C05904828

PAGE 01 STATE 029302 1400442 ORIGIN SS-00

INFO LOG-00 DASY-00 ADS-00 /000R

DRAFTED BY: EUR/RUS : TLYNCH: SSG APPROVED BY: S:THE SECRETARY S/P :JSTEINBERG S/NIS: JECOLLINS EUR: JKORNBLUM S/S: MGUEST S/S-O: GROLSON

-CONFIDENTIAL STATE 029302

EXDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/16 TAGS: OVIP, (CHRISTOPHER, WARREN), PARM, PREL, RS, US SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S HELSINKI MEETINGS WITH RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER PRIMAKOV, FEBRUARY 9-10

-CONFIDENTIAL-

PAGE 02 STATE 029302 1400442

1. CLASSIFIED BY: WILLIAM J. BURNS, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, REASON: 1.5 B.

2. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT

3. FOR USNATO: AMBASSADOR MAY DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO BRIEF PERMREPS, INFO ADDRESSEES SHOULD DRAW ON THIS REPORT AS APPROPRIATE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, BUT SHOULD NOT PROVIDE FORMAL BRIEFINGS. DEPARTMENT INTENDS TO PROVIDE SUCH BRIEFINGS TO AMPASSADORS IN WASHINGTON.

SUMMARY

4. THE SECRETARY AND RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER PRIMAKOV, WHO WAS APPOINTED JANUARY 9. HELD 8 1/2 HOURS OF INTRODUCTORY TALKS IN HELSINKI FEBRUARY 9-10, THE ATMOSPHERE WAS POSITIVE THROUGHOUT. THE SECRETARY AND THE MINISTER AGREED ON CONCEPTS FOR CONDUCTING THE

Declassified Under Authority of the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel, E.O. 13526, sec. 5.3(b) ISCAP Appeal No. 2016-179, document 6 Declassification Date: Nov. 6, 2023 RELATIONSHIP INCLUDING THE NEED FOR REGULAR CONSULTATIONS, AVOIDANCE OF SURPRISES, AND SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS WHICH AVOID CONFRONTATION. THE SECRETARY AND THE MINISTER ALSO AGREED TO INSTITUTE IN-DEPTH CONSULTATIONS ON REGIONAL ISSUES BETWEEN THE MFA AND STATE DEPARTMENT. PRIMAKOV AFFIRMED THE "NECESSITY" OF DUMA RATIFICATION OF START-2 WHICH NONETHELESS DEPENDS, HE SAID, ON AN AGREEMENT DEMARCATING ARM AND TMD SYSTEMS. PRIMAKOV AFFIRMED RUSSIA'S OPPOSITION TO THE ALLIANCE'S CONCEPTION OF NATO ENLARGEMENT AS WELL AS THE -CONFIDENTIAL-

PAGE 03 STATE 029302 140044Z NEED FOR A "SOLUTION": AS IN OTHER RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND PRIVATE MEETINGS, PRIMAKOV SUGGESTED "VARIANTS" ON NATO ENLARGEMENT. THE INITIAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, WHICH AIMED TO SET PRIORITIES FOR A MID-MARCH MINISTERIAL AND THE APRIL P-S AND BILATERAL MEETING IN MOSCOW, INCLUDED DISCUSSION OF NUMEROUS SECURITY ISSUES, FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES, AND A REVIEW OF CONFLICTS IN THE MIS. PRIMAKOV DOWNPLAYED PROSPECTS FOR THE PRC ESCALATING TENSIONS WITH TAIWAN UNLESS TAIWAN DECLARES INDEPENDENCE. PRIMAKOV SAID THE CONFLICT IN CHECHNYA IS A "REAL DILEMMA" FOR THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT. END SUMMARY.

