Eisenhower and the Red Menace, Part 2
By Michael J. Birkner
© 2001 Michael J. Birkner
So how can scholars legitimately argue that Ike helped kill Joe McCarthy? Because 1954 was not 1953. Once McCarthy took on the army, as he did with the Fort Monmouth investigation, it was inevitable that the President would act, usually behind-the-scenes, to thwart him and ultimately to bring him down.
Eisenhower had expected that a newly aggressive security program would blunt McCarthy's investigations. He was mistaken. The administration's secondary assumption— that McCarthy might be inclined to back off the communist issue if given the right inducements— also proved faulty. So did the third— the assumption that public would gradually lose interest in communist subversion and McCarthy would have less and less to talk about. But in a political climate where the cold war remained frigid, and in which the Oppenheimer and Rosenberg cases were front-page news for months on end, McCarthy and the communist question simply did not evaporate.
The origins of a more concerted administration effort may be dated to a memorandum circulated in the White House before Christmas 1953. Written by two relatively junior staff aides, Stanley Rumbough and Charles Masterton, the memorandum highlighted the costs of appeasing McCarthy and called on the President to take a more openly critical stance on McCarthy. Eisenhower's failure to challenge or repudiate McCarthy, Rumbough and Masterton wrote, conveyed the impression that he was weak. Taking McCarthy on directly, they argued, might entail some political costs, notably in relations with Congress. But this possible problem would be outweighed by political gains as the public perceived Ike as a "fighter." Eisenhower, they noted, held high ground. "He can appeal to the people now as a popular leader who has been attacked. Further, in speaking out against McCarthyism he is on the side of the angels. He can answer McCarthyism in the spirit of fair play and in the very words of the founding fathers, the Bill of Rights, Washington and Lincoln."35
Whether the President ever saw this memorandum is doubtful, and in any case, he was not willing to follow its prescription. But events in 1954 would force the hand of Eisenhower's staff in dealings with the Wisconsin senator and ultimately would encourage what Fred Greenstein and others have described as Eisenhower's "hidden hand" assault on McCarthy.
Early in January 1954 McCarthy announced his plan to subpoena members of the army's loyalty and security board regarding their actions in cases at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. It was in response to this McCarthy initiative that Herbert Brownell convened a secret meeting of key administration figures, seeking their counsel about the possible costs and benefits of refusing to honor McCarthy's subpoenas. At this meeting, which originally focused on questions of separation of powers, Army Counsel John G. Adams described the persistent demands McCarthy and his aide Roy Cohn had been making for special treatment for David Schine, another McCarthy aide, who had recently been drafted into the army.36
As the assembled aides were digesting John Adams's amazing story about Private Schine's service, Assistant to the President Sherman Adams suggested that a chronology be drawn up of McCarthy's efforts to secure special privileges for David Schine. The chronology produced by the army counsel was leaked to the press on March 11 and became the basis for a congressional investigation of McCarthy. McCarthy denounced the chronology as blackmail to drive him off his investigations, which he vowed to continue and to expand. It was a messy situation— and one in which the outcome was far from clear.37
In truth, though it was not evident at the time, the tide was turning against the senator even before the famous televised hearings of May and June 1954. McCarthy's bullying of witnesses, including his tongue-lashing of Fort Monmouth commanding officer Gen. Ralph Zwicker (a much-decorated World War II veteran) had not played well for the senator.38 Worse for McCarthy, one of his most valuable allies, FBI director J. Edgar Hoover, concluded that he was not a reliable ally in the fight against communism. At a crucial juncture when the senator challenged the White House version of a key document, Hoover publicly sided with Ike.39 Nor was it a matter simply of luck or good staff work. Eisenhower made shrewd moves. Among them were giving speeches outlining what his administration had done to assure that no communists remained in the executive branch; asserting executive privilege when it came to internal White House documents that McCarthy sought for his subcommittee on investigations; denying McCarthy's requests for access to military personnel to question them about communism in their ranks; refusing to allow McCarthy access to members of loyalty-security boards; continued back-channel support for anti-McCarthy Republicans in the Senate (and occasional public pats-on-the-back to several of them); and effective wooing of conservative senators— notably Everett Dirksen and Charles Potter— when procedural issues were raised relating to the Army-McCarthy hearings.
