Islamic fervor and intensity cannot be ruled out completely in leading Tehran to ignore the costs.

(C) In the short run, DIA assesses that active Iranian support for Iraq can do [illegible] to threaten Coalition forces or operations. Iranian aid most likely will consist of nonbelligerent materials and continued shelter for Iraqi aircraft. Active Iranian combat support to Iraq would provide Baghdad some limited political and military benefit but would subject Iran to Coalition military retaliation – a prospect it is likely to avoid. While a possibility exists for military equipment and repair part transfers from the Soviets and offshore sources, such as North Korea or China, these could not be expected to provide any short-term improvement in Iraq's military capabilities. Likewise, Iranian political or Islamic support is unlikely to provide Iraq any significant short-term benefits.

Conflicting Interests and Resurgent Radicals

(C) Iran's policy of neutrality would appear to be in Iran's best national interest. Without taking sides in the war, many of Tehran's goals and interests obviously stand to benefit. Tehran's apparent agreement to shelter Iraqi aircraft may portend a more active role for Iran – one tilted toward Iraq, seemingly at odds with its interests. In making a decision to allow the Iraqi aircraft into Iran, Tehran probably is reacting to a combination of internal political pressures and competing interests: conflict between the Iranian "radicals," who want to confront the United States, and the ruling "moderates," who look to the West for economic assistance; Iran's obvious displeasure over the prospects for a long-term US military presence in the Gulf; Iran's concern for the postcrisis political environment if Iraq is effectively destroyed and its own role in that environment; and Iran's desire to avoid any Coalition military retaliation.

(C) In estimating future Iranian policy toward the Gulf war, DIA believes the most critical factor probably will be the internal competition between the radicals and the moderates in the Iranian government. While Rafsanjani remains firmly in control of the government, he will have to make concessions to the radical elements. Rafsanjani generally has gotten his way in policy vis-a-vis the more radical members of the government because of his shrewd political skills and because the radical elements have had no cohesive agenda or voting bloc despite the majority control the radicals hold in the national parliament. The current Gulf crisis appears to have provided two strongly unifying issues to the disparate radical factions: religion and anti-Americanism. Despite recent pronouncements of unanimity throughout Iran's ruling elite over its intentions to remain neutral, many reports tell of radicals calling on Iran to support Iraq and challenge the "Great Satan," the United States. A cohesive radical faction within the Iranian government probably would be a direct challenge to Rafsanjani and his pragmatic policies and would require him to make some policy concessions. Iran's acceptance of the Iraqi combat aircraft may reflect the first such accommodation to the radicals. As the Gulf war continues, the radicals' power may increase and Rafsanjani's range of policy options shrink.

Outlook

~~(S)~~ To placate the Islamic radicals, Iran most likely will have to increase its cooperation with Iraq over the coming weeks. DIA expects that this increasing cooperation will be limited, incremental, and nonmilitary to the maximum extent. Several scenarios could generate stronger Iranian support to Iraq: a disproportionate Israeli retaliation on Iraq or entry into the war on a continuing basis, an Iranian belief that the United States had damaged or destroyed the Islamic holy sites in Iraq, a US military ground campaign into Iraq aimed at Baghdad, or a perception by Tehran that Turkey was going to make a grab for Iraqi land. In any case, DIA assesses that active Iranian support for Iraq can do little in the near term to enhance Iraq's prospects for political or military success.

(U) This memorandum contains information as of 4 February 1991. This memorandum has been coordinated with the Military Services. Questions and comments may be addressed to (b)(3) 10 USC 424 [redacted]
(b)(3) 10 USC 424 [redacted]

Defense Intelligence Memorandum

Is Moscow Covertly Assisting Baghdad? (U)

Key Judgments

~~(C)~~ Despite numerous rumors of covert Soviet support to Iraq, no convincing evidence exists that the Kremlin is providing military or intelligence assistance to Baghdad. Top Soviet political leaders are unlikely to approve any violation of UN-imposed sanctions or condone intelligence support for Iraq because such actions would jeopardize Moscow's relations with the West – already strained by the Baltic crackdown – and with moderate Arab regimes. In addition, such actions probably would be insufficient to undo the damage to relations with Iraq and radical Arabs caused by Soviet support for UN resolutions against Baghdad.

~~(C)~~ Recent reports suggesting that the Soviets are smuggling military equipment to Iraq through third countries, including Iran, have not been corroborated and probably are not true. However, rogue efforts by Soviet trade organizations and disgruntled military officers to smuggle small quantities of items that are difficult to detect and trace cannot be completely ruled out.

~~(S/NF)~~ The Soviets have withdrawn almost all of their civilian and military advisers as well as most of their embassy staff from Iraq. A small number of Soviet specialists probably could remain incountry undetected. However, there is no evidence that Soviet military advisers currently are assisting the Iraqi military.

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(3) 10 USC 424 Even prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August, the Soviet-Iraqi intelligence relationship was guarded. There is no convincing evidence of continued cooperation since the invasion.

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Background

(S) Top Soviet political leaders are unlikely to approve any military or intelligence support for Iraq because the Soviet Union has too much to lose. Moscow is aware that any large-scale attempt to supply Iraq with military equipment could jeopardize relations with the West, which are already strained by the Baltic crackdown. This would further diminish the likelihood that the West will release over $15 billion in economic aid (some of which already has been suspended because of the Baltic situation) and would damage prospects for future US-Soviet cooperation in arms control as well as in the Middle East. In particular, US acceptance of a major Soviet role in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, a key Kremlin objective, would not be forthcoming. In addition, Soviet attempts to resupply Iraq would harm their growing relations with Arab moderates, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Small-scale embargo violations, which would be difficult to detect and trace, probably would be insufficient to undo the damage to Soviet relations with Iraq and other radical Arabs caused by Soviet support for UN resolutions against Baghdad and by Moscow's refusal to support cease-fire proposals that do not include a prior Iraqi commitment to withdraw from Kuwait.

(SAF, [redacted] (b)(3) 10 USC 424 Some elements in the Soviet Union, however, probably would not regret possible damage to Soviet-American relations. According to Georgiy Arbatov, head of the Institute of the United States of America and Canada, some senior military officers believe that the USSR should not abandon Iraq "for the sake of capitalist favors."

Arms Smuggling

(C) Since the United Nations imposed trade sanctions on Iraq in August, periodic unconfirmed reports of Soviet violations have surfaced. Recently, several sources have suggested that the Soviets are smuggling military equipment through third countries, particularly Iran. However, these recent claims have not been corroborated.

