

S/AF

TASKING CONTROL FORM

Classification:

OFFICE OF ORIGIN J2	DOCUMENT DATE 02/04/91-1945	DOCUMENT NO.		
	DATE RECEIVED 02/04/91-1945	DATE TASKED 02/04/91-1945	DATE REVISED	CONSUMER CODE

DIA SUSPENSE: _____ 02/05/91-1970 _____ TASKING CONTROL NO: _____ 4171 _____

ORIGINATOR'S SUSPENSE: _____ COLLAB SUSPENSE: _____

COORDINATION SUSPENSE: _____

SUBJECT **IRAQ AFTER THE WAR - REGIONAL BALANCE OF POWER**
(EXPANDED GUIDANCE FOR SUBJECT THINK PIECE)

INTERNAL ROUTING			PREVIOUS ACTION OFFICER
ACTION OICC	COLLABORATION	COORDINATION	INFORMATION

INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE

Declassified Under Authority of the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel, E.O. 13526, sec. 5.3(b)(3) ISCAP Appeal No. 2015-002, Doc. 13
Declassification Date: April 12, 2024

(b)(3) 10 USC 424
(b)(3) 10 USC 424
This is closed per Request
(b)(3) 10 USC 424
Satisfied
(b)(3) 10 USC 424
(b)(3) 10 USC 424

SUB ELEMENT INSTRUCTIONS

Attachments:
J2 NOTE
DJS GUIDANCE

SIGNATURE

RETURN WITH COMPLETED ACTION TO: _____ FINAL DISPOSITION: _____

KEYWORD SEARCH ENTRY: _____

THIS FORM BECOMES _____ UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)

FEB 04 '91 18:15



Director for Joint
Staff Intelligence, J2

P.2

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-0001

2/4

ITF CDR

I passed a SECDEF
tasker directly to

(b)(3) 10
USC 424

(b)(3) 10 USC
424

This AM; Wants

think piece on "IRSO

after the War - Regional
Balance of Power"

2. Pls see attached for
expanded guidance.

3. Now due COB 5 FEB.

OPM-Cornell

FEB 04 '91 18:15

P.3

THE JOINT STAFF

**DIRECTOR, THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-0300**

J-2//McCormell

~~SECRET~~

Mike:

(b)(3) 10 USC
424 has asked for a quick look at the question of the before/after balance of power in the Persian Gulf. The SECDEF wants to be able to discuss the issue later in the week.

Can your people line up the issue something like...

Order of battle of Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and Iraq before the start of the Gulf war...

as compared to...

The same countries after a Gulf War, assuming that we take down Iraq to the intended level...kill the air force and navy, destroy the Republican Guards and leave him with only a defensive force.

I recognize that a fair amount of assumptions are necessary in sizing the residual forces in Iraq. May want to put more than one postulation in the listing.

(b)(3) would like a quick turn around...if possible, 180A tomorrow.


CARNs

~~SECRET~~

**MICHAEL P. C. CARNs
LIEUTENANT GENERAL USAF
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF**

TASKER (REVISED) PER JMWTS STA
TASKER NO DBA NO ~~1111~~
0600 6 FEB 91

FOR RADM MICCONNELL
BT 10:00 AM 6 FEB

NEEDS: OIB INFO: ① DIVISIONS ONLY - ARMOR, INF, ETC
② COMBAT ACFT

IRAQ

CURRENT ① & ②
AFTER WAR (SEE ASSUMPTIONS) ① & ②

EGYPT, TURKEY, SYRIA, SAUDI ARABIA & IRAN

CURRENT OIB ③ & ④ ONLY

A. PRESENT IN TABLES - 1 PG FOR GROUND
(ALL COUNTRIES) & 2 PG FOR AIR

B. MAKE BAR GRAPHS TO CAPTURE INFO
(1 EACH GROUND & AIR)
(# DIVISIONS; # OF ACFT)

C. SEND TO JS ATTN RADM MICCONNELL
ASAP IN AM BY COURIER AND
CALL HIS XO

REGARDING IRAQ OIB AFTER THE WAR
DE BELIEVES PROB WILL BE:

- ① 50 DIVISION, MOSTLY INF
- ② 50% COMBAT ACFT

H: DATA\USERS\IZAIR\TASKER4.171
PREPARED BY: (b)(3) 10 USC OICC/(b)(3) 10 USC
6 February 1991 (0500)

(S) The following lists the Iraqi combat aircraft AOB that could remain at war's end assuming a 50 percent degradation at war's end.

