

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECTION 10: FRD

10.1 Introduction and Summary

FRD

As indicated in previous sections, the ROKs can defeat NKA conventional attacks, and even hold for a limited period against the NKA if it is reinforced by the CPR. To reduce any uncertainties about ROK capability, a number of improvements have been suggested in previous sections. In an actual conflict, if the ROK conventional capability should come into question, US forces could be deployed. FRD

FRD

In this context, four possible postures bear consideration: (1) The

FRD

10.2 Operational Effectiveness

In considering alternative FRD postures, we would like to find an employment doctrine and a deployment which meets the following two criteria:

FRD

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
administrative and criminal sanctions.
Handle as Restricted Data on foreign
dissemination under section 14b, Atomic
Energy Act 1954.~~


~~RESTRICTED DATA
This document contains Restricted
Data Defined in the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954. Its dissemination or disclosure
to any unauthorized person is prohibited.~~

150
~~TOP SECRET~~

RESTRICTED DATA
This document contains Restricted
Data defined in the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954. Its dissemination or disclosure
to any unauthorized person is prohibited

~~TOP SECRET~~

TABLE 10-1



FRD

~~TOP SECRET~~

TABLE 10-2

OVERALL ANNUAL COSTS OF THREE TYPICAL POSTURES
(In Millions of US \$)

FRD



FRD



~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

~~This document contains Restricted Data defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Its dissemination or disclosure to any unauthorized person is prohibited.~~

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

~~Unauthorized disclosure subject to administrative and criminal sanctions. Handle as Restricted Data on foreign dissemination. Section 1.4b, Atomic Energy Act 1954.~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

of limited yield, by avoiding unnecessary civilian casualties, and by suitable declaratory policy. This second criteria is to reduce the incentive for the enemy to escalate the conflict to strategic nuclear war; preparations taken to meet this criteria will increase the credibility of our deterrent by increasing the enemy's perception of our willingness to employ FRD

FRD

FRD The first approach assumes a "typical" enemy division, deployed in a certain manner (either offensive or defensive); we then calculate how many such divisions could be destroyed by the force in question if the weapons were directed against the most lucrative portions of the target array. The target arrays selected to calculate the second and third columns are FRD The fourth and fifth columns simply give the area over which casualties would occur if all the weapons in a posture were detonated. In view of the fact that the Korean peninsula is only 200 km. wide, and that the critical invasion route is only about 40 km wide, it is clear that Postures 1 and 2 meet the first criteria above even if FRD and (depending on the will of the attackers) possibly even without outside reinforcement. Postures 3 and 4 would require additional warheads to effectively defeat NKA/CPR aggression.

Now we turn to a discussion of special features of the four postures which we considered.

10.3 The Current Posture

The current force posture provides a range of systems and weapons yield enabling the force to meet a broad spectrum of contingencies. It is dual capable in that the systems FRD can fire conventional as well as nuclear warheads. It also provides support to the ROKA as well as to US forces in some areas in which the ROKs do not have the organic delivery means. It has the capability to provide FRD

FRD It has sufficient capability to meet the operational criteria defined earlier and provides a strong deterrent to NK and Chinese aggression.

The costs associated with delivery systems are much more significant than the costs associated with the warheads themselves. Delivery systems fall into to broad categories: FRD

FRD Honest John does have a conventional warhead available to it FRD

FRD The force is very costly to maintain averaging around \$132 million annually. Table 10-4 on page 155 shows the annual cost of the FRD

FRD

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~
~~authorized disclosure subject to administrative and criminal sanctions.~~
~~Handle as Restricted Data on foreign dissemination, Section 114b, Atomic Energy Act 1954.~~

153

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
~~This document contains Restricted Data defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Its dissemination or disclosure to any unauthorized person is prohibited.~~

RESTRICTED DATA
 This document contains Restricted Data defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Its dissemination or disclosure to any unauthorized person is prohibited.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Table 10-3

FRD

FRD

FRD

1/

Total Area of Casualties 2/
 (square kilometers)