(SAF, [redacted] (b)(3) 10 Earlier reports that US and Spanish military personnel found 11 undocumented crates when they boarded the Soviet merchant ship *Dmitriy Furmanov*, which was bound for Aqaba, Jordan, in early January, no longer appear valid. Further analysis indicates that these boxes probably were part of the manifested cargo, which was intended for delivery to Jordan.

(CAF) Press reports claiming that up to 12 Soviet air transport flights a day were carrying ammunition, complete T-72 tanks, and building materials for bunker construction are not credible. Since Operation DESERT STORM began, there have been no Soviet flights into Iraq. Between the 25 September UN Security Council resolution defining the embargo's effect on air transport and the beginning of DESERT STORM, all but one Soviet flight to Iraq stopped for inspection in Turkey.

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(3) 10 Secondhand information obtained by the US Defense Attache in 25X1 ammunition and military equipment destined for Iraq were in Rezaiyeh, Iran, on 10 and 20 January, respectively. However, the source was vague when pressed for details and admitted that the numbers may have been exaggerated. Imagery of the only border crossing in the Rezaiyeh vicinity shows heavy snow and no sign of recent vehicular traffic. It would have been extremely difficult for trucks to transit this mountainous route under these conditions.

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(3) 10 USC 424 An untested source stated that Romania recently offered to broker the sale of 40 Soviet MiG-29/FULCRUMs to Iraq. According to the source, "interested parties" in the Soviet Union wanted to supply the aircraft via Iraqi "cutouts" in Iran. No other information supports this claim. 25X1
25X1

~~(S)~~ (b)(3) 10 USC At the same time, small-scale Soviet attempts to smuggle items that are difficult to detect and trace cannot be completely ruled out. If such actions are taking place, those most likely responsible would be Soviet civilian and military trade organizations eager to retain profitable links to Iraq or would be individuals acting for personal financial gain. Several foreign trade organizations have continued dealing with Iraq since the embargo was imposed. However, those contacts have focused primarily on prior contractual obligations and technical documentation of projects and not on continued trade. 25X1
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Soviet Personnel

~~(S)~~ Prior to Baghdad's invasion of Kuwait, the Soviet Union had 750 to 1,000 military specialists, about 7,000 economic technicians, and a large diplomatic presence in Iraq. Moscow now claims that only 13 officials associated with the embassy in Baghdad, as well as several journalists, remain incountry. That total is compatible with current intelligence information, but a small number of additional personnel could remain undetected in Iraq.

~~(TS~~ (b)(3) 10 USC 25X1
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25X1 Prior to DESERT STORM, Soviet military personnel neither engaged in Iraqi military planning nor participated in Iraqi combat

operations. There is no evidence that Soviet personnel currently are supporting the Iraqi war effort in any way.

Intelligence Sharing

(S/NF) (b)(3) 10 USC 424 Prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Moscow and Baghdad had a longstanding intelligence relationship that included finished intelligence exchanges, limited training, and some operational cooperation. However, the extent of cooperation was constrained, and the Iraqis were very cautious in their contacts with the KGB. While some informal attache contacts have continued since August, there is no convincing evidence that the Soviets are providing intelligence to Iraq on DESERT STORM.

Outlook

(S) As long as Soviet political leaders continue to believe that good relations with the West can survive current tensions over the Baltic, they probably will not endorse any attempt to violate the UN sanctions against Iraq or to provide Baghdad with information on DESERT STORM. However, rogue attempts by elements within the military, KGB, defense industry, or foreign trade establishments are possible. Moscow probably will send additional MiG-29/FULCRUM aircraft to Iran this year, but this transfer will be to fulfill a contract between Tehran and Moscow that predates DESERT STORM.

(C) Gorbachev and the Soviet leaders will continue to seek to avoid an open split with the United States over DESERT STORM. However, as the conflict lengthens and becomes more destructive, the Soviets more frequently will question US intentions and conduct.

(C) The Soviets now believe that a negotiated settlement of the conflict is unlikely. Should Saddam pledge to withdraw from Kuwait, the Soviet Union probably would require less proof that his commitment is genuine than would the United States before calling for a cease-fire. After the war, Kremlin participation in a UN peacekeeping force would be questionable because of strong popular opposition to any Soviet troop deployment.

(C/NF) If Iraq attacks Turkey and a NATO military response ensues, the Soviets most likely will increase the readiness of their military forces and harshly criticize NATO's involvement. Conservative elements would use this development as evidence that NATO remains a long-term threat despite changes in Eastern Europe.

(C) If Kremlin politics were to shift further to the right, resulting in strong US-Soviet tensions, the Soviets probably would further distance themselves from Coalition actions and call for an immediate end to hostilities. The danger of covert Soviet support to Iraq would increase significantly, but Moscow probably would not want to risk severing all ties to the West.

(U) This memorandum contains information as of 31 January 1991.

[redacted] (b)(3) 10 USC 424

(b)(3) 10 USC 424 *Soviet/East Europe Division, Directorate for Research* (b)(3) 10 USC 424

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

Defense Intelligence Memorandum

Pakistan: A Shift Toward Iraq? (C/NF)

Key Judgments

~~(S/NF)~~ Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, though personally committed to liberating Kuwait, is coming under heavy pressure to hedge or withdraw Pakistan's support for the war against Iraq. As the Gulf war intensifies, domestic political pressures will force Sharif to assume an increasingly neutral stance.

~~(S/NF)~~ Chief of Army Staff General Mirza Aslam Beg will continue to voice apprehensions over Pakistan's involvement in the US-led coalition. Although Beg openly expresses admiration for Baghdad's defiance of the United States, he will not abet the Iraqi war effort actively.

~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(3) 10 USC 25X1 based on a variety of questionable sources, exaggerates the extent of pro-Iraqi sympathies within the Pakistani government.

~~(S/NF)~~ Pakistan is not likely to switch sides in the conflict. However, a Pakistani troop withdrawal most likely would increase private efforts to send more humanitarian assistance to Iraq. Unless Sharif finds a way to placate domestic critics, his government could become a casualty of the Gulf war.