Mirage F-1	42
FISHBED	127
FLOGGER	59
FOXBAT	16
FULCRUM	20
FITTER	91
FENCER	12
FROGFOOT	30
BLINDER	3

400

(S) An equally arbitrary, though perhaps more rational estimate, is one based on the assumptions of what Saddam Hussein intends to do with his air force during the rest of the conflict. If the IZAF is safe havened in one of several nonbelligerent countries for the rest of the war, 80 percent of its original 831 combat aircraft would probably survive. If, on the other hand, the air force is committed to combat (and assuming the Iraqi aircraft in Iran are allowed to be reinserted), probably less than 100 combat jets would remain after the shooting stops. This latter assessment is based on coalition offensive counterair capabilities and demonstrated IZAF incompetence.

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GROUND FORCES

(S) After combat, Iraq's remaining total forces would be about 50 division equivalents, based upon an assumption of 40% destruction of Iraqi forces in the KTO. Most of these would comprise forces stationed along Iraq's eastern and northern borders. Some of the first line Republican Guard Divisions would probably also survive. Iraq would be left with limited heavy armored forces as most combat-ready heavy armored units are in the Kuwait theater (should the Iraqi forces suffer greater than 40% destruction in the KTO, remaining total forces would correspondingly be decreased).

05 FEB 91

COMBAT AIRCRAFT

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>BOMBERS</u>	<u>FIGHTER/ BOMBERS</u>	<u>COMBAT-CAP TRAINERS</u>	<u>RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>ATTACK HELICOPTERS</u>
IRAN	0	187	98	27	105
IRAQ	15	728	400	12	135
SYRIA	0	537	173	15	98
SAUDI ARABIA	0	187	100	10	3
EGYPT	1	425	140	18	87
TURKEY	0	491	148	31	0


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RESPOND TO TASK 4171
PASS TO THE ITF OPS OFFICER
5 FEB 91 2295 SENT BY: COOKIE DISK #19

05 FEB 91

DIVISIONS

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>ARMORED</u>	<u>INFANTRY</u>	<u>MECHANIZED INFANTRY</u>	<u>MOTORIZED INFANTRY</u>	<u>SPECIAL FORCES</u>	<u>INDEPENDANT BRIGADES</u>
IRAN	6	33	2	0	1	43
IRAQ	8	53	4	0	1	63
SYRIA	5	0	3	0	1	7
SAUDI ARABIA	0	0	0	0	0	15
EGYPT	4	0	6	2	0	33
TURKEY	9	13	1	0	0	32

COMBAT AIRCRAFT



ENCL TO: TASKER 4.171

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 06 FEB 91 0345 SENT BY: CHERYL

06 FEB 91

WARSHIPS

COUNTRY	DESTROYERS/ FRIGATES	MISSILE BOATS	SUBMARINES	PATROL CRAFT	MINE WARFARE	AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS/CRAFT
IRAN	6	10	2*	49	5	24
IRAQ**	0	13	0	65	7	19
SYRIA	0	21	3	11	10	11
SAUDI ARABIA	4	13	0	23	4	10
EGYPT	5	27	10	76	14	20
TURKEY	18	16	15	31	38	77

* MIDGET SUBMARINES

** PRIOR TO HOSTILITIES

05 FEB 91

DIVISIONS

COUNTRY	ARMORED	INFANTRY	MECHANIZED INFANTRY	MOTORIZED INFANTRY	SPECIAL FORCES	INDEPENDANT BRIGADES
IRAN	6	33	2	0	1	43
IRAQ	8	53	4	0	1	69
SYRIA	5	0	3	0	1	7
SAUDI ARABIA	0	0	0	0	0	15
EGYPT	4	0	6	2	0	33
TURKEY	9	13	1	0	0	32