Ike also continued to make strong public statements against McCarthy's methods without ever directly naming the senator.40 Whether this was true hidden-hand leadership is debatable, but it undoubtedly contributed to the process by which McCarthy was forced to make increasingly outrageous statements— such as his call, in late May 1954, for civil servants to report directly to him on "graft, corruption, communism, [and] treason" in the government, thus bypassing the President and congressional committees.41 By the time the televised hearings began, McCarthy was, as even his most sympathetic biographer concedes, at the end of his tether physically and mentally, increasingly dependent on drink, and relying much more heavily on his instincts than on research or preparation for the hearings.42 All of this caught up with McCarthy, most famously in his colloquies with Army Counsel Joseph Welch. By the end of the hearings in June, McCarthy was effectively finished as a force in American politics. The censure proceedings, which took until December to bring to a close, were merely the final strike against someone who had publicly self-destructed.
Eisenhower viewed McCarthy's fall as a vindication not only of political decency but of his own strategy of indirect rather than direct conflict with a man he believed the nation's worst demagogue since Huey Long.43 It can surely be argued that Ike's tactics were the best of several less-than-ideal options for combating the senator from Wisconsin. It can even be argued that the sheer fact of Ike's election spelled doom for McCarthy. Had there been communists to find, Eisenhower would have been forced to admit it, and McCarthy would have gained rather lost credibility.44 But there were none. McCarthy's scattershot charges and bullying tactics wore less and less well as time passed.
Nearly half a century removed from McCarthy's fall, a number of points seem reasonably clear.
First, there will never be a definitive accounting of who killed Joe McCarthy, because new evidence periodically is unearthed and perspectives inevitably change over time; second, Ike's decision to ignore McCarthy in 1953, rather than to engage him directly, was a judgment call, not a simple matter of cowardice or incompetence. Civil libertarians will forever emphasize that there were many victims of Eisenhower's failure to denounce McCarthy and of Herbert Brownell's loyalty-security program, which drove out of the government hundreds of decent and loyal Americans who had some personal flaw but nonetheless never compromised a single national secret. Eisenhower's sympathizers can respond that the President did his best to honor the Bill of Rights even as he was fighting against an evil empire that spared nothing and no one in its effort to subvert American power and American freedoms.
The abiding and ultimately unanswerable question about Eisenhower and the Red Menace is connected to a cost-benefit analysis of Ike's refusal to meet McCarthy head-on. Did the President underestimate his ability to shape public opinion and control his party? Or was Ike right to believe that had he denounced McCarthy he would have splintered his party and sacrificed not only his domestic agenda but also the public's faith in a two-party system? Given the complexion of the Congress and the intensity of many Americans' fears about communist subversion— and given what we know about McCarthy's stumble and fall in 1954— Eisenhower's choices seem increasingly defensible. Because history is not a matter of do-overs, we cannot be sure what would have happened had Eisenhower played things another way. It is clear, however, that with McCarthyism purged from the body politic, the nation enjoyed the peace and prosperity associated with the Eisenhower era. Throughout his eight years in the White House, Americans consistently liked Ike. Increasingly, historians have come to like him, too.
This article was originally delivered as a paper at a symposium titled "The Culture of Conspiracy," sponsored by the Herbert Hoover Library on September 30, 2000.Eisenhower and the Red Menace, Part 1
Michael J. Birkner is Benjamin Franklin Professor of Liberal Arts at Gettysburg College. The author of several books on nineteenth-century American political history, he is currently working on a biography of Sherman Adams, chief of staff to President Dwight Eisenhower, 1953 - 1958.
1. For the Herblock cartoon, which originally appeared in the Washington Post on March 4, 1954, I am grateful to Herbert Block. He provided a copy of the cartoon based on my description of it and granted permission to publish it. Writers critical of Eisenhower's response to McCarthy include Stephen A. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (1984), esp. pp. 82 - 83, 167, 619 - 620, and Jeff Broadwater, Eisenhower and the Anti-Communist Crusade (1992).
2. There is a large and growing literature on Senator McCarthy and McCarthyism, fueled most recently by a reexamination of lapses in American security policy during the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. For a fresh accounting, see Sam Tanenhaus, "Un-American Activities," New York Review of Books 48 (Nov. 3, 2000): 22, 24 - 27. For a review of recent historiography from a left-of-center perspective, see Ellen Schrecker and Maurice Isserman, "The Right's Cold War Revision," The Nation, July 24/31, 2000, pp. 21, 23 - 24. See also John Haynes, "The Cold War Debate Continues: A Traditionalist View of Historical Writing on Domestic Communism and Anti-Communism," Journal of Cold War Studies 2 (Winter 2000): 76 - 115.