5. THE SECRETARY HELD DISCUSSIONS WITH RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER PRIMAKOV FEBRUARY 9-10 IN HELSINKI, FINLAND, THE SECRETARY AND PRIMAKOV MET ONE-ON-ONE OVER DINNER FEBRUARY 9 AT THE FINNISH GOVERNMENT GUESTHOUSE WHERE PRIMAKOV WAS STAYING AND ENGAGED IN A FULL PLENARY SESSION WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE ADVISORS FEBRUARY 10 AT THE KALASTIJATORPPA GUESTHOUSE. BOTH THE DINNER AND PLENARY SESSIONS WERE OF THREE HOURS DURATION EACH. THE PLENARY WAS FOLLOWED BY A BRIEF JOINT PRESS APPEARANCE. AT THE PLENARY SESSION, THE SECRETARY WAS JOINED BY UNDERSECRETARY LYNN DAVIS, CHIEF OF STAFF THOMAS DONILON, AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE JAMES COLLINS. POLICY PLANNING DIRECTOR JAMES STEINBERG, NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR COLT BLACKER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS JOHN KORNBLUM, DEPARTMENT PRESS SPOKESMAN NICHOLAS BURNS AND RUSSIA DESK DIRECTOR THOMAS LYNCH (NOTETAKER), ACCOMPANYING PRIMAKOV WERE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MAMEDOV, MFA NORTH AMERICA DIRECTOR SPASSKIY (NOTETAKER), MFA SECURITY AFFAIRS CHIEF KISLYAK, CHIEF OF STAFF MAKARAYAN, MFA PRESS SPOKESMAN -CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 029302 140044Z KARASIN, AND SECRETARIAT DIRECTOR KOTENOV.

6. DURING THE FEBRUARY 9 DINNER, THE SECRETARY FOUND PRIMAKOV SERIOUS, WELL-BRIEFED, AND CONFIDENT. PRIMAKOV'S DINNER CONVERSATION REFLECTED TWO OVERARCHING THEMES: CONCERN THAT THE U.S. TREAT RUSSIA AS AN EQUAL AND THE ASSERTION THAT RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY WOULD NOT BE THREATENING, UNPREDICTABLE OR ALARMIST. DISCUSSION AT DINNER

RANGED OVER A VARIETY OF ISSUES, MOST NOTABLY CIS INTEGRATION, THE MIDDLE EAST, EUROPEAN SECURITY, BOSNIA, THE APRIL BILATERAL AND MENTION OF SEVERAL SECURITY ISSUES (START II AND CTBT). AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE DINNER THE SECRETARY HANDED OVER A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN REGARDING NATO ENLARGEMENT. THE FEBRUARY 10 PLENARY SESSION WITNESSED A TABLING OF VIEWS ON A NUMBER OF SECURITY AND REGIONAL ISSUES AND A DISCUSSION OF FUTURE VISITS AND THE CONDUCT OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. BOTH THE DINNER AND PLENARY DISCUSSIONS WERE INTENSIVE BUT CONDUCTED CORDIALLY AND WITHOUT CONFRONTATION. DISCUSSION BY TOPIC FOLLOWS.

CONDUCTING THE RELATIONSHIP

7. THE SECRETARY AND PRIMAKOV TOGETHER FORMULATED FIVE POINTS THEY AGREED SHOULD CHARACTERIZE CONDUCT OF THE RELATIONSHIP:

THERE SHOULD BE REGULAR CONSULTATIONS;

- EACH SIDE SHOULD PROVIDE INFORMATION ON SIGNIFICANT STEPS AFFECTING THE OTHER;

-CONFIDENTIAL---

PAGE 05 STATE 029302 140044Z

-- EACH SIDE SHOULD SEEK TO AVOID SURPRISING THE OTHER AND SHOULD SEEK TO AVOID PRESENTING THE OTHER WITH FAITS ACCOMPLIS:

-- BOTH SIDES WILL SEEK TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES WITHOUT CONFRONTATION.

-- IT IS IMPORTANT TO FULFILL EXISTING COMMITMENTS AND PROMISES.

8 IN THE SPIRIT OF ESTABLISHING "REGULAR CONSULTATIONS," THE SECRETARY AND PRIMAKOV AGREED TO INTENSIFY CONSULTATIONS ON REGIONAL ISSUES BETWEEN THE APPROPRIATE REGIONAL BUREAUS AND ADMINISTRATIONS OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN MINISTRY, FOR EXAMPLE, REGARDING ASIAN AND AFRICAN AFFAIRS.

UPCOMING MEETINGS

9. THE SECRETARY ACCEPTED PRIMAKOV'S INVITATION TO COME TO-MOSCOW IN MID-MARCH FOR A FORMAL MINISTERIAL; DATES REMAIN TO BE CONFIRMED BY BOTH SIDES, IT WAS INFORMALLY AGREED THAT THE STRATEGIC STABILITY GROUP (A HIGH-LEVEL WORKING GROUP INCLUDING STATE DEPARTMENT/MFA, NSC/KREMLIN, DOD/MOD, CIA/SVR, AND OTHER REPRESENTATION ON BOTH SIDES) WOULD FOLLOW UP THE MARCH MINISTERIAL, ALSO WITH A MEETING IN MOSCOW. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THE P-8 SUMMIT ON NUCLEAR SAFETY AND