Second Thoughts and Opposition

~~(S/NF)~~ Airstrikes against Iraqi targets opened deep political divisions and fueled a growing anti-American backlash, jeopardizing Pakistan's support for the international coalition arrayed against Iraq. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif faces fierce opposition to the Gulf policy he inherited on assuming office in November. Sharif is personally committed to liberating Kuwait, defending Saudi Arabia, and positioning Pakistan as a responsible international partner in the Gulf. However, domestic political realities have forced him to assume an increasingly neutral stance.

Pakistani Support for DESERT STORM (~~C~~)

~~(S/NF)~~ Initially, Islamabad unequivocally condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and supported UN sanctions. After sending an initial increment of 2,000 personnel in September, a total force of 10,000 Army personnel (an infantry and armored brigade) arrived in Saudi Arabia prior to the 15 January deadline. Equipment incompatibilities and the Indian threat precluded Islamabad from sending tanks and artillery to Saudi Arabia. Pakistan has not dispatched its pledged additional ground forces, fighter aircraft, and two frigates.

~~(S/NF)~~ Sharif's efforts to salvage his Gulf policy – televising speeches, wooing influential clerics, and embarking on a "peace mission" to Middle Eastern capitals – have not worked. Unless Sharif finds a way to placate domestic critics, his government could become a Gulf war casualty.

~~(S/NF)~~ A wide spectrum of opposition parties, Islamic fundamentalists, and some of Sharif's own advisers and coalition partners are siding openly with Iraq and calling for Pakistani troop withdrawals and a cease-fire. Opposition politicians – most notably Benazir Bhutto – are using the Gulf crisis to advance their political fortunes at Sharif's expense. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, often a moderating influence, has not taken sides in the policy dispute.

~~(S/NF)~~ Chief of Army Staff Mirza Aslam Beg, embittered by last October's suspension of US aid and supportive of Iran's neutrality, continues to oppose Sharif's close identity with US initiatives in the Gulf. Beg's public expressions of support for Iraq have fueled popular passions against the United States and have narrowed Sharif's foreign policy options. Beg is not likely to defy Sharif to the point of actively abetting the Iraqi war effort.

~~(TS~~ (b)(3) 10 USC 25X1 Reports of Pakistani and Iraqi intelligence sharing, 25X1 and support for Iraq's war effort are unsubstantiated. Earlier pronouncements of thousands of Pakistani volunteers rushing to defend Iraq have not materialized. However, the possibility of some embargoed nonlethal leakages to Iraq exists.

Possible Shifts

Pakistan-Iraqi Intelligence

~~(TSUAF)~~ (b)(3) 25X1 are actively fanning anti-American flames. Consequently, their sensational reporting exaggerates the extent of pro-Iraqi sympathies. Their reports are based on a variety of dubious sources who probably have limited access to sensitive military information. Moreover, dispatches detailing Pakistani and US troop dispositions and movements have been inaccurate. Nevertheless, reports of Iraqi-Pakistani intelligence sharing are of concern.

~~(SANF)~~ As a visible sign of its neutrality, Pakistan may decide to furnish nonlethal, humanitarian assistance to Iraq. Such assistance would have to transit Iran and would have minimal effect on the war's outcome. On the other hand, the Pakistani-manned 12th Armored Brigade's relocation to Ar Ar, Saudi Arabia, could make Islamabad an active belligerent should Iraq choose to attack Pakistani defensive positions.

Outlook

~~(SANF)~~ Pakistan is not likely to switch sides in the conflict. Unless Sharif finds a way to placate domestic critics, his government could become a casualty of the Gulf war. Sharif will not permit Pakistani troops to initiate offensive operations against Iraq. At worst, Sharif – or his successor – would recall the 10,000 Pakistani troops now serving in Saudi Arabia. Short of that, he will protect his political flanks by supporting peace initiatives, assuming a more neutral stance on the war, and distancing Pakistan from the United States.

(U) This memorandum contains information as of 1 February 1991. Questions and comments may be addressed to (b)(3) 10 USC 424 *Eastern Division, Directorate for Research* (b)(3) 10 USC 424 (b)(3) 10 USC 424 *Worldwide Division, Directorate for Estimates, also contributed to this memorandum.*

Defense Intelligence Memorandum

Iraqi Chemical and Biological Weapon Employment ~~(S)~~

Key Judgments

~~(S/NF)~~ Iraq has numerous ground and air systems, as well as possible missile warheads, available for chemical agent delivery.

~~(S/NF)~~ Iraq most likely would employ chemical agents against Coalition troops and troop assembly areas during a major ground conflict. Nonpersistent chemical agents would be used against frontline forces and persistent agents against selected rear area targets.

~~(S/NF)~~ Indicators of use will include Iraqi troops donning protective gear, loading trucks at known chemical storage facilities, or removing weapons from S-shaped bunkers at fighter airfields.

~~(S/NF)~~ DIA assesses that Iraq has biological agents in munitions. It possesses botulinum toxin, which has tactical applications, and anthrax, which is more suitable for use against strategic targets. Indicators for their use are unknown.

~~(S/NF)~~ Coalition air supremacy would limit Iraq's ability to conduct chemical attacks by air.

Methods of Chemical Weapon Delivery

(S/NF) Iraq has used various ground and air systems to deliver chemical agents in the past. DIA believes that Iraq also has the capability to use its SCUD missiles to deliver chemical weapons.

(S/WN) Iraq has delivered chemical weapons using its 130-millimeter, 152-millimeter, and 155-millimeter tube artillery and 122-millimeter multiple rocket launchers during the Iran-Iraq war. Other fire support systems also could be used to deliver chemicals. There are unconfirmed reports that Iraq also had used rocket-propelled grenades and mines to employ chemical agents.

(S/WN) Aircraft are Iraq's only means to deliver chemical agents accurately at distances in excess of artillery range. During the Iran-Iraq war, all types of aircraft, including fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, were used to deliver chemicals. Iraq has developed 90-millimeter rockets for its helicopters. The rockets probably are filled with mustard but could ~~contain~~ any agent.

(S/WN) Aerial bombs are estimated to be the major part of the Iraqi chemical stockpile. About 65 to 75 percent of Iraq's chemical agents are assessed to be in bombs because bombs can hold larger amounts of agents than artillery shells can. Iraqi aerial bombs are estimated to have 100 kilograms of nerve gas or 120 kilograms of mustard in the 500-kilogram bombs and 50 kilograms of nerve agent or 60 kilograms of mustard in the 250-kilogram bombs. Artillery shells contain an estimated 1.5 to 3.4 kilograms of agents.