3. Reevaluations of Eisenhower's leadership may be traced back to a 1967 Esquire essay by Murray Kempton, but the critical turning point in Eisenhower studies is linked to the publication of Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (1982), which held that Eisenhower was much more crafty and effective a President than previous studies had described. Greenstein used the McCarthy case as a centerpiece of his argument. See also William B. Ewald, Who Killed Joe McCarthy? (1984), for a sympathetic exegesis of the administration's actions in 1954.
4. The most detailed analysis is William B. Pickett, Eisenhower Decides to Run: Presidential Politics and Cold War Strategy (2000).
5. Peter Lyon, Eisenhower: Portrait of the Hero (1974), p. 480, observes, however, that voters more often came out to see Ike than to listen to his speeches.
6. Eisenhower remarks in Davenport, IA, Sept. 18, 1952, can be accessed through the Eisenhower Speech Digest for 1952, copy in Sherman Adams Papers, box 6, Dartmouth College Library Special Collections, Hanover, NH.
7. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change: The White House Years, 1953 - 1956 (1963), p. 57.
8. On Ike, McCarthy, and Nixon in 1952, see especially John Robert Greene, The Crusade: The Presidential Election of 1952 (1985); David Oshinsky, A Conspiracy So Immense: The World of Joe McCarthy (1983), chap. 16; Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 1890 - 1952 (1983), chap. 27; and Ewald, Who Killed Joe McCarthy? pp. 29 - 47.
9. Eisenhower speech in Madison, WI, Oct. 3, 1952, and the speech to the American Legion, Aug. 25, 1952, can be accessed in 1952 Speech Digest, Adams Papers, box 6, Dartmouth College, and Eisenhower speech files at the Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS. See also document 921 in The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower: NATO and the Campaign of 1952, Louis Galambos et al., eds. (1991), Vol. 13, pp. 1336 - 1337, n. 1. The editors note that Eisenhower removed from his prepared text for the American Legion words that could be interpreted as a direct criticism of Senator McCarthy. Elsewhere in the campaign, as Ewald shows, Eisenhower expressed disagreements with McCarthy's methods. Privately, in a meeting on the campaign train Eisenhower gave McCarthy a tongue-lashing. Ewald, Who Killed Joe McCarthy? pp. 33 - 35.
10. The "vigilance without fanaticism" motif was coined in Stanley Rumbough and Charles Masterton, memorandum to Murray Snyder, Dec. 1, 1953, DDE Central Files, OF 99 - 6, box 368, Eisenhower Library.
11. Among many good accounts of McCarthy's continuing investigations of fifth columnists in 1953 and 1954, the most detailed and reliable are Thomas C. Reeves, The Life and Times of Joe McCarthy: A Biography (1982), chapters 18 - 22; and Oshinsky, A Conspiracy So Immense, chaps. 17 - 30. Among the first flash points between the senator and the new administration was Eisenhower's nomination of Charles Bohlen as ambassador to the Soviet Union. For a first-hand account, see Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History, 1929 - 1969 (1973), pp. 320 - 335.
12. See Eisenhower, Mandate For Change, pp. 308 - 310; Herbert Brownell, Advising Ike: The Memoirs of Attorney General Herbert Brownell (1993), pp. 230 - 248; and Ralph S. Brown, Loyalty and Security: Employment Tests in the U.S. (1958).
13. The William Tompkins Papers at the Herbert Hoover Library in West Branch, IA, offer a useful window into the administration's anti-subversion efforts between 1954 and 1957 and its public relations efforts on this front. A major example was Brownell's November 6, 1953, speech on the Harry Dexter White case. It was Brownell's way of contrasting Truman's alleged lapses of judgment with Eisenhower's forceful anticommunist program. Brownell, Advising Ike, pp. 236 - 242; Oshinsky, A Conspiracy So Immense, pp. 347 - 350; and Athan G. Theoharis and John Stuart Cox, The Boss: J. Edgar Hoover and the Great American Inquisition (1988), pp. 271 - 273.
