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Country Background

Session Four: Saturday, May 7, 1977, 10:00 a.m. - noon

Jamaica-Venezuela:

1. Jamaica

Remarks by Patrick Maher, Central Intelligence Agency

Comments by Maureen Bunyon, WTOP (Channel 9)

2. Venezuela

Remarks by William Luers, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

Comments by Robert Bond, Research Assistant, Council on Foreign Relations

Session Five: Tuesday, May 10, 1977, 3:00 - 5:00 p.m.

Costa Rica - Colombia:

1. Costa Rica

Remarks by Michelle Bova, Costa Rican Desk Officer, State Department

Comments by Marvin Weissman, Ambassador Designate to Costa Rica

2. Colombia

Remarks by Frank Devine, Colombia Desk Officer, State Department

Comments by Jose Cabranes, Ambassador Designate to Colombia, current Legal Counsel to Yale University

3. Human Rights - Costa Rica

Thomas Farer, Member Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

4. Narcotics - Colombia

Peter Bourne, White House Narcotics Adviser

Mathea Falco, Senior Adviser on Narcotics to the Secretary of State

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 9, 1977

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: MRS. CARTER

FROM: ROBERT A. PASTOR *RAP*

SUBJECT: Alternative Interpretations of Inter-American Issues

In the discussions we had on Jamaica, there was a tendency among those who participated to minimize the importance of a Communist or a Cuban threat in Jamaica. This belief in the relative unimportance of a Communist threat to the United States is not shared by all Americans, as the attached article in Newsweek by Arnaud de Borchgrave indicates.

Similarly, the importance of looking at Latin America within a global context was stressed by the people who have discussed the President's Pan American Day speech with you, but this view is also not universally shared. I have attached two critiques of that approach -- an article by Arthur M. Schlesinger in the Wall Street Journal and an editorial in Business Latin America.

In my opinion, both articles misinterpreted the intent and probable effect of a global approach by arguing that the President's approach will lead to American disinterest or disengagement from Latin America. I think the opposite is more nearly true; that is, the rhetoric of regionalism to which Schlesinger and Business Latin America urge the President to return is more likely to lead to disengagement and weakened relations simply because the regional institutions cannot effectively address global issues.

This is stating the issue quite simply, but I would be glad to follow it up if you would like.



Alexandra de Borchgrave—Liaison

Agee in Jamaica, graffiti on a Kingston wall: 'I may have helped burst the bubble of Red-baiting anti-Communism in Jamaica'

Cuba's Role in Jamaica

BY ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE

Last December, Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley rolled up a smashing re-election victory. His People's National Party (PNP) won 58 per cent of the vote and 48 of the 60 seats in Parliament. Considering that Jamaica was plagued by violence and profound economic problems at the end of Manley's first five-year term, his margin of victory surprised most observers. Now, after several weeks of investigation, I can report that Manley's triumph was made possible, in part, by the direct support of Cuba's secret service, the Dirección General de Inteligencia (DGI)—and by some help from Philip Agee, 42, the former CIA man who has become one of the agency's harshest critics.

I recently talked to senior intelligence men in Britain, France and Venezuela, to non-CIA sources in the U.S. and—in Jamaica itself—to former Special Branch intelligence officials recently fired by Manley. These sources claim that Fidel Castro's grand design calls for a Marxist axis running across the Caribbean from Guyana to Jamaica to Havana. Along with the talk of rapprochement with the U.S., Castro's agents are steadily building their influence in Kingston. Cuba has the biggest embassy in town, and two-thirds of its staff are said to be DGI agents. Cuban airliners shuttle in and out at all hours, loading and unloading crates and people with no questions asked and no records kept. And now members of the Jamaican Special Branch are being trained in Guyana by DGI officers.

Ever since Manley returned starry-eyed from a 1975 visit to Cuba, he has relied heavily on Castro's aid and advice. Under Cuban guidance he has moved to reduce the role of private enterprise and drive Jamaica's pro-Western middle class into exile. His plan to institute "participa-

tory democracy" is directly modeled on Cuba's example (page 38). And my sources charge that during the election, Manley followed a Cuban-designed strategy to undercut the opposition Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) with a combination of violence and mudslinging charges that it was linked to a CIA "plot" against Jamaica. Last September, three months before the election, Agee helped—wittingly or unwittingly—to lend credence to the charges about the CIA.