<u>Offense</u>	<u>Defense</u>	<u>Total Area of Casualties 2/</u>	
<u>75% Exposed</u>	<u>25% Exposed</u>	<u>Exposed</u>	<u>Protected</u>
		<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Personnel</u>
<u>Present Force - Posture I</u>			
2.4	1.4	176	95
9.0	4.7	869	549
18.1	10.0	1,666	1,089
26.3	14.4	3,140	1,323
32.5	17.8	4,198	1,678
<u>Battlefield Use Only Force - Posture II 3/</u>			
1.8	.9	118	64
9.9 (8.0)	5.2 (4.3)	975 (807)	620 (515)
20.9 (19.0)	11.15 (10.25)	2,011 (1,843)	1,349 (1,244)
22.8 (19.0)	12.25 (10.25)	2,304 (1,843)	1,431 (1,244)
30.6 (26.8)	16.65 (14.65)	3,892 (3,431)	1,980 (1,793)
<u>Symbolic Force - Posture III</u>			
.12	.06	8	4
1.20	.60	121	79
2.46	1.35	242	163
2.46	1.35	242	163
3.04	1.67	353	206

- 1/ Based on FRD [redacted] "Chairman JCS, special studies group. Tab A to Annex B to Appendix D. (Top Secret-Restricted Data).
 2/ Based on "Nuclear Weapons Employment Effects Data (U)," FM 101-31-2. (Secret-Restricted Data).
 3/ Figures in parentheses are for Posture II without FRD [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

TABLE 10-4

ORGANIZATION AND ANNUAL COSTS:

FRD

FRD

Direct Cost (\$ Million)	Back-Up Cost (\$ Million)	Total Annual Cost
5.2	2.2	7.4
<u>6.2</u>	<u>5.0</u>	<u>11.2</u>
11.4	7.2	18.6
8.4	6.6	15.0
8.8	7.1	15.9
<u>10.0</u>	<u>7.1</u>	<u>17.1</u>
27.2	20.8	48.0
38.6	28.0	66.6
9.0	6.8	15.8
5.5	4.6	10.1
<u>21.7</u>	<u>18.0</u>	<u>39.7</u>
36.2	29.4	65.6
74.8	57.4	132.2

1/ Includes PEMA, OMA, and MPA.

2/ Cost of transients, training pipeline, support base, etc.

3/ Does not include costs of FRD

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
administrative and criminal sanctions.
Handle as Restricted Data on foreign
discrimination. Section 114b, Atomic
Energy Act 1954.~~

~~RESTRICTED DATA
This document contains Restricted
Data defined in the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954. Its dissemination or disclosure
to any unauthorized person is prohibited.~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
administrative and criminal sanctions.
Handle as Restricted Data on foreign
dissemination. Section 114b, Atomic
Energy Act 1954.

It may be possible to restructure the force with different mixes of systems and FRD with a resultant savings, yet still meet the operational criteria which we established for the FRD. Three alternative force postures were considered which are discussed in the following paragraphs. Each of these forces serves the operational criteria but with varying risks or degradation. The alternatives we considered are:

FRD

The program implications of these alternatives are also indicated; however, additional analyses would be useful to determine the exact force structure and how it should be obtained.

FRD

Under this concept, all categories of systems and weapons were retained. Delivery systems were limited and weapons mix was varied in order to orient the force more closely to a tactical battlefield role as back-up in event ROK conventional forces were unable to meet, for various reasons, an initial NK or NK/ChiCom attack. FRD

FRD

Posture 2 is presented in two versions: FRD

FRD

FRD is slightly more effective than the FRD if the enemy uses low-level tactics in attacking the batteries, and both systems are inferior to the mobile (and therefore hard to target) Hawk system against low-level attack. In one war simulation, 72 aircraft attacked Hercules sites and airfields (which were defended by nine Hawk batteries), with the results indicated in Table 10-5 below:

TABLE 10-5

COMPARISON OF AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS

FRD

Annual Direct Cost (Millions

of dollars for 9 HAWK

Batteries, 6 Hercules

Batteries)

14.0

14.0

10

10

Annual Direct Cost/Kill

.58

.48

1.67

1.41

1/ Source: Vol. II, FRD
JCS Special Studies Group, June 1967.

Chairman,

* When available in the inventory.

156
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
This document contains Restricted
Data defined by the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954. Its transmission or disclosure
to any unauthorized person is prohibited.

~~TOP SECRET~~

On the other hand, let us suppose the enemy attempts to penetrate at high altitude, but avoids flying close to Hercules sites. The separation between sites is about FRD and thus the enemy will be forced (if he wants to overfly the northwest ROK) to fly within about FRD of a Hercules site. At this range the SSPK is FRD and FRD. The overall ROK air defense issue is taken up in detail in Section 4, Chapter III (ROK and US Air Forces for Korean Defense).