SECURITY IN MOSCOW IN APRIL ALONG WITH THE BILATERAL MEETING OF THE PRESIDENTS AT THAT TIME WILL DO MUCH TO DEFINE THE BILATERAL AGENDA IN THE COMING WEEKS. -CONFIDENTIAL-

PAGE 06 STATE 029302 140044Z

NUCLEAR SUMMIT

10. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT WHILE THE APRIL NUCLEAR SUMMIT WAS DESIGNED TO FOCUS ON NUCLEAR SECURITY AND REACTOR SAFETY. IT WOULD ALSO BE IMPORTANT TO DEVELOP A STATEMENT THROUGH WHICH THE P-8 COULD EXPRESS THEIR SUPPORT FOR A ZERO-YIELD CTBT (COMPREHENSIVE TEST-BAN TREATY) BY THE FALL. PRIMAKOV INQUIRED WHETHER THE UK AND FRANCE WERE ON BOARD FOR A ZERO-YIELD CTBT.

APRIL BILATERAL

11. THE SECRETARY LAID OUT THREE BASIC CONCEPTS FOR THE APRIL BILATERAL BETWEEN THE TWO PRESIDENTS TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE: 1) THERE SHOULD BE A GOOD AGENDA; 2) IT MUST BE WELL-PREPARED; 3) THERE SHOULD BE NO SURPRISES AS HAD OCCURRED AT NAPLES AND BUDAPEST. PRIMAKOV AGREED, ESPECIALLY THAT THERE BE NO REPEAT OF BUDAPEST.

TRANSPARENCY TALKS

12. U/S DAVIS NOTED OUR HOPE THAT EXPERTS COULD RESUME THEIR TALKS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILES AND ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION BEFORE THE APRIL SUMMIT.

START-2

13. THE SECRETARY NOTED TO PRIMAKOV THE IMPORTANCE OF VISIBLE PROGRESS ON START II RATIFICATION. PRIMAKOV CONFIRMED " THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY" OF RUSSIAN RATIFICATION OF CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 STATE 029302 140044Z

START-2. PRIMAKOV SAID: "I WANT YOU TO BE CERTAIN THAT WE INTEND TO PROCEED WITH RATIFICATION." NONETHELESS, PRIMAKOV SAID, DUMA RATIFICATION WOULD DEPEND UPON AN AGREEMENT, AS CALLED FOR BY PRESIDENTS CLINTON AND YELTSIN, DEMARCATING ABM AND TMD SYSTEMS. HE URGED THAT THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES BE TURNED OVER TO EXPERTS FOR RESOLUTION. PRIMAKOV NOTED AS WELL THAT SOME IN RUSSIA WOULD TRY TO LINK START II RATIFICATION TO THE ISSUE OF NATO ENLARGEMENT WHICH COULD AFFECT CHANCES OF RATIFICATION. THE SECRETARY HANDED OVER THE U.S. RESPONSE TO THE LATEST RUSSIAN PROPOSAL ON ABM/TMD DEMARCATION, AND AGREED TO WORK TOWARD AN AGREEMENT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

COMPLIANCE ISSUES

14. THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED HOPE THAT ONE OR MORE OF THE SIGNIFICANT OUTSTANDING COMPLIANCE ISSUES -- BW (VISITS), CW (INFORMATION EXCHANGE)R AND CFE (FLANK LIMITS) COULD BE RESOLVED IN COMING WEEKS, THE RUSSIANS DID NOT COMMENT ON BW OR CW. ON CFE, THE SECRETARY PROPOSED CONTINUED NATO/RUSSIA CONSULTATIONS, TOGETHER WITH THE TURKS, TO TRY TO FIND A SOLUTION ALONG THE LINES OF THE FRAMEWORK ALREADY AGREED. PRIMAKOV ASKED OUR VIEWS ABOUT DIRECT RUSSIAN CONTACTS WITH THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT, WHICH THE SECRETARY ENCOURAGED. SUBSEQUENTLY, DFM MAMEDOV RAISED WHAT HE TERMED "THE NEED TO MODERNIZE" THE CFE TREATY SO AS TO ESCHEW THE BLOC-TO-BLOC APPROACH WHICH HE SAID ASSUMES EUROPE'S PRESENT AND FUTURE DIVISION. THE SECRETARY NOTED THIS COULD BE DISCUSSED AT THE MID-MARCH MINISTERIAL BUT LATER ADDED THAT THIS WAS NOT SIMPLY A BILATERAL ISSUE AND THAT THE U.S. WOULD WANT TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE AT NATO. GONFIDENTIAL-

