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WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2600



INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY POLICY



March 17, 1995

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FROM: *Jim* FRANK MILLER AND JOHN KORNBLUM *John for*

SUBJECT: NATO Expansion – Nuclear Aspect(s) (S)

(S) We have attached a paper on the nuclear aspects of expansion as we discussed at our meeting on March 9. Please provide comments/changes to Frank Miller by COB Thursday, March 30. Please note in particular that we would like you to supply pros and cons on the options and in the section on "Timing" as you see fit.

Attachment  
a/s

Declassified Under Authority of the  
Interagency Security Classification  
Appeals Panel, E.O. 13526, sec. 5.3(b)(3)  
ISCAP Appeal No. 2016-185, Doc. 1  
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## NATO EXPANSION: THE NUCLEAR ASPECT

### INTRODUCTION

The USG has three broad decisions to make regarding the nuclear aspects of NATO expansion:

- the substantive question of how new members will share in the Alliance's nuclear roles and guarantees;
- how (i.e., within what Alliance bodies and mechanisms) we share our view with the Allies and move to obtain NATO approval of the position; and
- the timing of when we share this approach with the Eastern Europeans, Russia and the other partners (particularly given the timelines already under discussion for the Expansion study and for the parallel path), how to play it to maximum advantage, and how an announcement fits into "parallelism";

### NUCLEAR ROLES AND GUARANTEES FOR NEW MEMBERS

There is a broad consensus within the USG that any new Alliance members:

- will be full NATO members, and will be covered by the nuclear guarantee;
- will be members of the integrated military structure;
- will be eligible to participate in NATO's various nuclear policy-making bodies, i.e., the NAG Ministerial, NAG Staff Group, High Level Group, and the Senior Level Weapons Protection Group;
- <sup>25X5, 6</sup> have US nuclear-ruled DCA based on their territory, or have US nuclear weapons stored on their soil;

It is also agreed that no changes will be required to key NATO policy documents, including the *Alliance's Strategic Concept* and the *Political Principles for Nuclear*

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*Planning and Consultation.* (The attached DoD background paper provides additional information on the above points.)

The political and military effectiveness of the Alliance can only be assured if new members share fully in the benefits and responsibilities of the organization. Conceding this principle would dilute the Alliance's effectiveness to operate as a cohesive forum with common security needs and objectives. Therefore, it is clear that NATO cannot accept or impose, as a precondition of membership, any constraints or restrictions on the way new members interact with Alliance political and military entities. Thus, as a general principle, involvement in nuclear roles and the peacetime basing of nuclear forces on the territory of a new member should neither be a precondition of membership nor foreclosed as an option, and the Alliance cannot negotiate with Russia on these points.

On the other hand, it is also clear that, with or without new members, the current security environment does not require any expansion of the existing nuclear posture or force structure. At the same time, direct participation or involvement in nuclear roles by new states cannot be ruled out, were security conditions to deteriorate significantly in the future.

### Obtaining NATO Approval

The Senior Political Committee/Reinforced is currently dealing with the broad intersection of expansion policy and Alliance nuclear policy. The recent IS draft Chapter III (USNATO 000899) sets forth general principles covering potential new members' participation in Alliance nuclear policy-making bodies and our requirement that there be no preconditions on membership. As a body reporting to the NAC at 16, however, the SPC cannot make the judgement we seek that existing NATO nuclear policy and force structure need not, and should not, change.

The High Level Group, the Alliance's key nuclear policy-making body, can make this judgement, however. Accordingly, the United States will seek to convene a special HLG seminar in April to produce a short paper for NPG Ministerial approval in June 1995. The gist of the paper would be along the following lines:

In light both of the current international environment and of the potential threats we see facing the Alliance, we have reviewed the Strategic Concept's nuclear elements, the Political Principles, and the Alliance's nuclear DCA requirements. We find that these continue to meet NATO's deterrent and military

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requirements and believe there is no requirement to change or modify any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture in the foreseeable future.

### Timing

Assuming Alliance concurrence with our preferred position, there are four broad approaches to be considered with regard to when NATO shares it with prospective members.

- Within calendar 1995: We could, as part of the briefing on enlargement for prospective members, indicate both our formal position (no preconditions or constraints) and our actual position (no change in NATO's nuclear posture).

Pros: IWG participants to fill in

Cons: IWG participants to fill in

- 1995 as part of "how and why"

Pros: IWG participants to fill in

Cons: IWG participants to fill in

- Before Russian presidential elections

Pros: IWG participants to fill in

Cons: IWG participants to fill in

- Coincident with (or nearly so) admission of the first new member.

Pros: IWG participants to fill in

Cons: IWG participants to fill in

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## The Nuclear Elements of NATO Enlargement

### I. Introduction

This paper examines issues regarding nuclear weapon programs as they may relate to NATO enlargement. The nuclear forces of France and the United Kingdom play a deterrent role of their own in contributing to the overall strengthening of the deterrent of the Alliance. However, US nuclear forces based in the United States as well as in Europe remain indispensable to Alliance security; they play a unique role in that the Allies have confidence in the umbrella they represent and have indicated that a UK-French force would not attract similar support; and only the United States provides nuclear weapons for use on Allied dual-capable aircraft (DCA). Therefore, this paper concentrates on the role of US nuclear forces in NATO enlargement and will address the potential basing of only US nuclear weapons and delivery systems on the territory of new members. It is worth noting in passing, that we assume here that any new members would participate fully in all aspects of the Alliance, including the Integrated Military Structure, and that the 15 will find a way to indicate to prospective members that IMS participation is a requirement of membership.