If some of the Hercules batteries are destroyed, then engagement at longer ranges may be necessary. Table 10-6 on the following page summarizes the expected number of kills achieved under various assumptions as to range and authorization FRD

FRD

The strength of this force should be adequate to meet all of the operational criteria as well as serving as a powerful deterrent to NK or NK/ChiCom aggression.

If the two US divisions now in Korea were withdrawn, leaving behind a FRD then it would be necessary to leave behind not only artillery battalions FRD but also engineers, a target acquisition battalion, an infantry battalion (for security), and other support forces. The total annual costs of a representative FRD averages from \$126 to \$136 million annually, including costs of FRD FRD. Organization and costs are shown in Table 10-7 on page

10.5 FRD

The purpose of this force would be to retain in country a FRD with limited capability primarily to demonstrate US resolve to

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~
~~authorized disclosure subject to~~
~~administrative and criminal sanctions.~~
~~Handle as Restricted Data on foreign~~
~~dissemination. Section 114b, Atomic~~
~~Energy Act 1954.~~

157
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
~~This document contains Restricted~~
~~Data defined in the Atomic Energy Act~~
~~of 1954. Its dissemination or disclosure~~
~~to any unauthorized person is prohibited.~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

TABLE 10-6

FRD



158
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

TABLE 10-7

ORGANIZATION AND ANNUAL COSTS: FRD [REDACTED] FORCE

FRD	No. of Men	Direct Cost (\$ Million) ^{1/}	Back-Up Cost (\$ Million) ^{2/}	Total Annual Cost ^{3/}
[REDACTED]	1,308	12.6	9.9	22.5
[REDACTED]	560	7.2	4.2	11.4
[REDACTED]	914	9.0	6.8	15.8
[REDACTED]	616	5.5	4.6	10.1
[REDACTED]	<u>1,815</u>	<u>10.4</u>	<u>13.6</u>	<u>30.0</u>
[REDACTED]	5,213	50.7	39.1	89.8
[REDACTED]	950	10.7	7.1	17.1
[REDACTED]	6,163	61.4	46.2	106.9

^{1/} Includes PEMA, OMA, and MPA.

^{2/} Cost of transients, training pipeline, support base, etc.

^{3/} FRD [REDACTED]

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~
Unauthorized disclosure subject to administrative and criminal sanctions. Handle as Restricted Data on foreign dissemination. Section 114b, Atomic Energy Act 1954.

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
This document contains Restricted Data defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. No reproduction or disclosure to any unauthorized person is prohibited.

~~TOP SECRET~~

weapons should ROK conventional force be unable to defend against a North Korean attack. It would serve as a deterrent not only to NK but to Chinese Communist participation in a combined attack. This force, as a symbol of US determination FRD should meet the purposes and operational criteria FRD earlier with the exception that the ability of the force to defeat a combined NK/ChiCom attack would be greatly reduced. Heavy reliance would be placed FRD to delay the enemy until US combat forces could be deployed. Early augmentation of the force would probably be required. The total costs are around \$43 million as shown in Table 10-8 below:

TABLE 10-8

ORGANIZATION AND ANNUAL COSTS: FRD

<u>Unit</u>	<u>No. of Units</u>	<u>No. of Men</u>	<u>Direct Cost^{1/} (\$ Million)</u>	<u>Back-up Cost^{2/} (\$ Million)</u>	<u>Total^{3/} Annual Cost</u>
FRD					
8" Arty Bn	1	436	4.2	3.3	7.5
Engineer Bn	2	914	9.0	6.8	15.8
Infantry Bn	1	615	5.6	4.6	10.2
Support, etc.	1	600	5.4	4.5	9.9
TOTALS		2,565	24.2	19.2	43.4

1/ Includes PEMA, OMA, and MPA.

2/ Cost of transients, training pipeline, support base, etc.

3/ FRD

10.6 Rapid Deployment Force

The Rapid Deployment Force would be a tailored FRD designed to meet the needs of present FRD but stationed elsewhere in FRD CONUS. FRD

FRD The effectiveness of this alternative would depend first, upon the immediate availability of the airlift required to position the force in Korea as well as assurance that airfields would be available in Korea to receive the force. Secondly, ROK capabilities must be such as to insure a successful initial defense in order to provide time for deployment of the force. The costs of maintaining this force are greatly reduced from present costs (an annual reduction of approximately \$4,000 per man for CONUS deployment, see Section 11). However, the force stationed in the US would not be effective as a symbol of US commitment to FRD defend Korea. Consequently their deterrence value to back-up combat power

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~
Unauthorized disclosure subject to administrative and criminal sanctions. Handle as Restricted Data on foreign dissemination. Section 114b, Atomic Energy Act 1954.