05 FEB 91

COMBAT AIRCRAFT

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>BOMBERS</u>	<u>FIGHTER/ BOMBERS</u>	<u>COMBAT-CAP TRAINERS</u>	<u>RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>ATTACK HELICOPTERS</u>
IRAN	0	187	98	27	105
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SAUDI ARABIA	0	187	100	10	3
EGYPT	1	425	140	18	87
TURKEY	0	491	148	31	0

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RESPOND TO TASK 4171
PASS TO THE ITF OPS OFFICER
6 FEB 91 0130 SENT BY:

06 FEB 91

WARSHIPS

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>DESTROYERS/ FRIGATES</u>	<u>MISSILE BOATS</u>	<u>SUBMARINES</u>	<u>PATROL CRAFT</u>	<u>MINE WARFARE</u>	<u>AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS/CRAFT</u>
IRAN	6	10	2*	49	5	24
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* MIDGET SUBMARINES

** PRIOR TO HOSTILITIES

TK 4171B

Prepared by (b)(3) 10 USC 424 /OICC Team Chief, (b)(3) 10

TASKER 4171

6 February, 1991

~~(Secret)~~

DIVISIONS (AFTER HOSTILITIES)

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>ARMORED</u>	<u>INFANTRY</u>	<u>MECHANIZED INFANTRY</u>	<u>MOTORIZED INFANTRY</u>	<u>SPECIAL FORCES</u>	<u>INDEPENDENT BRIGADES</u>
IRAN	6	33	2	0	1	43
IRAQ *	1	35	0	0	0	32
SYRIA **	5	0	3	0	1	7
SAUDI ARABIA **	0	0	0	0	0	15
EGYPT **	4	0	6	2	0	33
TURKEY	9	13	1	0	0	32

* After combat, Iraq's remaining total forces would be about 50 division equivalents, based upon an assumption of 40% destruction of Iraqi forces in the KTO. Most of these would comprise forces stationed along Iraq's Eastern and Northern borders. Some of the first line Republican Guard Divisions would probably also survive. Iraq would be left with limited heavy armored forces as most combat-ready heavy armored units are in the Kuwait Theater (should the Iraqi forces suffer greater than 40% destruction in the KTO, remaining total forces would correspondingly be decreased).

** No assumptions made for Syrian, Saudi or Egyptian casualties.

T K 4171A

Prepared by (b)(3) 10 USC 424 JICC Team Chief (b)(3) 10 USC 424

TASKER 4171

6 February, 1991

~~(Secret)~~

COMBAT AIRCRAFT (AFTER HOSTILITIES)

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>BOMBERS</u>	<u>FIGHTER/ BOMBERS</u>	<u>COMBAT-CAP TRAINERS</u>	<u>RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>ATTACK HELICOPTERS</u>
IRAN	0	187	98	27	105
IRAQ	3	397	0	0	0
SYRIA	0	537	173	15	98
SAUDI ARABIA	0	187	100	10	3
EGYPT	1	425	140	18	87
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An arbitrary, though perhaps more rational estimate than the above, is one based on the assumptions of what Saddam Hussein intends to do with his Air Force during the rest of the conflict. If the IZAF is safe-havened in one of several nonbelligerent countries for the rest of the war, 80 percent of its original 831 combat aircraft would probably survive. If, on the other hand, the Air Force is committed to combat (and assuming the Iraqi aircraft in Iran are allowed to be reinserted), probably less than 100 combat jets would remain after the shooting stops. This latter assessment is based on coalition offensive counterair capabilities and demonstrated IZAF incompetence.

~~Secret~~

DIM 22-91
January 1991

~~NOFORN~~



Defense Intelligence Memorandum

Iraq's Armed Forces After the Gulf Crisis: Implications of a Major Conflict ~~(CONF)~~

Key Judgments

~~(S)~~ If a major conflict occurs, Iraqi forces would be rendered essentially combat ineffective against coalition forces for a period of weeks or months.

~~(S)~~ Iraqi forces in the Kuwait theater of operations would suffer about 40 percent destruction. Remaining total forces would be about 50 division equivalents. Only limited heavy armored forces would remain after combat as all combat ready heavy armored divisions are in the Kuwait theater. Up to 50 percent of Iraq's fighter aircraft could remain intact if Saddam limits the employment of his aircraft, and most of his fighters remain in hardened facilities.