PAGE 08 STATE 029302 140044Z

EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE/NATO ENLARGEMENT

15. IN THEIR PRIVATE MEETING, THE SECRETARY AND MINISTER REVIEWED THE NATO AND RUSSIAN POSITIONS ON NATO ENLARGEMENT. THE SECRETARY REAFFIRMED THE U.S. AND NATO COMMITMENT TO THE ALLIANCE ADMITTING NEW MEMBERS AND TO A PROCESS THAT WILL BE TRANSPARENT, DELIBERATE, AND INTEGRATIVE IN CHARACTER. THE SECRETARY PRESENTED A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON WHICH RESPONDS TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S JANUARY 26 LETTER AFFIRMING RUSSIAN CONCERNS ABOUT NATO ENLARGEMENT. THE SECRETARY REVIEWED NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS IN THE PLENARY SESSION, NOTING THE GOOD COOPERATION DEVELOPING IN BOSNIA AND THROUGH PFP. HE STRESSED THAT THE U.S. WANTED TO PURSUE A DIALOGUE WITH RUSSIA ON EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES. THIS WAS AN AREA WHICH HE AND PRIMAKOV SHOULD MANAGE JOINTLY WITHOUT LETTING IT INTERFERE WITH OTHER PARTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP.

16. PRIMAKOV SAID THAT IN PRINCIPLE HE AGREED WITH THE MANNER IN WHICH THE SECRETARY HAD RAISED THE NATO ISSUE, BUT SAID HE WOULD NOT LIKE TO CREATE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE RUSSIAN POSITION WOULD CHANGE. HE SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE CONCERNS OF THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEANS OVER THEIR SECURITY AND THEIR DESIRE NOT TO BE ISOLATED. HE ALSO ACCEPTED NO COUNTRY HAD A VETO OVER ANOTHER COUNTRY'S DECISION TO JOIN OR NOT TO JOIN A SECURITY ORGANIZATION. NEVERTHELESS HE AFFIRMED RUSSIA'S STRONG OPPOSITION TO NATO ENLARGEMENT AS IT IS CURRENTLY PROJECTED. HE CLAIMED THIS OPPOSITION WAS SHARED BY EVERYONE IN THE KREMLIN LEADERSHIP AND SAID THE U.S. MUST UNDERSTAND THE DEEP FEELINGS OF THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE. HE ARGUED THAT THE MOVEMENT OF NATO'S -CONFIDENTIAL-

PAGE 09 STATE 029302 140044Z

INFRASTRUCTURE INTO CENTRAL EUROPE, BY BRINGING MISSILES CLOSER TO RUSSIA, WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO AN ABROGATION OF THE

INF TREATY TO WHICH RUSSIA WOULD HAVE TO REACT. (I.E. SHORT RANGE MISSILES BASED AT SITES CLOSER TO RUSSIA COULD THREATEN TARGETS REACHABLE ONLY BY INF RESTRICTED MISSILES WITHIN CURRENT NATO BOUNDARIES.)

17. PRIMAROV SUGGESTED TWO "OPTIONS" AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO NATO ENLARGEMENT: WESTERN SECURITY GUARANTEES TO THE CENTRAL EUROPEANS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY OTHER ATTRIBUTES OF NATO MEMBERSHIP OR ENCOURAGING ENTRY OF CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES INTO OTHER EUROPEAN ORGANIZATIONS. THE SECRETARY CAUTIONED THAT A RUSSIAN PUSH AGAINST ENLARGEMENT WOULD ONLY GENERATE A REACTION BY THE CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEANS IN FAVOR OF MORE RAPID ENLARGEMENT. PRIMAKOV TOLD THE PLENARY SESSION THAT "WE WILL HAVE TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THIS ISSUE THAT IS ACCEPTABLE TO RUSSIA, NATO AND THE CENTRAL EUROPEANS OR SLEEP WITH THE PORCUPINE."