160
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
This document contains Restricted Data as defined in Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Its dissemination or disclosure to any unauthorized person is prohibited.

~~TOP SECRET~~

required in event the ROKs are unable to defend against a surprise attack would be open to question.

10.7 Security FRD

North Korea has attempted a number of raids into the South, and her seizure of the PUEBLO and destruction of the EC-121 demonstrate her willingness to run great risks to embarrass the United States. Thus, it is possible that she could organize a raid FRD. If such a raid met with some success, it could create political pressure against FRD. This would be especially true if FRD.

FRD

The current posture includes FRD

FRD

Table 10-9 on the following page gives the security requirements for the various types of FRD under two alternative assumptions: (1) That the present conditions in Korea persist (i. e., that the North Koreans continue to mount raids against the South); (2) that "peaceful" conditions return to Korea (i. e., the North Koreans cease mounting such raids). Table 10-10, p.164 gives the total security force required by the various postures, together with their approximate costs.

10.8 Over-all Dollar Costs

The dollar costs associated with FRD fall into two categories: annual costs and "one-time costs" (investment costs or "wind-fall profit" FRD).

These, in turn, break down into costs associated with FRD themselves, with their delivery systems, and with the security forces which are required to protect them in the Korean environment.

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~
~~authorized disclosure subject to administrative and criminal sanctions. Handle as Restricted Data on foreign dissemination. Section 114b, Atomic Energy Act 1954.~~

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
~~This document contains Restricted Data defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Its dissemination or disclosure to any unauthorized person is prohibited.~~

/161
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
administrative and criminal sanctions.
Handle as Restricted Data on foreign
dissemination. Section 114b, Atomic
Energy Act 1954.

~~TOP SECRET~~

TABLE 10-9

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
This document contains Restricted
Data defined in the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954. Its dissemination or disclosure
to any unauthorized person is prohibited.

FRD

~~TOP SECRET~~

162 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

Table 10-11, p. 165, gives the annual maintenance cost for FRD under the different postures. If the true annual costs associated with FRD were calculated more exactly, they would include the costs of FRD FRD FRD. This is especially true for Postures III and IV, which are explicitly based on the notion FRD if they are needed. All three postures (other than the current force posture) FRD there would be one-time costs or savings obtained by the shift from Posture I. Table 10-12 summarized these costs and savings (the latter are entered as "negative costs").

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~
Unauthorized disclosure subject to administrative and criminal sanctions. Handle as Restricted Data on foreign dissemination. Section 114b, Atomic Energy Act 1954.

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
This document contains Restricted Data defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Its dissemination or disclosure to any unauthorized person is prohibited.

163
~~TOP SECRET~~


FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
administrative and criminal sanctions.
Handle as Restricted Data on foreign
dissemination. Section 114b, Atomic
Energy Act 1954.

~~TOP SECRET~~

TABLE 10-10

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
Unauthorized disclosure of Restricted
Data is prohibited by the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954. The disclosure or disclosure
to any unauthorized person is prohibited.

SECURITY PERSONNEL REQUIRED FOR VARIOUS POSTURES



FRD

Cost (Annual) ^{1/}
Present Peaceful
Conditions Conditions

57.0 14.5

34.7 14.5

8.4 4.2

^{1/} Includes direct costs plus back-up costs (see Table 10-11), in millions.

~~TOP SECRET~~


~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~
 Unauthorized disclosure subject to
 administrative and criminal sanctions.
 Handle as Restricted Data on foreign
 dissemination. Section 114b, Atomic
 Energy Act 1954.

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
 This document contains Restricted
 Data defined in the Atomic Energy Act
 of 1954. Its dissemination or disclosure
 to any unauthorized person is prohibited.