Ostensibly, his visit to Jamaica was sponsored by a local leftist organization called the Human Rights Council. Actually, I was told, the tour was organized by several Cabinet ministers and PNP aides who have known Cuban connections, among them Information Minister Arnold Bertram, a Marxist theoretician. The plan was to use Agee's credibility as an ex-CIA agent to back up charges that the agency was out to ruin Jamaica's economy. During his three-day visit in Jamaica, Agee appeared on two television talk shows, was interviewed twice on radio and made three speeches.

Priority: "What seems to be occurring in Jamaica is the beginning of the deliberate undermining of the economic system through the efforts of the CIA," he told one interviewer. To another, he declared that the CIA was responsible for "the massive and coordinated bad press [for Jamaica] in North America . . . which served to keep tourists from the island and thus put a strain on the balance of payments." He claimed that the CIA's highest priority in the Caribbean was to defeat politicians friendly to Cuba. Just before he left, Agee announced dramatically that there was a CIA office on the third floor of the U.S. Embassy, and he said he had identified its agents "to the proper authorities."

Agee acknowledged last week that his speeches may have done Manley some good. "My talks may have helped to burst the bubble of Red-baiting anti-Communism in Jamaica," he told NEWSWEEK'S Stuart Seidel in London. Although he conceded that his political sympathies lie with the Marxist socialists, he insisted that, "I have not joined any party. I have no capacity for Marxist theory." Agee denied that he had tried to influence Jamaican politics or that he had allowed himself to be used by any Communist intelligence service. "I am against secret intervention," he said. "There is no conspiracy or plot."

Catcalls: The British were not so sure of that. Last week, Home Secretary Merlyn Rees announced that he had decided to carry out an order to deport both Agee and Mark Hosenball, 25, an American who wrote on intelligence matters for a London newspaper. Rees declined to give a reason, and while opposition Conservatives cheered, the Labor backbenches greeted the statement with catcalls and cries of "Back to Russia!" "The people who jeer and shout have not had access to the papers I have," Rees retorted, explaining that evidence against the two men "can't be brought out without risking the lives of people who work for the state." Later, Agee left London for Edinburgh to try to take advantage of an obscure law requiring Scotland's consent to a deportation order, but he was expected to be ejected from Britain anyway.

Predictably, perhaps, Jamaican opposition leader Edward Seaga contends that Agee helped Manley to achieve his landslide victory, and that the former CIA agent was "used by the DGI to stimulate our urban radicals against the opposition party." Seaga also charges that Manley has set out to build "nothing short of a Marxist police state" in Jamaica. He predicts that Manley's next move will be to impose food rationing and to "use the system, as was done in Cuba, as a carrot and stick to bring JLP recalcitrants to heel. Dissenters will be threat-

February 28, 1977

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Enrique Rodriguez Larreta to see how torture has become a routine instrument of

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with the loss of their ration card." Manley's critics also accuse the PNP of continuing to use terror tactics against the opposition. Early this month, police cars packed with plainclothesmen moved into a JLP stronghold in Rema, a Kingston suburb, and began firing indiscriminately into blocks of low-rent apartments. JLP supporters were beaten, homes were ransacked, a few women were reportedly raped and residents were herded out of the neighborhood by PNP thugs. Only after Seaga appealed to the army were his followers allowed back into their homes.

According to my sources, the army may not be able to stand up to Manley's PNP for long. The Prime Minister is organizing a 20,000-member people's militia that will be more than double the size of the army and police combined. And already twenty Jamaican intelligence agents trained by the Cubans in Guyana have returned home to begin a process described to me as the "politicization" of the army and police. Another 200 trainees are in the Guyana pipeline.

Within the next two months, the Soviet Union is expected to open an embassy in Kingston. The Cubans already are

well entrenched. Cuban "peace corps" teams are engaged in construction projects and advising cattle ranchers—and proselytizing among the Jamaicans in their spare time (NEWSWEEK, May 31, 1976). A Jamaican labor brigade is in Cuba learning construction skills and propaganda techniques. Two months after the election, the ruling PNP is deeply divided between moderates and pro-Cuban hard-liners. Thanks in part to Havana's DGI, the hard-liners appear to be in the ascendancy. Whether Manley intends it or not, Jamaica could become the next country to go Marxist.