~~(S)~~ Most major nuclear, biological, and chemical research and development facilities would be destroyed as would most storage sites for chemical and biological weapons.

~~(S)~~ Other than perhaps Kuwait, Arab states do not favor the total destruction of Iraq's military capabilities, recognizing the need for a balance of power in the region. However, virtually all Arab states probably would support the destruction of Baghdad's weapons of mass destruction despite their belief in the value of these weapons as a deterrent against Israel.

~~(S)~~ After their reconstitution, a military force of approximately 50 divisions - mostly infantry - would be sufficient for Iraq to defend itself against potential threats from most neighbors. Israel would remain a potentially grave threat to Iraq, but the likelihood of an Israeli attack on Iraq would sharply decrease with the elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. The most significant Iranian threat would be Tehran's potential support to Iraqi Shia and Kurdish separatists.

~~(S/CONF)~~ US leverage over Iraq - except in the unlikely case of an extended US military presence in country - would be very limited.

~~Secret~~

Discussion***Iraqi Forces After A Major Conflict***

(S) If military action is necessary to force Iraq out of Kuwait, it will likely require a major US military effort and lead to the fall of Saddam Husayn. In this scenario, Iraqi military forces would suffer considerable damage with the extent of loss dependent on the force of allied attacks and how long the Iraqis choose to fight. We estimate Iraqi forces would be rendered essentially combat ineffective against coalition forces, meaning they would be unable to conduct assigned offensive and defensive operations for a period of weeks or months. We judge that Iraqi forces in the Kuwait theater of operations would suffer about 40 percent destruction. (After combat, Iraq's remaining total forces would be about 50 division equivalents. Most of these would comprise forces stationed along Iraq's eastern and northern borders. Some of the first-line Republican Guard Divisions would probably also survive. Iraq would be left with limited heavy armored forces as all combat-ready heavy armored divisions are in the Kuwait theater.)

(S) Fighter aircraft survivability would depend on how Saddam employs his assets. A substantial number of aircraft could be left after hostilities if Saddam limits their use and most are protected in hardened facilities. If Saddam chose this strategy, up to 50 percent of his fighter aircraft could survive. Supply depots and logistics infrastructure would be severely damaged and key military industries destroyed.

(S) A military resolution would largely eliminate the Iraqi nonconventional weapons threat. Most major nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) research and development facilities would be destroyed as would most storage sites for chemical and biological weapons. Limited production of agents would still be possible, but Baghdad might have little ability to weaponize them. Although maintenance and repair depots would be severely damaged, a limited ballistic launch capability could remain.

(S) After their reconstitution, a military force of approximately 50 divisions - mostly infantry - would be sufficient for Iraq to defend itself against potential threats from most neighbors, including Iran, for the next five years. Iraq could not fight a two-front war nor deter an attack from strong regional states such as Israel and Turkey. Baghdad's ability to purchase heavy weapons would depend on the international containment effort.

(S) The military's role in future Iraqi regimes will likely remain central even if Saddam is no longer in power. A successor to Saddam would mostly likely be a Baath party official, probably from Saddam's Tikriti clan, who would govern with heavy military involvement, or a military officer who would probably also be a Baath party official. Such a regime would make reconstituting the armed forces a top priority and would resume the pursuit of a strategic deterrent to support regional

resentment of wealthy Gulf Arabs among other reasons. Any regime would have to develop a modus vivendi with regional states leading to complicated and unpredictable relations due to mutual distrust and antagonisms. Baghdad's expected attempts to rearm would also raise concerns.

(S) A new regional security arrangement would be the source of considerable friction due to antagonisms among its likely participants and lack of agreement on questions such as the role of Iran and possibly other non-Arab states such as Turkey and Pakistan. For Western countries, particularly the United States, any role other than a behind-the-scenes one would not be acceptable to any regional state except perhaps Kuwait. Egypt would be the state most able to play a dominant post-crisis role in the Gulf. Iran will want to play a major role in the region and is unlikely to accept willingly any major long-term outside military presence. Iranian ambitions must be factored into any post-crisis Gulf security arrangement.