(S/WN) Iraq is assessed to have a limited number of chemical warheads for its SCUD B missile and possibly for the Al Husayn and the Al Abbas missiles. Chemical warheads would improve the value of these inaccurate missiles by giving them the potential to contaminate large areas. The chemical fill weight for the missiles has been estimated at about 550 kilograms for the SCUD B, 80 to 100 kilograms for the Al Husayn, and 200 to 300 kilograms for the Al Abbas. The extended-range SCUD missiles gained range in part by reducing the missile payload. Significant technical problems in guidance, fusing, and agent stability will limit their effectiveness against military point targets, but they could be used as terror weapons against civilian population centers.

(S/WN) The most effective chemical agent fill for a missile warhead is a persistent agent. The VX nerve agent or a thickened agent of any type could be used to attack high-value deep targets. Iraq's best agents for missile warheads are the persistent blister agent mustard and the semipersistent nerve agent GF. VX is a possible agent in the Iraqi inventory.

(S/WN) Iraq probably has filled munitions with particulate carriers impregnated with mustard, also called "dusty mustard." 25X1

25X1

ensembles. Other possible items in the Iraqi arsenal are aerosol generators for agent dissemination and spray tanks that could spread chemical contaminants from helicopters or fixed-wing aircraft.

Scenarios for Chemical Weapon Employment

~~(S/WN)~~ During the war with Iran, the Iraqis learned to use chemical weapons in ways that maximized effectiveness. For example, they disseminated chemical agents in the morning rather than later in the day, when high temperatures would accelerate evaporation of the agents. Typically, the Iraqis would deposit persistent mustard agents in an Iranian force's rear area and bombard the frontlines with the nonpersistent nerve agent sarin. Troops fleeing the sarin-contaminated area then would be exposed to mustard as well.

~~(S/WN)~~ Iraq might attempt to use air assets to attack targets deep in rear areas, such as logistic stockpiles, ports, and airfields. Airfields, in particular, would be considered critical targets because of the importance of Coalition air power. Persistent chemicals would be employed to suppress airfield operations. Attacks against naval ships might be attempted but would not be expected to have a significant military effect.

~~(S/WN)~~ Iraq used chemicals effectively in the 1988 offensives against Iran. During this time, Iraq emphasized selective saturation of targets with chemical weapons. Because Iraq had the operational initiative, its forces could choose the best weather and terrain conditions to select their chemical targets.

~~(S/WN)~~ Late in the war with Iran, Saddam Husayn delegated the authority to use chemicals to corps commanders. This improved the results from chemical attacks by making them more timely. The ground force commander's discretion made it possible to respond quickly when the tactical situation made use of chemicals favorable, and commanders took advantage of the authority.

~~(S/NF)~~ Should Iraqi forces become involved in a multidivision attack against Coalition forces or in defending against a large Coalition attack, they would use artillery and multiple rocket launchers filled with nonpersistent agents against frontline troops. In an offensive, this would occur about 15 minutes before the attack. Iraq also could employ persistent chemicals against troop assembly areas to try to prevent reinforcements for Coalition defenders or reinforcements for a Coalition offensive. It also would employ persistent and nonpersistent agents on counterattacking Coalition forces. Iraq would employ chemical fires simultaneously with conventional fires as it did during the Iran-Iraq war. Iraq is not likely to use chemical agents when conducting small-unit spoiling and probing ground attacks against Coalition forward forces.

~~(S/NF)~~ Iraq also might use chemical agents against rear area targets, such as command posts, troop assembly areas, and logistic bases, as part of a multidivision

attack. Iraq could use its SCUD missiles and aircraft for attacks on rear area targets and its artillery and multiple rocket launchers for rear area targets within range of these systems. The Iraqis would use persistent agents on these targets since they would not expect their troops to enter the area. However, Iraq needs better intelligence than it now has to do this effectively.

~~(S/NF)~~ Should Iraq use chemical weapons, it also would try to employ air assets, such as Su-22 and MiG-23 aircraft, as it did during the Iran-Iraq war. Such aircraft would attempt to deliver 250- and 500-kilogram bombs. Helicopters also might try to deliver agents using rockets and aerosol spray. Coalition air supremacy in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations would greatly limit Iraq's capability to conduct chemical attacks by air.

Effectiveness of Chemical Weapons

~~(S/WN)~~ Iraq is not able to make good-quality chemical agents. Technical failures have reduced the purity of Iraqi agents and caused problems in storage and handling. This is a particular problem for sarin (GB) and sarin-type nerve agents (GF). GB and GP both contain hydrofluoric acid, an impurity that attacks metal surfaces and catalyzes nerve agent decomposition. This leads to metal failure and leaks in the ammunition, increasing handling hazards. Mustard also is judged to be of poor quality but has less corrosive impurities. Lower purity significantly limits shelf life and reduces toxic effects when the munition is employed.

~~(S)~~ In weapons with relatively small fill weights, the reduced purity and loss of toxicity through dilution probably would not have much effect on the weapon's area of coverage. In munitions with larger fill weights (aerial bombs and missile warheads), the weapon's loss of potency could reduce contaminated areas considerably. Environmental factors, including weather and terrain, also influence the extent and effectiveness of contamination.

~~(S/WN)~~ A chemical agent-weapons production run probably was conducted at Samarra from mid-December 1990 through mid-January 1991. Periodic production runs are needed to replenish deteriorated nerve agent stocks. The Iraqi stockpile's total size is not known, but it has been estimated at 300 to 2,000 metric tons. The larger stockpile size is based on a large proportion of mustard in the inventory.

~~(S/WN)~~ Recently produced nerve agents already should have begun to deteriorate. Agent decomposition should make most of the unitary nerve agent weapons unserviceable by the end of March 1991. Iraq's binary stocks and blister agents will remain toxic for a longer time. The recent production run at Samarra could have resulted in new stocks of binary chemical munitions.

~~(S/WN)~~ DIA estimates that most of the Iraqi chemical stockpile is in munitions, with a modest amount of chemical agents stored in bulk. DIA assesses that most Iraqi chemical weapons are unitary; they have been filled with a finished chemical

agent. Binary weapons are being introduced, but they are believed to be a small [illegible] weapons. Blood agents cannot be ruled out.

Indications of Employment

~~(S)~~ During the Iran-Iraq war, the numbers of stakebed trucks increased tremendously at the Samarra facility's cruciform bunker storage area. These trucks, typically associated with the movement of chemical munitions, departed Samarra and headed to the front lines immediately preceding major chemical offensives in the Iran-Iraq war.