A TALK WITH MANLEY

In Kingston last week, Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley granted an interview to NEWSWEEK'S Arnaud de Borchgrave. Excerpts from their talk:

DE BORCHGRAVE: You stand for "democratic socialism." How democratic will Jamaica remain in Western terms, and how socialist will it become in Eastern or Cuban terms?

MANLEY: In Western terms, we are completely committed to pluralistic democracy, but we also believe in participatory democracy at the grass-roots level. In Eastern terms, we honestly believe that in trying to achieve a socially responsive economy, we will not have to eliminate the private sector. A more important question than how much of the economy should be taken over by the state is industrial democracy—worker participation in ownership, collective responsibility and so forth.

Q. People who know you well say that in 1975 you returned from your meeting with Fidel Castro a changed man. What is it that you admire most about the Cuban system, and what part of it do you feel is applicable to Jamaica?

A. All sorts of things. Before I went there, I myself had been grappling with how you use the educational system to create a whole new set of responses in a society: how to get rid of the elitist system, give the people pride, confidence, self-reliance, brotherhood. This can only be inculcated from childhood on. Other Cuban concepts that interest me are the workers' brigades, which we are now looking into here to help solve our unemployment problem. The Cubans are also creating a democratic structure within a one-party state with primaries, democratic opportunities for defeating candidates and so forth.

Q. Some of your critics charge that the Cuban secret service has been working closely with prominent radicals in your own party, and that it helped to organize Philip Agee's visit last September. Is that true?



Alexandra de Borchgrave—Liaison

Manley: 'Somebody tried to destabilize our society'

A. The Cubans do not interfere with our internal affairs and are most correct in their dealings with us.

Q. Members of the Jamaican Special Branch told me that these activities were brought to your attention.

A: The Special Branch people told me they were concerned about Agee as they weren't sure what he was—an agent, a double agent or on the level—and planned to watch him carefully. And for that reason I did not see him.

Q. Do you believe, as some of your supporters do, that the opposition Jamaica Labor Party was armed by the CIA last year to overthrow your "democratic socialism?"

A. No, I don't think the CIA was attempting to overthrow my government. Yet what was clearly an attempt to destabilize our society last year and

techniques used in the past had something in common. But we never came up with any evidence that the CIA was involved. It could have been the American Mafia because they were angry with us as we had broken their marijuana and cocaine export routes.

Q. Many skilled middle-class people are leaving Jamaica. Under those circumstances, how can free enterprise manage to coexist with your brand of democratic socialism?

A. Next month we will unveil a new production plan that will clearly spell out the sectors the state plans to take over and the areas where private enterprise can continue (chiefly consumer goods and services). Hopefully, this should reassure some people.

Q. International bankers tell me that the Jamaican economy needs a large transfusion of foreign money—\$1.5 billion to \$2 billion or more over the next ten years. Where will this money come from?

A. Your figures presuppose a lesser effort of self-reliance than we are planning for. But there is no question our needs are very substantial, and that we are looking for import credit opportunities on our raw-material bill. We will also need some loans and plan to resume talks with the International Monetary Fund shortly, I believe. The new joint venture we are presently planning with Mexico and Venezuela—a \$300 million project that will include a processing plant for alumina, a jointly owned cargo fleet, and so forth—will stimulate capital inflows again. The markets are already in place. Mexico will be our biggest customer. Algeria and Japan are also interested. Hopefully, the main spinoff will be a restoration of confidence. We are also looking at alternative markets for bauxite with the Comecon [Soviet bloc] countries. Diversification is the name of the game.

Newsweek, February 28, 1977

20. Although several groups reportedly are interested in acquiring Swift, it is not known if they actually submitted bids or, if so, for how much.

For these reasons, there is no indication whether Deltec would receive any return on the Swift sale after the obligations to its creditors have been met. However, satisfactory resolution of the bankruptcy case would allow Deltec to regain control of the solvent and profitable La Esperanza sugar operation. Deltec's former *financiera* has already been sold to private interests, and the proceeds will also be used to satisfy the demands of Swift's creditors.