Implications for the United States

(S) US leverage over a hostile Iraq, except in the unlikely case of an extended US military presence in Iraq, would be very limited. Working through friendly Arab or Western states would have the best potential of serving US interests. No more than limited trade - essentially oil - would be likely. Any US military presence in Iraq would require stringent security measures and involve a major commitment of resources. US military forces stationed in Iraq would engender violent opposition and evoke strong negative Arab reaction, possibly jeopardizing US access to facilities in the GCC states.

(S) US influence in the region as a whole would increase initially after a defeat of Iraq but would be limited by lingering suspicions of US intentions. With Iraq's warmaking capabilities hobbled, the perceived need for US forces in the area would recede quickly. While Gulf states would view the US as the ultimate guarantor of their security, the threat from Iraq would be temporarily in abeyance, and states would feel less need for a US military presence. Most states, however, would be willing to cooperate closely with US forces in training, exercises and repositioning. One danger would be that heavy US military involvement with the GCC states - particularly major arms sales - could prompt Iran to rearm rapidly, lead to a new arms race in the region, and generate a new round of serious instability.

(S) Positive effects on the region from an Iraqi defeat would include the probable end to Saddam Husayn's rule and his personal anti-US, anti-Saudi campaign, the preservation of friendly moderate regimes in the region, a strengthened moderate bloc in the Arab League, the containment of Iraq, and at least the temporary slowdown of the arms race. There would also be high expectations for solving other regional problems, i.e., the Palestinian issue, which if not addressed would undermine US prestige and regional stability in a relatively short time.

~~Secret~~

DIM 31-91
January 1991

~~NOFORN~~



Defense Intelligence Memorandum

The Middle East After the Gulf Crisis: The Changing Strategic Environment 1991-95 ~~(S)~~

Key Judgments

~~(S)~~ Arab regional politics are likely to become more decentralized and divided generally into three regions - the Persian Gulf area, the Levant, and the Maghreb.

~~(S)~~ The Arab-Israeli conflict may be the last pan-Arab issue and the only one with the potential to force all Arab countries together.

~~(S)~~ Several regimes in the region, such as Jordan, will face serious challenges to stability and pressures for political reform.

~~(S)~~ With the possible exception of Israel, the post-crisis arms race in the region in the 1990s will be a reflection of the wealth of those countries that are able to pay.

~~(S/NF)~~ Arab countries may turn increasingly to Europe in an attempt to move away from dependence upon superpower involvement.

~~(S/NF)~~ The environment will provide great dangers as well as potential benefits for U.S. interests, in large measure dependent upon U.S. actions in resolving the Gulf crisis and, in the longer term, the Palestinian issue.

~~Secret~~

Discussion**Regime Stability and Forces for Political Change**

(S) The myth of Arab unity may have been shattered more completely by the Gulf crisis than ever before. Groupings representing loosely North Africa, the Levant, and the Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf are a more accurate reflection of regional alignments than speaking of the "Arab World". Even if the Arab League survives the next five years intact, it will be a much diminished organization. Egypt may be the only country with a foot in each region, holding some claim to leadership in the Middle East as a whole. While Cairo may seek to strengthen its leadership in the region, most governments are likely to concentrate on internal concerns and attempt to deal with the forces for change within their countries brought forth in part by this crisis.

(S) Israel may be the last issue to unite the Arab countries. Even in this case, major differences in how to deal with Tel Aviv will persist. While Islam could be a unifying factor, pan-Islamic concepts will probably not be a major force for unity in anything but an emotional sense. This is not to say that the concept will not have a popular appeal. Islam combined with nationalist or even ethnic sentiments is likely to exercise a powerful influence. However, most Islamic fundamentalist groups, while they may have international connections, will continue to concentrate on shaping events and winning support within their countries, not promoting Islamic unity throughout the region.