BOSNIA

18. IN THE DINNER CONVERSATION, PRIMAKOV STATED GENERAL SATISFACTION WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DAYTON AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, HE OBJECTED TO DELAYS IN SUSPENDING SANCTIONS ON THE BOSNIAN SERBS AND SAID THAT IF A COMMON POSITION WERE NOT WORKED OUT SOON IN NEW YORK, RUSSIA WOULD BE FORCED TO TAKE UNILATERAL ACTION. HE CITED BOSNIAN SERB COMPLIANCE WITH THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE DAYTON ACCORDS AS WELL AS STRONG PRESSURE FROM THE RUSSIAN DUMA TO TAKE THIS STEP. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WAS INSTRUCTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY -GONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 10 STATE 029302 140044Z HOLBROOKE TO GO OUT TO THE REGION TO DEAL WITH GENERAL IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND WOULD ASK HIM TO LOOK INTO THIS ONE AS WELL. PRIMAKOV EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THIS EFFORT AND SAID HE FELT HE COULD HOLD OFF A UNILATERAL LIFTING OF SANCTIONS FOR TWO WEEKS.

19. PRIMAKOV HANDED THE SECRETARY A PAPER WHICH DETAILED RUSSIAN VIEWS ON DAYTON IMPLEMENTATION. THE PAPER ALSO CONTAINED A PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING IN MOSCOW OF CONTACT GROUP FOREIGN MINISTERS WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF BOSNIA, SERBIA AND CROATIA. THE MEETING WOULD ALSO BE ATTENDED BY CARL BILDT, GENERAL JOULWAN, AMBASSADOR FROWICK AND OTHER REPRESENTATIVES OF ORGANIZATIONS ACTIVE IN BOSNIA. PRIMAKOV SAID RUSSIA PLACED GREAT IMPORTANCE ON THE ROLE OF THE CONTACT GROUP AND BELIEVED SUCH A MEETING WOULD HELP GIVE AN IMPULSE TO IMPLEMENTATION. HE CONFIRMED THAT DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER AFANASYEVSKIY WOULD BE THE RUSSIAN CONTACT GROUP REPRESENTATIVE.

20. THE SECRETARY ENCOURAGED RUSSIA TO SIGN THE RUSSIA/IFOR MOU IN ORDER TO COMPLETE THE FORMAL FRAMEWORK FOR RUSSIAN

C05904828

.

PARTICIPATION IN IFOR.

CHECHNYA

21. NOTING THAT CHECHNYA WAS A VERY THORNY PROBLEM FOR RUSSIA, THE SECRETARY ASKED PRIMAKOV HOW RUSSIA INTENDED TO DEAL WITH IT. SHAKING HIS HEAD, PRIMAKOV REPLIED WITHOUT ELABORATION THAT IT IS A "REAL DILEMMA" FOR THE RUSSIAN AUTHORITIES.

-CONFIDENTIAL-

PAGE 11 STATE 029302 140044Z

CIS INTEGRATION

22, DURING THE ONE-ON-ONE, PRIMAKOV SPOKE AT LENGTH ABOUT RUSSIAN INTENTIONS REGARDING CIS INTEGRATION CLAIMING THAT HE WANTED TO PREVENT ANY MISUNDERSTANDING THAT CIS INTEGRATION MEANT THE REVIVAL OF THE USSR. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS INTEGRATION NOT REINTEGRATION AND IT IS A GOAL DESIRED NOT ONLY BY MOSCOW BUT OTHER CIS MEMBERS AS WELL. CONTENDING THAT THE FOCUS OF CIS INTEGRATION IS ECONOMIC, HE ARGUED THAT THE WEST, IN JUDGING CIS INTEGRATION, SHOULD NOT MAKE THE MISTAKE THE SOVIET UNION DID IN THE SIXTIES AND SEVENTIES WHEN THE SOVIET UNION LOOKED AT WESTERN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AS A STRATEGIC PLOT AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION.

23. THE SECRETARY STRESSED THAT THE U.S. STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE INDEPENDENCE, STABILITY, AND PROSPERITY OF THE NIS STATES AND THAT ANY INTEGRATION SHOULD BE VOLUNTARY AND ON AN EQUAL BASIS. SUCH ASSOCIATIONS SHOULD NOT LIMIT MEMBERS' OUTSIDE CONTACTS OR OPPORTUNITIES TO ESTABLISH WITH THE BROADER NON-CIS COMMUNITY.