Final resolution of this case would clear up one of the last important compensation claims by foreign investors, and be an encouraging sign for international firms. The government wants to demonstrate its backing for private enterprise by spinning off intervened companies and settling such compensation disputes. Nevertheless, it will undoubtedly handle the Swift matter with kid gloves. Due to the economic significance of the meat-packing industry in Argentina, nationalistic sentiment surrounding the Deltec case is high. The government will be sure to keep the national interest at the forefront in deciding on the sale of the property, the value of creditor claims and the disposition of Deltec's other Argentine operations.

Carter's LA Stance May Create More Problems Than It Will Solve



President Jimmy Carter's address last week to the Organization of American States (OAS) raises a number of questions and doubts about inter-American relations and the effect US policy changes will have on business in the region. The basic message—that the US will formulate no regional policy for Latin America and that the core ingredients of Washington's approach are regard for national sovereignty, respect for human rights and a global context for solving economic problems—is loaded with implications that could work to the detriment or to the benefit of the region. Much will depend on the design of policies fashioned for the Third World, to which Latin America now belongs for economic purposes in US eyes, as well as the content of the bilateral policies the US will pursue. Within this combination of globalism and bilateralism, the climate for US business could be strengthened or eroded, depending on how the policy responds to real needs and how Latin America reacts to the new ground rules.

Certain elements in the approach are worthy of note. One is that in taking his cue from the "no special treatment" for Latin America school of thought, originally propounded by the second Linowitz Commission report (BL '77 p. 105, '76 p. 401), Carter means to carefully hedge the US position at the outset, perhaps to ward off later accusations of making undeliverable promises and perhaps to give his new team time

to learn the problems and work out precisely what it wants to do.

The caution in the stance is especially pronounced in the economic sphere, where Carter virtually gave nothing away except a promise to be open-minded about particular issues. While companies could read this as a sound approach, even if lacking in flair, they might question whether it really fits Latin America's present economic situation. Among the most pivotal economic issues affecting Latin American development are: US protectionism and access to the US market for manufactured goods; maintenance of high levels of private and public capital flows to help countries handle their combined foreign debt burden of around \$70 billion; US measures that would be supportive of Latin America's exports of such commodities as wheat, soybeans, sugar, meat, vegetables and fruit; and US support in the Geneva multilateral tariff negotiations (MTNs) for trade openings favorable to regional products.

At best, Carter addressed these subjects peripherally. He put willingness to be open-minded about commodity agreements at the top of the economic agenda. This is a clear and welcome departure from the previous administration, which only considered free-market solutions to commodity problems. However, it only responds to part of Latin America's growing interest in a wide variety of farm and mineral products for export, many of which cannot be handled under a commodity-agreement umbrella. Tackling these sorts of issues successfully may require an approach differentiated from that formulated for the Third World in general.

For example, Brazil and the US may be headed for a clash on soybean marketing, an issue that may not lend itself to a global pact. By the same token, Argentina is seeking US support for a wheat agreement that would probably have to involve Canada and Australia, which are not LDCs. The danger, then, in the Carter nondifferentiation approach is stagnation in solving problems that do not fit easily into a Third World mode. The opportunity in the stance is that Carter's open-mindedness on commodity agreements will translate into willingness to confront related difficulties at a bilateral level.

On the matter of the MTNs, Carter's remarks were general and not overly magnanimous. He spoke of "minimizing" trade restrictions, whereas the Latin Americans would have preferred to hear about *maximizing* trade openings. Similarly, his comment that the US will "provide special and more favorable treatment to LDCs where feasible and appropriate" (presumably applying to trade preference systems) was so couched in caution as to render it insubstantive. Some Brazilian observers took it as at least a positive sign that the president of the world's biggest trading nation had reaffirmed his belief in liberal commercial standards. However, they also noted pointedly that Brazil did not need to feel any special gratitude for trade favors, since it offers US companies access to a growing and prosperous market.

The same low-key tone underlined Carter's remarks on aiding for the Inter-American Development Bank. His commitment is to fulfill the US pledge—not to increase it.

US investors abroad got only a vague hint of how the administration would view their activities. Carter seemed to suggest that Washington would not look unkindly on some of the rule changes Latin America has introduced to reshape foreign investment to meet development needs. He also steered clear of any hint of Hickenlooperism or other forms of economic sanctions for host-country violations of investors' rights, an ingredient of past US policy that was never well received in Latin America.