~~TOP SECRET~~

TABLE 10-11

FRD



FRD

Total Annual Cost (Thousands of Dollars)

I	II	III	IV
134.4	0	0	0
150.72	0	0	0
174.00	0	0	0
132.50	0	0	0
0	509.	0	0
148.5	225.	36.0	0
336.0	0	0	0
11.73	39.1	39.1	0
62.2	62.2	62.2	0
31.90	0	0	0
5.60	0	0	0
35.20	32.0	32.0	0
151.20	0	0	0
84.78	0	0	0
230.49	0	0	0
323.44	0	0	0
61.68	0	0	0
61.68	0	0	0
142.02	0	0	0
312.06	371.5	74.3	0
<u>190.57</u>	<u>501.5</u>	<u>100.3</u>	<u>0</u>
3,780.72	1,740.3	343.9	0
7,561.44	3,480.6	3,824.5	3,480.6 (IV) 343.9 (V)

FRD

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

TABLE 10-2

RD



RESTRICTED DATA

~~This document contains Restricted Data defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Its dissemination or disclosure to any unauthorized person is prohibited.~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SECTION 11

ALTERNATIVE US DEPLOYMENTS

11.1 Summary

As will be discussed more fully in Chapter Seven, "Political Constraints", the US has actively participated in the domestic affairs of Korea since 1945. During this period of involvement, the ROK has greatly increased its capabilities to sustain itself economically and to provide for its own security. With improvements in its land forces through modernization and the establishment of an adequate support infrastructure outlined earlier, increased ROKA capabilities for self-support will reduce the need for a continuing US land force deployment. Yet the reduction or disengagement of US land forces creates a certain political and military dilemma. The principal problem revolves around how to obtain ROK acceptance of their own ability to provide for their security while, at the same time, demonstrate to North Korea that the US is neither abandoning its long-time ally nor preparing it for an invasion of the north. The first problem can be largely offset once ROKA combat modernization and the improved support infrastructure are accomplished. Once these programs are initiated, they should serve to demonstrate to North Korea a greatly increased ROK capability for defense, acting as a further deterrent to open hostilities. Notwithstanding, political constraints, such as uncertainties surrounding NK intentions and actions, ROK political stability and the impact of a US force reduction or withdrawal together with the pace of improvements to the ROKA may require a continuing US land force presence for the foreseeable future.

Assuming that the ROKA modernization program together with the establishment of an adequate support infrastructure (with or without US support units) provide the conditions for a change in US land force deployment, either on a phased basis as these programs proceed, or as a trade-off to obtain the desired ROKA improvement programs, the problem is how to initiate disengagement of US land forces yet meet the requirements of the political constraints. To provide a range of options with which to consider this problem, we have considered three basic alternative land force deployments, each with a number of variations which are representative of the broad range of sub-options available. These alternatives are summarized below and discussed in para. 11.2 - 11.4:

1. Present deployment of two divisions with the following variations:
 - a. Troop List I - Two divisions at 80% strength (current situation).
 - b. Troop List II - Two divisions at 90% strength through the addition of 8,500 spaces.
 - c. Troop List III - Two divisions at 90% strength plus some modest modernization through the addition of 13,101 spaces.

~~SECRET~~

TABLE 11-2
ANNUAL COST OF ALTERNATIVE US DEPLOYMENTS 1/
 (1968 Cost Index)