14. Tompkins Papers, box 8, Hoover Library. Eisenhower and his aides trumpeted the number of "security risks" purged from the executive branch— for example, announcing in the fall of 1953 that 1,456 "Reds" had been ousted from the government through the administration's protocols. But as scholars of the subject have noted, Eisenhower could announce such dramatic numbers only by fudging facts— for example, counting as a security risk any individual who left the government who had in his or her files derogatory comments from any source, including anonymous, unverified tips. In fact, almost all of the 1,456 cases Eisenhower cited were of people who had left government service for other than security-related reasons. See John E. Haynes, Red Scare or Red Menace? American Communism and Anticommunism in the Cold War Era (1996), p. 175, and Reeves, Joe McCarthy, p. 545. Reeves notes that in a year of nearly frenzied investigation by the administration, "not a single Communist had been found in any of the departments."
15. On Ike's concern to avoid unnecessarily smearing individuals during security investigations, see DDE memo to Herbert Brownell, Nov. 4, 1953, Ann Whitman Files, Administration Series, box 8, Eisenhower Library, published in Louis Galambos and Daun Van Ee et al., eds., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The Presidency: The Middle Way (1996), 14: 640 - 642.
16. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pp. 309 - 310. Tompkins speeches files, box 8, Hoover Library. On the subject of balancing fairness to individuals against security imperatives, see also Brownell, Advising Ike, pp. 230, 248. Brownell concedes that security policies varied from agency to agency within the federal bureaucracy and this imbalance caused some "unnecessary problems" in morale. Other observers, in the press and among liberals, were sharply critical on this score, especially regarding the State Department. For a fascinating give-and-take between a defender of the Eisenhower policies and scholarly critics, see William B. Ewald, "McCarthyism and Consensus," in Kenneth B. Thompson, ed., Credibility of Institutions, Policies and Leadership (1986), 13: 32 - 35.
17. The literature on the Oppenheimer case is voluminous. For a balanced and persuasive reconstruction of the case, see Barton Bernstein, "The Oppenheimer Loyalty-Security Case Reconsidered," Stanford Law Review 42 (July 1990): 1383 - 1484; also Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (1989), pp. 34 - 112. For a pithy personal reflection, see James Reston, Deadline: A Memoir (1991), pp. 221 - 226.
18. On the Rosenberg case and its implications, the best source is Ronald Radosh and Joyce Milton, The Rosenberg File: A Search for the Truth (2nd ed., 1997). For the revelations of the Venona intercepts, which show without a doubt that Julius Rosenberg spied for the Soviet Union against the U.S., see John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (1999), esp. pp. 35 - 36, 295 - 303. Richard Gid Powers notes that "nothing Eisenhower did during his first year was more effective in laying the communist issue to rest than execution of the Rosenbergs on June 19, 1953. . . . Eisenhower's refusal to grant clemency was meant to put the Soviets and potential spies on alert that espionage would be dealt with mercilessly in the future, but just as surely it sent a message to counter subversives that their services were no longer needed." Powers, Not Without Honor: The History of American Anti-Communism (1995), p. 266.
19. Particularly sharp criticism of the president was expressed in liberal newspapers like the Washington Post and New York Post, and left-of-center opinion journals, including The New Republic, The Reporter, and The Nation.
20. Quoted in Ewald, "McCarthyism and Consensus," p. 15. For context, see Robert Griffith, The Politics of Fear: Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate (1970), pp. 198 - 199; Ambrose, Eisenhower the President, pp. 56 - 58; Greenstein, Hidden-Hand Presidency, pp. 169 - 171.
21. DDE to Paul Helms, Mar. 9, 1954, in Galambos and Van Ee, Papers of DDE, 15: 937 - 940; DDE to Harry Bullis, May 18, 1953, in ibid., 14: 233 - 234; Leonard Finder, memo of a conversation with Eisenhower in the White House, Dec. 8, 1953, Finder Papers, box 1, Eisenhower Library; Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pp. 319 - 321, 327; Eisenhower Oral History in John Foster Dulles Oral History Project, Princeton University Special Collections, Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton, NJ; Lucius Clay Oral History with Herbert S. Parmet, Apr. 8, 1969, copy, uncataloged, in Columbia University Oral History Project office, New York, NY. Clay notes that he thought Eisenhower's approach was wrong at the time but on reflection concluded that it was exactly the right way to deal with McCarthy— a view also expressed by Eisenhower's brother Milton, in his own memoir.