(S) The current Gulf crisis has revealed the inadequacies of a number of Arab regimes and shown them, to varying degrees, to be unable to answer the security and political challenges facing their countries. The legitimacy of these regimes could be increasingly called into question by the general populace due to their inability to defend their countries or the Arab world in general. Whatever position governments might have taken (i.e. pro- or anti- Iraq), their populations perceive that they were unable - collectively or individually - to solve the problem without foreign forces. The anti-Iraq Gulf countries have shown themselves unable to meet the Iraqi challenge. For example, Saudi Arabia, which has spent billions of dollars on the most sophisticated weapons and which has based its legitimacy on the defense of the two holy places, had to invite in Western, non-Muslim forces at the first sign of conflict. In the case of Egypt and Syria, the perception is slightly different. Military forces, built up supposedly to counter the threat from Israel, were in fact being used to counter another Arab country - in concert with the U.S., Israel's biggest supporter. Pro-Iraq countries could also have their problems. Those regimes that supported Iraq (such as Jordan and Yemen) will be penalized in the aftermath, causing serious economic and other difficulties to their country and populations.

(S) A push toward democratization and greater public participation in government is likely, particularly in the Gulf countries. However the crisis is ended, Kuwait

~~(S)~~ It is also unclear how much benefit the population at large will feel as a result of the debt relief. Egypt would have been unable to repay the debts in any case, and other payments may do little beyond making up for revenue lost due to the crisis such as tourism and remittances from the Gulf and Iraq. The debt relief and additional funding could provide Egypt with the breathing space to undertake some needed economic restructuring, but it is doubtful that the leadership will be bold enough to seize the opportunity.

Likely Sources of Conflict

~~(S)~~ The Arab-Israeli problem will still represent a major source of conflict. Prior to the current crisis, Israel probably no longer enjoyed a preemptive military option against the potential array of Arab adversaries, i.e. the ability to take out all the ballistic missile and nonconventional weapons targets. If the Iraqi military is destroyed, Israel may recover that option. Assuming Egypt stays out of the picture, Israel would then be concerned only with Syria and around twenty missiles in Saudi Arabia.

~~(S)~~ If the Iraqi military is weakened but retains its chemical, biological, nuclear, and ballistic missile facilities, Israel would probably conduct a preventive attack at some point to destroy these facilities. The Israeli government has gone on record stating that it could not tolerate an outcome to the current crisis which would leave these facilities intact. Tel Aviv might also calculate that Syria would really not be prepared for war with a division plus tied down in the Gulf, and other troops in Lebanon. From Israel's perspective, a post-crisis lull might provide the best opportunity to eliminate, at least temporarily, the Iraqi threat. Israeli action could lead to a wider Arab-Israeli conflict.

~~(S)~~ The initiation of an Arab-Israeli conflict might also occur over Lebanon. Syria and Israel have established a certain modus vivendi in Lebanon, but the uneasy truce could be disrupted by a renewed Palestinian effort to mount attacks against Israel from Lebanon and the potential spill over when or if the Lebanese government, assisted by Syrian forces, takes on the Shia.

~~(S)~~ On the whole, Israeli strategic thinking is not likely to change. Israel will continue to sustain its qualitative superiority over Arab forces, and therefore will attempt either to eliminate or counter each new Arab threat (for example, an air strike to take out an Iraqi nuclear facility, or development of an anti-missile capability with the Arrow program). This strategic thinking assumes a continuing level of U.S. financial and military support and the ability to maintain a qualitative edge. Because of anticipated Syrian, Jordanian, and Iraqi economic difficulties over the next few years, this strategic doctrine could remain viable over the short term.

~~(S)~~ Syrian strategic thinking, on the other hand, will have to undergo serious revision. The goal of "strategic parity" with Israel was probably never achievable, but with the reduction of Soviet support, a weak economy, and no potential strong

are seeking better relations with Tehran, and could also undertake some sort of defensive cooperation with Iran. The Gulf states will be looking for a new balance of power to play off Iranian and Iraqi strengths. The GCC might also look farther afield and attempt to bring in other regional powers such as Turkey into cooperative agreements. In our judgment, the Gulf countries would likely move very slowly into any such agreements.