~~SECRET~~

<u>Korea Deployment Alternatives</u>				<u>Cost Saving Deployment Variations</u>			
<u>Alternative 1 - Present Korea Deployment 2/</u> (2 Division Force)				<u>CONUS Active Deployment</u> (Cost Reduction)		<u>CONUS Reserve</u> (Cost Reduction)	
<u>Troop List I 3/</u> (2 Div @ 80% TOE)	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Total Cost 1/</u> Man (000's \$)	<u>Total Cost</u> (Million's \$)	<u>Total Reduction/Man</u> (000's \$)	<u>Total Reduction</u> (Million's \$)	<u>Total Reduction/Man</u> (000's \$)	<u>Total Reduction</u> (Million's \$)
Div Level Forces	21,193	17,883	379.0	4,392	93.1	13,480	285.7
SPT Level Forces	30,277	16,403	496.6	3,951	119.6	12,868	389.6
PROV-MAAG-K 6/	1,275		21.4		5.0		15.1
	52,745		897.0		217.7		690.6
Troop List II (Troop List I + 8,500 for 2 Div @ 90%)							
Div Level Forces	3,584		64.1		15.7		48.1
SPT Level Forces	4,816		69.5		19.0		63.2
Sub-Total	8,300		133.6		34.7		111.5
TOTAL	61,245		1,030.6		252.4		812.1
Troop List III (Troop List I + 13,101 for Modernization and 2 Div @ 90%)							
Div Level Forces	3,584		64.1		15.7		48.3
SPT Level Forces	9,517		156.1		37.3		122.2
Sub-Total	13,101		220.2		52.0		170.5
TOTAL	65,846		1,117.2		269.7		861.1
Alternative 2 - One Division Force							
Troop List IV (Full Structured US Div + Sep Inf Bde w/Airml Bg @ 90%) 244/							
Div Level Forces	18,040		322.6		79.2		243.2
SPT Level Forces	35,287		578.8		139.4		436.1
Sub-Total	53,327		901.4		218.6		699.3
PROV-MAAG K 6/	1,275		21.4		(5.0) 7/		--
TOTAL	54,602		921.8		218.6		699.3
Troop List V (1 Div w/Min SPT Force - all US) 2/							
A. 100% TOE (All US)							
Div Level Forces	16,863		301.5		71.7		226.3
SPT Level Forces	12,848		200.7		50.8		165.3
Sub-Total	29,711		502.2		122.5		391.6
PROV-MAAG K 6/	1,275		21.4		(5.0) 7/		--
TOTAL	30,986		523.6		122.5		391.6
B. 90% TOE (All US)							
Div Level Forces	15,147		271.4		66.6		204.6
SPT Level Forces	11,563		189.6		45.6		149.0
Sub-Total	26,710		461.0		112.2		353.6
PROV-MAAG K 6/	1,275		21.4		(5.0) 7/		--
TOTAL	27,985		482.4		112.2		353.6
C. 80% TOE (All US)							
Div Level Forces	13,400		251.2		59.2		181.7
SPT Level Forces	10,278		168.6		40.7		132.2
Sub-Total	23,768		419.8		99.9		313.9
PROV-MAAG-K 6/	1,275		21.4		(5.0) 7/		--
TOTAL	25,043		441.2		99.9		313.9
FRD							
			89.8		20.6		67.1
			32.8		7.9		25.7
			122.0		28.5		92.8
			(2.8) 8.2		(.8) (2.5) 7/		--
			(125.4) 130.8		28.5		92.8

1/ Costs are derived from Table 11-3. Includes direct/indirect costs; does not include costs of US units supporting ROKA.
 2/ Does not include 11,000 MATUSA per troop list which are funded by ROKG.
 3/ Current strength and deployment.
 4/ Could be used as Regional Reserve under Alternative 2 with replacement of 11,000 MATUSA with US at additional cost of approximately 187.7 million.
 5/ See Sec 10, FRD support Force cost factors used.
 6/ SPT Force Cost Factors used; includes total MAAG (Army, Air Force, Navy) plus \$4,000 per 178 LN Civ employees.
 7/ Not included in total.
 8/ Estimated MAAG strength increase for ROKA modernization requirements - all services.
 9/ Structured all US to permit dual role as regional reserve.
 10/ See Section 11.6. Spt level cost factors used plus \$4,000 per (50) 150 LN civ.

~~SECRET~~

TABLE 11-3
ANNUAL US COST-CURRENT KOREA LAND FORCE DEPLOYMENT FACTORS FOR A TYPE FORCE ^{1/}

Unit	Nbr	Strength	Current Cost - Korea Deployment (millions of dollars)					Reduction in Costs - CONUS Redeplo (millions of \$)						
			Direct			Sub-total	Backup	Indirect		Sub-total	Total	Direct		Indirect
			PRMA	OMA	MPA			OMA	MPA			Sub-total		
<u>Division Level Forces</u>														
Inf	10	6522	4.0	12.8	39.6	56.4					4.6	8.3	12.9	
Mech Bn	4	2892	1.8	6.6	17.4	25.8					2.4	3.6	6.0	
Tank Bn	3	1437	3.0	4.5	8.9	16.4					1.7	2.9	4.6	
Arty Bn/105	6	2308	2.0	4.8	14.6	21.4					1.8	3.0	4.8	
Arty Bn/155-8"	2	956	.8	2.2	5.8	8.8					.8	1.2	2.0	
Arty Bn/175	1	412	.4	1.2	2.5	4.1					.5	.5	1.0	
Egt Agn Bn	1	616	.3	1.4	3.8	5.5					.5	.8	1.3	
AC Sqdn	2	1152	.8	3.2	7.6	11.6					1.0	1.6	2.6	
Eng Bn	2	914	.2	2.4	6.4	9.0					1.0	1.4	2.4	
Sig Bn	2	876	.4	3.2	6.4	10.0					1.0	1.2	2.2	
HJ Bn	2	390	.4	1.0	2.6	4.0					.4	.6	1.0	
Lt. Amb Co.	2	186	1.8	1.8	1.8	5.4					.3	.3	.6	
GS Hel Co	2	310	.2	1.4	2.4	4.0					.2	.4	.6	
Div Base	2	2222	4.2	8.2	26.1	38.5					2.5	5.9	8.4	
Sub-total		21,193				220.9	123.5	34.6	158.1	379.0 ^{1/}			50.4	42.7
<u>Support Level Forces</u>														
Arty Bn/8"	2	872	.8	2.2	5.4	8.4					.8	1.2	2.0	
Arty Bn/175	1	412	.4	1.2	2.5	4.1					.5	.5	1.0	
Sgt Bn	1	301	1.2	2.1	1.9	5.2					.8	.4	1.2	
NIKE Bty	6	950	.4	3.6	6.0	10.0					1.4	1.2	2.6	
HAWK Bn	4	2168	1.6	9.6	14.0	25.2					3.6	3.2	6.8	
Vul-Chap Bty	4	457	.8	1.8	2.6	5.2					.5	.5	1.0	
Eng Bn	4	2702	2.1	10.4	27.5	30.0					2.3	2.4	4.7	
HJ Bn	1	274	.3	.3	1.6	2.2					-	.2	.2	
Supt Base	2	15044	15.1	29.1	91.4	135.6					10.2	19.6	29.8	
Sub-total		23,180				225.9	119.7	34.7	154.4	380.32 ^{1/}			49.3	42.5
TOTAL		44,373				446.8			312.5	759.3			99.7	85.2