~~(S)~~ During DESERT STORM, identifying such obvious indicators for potential use of chemical weapons will be difficult. The fortuitous sighting of stakebed trucks or chemical decontamination vehicles at Iraqi chemical supply centers might give a tipoff for potential deployment of chemical weapons.

~~(S)~~ Communications security probably will preclude DIA or the Coalition getting an advance warning of orders to use chemical weapons. In the past, Iraq has transmitted orders to use chemicals by messenger or other secure means. Iraqi intelligence probably will continue to help transmit orders to employ chemicals.

~~(S)~~ There have been a few tactical indicators for possible chemical use in recent days. Iraqi radio recently announced allied chemical attacks in the Basra vicinity. Iraq's diplomatic reporting repeatedly warns of the intention to use chemicals against the Coalition. Iraq appears to be laying the psychological groundwork for its use of chemical weapons.

~~(S/NF)~~ During the Iran-Iraq war, prior to Iraq's own use of chemical weapons, Iraqi troops frequently were advised that enemy use of chemicals was imminent and that they should put on their protective gear. During DESERT STORM, activity at S-shaped bunkers in southern Iraqi fighter airfields and the uploading of strike aircraft would indicate an imminent chemical attack. Forward deployment of large numbers of ground-attack aircraft and helicopters to these southern bases might be another indicator of a chemical attack.

Use, Effectiveness, and Indications of Biological Weapon Employment

~~(S/NF)~~ Iraq possesses the biological warfare agents anthrax and botulinum toxin, which are assessed to have been placed in munitions. The exact munition types are unknown. Iraq's biological agents have distinctly different effects, which suggest conditions under which they may be used. The characteristics of anthrax – delayed effects and extreme persistence – make it useful against rear area point targets, such as airfields or broad areas (oilfields or population centers). It also could be employed covertly against key headquarters. Botulinum toxin behaves much like a chemical agent; it causes casualties in a timeframe much like mustard gas but

deteriorates like a nonpersistent agent. It could be used against troops in defensive positions and in assembly areas or against tactical command posts, but it is not likely to be employed against frontline troops.

~~(S/NF)~~ There are no confirmed delivery systems for Iraqi biological warfare agents. However, Iraq has high-capacity aerosol generators suitable for disseminating such agents over large areas. Other munitions, such as aerial bombs, cluster munitions, artillery, spray tanks, and missile warheads, are within Iraq's technical capability, but no evidence shows that they have been filled with biological agents.

Outlook

~~(S/WN)~~ Iraq's chemical capability remains significant. This capability will deteriorate over time but will not be eliminated completely. Iraq retains the ability to launch chemical strikes at any time with artillery and air power and could use chemical fills in many of its remaining SCUD missiles.

~~(S/WN)~~ Iraq may be saving its chemical weapons to launch a strike with all available assets to kill and injure Coalition forces. Such an attack might attempt to disrupt an allied attack or might be prompted by Iraq's calculation that it is facing imminent defeat and thus has little to lose. These options could be countered by continued diminishment of Iraq's capability to deliver chemical weapons: eliminating its airfields, missile launchers, and fire support assets.

~~(S/WN)~~ Saddam evidently believes that the United States has both a chemical and a nuclear capability in the theater. However, DIA doubts that would deter Saddam from employing chemical weapons against Coalition forces. DIA believes that Saddam values the force-multiplication capability of chemical weapons too highly to forgo their use in any important combat situation where they would provide substantial tactical benefits. Chemical weapons are an integral part of Iraq's military doctrine. Consequently, DIA believes that:

- Iraqi forces are virtually certain to use chemical weapons in any defensive situation in Iraq or Kuwait where they are being pushed back by an allied offensive and their defeat is imminent.
- Iraqi forces most likely will use chemical weapons as an integral part of any offensive into territory defended by US or other allied forces.
- Once Iraqi forces begin using chemical weapons against allied forces, DIA anticipates they would use their entire chemical arsenal, including missiles with chemical warheads.

- Special forces or other Iraqi agents also could deliver chemical weapons to selected targets.

~~(SAVR)~~ Iraq also must consider retaliation in planning its chemical use. Iraq probably calculates that the Coalition forces have the ability to respond with chemical weapons. This potential for retaliation, combined with other factors, may discourage chemical weapon use.

~~(SANF)~~ Iraq's capability to use biological agents in wartime is unclear. However, DIA believes some of the delivery means are similar to those for chemical weapons, although covert means might be more ideal for strategic targets and for a greater psychological effect. Indications of such use are unknown and would be difficult if not impossible to detect.

(U) This memorandum contains information as of 1 February 1991. Questions and comments may be addressed to the VP Task Force/Operational Intelligence Crisis Center (b)(3) 10 USC 424
(b)(3) 10 USC 424

Defense Intelligence Memorandum

Will the Coalition Against Iraq Remain Unified? ~~(C)~~

Key Judgments

~~(S)~~ Heavy casualties could weaken the resolve of some Coalition partners to continue offensive operations and probably would cause some smaller partners to adopt a defensive posture for the remainder of the war.

~~(S)~~ A prolonged conflict lasting into summer could cause Coalition resolve to waver because of mounting costs and growing opposition pressures.

~~(S/NF)~~ The current strong Coalition support of Arab partners for the war would not be affected by Israeli retaliation, unless it were seen as out of proportion to Iraq's provocations, or unless Jordan or Syria were drawn into conflict against Israel.

~~(S/NF)~~ European Coalition partner support probably would not be affected by Israeli retaliation, unless Israel were to launch a 25X1.6 strike against Iraq. In this case, the Coalition could unravel.

~~(S)~~ Saddam Husayn's strategy is to inflict maximum casualties and broaden the war in an effort to undermine the Coalition. Despite problems caused by heavy casualties or a protracted conflict, however, the Coalition probably would not collapse and key members probably would not reduce their military commitment significantly.

Heavy Casualties

~~(S)~~ Heavy casualties in the coming ground war could weaken the resolve of some Coalition partners to continue offensive operations, primarily because of internal political opposition. Coalition support for Operation DESERT STORM has increased since the beginning of the war because Iraq has been unable to mount a significant military response, civilian and religious targets have been avoided, and the Coalition appears to be winning the war. Widespread popular support for Iraq in Syria and President Assad's already uncomfortable position of military cooperation with the United States, Israel's principal backer, against another Arab state make him especially vulnerable to internal opposition. If his forces receive heavy casualties, Egypt, too, would be sensitive to such casualties. The United Kingdom may consider reducing the exposure of its forces if they suffer disproportionately high casualties.