22. Reeves, Joe McCarthy, pp. 460, 486 - 487, 532 - 533. See also Fred Seaton papers, "Eyes Only" series, boxes 4, 5, Eisenhower Library; William H. Lawrence Oral History, Eisenhower Library; and Stephen Ambrose, Nixon: The Education of a Politician, 1913 - 1962 (1987), pp. 311 - 316. Ambrose observes that Nixon's behind-the-scenes diplomacy with McCarthy was not so successful as he liked to think it was. "The Senator was always agreeing to behave, then forgetting the next day" (p. 316). Nixon's memoirs discuss McCarthy but shed little light on his interactions with the Wisconsin senator.
23. McCarthy biographers David Oshinsky and Thomas Reeves both concluded that McCarthy was sincere, if deeply flawed and destructive in his pursuit of communists. A new biography of McCarthy by Arthur Herman offers a different slant, arguing that whatever his flaws as an investigator and political leader, McCarthy was not wrong to take on the communist issue as he did and, further, that his sins were minor compared to those of his enemies. See Herman, Joseph McCarthy: Reexamining the Life and Legacy of America's Most Hated Senator (2000).
24. See DDE to Swede Hazlett, July 21, 1953, in Robert Griffith, ed., Ike's Letters to a Friend, 1941 - 1958 (1984), p. 110.
25. See especially Broadwater, Eisenhower and the Anti-Communist Crusade, pp. 127 - 128, 224 - 225, n. 21, and John G. Adams, Without Precedent: The Story of the Death of McCarthyism (1983), pp. 51 - 52, 58, 71 - 80, 99 - 101, 109. Regarding book-burning and the ALA letter upholding free expression, see Emmet J. Hughes, The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years (1963), p. 94. Hughes takes credit for writing the letter as an implicit jab at McCarthy, an assertion verified in his papers at Princeton University. See also the telephone conversation (transcript) between retired Gen. Lucius Clay and Robert Stevens, Feb. 25, 1954, which suggests that Eisenhower had to this point been largely on the sidelines in his administration's dealings with McCarthy. Stevens observed that Ike needs "to make up his mind what he is going to do."
26. Robert Clark interview, Eisenhower Oral History Archive, Gettysburg College; Fred Seaton "Eyes Only" file, boxes 4, 5, Eisenhower Library. See also Oshinsky, A Conspiracy So Immense, pp. 260, 296 - 297; Ambrose, Nixon, p. 328.
27. Adams, Without Precedent, chaps. 5 - 20; Ewald, Who Killed Joe McCarthy? pp. 90 - 94; Oshinsky, A Conspiracy So Immense, pp. 336 - 338, 359 - 360. Stevens's complicated interactions with McCarthy are documented in the "Eyes Only" materials in the Fred Seaton papers, boxes 4, 5, Eisenhower Library. See especially "memo for the file," Nov. 6, 1953, and Army Counsel John G. Adams's forty-page analysis of the army's dealings with McCarthy, dated April 1, 1954; Stevens telephone conversation with McCarthy, July 14, 1954 (transcript); H. Struve Hensel memorandum, Mar. 22, 1954; and William Rogers telephone conversation (transcript), Sept. 9, 1953. "Half of the battle," Rogers told Stevens, "is to have a good relationship [with McCarthy]."
28. Adams, interviewed by Fred I. Greenstein, 1978, tape 1, in author's possession. I am grateful to Professor Greenstein for making this tape recording available to me. Robert Kieve interview, Eisenhower Oral History Archive, Gettysburg College, corroborates Adams's account of the White House staff's preoccupation with McCarthy. He notes that there was never a consensus about how to respond to the Wisconsin senator.
29. Ann Whitman Files, Diary Series, box 1, Eisenhower Library, especially entry of Sept. 29, 1953. See also Reeves, Joe McCarthy, pp. 512 - 513.
30. Oshinsky, A Conspiracy So Immense, p. 359. At one point Eisenhower called McCarthy "a pimple on [the] path of progress." See Robert H. Ferrell, ed., The Diary of James G. Hagerty: Eisenhower in Mid-Course, 1954 - 1955 (1983), p. 27. In the course of a private conversation with Michigan Senator Charles Potter in May 1954, Ike called McCarthy "lawless" and "psychopathic." Charles E. Potter, Days of Shame (1965), pp. 15, 17.