1/ Cost per man \$17,449.
2/ Cost per man \$16,403.
3/ Cost reduction per man \$4,392.
4/ Cost reduction per man \$3,951.

ment Active

Reduction in Costs - CONUS Reserve
(millions of \$)

<u>Total</u>	<u>Direct</u>	<u>Indirect</u>	<u>Total</u>
	33.4		
	15.3		
	8.3		
	12.2		
	5.1		
	2.1		
	3.3		
	7.0		
	5.4		
	6.3		
	2.2		
	2.4		
	2.9		
	<u>21.7</u>		
<u>93.1</u> ^{3/}	127.6	158.1	285.7 ^{5/}
	4.8		
	2.2		
	2.4		
	6.0		
	14.3		
	2.8		
	19.8		
	1.5		
	<u>77.1</u>		
<u>91.8</u> ^{4/}	<u>130.9</u>	<u>154.4</u>	<u>285.3</u> ^{6/}
184.9	258.5	312.5	571.0

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2. Reduction of forward deployment to one division force with the following variations:

a. Troop List IV - A fully structured US division, plus a separate infantry brigade with a small airmobile package at 90% strength but including KATUSAs.

b. Troop List V - A fully structured US division with a minimum support package, manned at 100%, 90% and 80% TOE, but only with US personnel so that it can also be used more readily as a regional reserve force.

3. Withdraw two divisions leaving only a small residual force with the following variations:

a. FRD

b. An enlarged Military Assistance Advisory Group to assist in the modernization and support infrastructure improvement programs.

c. Reforger Cadre (see para. 11.6).

Finally, cost-saving variations for all of the alternative US deployment which we considered were computed in which the forces were withdrawn to CONUS active deployment and to CONUS Reserve.

A summary of the costs for these various alternatives and deployments is shown in Table 11-1 on the following page.

Table 11-2, page 100, provides a detailed break-out of costs between divisional and support level forces and the MAAG for all alternatives and the Korea/CONUS deployments. Cost factors upon which Tables 11-1 and 11-2 are based are contained in Table 11-3, p. 101. Troop lists upon which the representative deployments are based are at Appendix E, Annex II.

In addition to these basic alternatives and their variations, two other options were developed. First, relocation of the divisional forces to less vulnerable positions was considered. One-time construction costs for this option ranged from 81.2 million for one division to 297.0 for two divisions. Second, a Reforger concept was developed whereby a division (brigade) force would be reinserted from CONUS using pre-positioned equipment. Costs for this option ranged from \$79 million for a brigade size force to \$141 million for a division size force. These costs would be reduced to \$8.7 million for a brigade to \$26.3 million for a division if one withdrawn division was inactivated. These variations are discussed in para. 11.5 and 11.6.

11.2 Alternative 1 - Present Deployment of Two Divisions

Under the present deployment, the two US divisions are manned at under 80% TOE and have attached approximately 11,000 KATUSAs.* Total numbers around 52,700. Under the first variation to this alternative.

* KATUSAs are funded out of the ROKs.