Prolonged Conflict

(~~S/NF~~) A prolonged conflict lasting into the summer would weaken Coalition resolve because of mounting costs and growing opposition pressures. None in the coalition envisioned supporting a long conflict, and the costs (which all Coalition partners bear to varying degrees) will have significant impact on painful budget decisions for most. In addition, Egypt has been hit hard by lost tourist trade and expatriate remittances. Some European partners eventually may decide to reduce their commitments for financial reasons.

(~~S/NF~~) Iraq's ability to survive a Coalition offensive to this point, together with Saddam's continuing propaganda campaign, will gain increasing sympathy and will have the most serious impact on popular opinion in Egypt and Syria. Also, some Arab partners such as Oman, Bahrain, and Qatar, may lose confidence that Saddam's power will be destroyed, and they would condition their policy on the prospect of living with a powerful enemy. Particularly if Iran were drawn in to stronger support for Iraq, these states might reduce the profile of their support to the coalition.

Israeli Retaliation

(~~S/NF~~)(b)(3) 10 Most Arab states accept Israel's right to retaliate and have been surprised at Tel Aviv's restraint. Coalition support for the war will remain strong in the face of Israeli retaliation against Iraq so long as it is quick, does not target civilians, and does not draw in other countries such as Jordan and Syria. Even small countries like Qatar and Bahrain have gained the confidence to commit aircraft to the battle, probably judging that Saddam will lose and his military power will be destroyed.

~~(S)~~ Popular Arab support for Iraq and admiration for Saddam Husayn, however, is growing and would cause Arab Coalition partners to reassess their position if

Israel's response were seen as out of proportion to Iraq's provocation, or if 25X1, 6 too, might reconsider its cooperation with the Coalition.

25X1, 6

(S) A massive or prolonged Israeli attack would play into Saddam's hands politically and would risk widening the war. Barring more damaging Iraqi attacks on Israel, the Israelis probably will delay military retaliation until a later stage of the war. Their response could include fixed-wing aircraft and helicopter attacks or commando attacks against any remaining Iraqi missile launchers threatening Israel.

(S) If, however, Iraq succeeds in launching a missile or air attack that employs chemical weapons and causes major casualties in Israel, Tel Aviv will feel compelled to mount a major retaliation, 25X1, 6 Israeli 25X1, 6 would create a radical change in the political situation and could cause the Coalition to unravel. The Arab partners would feel they no longer could fight alongside the United States while Israel is seen as destroying the Iraqi people, and the European partners generally would be repelled 25X1, 6 25X1, 6

(S) European Coalition partners will continue to support DESERT STORM operations, barring Israeli 25X1, 6 The European Community has voiced strong backing for the effort to oust Saddam Husayn from Kuwait, despite concern that members maintain good relations with their Arab neighbors. NATO Ally Turkey in particular is concerned about future relations with its Arab neighbors, and President Ozal faces serious opposition from the military for his strong support for US operations from Incirlik. An Israeli-Iraqi conflict could intensify this opposition.

Iraqi Withdrawal

(S) Once the ground war begins, Iraq will be unable to negotiate a cease-fire and withdraw its forces from Kuwait. However, if Saddam Husayn were to see his key heavy divisions disintegrating in the face of the allied air campaign, he might decide to withdraw his forces before the allied ground campaign began. Many Arab states, including some in the Coalition, might be in favor of a cease-fire to avoid heavy losses and to counter popular sympathy for Iraq.

Outlook

~~(S)~~ Saddam Husayn's strategy is to inflict maximum casualties and broaden the war to include Israel in an effort to undermine the Coalition. Heavy casualties or a protracted conflict could weaken the Coalition, and a few countries might limit their support or reduce their commitment. These factors probably would not cause the Coalition to collapse or key partners to reduce their military commitment significantly. Some analysts believe that, in a protracted conflict with heavy casualties, Egypt and Syria probably would want to reduce casualties by pulling their forces back from the forward edge of the battle but that this would not change the war's outcome.

(U) This memorandum contains information as of 4 February 1991. This memorandum has been coordinated with the Military Services. Questions and comments may be addressed to (b)(3) 10 USC 424 *VP Task Force/Operational Intelligence Crisis Center* (b)(3) 10 USC 424 (b)(3) 10 USC 424

Defense Intelligence Memorandum

Iraq's Options for Employing Its Combat Aircraft Deployed to Iran (S)

Key Judgments

(S) Iraqi fighters in Iran must be considered a threat pending a determination of their status. Confirmation is lacking on fighter numbers and combat support available.

(S) The aircraft Iraq has deployed out of country or lost in combat do not constitute the major portion of the Iraqi Air Force inventory. The estimated 75 fighters deployed to Iran and 60 destroyed by the Coalition equate to roughly 15 percent of Iraq's prehostility inventory. However, Iraq's aircraft dispersal to Iran has affected Iraq's deep-strike offensive air capacity substantially.

(S) With its strategic air combat capability in Iran, Iraq has two employment options: attack from Iran or reinsert aircraft into Iraq for combat after Coalition air attacks on Iraqi airbases slacken.

(S) Iraqi aircraft flying combat missions from most bases in Iran, except on the periphery of the Persian Gulf, would require either aerial refueling or forward basing to place them within practical combat range of naval targets, targets on the Arabian peninsula, or targets in Turkey. Deep-strike operations against Israel, while possible, are less likely.

(S) Mountains running northwest to southeast in Iran would provide terrain masking for Iraqi strike aircraft before they break the coast at the last moment to attack in the Gulf region or penetrate into Turkey.

(S) NOTE: This memorandum addresses the military options for employing Iraqi combat aircraft in Iran that might be made available to Saddam Husayn. It does not seek to establish which option is more likely in a political-military context. The memorandum confronts only the issue of military feasibility.

Copy No. 6

SI-428500/91

Background

(S) Iraqi civil airliners and military transports began dispersing to various countries on 15 January, just prior to the UN deadline for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. On 23 January, Iraq deployed a number of high-value military aircraft, including airborne early warning and possibly intelligence collection and tanker aircraft, to Iran. By 26 January, large formations of fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft began to join the Iraqi aircraft exodus into Iran.