31. Hughes, Ordeal of Power, p. 66.
32. Ambrose, Eisenhower the President, pp. 82 - 83; Greenstein, Hidden-Hand Presidency, pp. 175 - 177.
33. On Ike's failure to back Stassen, see Robert G. Spivak, "Ike's Appeasement of McCarthy: Rebuff to Stassen Jolts Liberals," New York Post, Apr. 3, 1954; also Griffith, The Politics of Fear, pp. 203 - 204, and Oshinsky, A Conspiracy So Immense, pp. 294 - 297. Stassen's memoirs concede that he had gotten bad publicity in his tangle with McCarthy but expressed certitude the President would stand with him in any further confrontation with the senator. Harold Stassen and Marshall Houts, Eisenhower: Turning the World Toward Peace (1990), pp. 247 - 250.
34. 34 On Scott McLeod, see William Harlan Hale, "'Big Brother' in Foggy Bottom," The Reporter, Aug. 17, 1954, pp. 10 - 17; and Charlotte Knight, "What Price Security?" Collier's (July 9, 1954), pp. 58 - 69; "Interview with R.W. Scott McLeod," U.S. News and World Report, Feb. 12, 1954, pp. 62 - 73; Reeves, Joe McCarthy, pp. 469 - 471, 478, 556 - 557; and Herbert S. Parmet, Eisenhower and the American Crusades (1972), pp. 239 - 246, 252 - 254. In Eisenhower and the Anti-Communist Crusade, chap. 5, Jeff Broadwater places McLeod's activities in the context of a state department security system that demoralized hundreds of the department's best employees. For a vigorous, albeit qualified, defense of McLeod's efforts to establish new security policies in the State Department, see John Hanes, Jr., Oral History, John Foster Dulles Oral History Project, Princeton University.
35. Rumbough and Masterton, memorandum to Murray Snyder, Dec. 1, 1953, DDE Central Files, OF 99 - 6, box 368, Eisenhower Library.
36. Brownell, Advising Ike, pp. 257 - 259; Ewald, Who Killed Joe McCarthy? pp. 171 - 172ff; Haynes, Red Scare or Red Menace? pp. 159 - 161.
37. On Sherman Adams's instigation of the chronology, Sherman Adams, First Hand Report: The Story of the Eisenhower Administration (1961), pp. 144 - 145. In March John Adams leaked an early draft of the chronology to three Washington reporters and syndicated columnist Joseph Alsop. Without Precedent, pp. 122 - 123. On the uncertainty of the situation in terms of political advantage, see William Lawrence, "McCarthy v. Eisenhower: Showdown Again Off," New York Times, Feb. 28, 1954, in which Lawrence suggested that Washington observers believed McCarthy had the advantage in his dealings with the White House; and William S. White, "McCarthy Still Strong with GOP Pros," New York Times, Mar. 21, 1954.
38. On McCarthy's hazing of General Zwicker and its political impact, see especially Reeves, Joe McCarthy, pp. 542 - 548. UPI's White House correspondent Merriman Smith later recalled that while few staffers would talk frankly with him about McCarthy, even in private, in 1953, by spring 1954 a new and more "open" attitude was prevalent. That suggested to Smith that the administration's position was changing. He was right. See Merriman Smith, Meet Mr. Eisenhower (1955), p. 19.
39. Richard Gid Powers, Not Without Honor, p. 269. For background on Hoover's disenchantment with McCarthy after three years of regularly feeding him tips, see Theoharis and Cox, The Boss, esp. pp. 283 - 298. Roy Cohn insisted that McCarthy never received "one single piece of paper" from Hoover or the FBI. Ovid Demaris, The Director: An Oral Biography of J. Edgar Hoover (1975), p. 164.
40. For Eisenhower's "covert anti-McCarthy campaign," beginning in March 1954, see Greenstein, Hidden-Hand Presidency, pp. 187 - 201. A more detailed treatment which runs along essentially the same interpretive track is Ewald, Who Killed Joe McCarthy? pp. 283 - 312.
41. Reeves, Joe McCarthy, pp. 618 - 619, 623.
42. Herman, Joseph McCarthy, pp. 262 - 271.
43. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pp. 330 - 331; Eisenhower Oral History for John Foster Dulles Project, Princeton University.
44. Richard Rovere, "The Untold Story of McCarthy's Fall," New York Review of Books, Oct. 2, 1965, pp. 3 - 5. The quotation is from p. 4.
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