Carter seemed to tread delicately around the nuclear question, noting that the US would help in the development of nuclear technology used for peaceful purposes. Brazil may not have been particularly mollified by this comment but has avoided further comment.

Another element of US policy that emerged in the Carter speech is the president's apparent intention to proceed with great deliberation on political issues that once were thought ripe for resolution. This was signaled when Carter spoke about Cuba, stating that the US was seeking to determine "whether" relations could be improved. Cuba watchers were inclined to interpret this to mean that rapprochement is moving slowly and perhaps encountering obstacles that make the "how" of improving relations still far from being cleared up. On the Panama controversy, Carter was more forthcoming, with a between-the-lines reassurance that the march toward a new Canal Treaty was continuing.

The president's emphasis on human rights as the criterion for warm relations with the US did nothing to ease the tensions in hemispheric relations that have been building up over this sore point. Carter's stance seemed, if anything, to put more distance between the US and the region. The feeling is that several Latin American nations could find themselves the object of correct relations and little more. How much the countries that do not measure up to human rights standards can expect economically from the US in terms of aid and advantages is obviously important for their continuing development needs. If the president decides to tie a carrot to the human rights stick, the human rights imbroglio could clear up, but the address gave no indication such a dual approach was in the offing.

While the speech did not cause a great stirring of enthusiasm in Latin America, its cautious, low-key nature did win some faint plaudits. The absence of ringing rhetoric and the minimization of bows in the direction of Bolivar were seen as realistic, given the empty words delivered so frequently in the past.

Meaning for business

The question businessmen must be concerned with is whether the new policy is fraught with more dangers than opportunities. Among the potential problems are: that drift and indecision will emerge as the strongest characteristics of bilateral relations, while the programs developed for the

global framework will tend to gloss over, or ignore, issues of vital importance in the region; and that, in keeping with human rights goals, certain Latin American countries will find themselves extremely far from Washington—among them, several in which US business interests have major stakes. The timing of such distancing would seem most inopportune for business, in that some of these countries are well on their way to making it economically and are at peace with foreign investors and the concepts of Western industrial capitalism. What these countries could most benefit from now is a healthy, productive and positive economic relationship with the US.

Among the opportunities that can be discerned from the US's "letting go" of Latin America is that the well-developed trend of Latin America's striking out in search of new markets and new areas of investment interchange, notably Europe, Japan and Africa, may accelerate. The letting-go process may also bolster still nascent inclinations to seek regional solutions to regional problems, including revival of economic integration efforts. Over the long term, such developments would be indisputably healthy for Latin America and for the investors associated with that region. What is distressing is the US's apparent lack of interest in fostering such healthy trends with positive policy initiatives directly helpful to the region.

Brazilian Cutback In Political Liberalization Could Raise Tensions



The political "reforms" promulgated last week by Brazilian President Ernesto Geisel have put opposition forces in an electoral straitjacket and may mean that the military-dominated regime will be in power for another eight years. In effect, the government has put off indefinitely any broad reconciliation of mainstream political currents—sharply split since the 1964 military takeover—until it can mend the economy. Only then will the regime, if ever, submit to a legitimate test of its strength at the polls. This closing of the political-expression escape valve should be watched closely by companies.

The latest turn of events in Brazil will have the following repercussions:

• In the short run, business and the economy in general will be spared the shock of seeing the strength of the opposition Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB) party expand dramatically in congressional and gubernatorial elections next year. Public dissatisfaction with inflation and other economic ills had virtually ensured such an outcome. Under new election rules drafted by Geisel and a handful of advisors, this cannot possibly happen.

• Nonetheless, political tensions still remain. Instead of resolving an impasse, the sweeping constitutional changes decreed last week have accentuated it. Far from being cowed,

Roses:
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By ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.
President Carter is surviving his first hundred days. This quadrennial deadline, so much cherished by journalists, is an entirely artificial test. No President, except for Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt, did very much in the first hundred days; and Lincoln and Roosevelt were faced with palpable crises requiring dramatic action.