~~SECRET~~

TABLE 11-1

SUMMARY OF ANNUAL COSTS
ALTERNATIVE US KOREA LAND FORCE DEPLOYMENTS 1/ and 7/
(Millions of \$US at 1968 Prices)

	<u>Strength</u>	<u>FY70</u>	<u>FY71</u>	<u>FY72</u>	<u>FY73</u>	<u>FY74</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>FY70-74</u>
<u>Alternative I: (Present 2 Div Deployment) 2/</u>							
a. Troop List I	52,745	897.0	897.0	897.0	897.0	897.0	4,485.0
b. Troop List II (a + 8,500)	61,245	897.0	1,036.6	1,036.6	1,036.6	1,030.6	5,043.4
c. Troop List III (a + 13,101)	65,846	897.0	1,117.2	1,117.2	1,117.2	1,117.2	5,365.8
<u>Alternative II: (One Div Force) 2/</u>							
Troop List IV (1 Div + 1 Bde)	54,602	897.0	897.0	897.0	921.8	921.8	4,534.6
Troop List V (1 Div, All US)							
100%	30,986	897.0	897.0	897.0	523.6	523.6	3,738.2
90%	27,985	897.0	897.0	897.0	482.4	482.4	3,655.8
80%	25,043	897.0	897.0	897.0	441.2	441.2	3,573.4
FRD					89.8	89.8	179.6
					32.8	32.8	65.6
					8.2	8.2	16.4
					130.8	130.8	261.6
					(122.6)	(122.6)	(245.2)

- 1/ Assumes US force deployments in Korea take place during FY73 as ROKA modernization progresses; see Table 11-2 for detail costs.
- 2/ All troop lists include the MAAG; do not include 11,000 KATUSA.
- 3/ FRD
- 4/ See para 11.4.
- 5/ Cadre required to maintain prepositioned equipment for division under Reformer concept (see para 11.6 and Table 11-2).
- 6/ Numbers in parenthesis are minus cost of Reformer Cadre.
- 7/ Does not include one-time costs of activations, inactivations and redeployment construction costs.

~~SECRET~~

strengths to around 90% with a little more than half of the increase going to support level forces. A second variation was an increase of 13,101 spaces over present strength. This increase would raise division manning to approximately 90% and would also provide some modernization in aviation, intelligence, air defense and support capabilities. Annual costs for the present deployment is about \$897 million with costs for the two variations ranging from over \$1 billion for the 8,500 space increase to \$1.1 billion for the 13,000 increase. Detail costs are shown in Table 11-2. Troop lists to support the two force increases are included at Appendix A, Annex II.

11.3 Alternative 2 - Withdraw One Division

We considered under Alternative 2 two separate variations. In the first case, the division was restructured at 90% to a full G-series TOE plus a separate infantry brigade, plus support with a strength of around 54,600. This roughly equates with the strength of the present two division force (52,700). An Aviation Group was included which would permit lift of about two infantry battalions. Under this concept, a brigade-type force could be positioned on the DMZ, with the brigade rotating periodically with the brigades of the division. Cost for this alternative was around \$921 million vs. \$897 million for the present two division force. As will be discussed in para. 11.5, it would be possible to reposition the division south of Seoul where with some tailoring (i. e., 90% but without KATUSAs), it could be considered as a regional reserve force. Replacing the 11,000 KATUSAs would cost approximately \$187 million annually. Relocation costs range from \$81 to \$148 million (one-time) depending on location.

In the second variation, a division level force with a Corps Headquarters and a minimum support force was structured at 100, 90 and 80% strength with only US personnel to permit more rapid deployment as a regional reserve as well as in the Korea security role. Strength of the force ranged from over 30,000 at 100% to 25,000 at 80%. Costs for this option ranged from \$441 million for the 80% force to \$523 million for the 100% force. Although not essential, this force should probably be positioned south of Seoul to permit it greater flexibility for deployment out of country. The one-time relocation costs indicated above would apply.

Detail costs for this alternative are reflected in Table 11-2. Troop lists for the two variations are included at Appendix A, Annex II.

11.4 Alternative 3 - Withdraw Two Divisions

Under this alternative both divisions were withdrawn leaving in-country only a small residual force consisting of a FRD [redacted] and an enlarged MAAG. The FRD [redacted] would be structured at around 5213 spaces and would contain its own security forces. It would cost about \$90.0 million annually.

In order to anticipate the requirements of the modernization and support infrastructure improvement programs, the MAAG was increased to 2,000 (550

~~SECRET~~