The Arms Race

~~(S)~~ The arms buildup in the Middle East is unlikely to continue in the 1990s in the same way it developed in the 1980s. Weapons acquisition will become more a reflection of a country's ability to pay. The Soviet Union will not be willing or able to fund the purchases, even of allies like Syria, meaning that Damascus will be unable to fund major new purchases. Any improvement in the Syrian economy or largesse from Saudi Arabia or other Gulf countries will not cover the gap. Egypt is another case in point. U.S. funding is unlikely to continue at current levels. After the completion of the F-16 program and the M-1 co-production agreement, no major purchases have been approved for Egypt. As with Syria, domestic sources or Gulf funding will not be enough to permit weapons acquisition at close to the level of the past decade. Smaller countries like Morocco, Jordan, Yemen, and Tunisia will have similar difficulties. As for Israel, if Iraq is seriously weakened as a result of this crisis, Tel Aviv may devote somewhat less resources to defense.

~~(S)~~ Concurrently, several countries in the Gulf region led by Saudi Arabia will have the money to fund purchases from whatever source they choose, i.e., U.S., Europe, China, or the Soviet Union. While the current crisis has illustrated that simply purchasing weapons is not enough to insure security, it nevertheless has demonstrated that these countries have a clear threat. They will therefore continue to make major conventional weapons buys.

~~(S)~~ The desire to purchase or develop nonconventional weapons may be partially dependent upon how the current crisis is resolved. If Iraqi chemical, biological and nuclear facilities are destroyed, there may be some hesitation (at least on the part of the Gulf countries) to acquire such weapons. The attention of the world will be clearly focused on proliferation of nonconventional weapons and the international community will have demonstrated some desire not to tolerate them. Other countries, however, lacking funds to carry out full scale conventional modernization, might seek the relatively cheap deterrent that chemical or nuclear weapons theoretically supply. For example, Jordan's conventional capability is likely to continue to erode and provide little deterrent to any potential enemy.

Arms Limitation

~~(S/NF)~~ While the United States and the Soviet Union may exercise some constraints on arms distribution, Western Europe, China, North Korea, and even South America are not likely to be as reluctant to sell arms. If a country has the

promote them. Of even greater significance for Arab countries may be the fact that their relationship with Europe is of a different nature than that with the superpowers. If it is not exactly equal and memories of the colonial past may remain, the relationship is at least more equal than that with the United States. The European countries simply do not have the strength or desire to dominate in the same way that a superpower can. The region would like to become more independent, and (ironically perhaps) a closer relationship with Europe may enable them to move toward greater independence.

Implications for the United States

~~(S/NF)~~ The post-crisis environment in the region will pose serious risks as well as potential benefits for the United States. How the crisis ends and the United States extracts itself will clearly be of major importance to the U.S. position in the region for some time to come. If there is a prolonged military conflict and large numbers of Arabs are killed, there would be considerable resentment of the United States and distrust of its motives. Even among our erstwhile Arab allies, there would be the suspicion that the United States wanted to destroy Iraqi military power in order to benefit Israel and assure U.S. dominance in the Gulf. If the United States maintains large numbers of troops in the Gulf countries after a war, this perception would be reinforced. Under such a scenario, it would be very difficult for any Arab government to deal with the United States. A more limited scenario which only pushed Iraq out of Kuwait would cause fewer problems for U.S.-Arab relations generally.

~~(S/NF)~~ In any scenario, a large residual U.S. ground force presence would be perceived as an indication of a U.S. desire to assert control in the region and would cause significant problems for friendly regimes, particularly Saudi Arabia. While governments might see a security need for a continuing U.S. presence, most regimes would probably decide that the popular reaction against such a presence would outweigh the potential benefits it could provide.

~~(S/NF)~~ In spite of the fact that most countries in the region would be opposed to a continuing U.S. troop presence, there will probably be opportunities for greater cooperation in the areas of prepositioning, joint exercises, and planning. Saudi Arabia has seen very clearly in the events of the current crisis the need to consider prepositioning in order to significantly cut the deployment time for U.S. forces in a future crisis - perhaps to as little as a couple of weeks. Egypt, as well, might be willing to consider more prepositioning of U.S. equipment. The Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, will probably be interested in more combined exercises with U.S. Armed Forces. In the past, the Gulf countries have been hesitant to undertake such exercises and in fact, since their forces were so limited in organization and capability, there probably would have been little utility in such exercises. However, if some Gulf countries - mainly Saudi Arabia - decide to work toward fielding more capable ground forces, they would be interested in combined exercises and planning for various contingencies.