NAGORNO - KARABAKH

24. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT APPEARS RIPE FOR PROGRESS IF THERE IS A SUSTAINED EFFORT BY THE PARTIES, THE U.S. AND RUSSIA, TOGETHER WITH THE MINSK GROUP. PRIMAKOV RESPONDED THAT AN ACTIVE RUSSIAN ROLE IS A PREREQUISITE FOR SETTLEMENT ALTHOUGH INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION IS A CONSTRUCTIVE AND ESSENTIAL ELEMENT. PRIMAKOV SAID RUSSIA DID NOT OBJECT TO A U.S. ROLE IN CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 12 STATE 029302 140044Z NAGORNO-KARABAKH, BUT THAT THE U.S. SHOULD CONSULT WITH RUSSIA FIRST, JUST AS THE U.S. EXPECTS RUSSIA TO CONSULT FIRST WITH THE U.S. ON THE MIDDLE EAST. PRIMAKOV CONTENDED THE PARTIES ARE NEARING OVERALL AGREEMENT THAT NK WILL NOT BE AN ENCLAVE. RUSSIA SEES TWO WAYS FORWARD: A "BIG PACKAGE" APPROACH WHICH ESTABLISHES THE FUTURE STATUS OF NK, OR A "SMALL PACKAGE1. PROVIDING FOR DEMILITARIZATION OF THE LACHIN

CORRIDOR, THE RETURN OF REFUGEES, AND WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES LEAVING THE ISSUES OF STATUS UNTIL

LATER.

ABKHAZ IA

25. PRIMAKOV NOTED THAT RUSSIA IS TRYING HARD TO CHANGE ARDZINBA'S POSITION THAT THERE CAN BE TWO STATES ON ONE TERRITORY BUT THAT "HE HAS THE MENTALITY OF A VICTOR, LIKE (KOCHARYAN) IN NK." IN GENERAL PRIMAKOV THOUGHT THERE WAS LESS REASON TO HOPE FOR PROGRESS HERE THAN IN NK.

TAJIKISTAN

26. PRIMAKOV SAID WITHDRAWAL OF THE RUSSIAN MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISION WOULD ADD TO INSTABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN, AND BRING PROBLEMS IN UZBEKISTAN. RUSSIA CANNOT FORTIFY ITS 5500-KM BORDER WITH KAZAKSTAN, HENCE "WE'RE IN TAJIKISTAN, WHETHER ONE LIKES IT OR NOT."

MOLD OVA

27. PRIMAKOV ASSERTED MOSCOW IS DOING ITS BEST TO MAKE -CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 13 STATE 029302 140044Z TIRASPOL COME TO TERMS, BUT HAS TO ENSURE THAT THE RIGHTS OF THE RUSSIAN SPEAKING MINORITY ARE ADEQUATELY PROTECTED.

AFGHANISTAN

28. THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT RUSSIAN AND IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR RABBANI AND MASOOD, WHILE NOTING RUSSIAN CONCERNS WITH PAKISTANI SUPPORT FOR THE TALIBAN. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT OUTSIDE SUPPORT FOR THE VARIOUS FACTIONS IS IMPEDING THE EFFORTS OF THE UN SPECIAL MISSION TO MEDIATE; HE URGED THAT MOSCOW USE ITS INFLUENCE IN KABUL TO ENCOURAGE FULL COOPERATION WITH THE UN EFFORT. PRIMAKOV SAID WE OVERESTIMATED RUSSIAN INFLUENCE WITH RABBANI AND MASOOD, THAT DOSTAM HAD THE UPPER HAND NOW, THAT RUSSIA ALSO SUPPORTED THE UN APPROACH BUT THAT HE DID NOT SEE LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL.

UKRAINE/TRILATERAL AGREEMENT

29. THE SECRETARY URGED THAT RUSSIA NEEDS TO FULFILL ITS OBLIGATION TO COMPENSATE UKRAINE FOR THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS TRANSFERRED IN 1991-92. HE STRONGLY URGED ALSO THAT THE AGREEMENT BE FULLY IMPLEMENTED BY MID-1996.

IRAQ

30. THE SECRETARY RAISED REPORTS THAT MISSILE GUIDANCE GYROSCOPES WERE SHIPPED FROM RUSSIA TO IRAQ LAST YEAR, AND

URGED RUSSIAN COOPERATION WITH UNSCOM AND TO INVESTIGATE WHETHER ANY RUSSIAN ENTITIES HAD VIOLATED RUSSIA'S MTCR -CONFIDENTIAL-