### II. Substance

NATO's nuclear deterrent has five components: the extension of the nuclear umbrella, the nuclear consultation process for peacetime policy development and

wartime considerations of nuclear use, <sup>25X5, 6</sup>  
<sub>25X5, 6</sub>

the forward deployment of US nuclear delivery forces on allied territory in peacetime, and the stationing of US nuclear weapons (<sup>25X5, 6</sup> on an ally's territory.

#### The Guarantee Itself

Article 5 of the NATO Treaty provides for collective defense whereby an attack on one Alliance party shall be considered to be an attack on all members of the Alliance. Because the Treaty predates the extension of the US nuclear umbrella to NATO, Article 5 does not discuss nuclear weapons but speaks only to "the use of armed force." After the provision of the US nuclear guarantee in the mid-1950's, and later the commitment of UK nuclear forces, however, Article 5 has clearly and explicitly been understood to include the nuclear component, and Alliance membership

has been seen to bring a country under the nuclear umbrella (c.f. Spain, the most recent case).

One notable exception to the rule is France, which of course maintains its own independent nuclear deterrent systems which are not coordinated with other Alliance nuclear forces or plans. Because the French have chosen not to be involved in NATO's integrated military structure, they do not participate in any of the Alliance defense organizations, including the key nuclear consultative bodies — the Nuclear Planning Group at the Defense Minister level, and the High Level Group and Senior Level Weapons Protection Group at the ASD level. The French were able to sign up to the Strategic Concept with the insertion of "the Allies concerned" (subtly excluding France) in the nuclear section of the document, and noting that "the independent nuclear forces of France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies." However, because they do not have nuclear forces, it is not expected that the French model would be applicable to new members.

The Alliance's 1991 Strategic Concept, which sets forth the Alliance's strategy and governing principles, assumes explicitly that the nuclear guarantee remains in force to protect vital interests and to maintain the territorial integrity of Allied nations. It states that NATO must maintain an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear forces based in Europe; while both elements are essential to Alliance security, conventional forces alone cannot ensure the prevention of war. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of any aggression incalculable and unacceptable. Admitting a new member without extending the nuclear guarantee would immediately create the unacceptable prospect of a two-tiered Alliance; moreover, because the nuclear guarantee is not broken out in the Treaty, the Strategic Concept would have to be revised to exclude new members from the guarantee, and revising that document could result in other major changes to overall Alliance strategy. Therefore, we believe that any new member must be covered by the nuclear guarantee.

### Consultation Arrangements

NATO nuclear consultations take two forms: routine nuclear policy development in peacetime, and, if the situation were to arise, discussion of a request by any NATO member state or NATO major commander to use nuclear weapons.

Peacetime consultations occur routinely at the staff group level at NATO Headquarters, twice yearly at the Ministerial level (NPG), and as necessary at the sub-

Ministerial level (HLG, SLWPG). Prior to 1979, Ministerial consultations were limited to a core group of states plus a group of states represented on a rotating regional basis. After 1979, all Alliance members were included in nuclear Ministerials. All NATO members have been welcome to join nuclear discussions at the sub-Ministerial and staff group levels. Based on these precedents, it would be extremely difficult to exclude any new members from peacetime consultations.

NATO procedures also call for Alliance consultations in a wartime situation in which a NATO commander — or a NATO nation — calls for nuclear weapons use.

25X5, 6



Inclusion of new members in nuclear consultative bodies would not necessitate divulging or risk compromise of sensitive nuclear war plans. Since 1992, there has been increased emphasis within NATO on adaptive nuclear employment planning during crisis and war and less emphasis on preplanned nuclear missions during peacetime.


25X5, 6  
25X5, 6



25X5, 6

Operational plans for these systems are restricted to only those personnel in NATO military headquarters and staffs with a strict need to know.

25X5, 6; FRD



25X5, 6; FRD

Neither the nuclear

25X5, 6

guarantee itself nor

the nuclear consultative process is affected by this fact.

Based on precedent, therefore, there is no compelling argument that a new member nation<sup>25X5, 6</sup> and the most recent member,<sup>FRD</sup>

FRD

Equally, from a nuclear safety and security standpoint, and, more importantly, from a military standpoint given the current security situation the Alliance faces, there are strong arguments not to increase the number of countries having this type of nuclear role. Consequently, [under current and projected circumstances] we believe new members<sup>25X5, 6</sup>

25X5, 6

Forward Deployment of US Nuclear Delivery Systems

The forward deployment of US nuclear delivery systems in Europe has always been perceived as a visible indication of the US nuclear guarantee to NATO. Because the guarantee applied to all Alliance members, however, it was more important as a general matter that these forces be deployed on the European continent than it was that they be stationed in any particular country. With the post-Cold War drawdown of US non-strategic nuclear forces, the number of nuclear-armed units in Europe (now only DCA) is at an all time low. Similarly, because in the present security environment in which the Alliance has no declared enemies, NATO nuclear forces represent a deterrent in being. The location of the DCA is not dictated by targeting, range, or scenario considerations, but rather the requirement for widespread participation in nuclear roles. Accordingly, since (a) maintaining even the current US DCA will be difficult to justify over time, given budget constraints, (b) there is no military requirement for basing additional US nuclear units (or rebasing existing ones) on the territory of a new member, and (c) the infrastructure costs of creating a new nuclear-capable DCA base would be both high and unjustifiable, we believe US nuclear systems should not be based on the territory of new NATO states.

Stationing of US Nuclear Weapons on Allied Territory

NATO

The only US nuclear weapons deployed outside CONUS are those deployed to

25X5, 6; FRD

25X5, 6; FRD

25X5, 6

Inasmuch as we do



not foresee new members <sup>25X5, 6</sup> [redacted] or do we envision US DCA  
forward deployed to those coun<sup>tries</sup> in a nuclear role, there is no requirement to  
deploy US nuclear weapons on the territory of new members.