Iraqi Military Aircraft Estimated To Be in Iran (as of 3 February 1991)

Tabriz	10 Su-24/FENCERs 4 Su-22/FITTERs 4 unknown
Hamadan Military	15 Su-22/FITTERs 12 Mirage F-1s 4 Su-24/FENCERs (including 2 that crashed during landing)
Bakhtaran	6 Mirage F-1s 4 MiG-29/FULCRUMs 6 unknown
Esfahan	1 Il-76/CANDID 1 unknown transport
Manzariyeh	2 Il-76/CANDID airborne-early warning aircraft 1 Il-76/CANDID (camouflaged)
Tehran-Mehrabad	2 Dassault Falcon 20/50s 7 unknown transports
Zahedan	4 Il-76/CANDIDs
Mashhad	1 unknown transport

NOTE: Unlocated aircraft include a number of Mirage F-1s, possible MiG-23/FLOGGERs, MiG-29/FULCRUMs, transports, and helicopters; helicopters are not included in the deployed numbers.

25X1

Discussion

(S) Iraqi Air Force pilots deployed to Iran face a potentially significant drop in their already low proficiency. Since the beginning of hostilities on 16 January, the offensive air arm has stood down. Even in Iraq, with such limited combat and

training activity the Iraqi Air Force's capability to conduct a coherent attack [illegible] and [illegible] feasible. This situation will deteriorate further unless the Iraqi pilots are permitted to maintain proficiency during their deployment in Iran. Political and logistic constraints may inhibit their efforts.

(S) From the standpoint of military feasibility, the Iraqi Air Force has two options: it can attack Coalition targets from bases in Iran, or aircraft can return to Iraq for future combat employment from reconstituted airbases.

Attacks From Iran

(S) Assuming the Iraqi Air Force's intent is to attack militarily significant targets, striking Coalition naval or land targets is possible from bases in the interior of Iran (see appendix A). Unrefueled hi-lo-hi combat radii for the Mirage F-1 and the Su-24/FENCER are as follows:

- Mirage F-1: 520 nautical miles (equipped with one Exocet missile, two R-550 air-to-air missiles, two Remora jamming pods, and two external tanks).
- Su-24/FENCER D: 780 nautical miles (equipped with four 1,100-lb bombs and two external tanks).

(S) However, with the expected hostile air defense environment against Iraqi fighters, especially in the Persian Gulf area and over Iraq and Saudi Arabia, Iraqi Air Force fighters very likely will have to conduct a major portion of their flight routes at low altitudes. This factor will shorten the legs of attacking aircraft and will require aerial refueling for the Mirage F-1 as well as the Su-24/FENCER. The F-1 can refuel at low altitude; however, the Su-24, which is believed equipped for aerial refueling, has not been detected practicing this required operation. Su-24 mission planning data and tactical radii the Soviets provided for the export FENCERs indicate a significantly shorter practical mission planning radius of action than US optimum technical tables show. By comparison, the Su-24, with two 3,000-liter external tanks and eight 500-lb bombs, has a practical mission planning radius of action for a hi-lo-hi profile of only 378 nautical miles. On a lo-lo-lo profile, that same Su-24 would be limited to only 211 nautical miles.

(S) A strike against a notional target in the Persian Gulf probably would be conducted by Mirage F-1s, after redeploying from their current location at Hamadan (see appendix B for Iraqi basing options in Iran). Alternatively, Mirage F-1s could take off fuel-light and refuel at altitude prior to descent and ingress into the target area. The F-1s probably would be uploaded with Am-39 Exocet missiles or AS-30L laser-guided missiles for use against shipping or coastal targets, such as desalinization plants or powerplants. Iraqi Air Force FENCERs most likely would be employed against Coalition land targets in a battlefield air interdiction mission or perhaps in a deep-strike attempt against Riyadh.

(S) To conduct extended low-altitude attacks, the Iraqi Air Force would have to overcome pilot proficiency shortfalls caused by inadequate peacetime pilot training and exacerbated by an offensive air standdown since hostilities began on 16 January. This absence of activity would render the Iraqi Air Force only minimally able to conduct a coherent attack. Further, the general lack of Iraqi experience in force marshaling also suggests it is unlikely the Iraqi Air Force would strike using major force packages. Aircraft over targets probably would be single aircraft or two-ship formations, employing self-protection jamming, with no escorts. Attacks on targets in Turkey likewise would involve small attack packages. However, escorts for an attack on Diyarbakir Airfield would be feasible.

(S) In an attempt to enhance success, strike aircraft could deploy to Iranian bases on the coast, such as Bandar Abbas. In so doing, attacking aircraft could execute a high-speed, low-level strike, thereby minimizing detection.

Return to Iraq for Reemployment

(S) This option assumes the Iraqis could reinsert their combat aircraft into the country as the Coalition air offensive against Iraqi airfields slackens. It is worth noting that the Iraqis have restored damaged bases at which little activity has been detected or from which many assigned aircraft are estimated to have deployed, making the bases available for limited combat operations on short notice. The Iraqis could use undamaged aircraft shelters to deny intelligence collection on the numbers and locations of aircraft redeployed.

(S) If Iranian logistic support capability is limited, as is probable, Iraq would have to return its aircraft to Iraqi bases prior to a strike. The most effective return route would be through northern Iraq (probably at night), where Coalition radar surveillance and intelligence collection is limited, or possibly along civil air corridors using emission control or deception to mask the deployment. Incremental deployments to bases in central or northern Iran could indicate this. Furthermore, Iraqi emission control procedures demonstrate they can conduct at least limited undetected flight activity. This plan's weaknesses include the high probability of detection by Coalition all-source intelligence assets and the likely resumption of intensive Coalition airfield attacks.

(S) Finally, Iran could allow Iraq to keep a number of aircraft at selected Iranian airbases "on display," while larger numbers of aircraft slip into Iran for sanctuary, subsequently returning to Iraq for future operations. Current use of shelters at Iranian facilities affords the deployed Iraqi aircraft some degree of denial of their presence and activities.