PAGE 14 STATE 029302 140044Z

OBLIGATIONS. PRIMAKOV SAID THAT AN INVESTIGATION WAS UNDER WAY AND THAT IT WAS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE GYROSCOPES HAD ORIGINATED IN RUSSIA OR ANOTHER NIS COUNTRY; HE AFFIRMED THAT RUSSIAN GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTED THEIR COMMITMENT TO MTCR. THE SECRETARY SAID OUR POSITION ON IRAQI SANCTIONS WAS REINFORCED BY WEAPONS DISCLOSURES OVER THE PAST YEAR; HE SAID THAT USG WOULD CONTINUE TO OPPOSE ANY MODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS UNTIL IRAQ HAS FULLY COMPLIED WITH ALL OF THE SANCTIONS RESOLUTIONS, AND THAT WE HOPE THE RUSSIAN-IRAQI OIL CONTRACT ANNOUNCED RECENTLY (WHICH IS CONTINGENT ON LIFTING OF THE OIL EMBARGO) DOES NOT INDICATE A LESSENING OF RUSSIAN COMMITMENT TO IRAQI COMPLIANCE. THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED HOPE FOR THE SUCCESS OF FOOD-FOR-OIL SWAPS UNDER NEGOTIATION IN NEW YORK, PRIMAKOV RESPONDED THAT RUSSIA BELIEVES EFFORTS TO KEEP IRAQ FROM ACQUIRING ARMS SHOULD CONTINUE. THE EKEUS COMMISSION ON IRAQI WMD HAS AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE DECISIONS, IF AND ONLY IF THE COMMISSION FINDS IRAQ IN COMPLIANCE, PRIMAKOV SAID, THE OIL EMBARGO SHOULD BE LIFTED. THE SECRETARY REPEATED OUR VIEW THAT IRAQ SHOULD COMPLY WITH ALL THE SANCTIONS RESOLUTIONS, INCLUDING THOSE DEALING WITH KUWAITI PRISONERS, BEFORE THE OIL EMBARGO IS LIFTED. PRIMAKOV NOTED THAT IRAQ OWES RUSSIA USD BILLION, HE DOUBTED THAT HE, DESPITE HIS REPUTATION AS SADDAM HUSSEIN'S FRIEND, COULD CHANGE IRAQ'S POSITION; HE AGREED TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH US.

IRAN: NUCLEAR COOPERATION

31. THE SECRETARY URGED THAT RUSSIA REFRAIN FROM NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH IRAN. PRIMAKOV REITERATED THE RUSSIAN VIEW THAT THEIR COOPERATION WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE TO IRAN CONFIDENTIAL.

PAGE 15 STATE 029302 140044Z DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT RUSSIA'S ROLE IN BUILDING REACTORS IN IRAN COULD PROVE TO BE A PUBLIC ISSUE AT THE MOSCOW NUCLEAR SUMMIT. PRIMAKOV NOTED THE POINT.

NORTH KOREA

32. PRIMAKOV RAISED NORTH KOREA ALLUDING TO A CLAIMED CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE U.S. APPROACHES TO IRAN AND NORTH KOREA. THE SECRETARY REJECTED ANY IDEA OF CONTRADICTION AND SAID WE ARE CONTINUING TO SEEK WAYS TO INCLUDE RUSSIA IN THE KEDO (KOREAN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION). PRIMAKOV SAID THAT RUSSIA HAD BEEN INTERESTED IN SELLING ONE LIGHT WATER REACTOR, WHICH HAD BEEN RULED OUT BY THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS; HE CHARACTERIZED UNASSIGNED CONTRACTS AS "MINOR" BUT SAID RUSSIA WOULD CONTINUE TO DISCUSS PARTICIPATION.

HAITI

33. THE SECRETARY URGED THAT RUSSIA SUPPORT THE EXTENSION OF UNMILL DUE TO THE SMALL NUMBERS REQUESTED AND LIMITED EXPERIENCE OF PRESENT HAITIAN POLICE FORCES. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT, AS RENEWED, UNMIH WOULD BE REDUCED FROM 3,000 TO 1,000, IN CONTRAST WITH THE ORIGINAL COALITION FORCE OF 25,000. PRIMAKOV SAID THAT HE "GOT THE MESSAGE', BUT SUGGESTED THAT, ALTHOUGH THIS WAS "NOT LINKAGE," RUSSIA WOULD BE ASKING AT SOME POINT FOR ANALOGOUS TREATMENT OF ITS PEACEKEEPING EFFORT IN TAJIKISTAN.