~~Secret~~

DIM 31-91

status quo, improved cooperation and trust in the region are likely. However, the dangers are significant (such as the potential for alienating most of a new generation of political actors or many of our current allies), and it will be impossible to meet the expectations of all.

*(U) This memorandum contains information as of 17 January 1991.
Questions and comments may be addressed to (b)(3) 10 USC 424*

*Middle East Team, Worldwide Division, Directorate for Estimates
(b)(3) 10 USC 424*

*This memorandum was also informally coordinated with the National
Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia.*



Time Sent
14:15

H

CONTROL NUMBER

928

TO BE COMPLETED BY REQUESTER

FROM OICC OFFICE/DESK (b)(3) 10 USC 424 PHONE NUMBER (b)(3) 10 USC 424
SUBJECT Estimates on the Post-Crisis Environment
CLASSIFICATION: Secret PAGES 21

DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS

HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS

DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

TRANSMIT TO

AGENCY	INDIVIDUALS NAME	OFFICE	ROOM NUMBER	PHONE NUMBER
<u>ITF</u>	(b)(3) 10 USC 424			

*Put on show
+ fax*

REMARKS

memorandum VP

S-018/DE

DATE:

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: DE

SUBJECT: Estimates on the Post-Crisis Environment (U)

TO: JS (RADM McConnell)

1. (U) Per your request, I am forwarding the attached Defense Intelligence Memoranda which DE prepared on the post-crisis environment. We consider their judgments to be still valid.

2. ~~(S)~~ With regard to 25X1
25X1 our views are as follows:

-- We generally agree with paragraph 3, The Short Term, with the exception that Morocco is clearly among the countries whose regimes are most threatened, and we note that Morocco is of greater than secondary concern to larger U.S. interests in the region. We also do not agree that "terrorism is greatly reduced as a threat to U.S. interests."

-- Prospects for Riyadh -- and even Cairo -- are less straightforward than indicated, and we are not certain Saudi Arabia will emerge in such a strong leadership role.

-- We believe Syria may actually be a net gainer rather than loser.

-- We do not believe prospects for the Arab-Israeli peace process will improve nor that feelings of more security in Tel Aviv will prevail.

-- We are not certain that an Iraqi defeat will present opportunities to improve relations with Tehran, especially if we "maintain a significant military presence in the Gulf," a proposition which we also believe to be less likely than stated
25X1

-- Finally, we estimate that terrorism will not decrease to pre-crisis levels as rapidly as stated.

3. (U) Please let me know if you require additional support.

2 Encls

1. DIM 22-91 (S/NF) 1 Cy
2. DIM 31-91 (S/NF) 1 Cy

JOHN J. SLOAN
Assistant Deputy Director
for Estimates

UPON REMOVAL OF ENCLOSURES THIS
DOCUMENT BECOMES ~~SECRET~~

TASK RECORD OF ACTIONS

DAY/TIME

RECORD OF ACTION (notes, problems)

- 04 2000 Feb (b)(3) 10 USC 424 received instructions to pass
 (b)(3) 10 USC 424 This to (b)(3) 10 USC 424 Times AM.
 Copies provided in Tasker Pass List File.
- 05 1105 Feb (b)(3) 10 USC 424 Per memo copy of the memo to
 (b)(3) 10 USC 424 with Mr. McConnell. Forward memo to ITF to close out ITF
- 05 1800 FEB TASKER REQUESTED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL TO DJS/J-7.
 POL (b)(3) 10 USC 424 TASKED TO (b)(3) 10 USC 424 CALL. SUSPENSE
 060600 FEB
- 2000 (b)(3) 10 USC 424 (b)(3) 10 USC 424 to include
 incorporated into... since...
 based on... the...
 conditions... that...
 along the... was...
 closed out 4.171. per Team Chief. MK
- 06 0250 FEB
- 06 0430 FEB responded for comment MK
- 06 0950 FEB closed out per Team Chief (b)(3) 10 USC 424 MK