Outlook

(S) As long as the Iraqi aircraft disposition in Iran is unresolved, the development of an air threat from this direction must be considered. Furthermore,

despite Iranian assurances to the contrary. Coalition planning should consider that [redacted]

(S) For the near term, Iraq is likely to concentrate on relocating its Iranian-deployed aircraft throughout Iran, as beddown plans are refined. DIA believes that Iraqi transports, at least, will continue to attempt limited missions back into Iraq. Such missions may be flown at night under emission control procedures and in civil air corridors to thwart Coalition air supremacy. Iraqi civil aircraft also could fly military-related missions. Within the next several weeks, the degree of operational capability that Iraqi fighters will be able to retain in Iran should be more apparent. Dispersal of fighters to at least one major Iranian maintenance base at Tabriz suggests some logistic support may be available for the upkeep of dispersed Iraqi aircraft. At least limited servicing has occurred at some Iranian bases, and Iraqi pre-positioning of logistic items at some Iranian bases already may have been accomplished covertly. Therefore, limited Iraqi proficiency flights may continue.

(S) Should Saddam decide to launch his aircraft in any hostile actions, he may be forced by logistic, geographic, and political concerns to redeploy them into Iraq first.

(U) This memorandum contains information as of 4 February 1991. Questions and comments may be addressed to (b)(3) 10 USC 424 *and* (b)(3) 10 USC 424 *USAF, VP Task Force/Operational Intelligence Crisis Center, Directorate for Research* (b)(3) 10 USC 424 (b)(3) 10 USC 424

Appendix A

Comparative Threat Radii

Airfield	Radius	25X1 [redacted]
Threat to Fleet Location 25X1 [redacted]		
Ahwaz	363 NM	25X1 [redacted]
Zahedan International	520 NM	
Esfahan International	405 NM	
Hamadan Military	579 NM	
Shiraz International	215 NM	
Omideyeh	318 NM	
Threat to Incirlik Air Base 25X1 [redacted]		
Hamadan Military	561 NM	25X1 [redacted]
Tabriz	519 NM	
Threat to Diyarbakir 25X1 [redacted]		
Hamadan Military	438 NM	25X1 [redacted]
Tabriz	286 NM	
Omideyeh	627 NM	

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

Appendix B

Possible Iraqi Basing Locations in Iran

25X1

Airfield	Runway Length and Width (meters)	Comments
Ahwaz	3,385 x 62 asphalt	13 aircraft revetments
Bakhtaran	2,695 x 45 asphalt	15 aircraft revetments
Bandar Abbas	3,664 x 45 asphalt	No aircraft shelters
Dezful	3,903 x 48 concrete	42 aircraft shelters
Esfahan	4,617 x 70 concrete	54 aircraft shelters
Hamadan Civ	2,329 x 45 asphalt	3 aircraft shelters
Hamadan Mil	4,458 x 52 asphalt	30 aircraft shelters
Manzariyeh	3,307 x 47 asphalt	No aircraft shelters
Mashhad	3,849 x 45 concrete	No aircraft shelters
Mehrabad	4,000 x 60 asphalt	27 aircraft shelters
Omideyeh	4,118 x 50 asphalt	22 aircraft shelters
Shiraz	5,122 x 45 asphalt	38 aircraft shelters
Tabriz	3,816 x 45 asphalt	27 aircraft shelters
Zahedan	4,320 x 44 asphalt	No aircraft shelters

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Ref: DIMs Tasked by the OICC for the MIB Meeting 5 February 1991

(b)(3) 10 USC 424 will edit the (b)(3) 10 USC 424 drafts before coordination is received on the assumption that major changes will not be required. (b)(3) 10 USC will have editors and proofers working over the weekend if drafts are available. In this manner the MIB will receive coordinated DIMs in very close, if not final form, which will speed up dissemination of those approved for dissemination.

Bring a copy of the DIM and the disk to (b)(3) 10 USC as soon as it's released for coordination. If no one is in (b)(3) 10 USC 424 slide the DIM and disk under the door. If it's after 0900, Saturday or Sunday, call Jay (b)(3) 10 USC 424 and he will get editors and proofers in to work on the product. **Ensure the author's office/home phone number, or alternate POC and numbers are included.** If the author or his/her alternate are not available, corrections will be made. Authors will then work from the corrected copy to make coordination changes, etc.

Completed Product Validation Plan, Publication Control Sheet (green), and Product Certification Form (back of green) will be required before dissemination beyond the MIB can be made.

Questions, etc should be addressed to (b)(3) 10 USC 424 (b)(3) 10 USC 424

From [redacted] for this weekend.

2.8.91 2200 All coordination complete except for DIO coord on (b)(3) 10 USC 424 this paper.

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

14.0430 FEB Cleared per (b)(3) 10 USC 424 MK

Best Available Copy

TASK RECORD OF ACTIONS

DAY/TIME RECORD OF ACTION (notes, problems)

03 1525 Feb Copy of paper #4 placed on share (Coalition Disintegration

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

04 1830 ~~AS OF~~ Per [redacted] all ...

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

Papers have been to [redacted], we have clean copies which state the Services have coordinated, although we have no confirmation that they have. Now

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

will have [redacted] over 15 copies. 10 will be given to NMCC stamped "draft". The

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

rest will be held in [redacted]. As far as

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

we know [redacted] was involved in coordinati with services. OCC has no further action except to get copies of the final products

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

2120 – Closed out tasker with [redacted]

ITF. OPS "O" Jain

04 2130 Close tasker when hard copies of DIAS are received

[illegible]

(b)(3) 10 USC 424

07 [illegible] [redacted] Report [illegible]

TASK RECORD OF ACTIONS

DAY/TIME	RECORD OF ACTION (notes, problems)
1·31·91 1200	All papers have been tasked. Need to pass copies of tasker to offices just for record-keeping. Deadlines are firm: – DIA coordinated paper by Mon morning – NSA + Services coord by Mon afternoon – Coord. drafts to (b)(3) 10 USC 424 [redacted] by 1000 Tues. These were originated by SA (b)(3) 10 USC 424 [redacted] (b)(3) 10 USC 424 [redacted] (b)(3) 10 USC 424 [redacted] can field questions if they arise. (b)(3) 10 USC 424 [redacted]
2·1·91 1215	Provided copy of tasker to (b)(3) 10 USC 424 [redacted] (b)(3) 10 USC 424 [redacted] put his draft on the shared SA as TASKER 40.134
1530	Gave (b)(3) 10 USC 424 [redacted] a RTS pub form for a map to go in the TFC paper. IEC3 Map. (b)(3) 10 USC 424 [redacted]
2·2·91 1225	To ITF for coord by 1800 Sun - TASKER 40.155 the Fix / Ctr paper. (b)(3) 10 USC 424 [redacted]
03 1310 Feb	JIC called to comment on CW paper.