CHINA

-CONFIDENTIAL-

PAGE 16 STATE 029302 140044Z 34. PRIMAKOV SAID YELTSIN WILL GO TO BEIJING SOMETIME IN APRIL, THE SECRETARY SUGGESTED THAT CTB SHOULD BE RAISED. WITH THE CHINESE DURING THE VISIT. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT PRC POLEMICS AGAINST TAIWAN, WHICH PRIMAKOV CHARACTERIZED BOTH AS STANDARD FARE PRECEDING A TAIWANESE ELECTION AND AS A SIGN OF CHINESE SENSITIVITY THAT "SOMEONE FROM OUTSIDE" IS WORKING AGAINST CHINA'S SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY INCLUDING IN RESPECT TO SINKIANG AND TIBET, PRIMAKOV ASKED FOR U.S. UNDERSTANDING OF THE FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS BEHIND RUSSIA'S ARMS SALES TO THE PRC. PRIMAKOV COULD NOT ENVISAGE A CHINESE MILITARY ATTACK ON TAIWAN ALTHOUGH HE FELT THAT TENSION WOULD INCREASE IF TAIWAN WERE TO DECLARE ITS INDEPENDENCE, THE SECRETARY, WHO URGED THAT THE RUSSIANS URGE RESTRAINT ON THE CHINESE, ANTICIPATED THAT TAIWAN WOULD SEEK DIALOGUE WITH THE PRC RATHER THAN DECLARING INDEPENDENCE. THE SECRETARY URGED THAT RUSSIA CONSIDER SUPPORTING THE EU'S UNHRC DRAFT RESOLUTION ON HW4AN RIGHTS IN CHINA AND SUGGESTED CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH RUSSIA ON THESE ISSUES. PRIMAKOV AGREED TO CONSULT BUT QUESTIONED WHETHER THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WAS CONSTRUCTIVE OR COUNTERPRODUCTIVE.

JAPAN

35. IN ANSWER TO THE SECRETARY'S POINT THAT IMPROVED RUSSIAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS ARE IN EVERYONE'S BEST INTERESTS, AND HIS QUESTION ABOUT HOW RUSSIA INTENDED TO PROCEED IN DEVELOPING RELATIONS, PRIMAKOV ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IT HAD BEEN A MISTAKE FOR THE USSR TO REFUSE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE, AND SUGGESTED THAT HE WOULD PURSUE THE APPROACH OF DEVELOPING BROAD-BASED RELATIONS WITH "RECIPROCAL -CONFIDENTIAL-

PAGE 17 STATE 029302 140044Z

.

TANGIBLE MOVEMENTS" AND CONSIDERATION OF MOVES TO REDUCE MILITARY FORGES. HOWEVER, HE TEMPORIZED, RUSSIA CANNOT UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS ADDRESS THE TRANSFER OF TERRITORY. THAT

SUBJECT IS "BLOCKED" AND "CONTENTIOUS."

APEC

36. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT RUSSIA IS INTERESTED IN JOINING AND THAT THE MORATORIUM ON NEW MEMBERSHIPS EXPIRES THIS FALL. THE SECRETARY SAID U.S. SUPPORT FOR RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN APEC WORKING GROUPS HAS BEEN "FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE SUPPORT WE GIVE FOR RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IN ALL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.'1 FULL RUSSIAN MEMBERSHIP IN APEC WOULD HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER THE MANILA SUMMIT; IT WAS UNCERTAIN HOW FUTURE MEMBERSHIP APPLICATIONS WOULD BE HANDLED.

THE MIDDLE EAST

37. THE SECRETARY AND PRIMAKOV HAD A LONG DISCUSSION OF THE MIDDLE EAST DURING THE ONE-ON-ONE. PRIMAKOV EXPRESSED ADMIRATION FOR THE SECRETARY'S EFFORTS AND SAID THAT HE THOUGHT COORDINATION WITH RUSSIA COULD EASE THE WAY BUT MADE NO PRESSURE FOR DIRECT RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT. PRIMAKOV CLAIMED HE HAD URGED AS SAD A YEAR AGO TO BECOME INVOLVED IN THE PEACE PROCESS AND INDICATED THAT HE HAD GIVEN SIMILAR ADVICE TO ARAFAT. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THE U.S. HAS BEEN TO ATTENTIVE TO RUSSIAN INTEREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND, IN THE SPIRIT OF ENHANCING CONSULTATIONS, OFFERED TO SEND SPECIAL MIDDLE EAST COORDINATOR DENNIS ROSS TO MOSCOW TO BRIEF -CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 18 STATE 029302 140044Z PRIMAKOV ON CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS, PRIMAKOV ACCEPTED THE OFFER. CHRISTOPHER

-CONFIDENTIAL-

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>