Mr. Carter is new in Washington and has been sensibly concentrating on getting the hang of his job. If he has passed no miracles, he has perpetrated no disasters either. After all, we brilliant fellows in the Kennedy administration managed a Bay of Pigs in our first hundred days.

We also proclaimed the Alliance for Progress. People tend to dismiss the Alliance these days as a failure. It would be more accurate, I think, to say that it was never really tried.

After President Kennedy's death, when its political and ideological components—i.e., its heart and soul—were removed, the Alliance became a very different program, even as it struggled on under the same name. Still its promulgation in the first hundred days—even the Bay of Pigs too, in its distorted way—demonstrated a very genuine concern about Latin America.

There has not been much of that in the White House since. Recent Presidents have been consumed with agitation about Asia, the Middle East, Africa and other exotic areas. None of them seems to have given a damn about the future of the Western Hemisphere.

One hopes it will be otherwise with Mr. Carter. After all, he reads the Bible in Spanish every night and is probably the first President since Jefferson to speak a little of the language. Yet all we hear about these days are our prospective policies in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Asia. If we are working on a policy for Latin America, beyond the Panama Canal treaty and rapprochement with Cuba, it is a well-kept secret.

There is surely something out of proportion here. Take Africa, for example. What are we to Africa, or Africa to us? We delude ourselves if we think we can make much difference, one way or the other, to the future of Africa. If the Russians suffer similar delusions, their folly does not create a serious Soviet threat to the United States through Africa. Communism is as irrelevant as parliamentary democracy to a chaotic continent dominated by tribal folkways, antagonisms and aspirations. And, whatever the outcome of tribal wars in Zaïre, Angola, Rhodesia, South Africa, it will not vitally affect the safety of the United States.

Wars of the Roses

As a wise Englishman said a decade ago when the Kennedy administration was agonizing over the perennial turmoil in what was then called the Congo, "Every country has a right to its own Wars of the Roses."

The Western Hemisphere is a very different matter. For all the tensions between North and South America, historical as well as geographical factors still bind us together. A hostile South America could make life complicated for us. A friendly South America could ease many burdens. At the same time, we must recognize that our power in Latin America is no longer what it once was—and will never be again.

The tide of history has swept the Latin nations beyond what once was an American sphere of influence. Ideological nationalism, distinctive needs for energy and exports, extreme economic disparities, harsh military despotisms, desperate guerrilla resistance—all this creates a host of problems for United States policy.

Yet, if we can never hope to restore a suzerainty to which we were never entitled, we still do not have to throw in our hand. The Western Hemisphere surely deserves a priority in our foreign policy at

least as high as that, say, of Africa. There is no evidence that it has such priority. Henry Kissinger appointed a strong and experienced outsider, William D. Rogers, as Assistant Secretary for American Republic Affairs. Mr. Carter's administration has returned the job to the Foreign Service. This does not hold forth the promise of new ideas.

A fortnight ago Mr. Carter addressed the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States. The idea of "a single

Board of Contributors
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U.S. policy" in the hemisphere, he said, "makes little sense." Instead he proposed "a wider and more flexible approach," resting on three principles—non-intervention; intervention in support of human rights; and the treatment of Latin American economic problems on a global rather than solely a regional basis.

From the Latin American viewpoint, the first two principles seem to contradict each other; and the third supplies only more proof that the United States is no longer interested in the Western Hemisphere. The South American reaction to the Carter speech was predictably tepid and unenthusiastic.

If we want to be effective in our own hemisphere, it is a useful discipline to consider from time to time how our policies look to the Latin Americans. We feel entirely virtuous, for example, when we attempt to stop the spread of nuclear explosive capabilities by trying to block a West German nuclear deal with Brazil. If we were Brazilians, however, we might take a different view.

Brazil imports 80% of its oil. It has reached the limit of hydroelectric development. Its future, Brazilians feel, depends on nuclear energy. When we try to veto the West German deal, it looks to many people in Brazil as if the United States, determined to be king of the hemisphere, is out to prevent the rise of Brazil as a major power. There is a genuine dilemma here.

Human rights is another dilemma. Horrible things are going on in Latin America. One has only to read the story of the Uruguayan journalist Enrique Rodriguez Larreta to see how torture has become a routine instrument of government in many Latin states. It is impossible not to sympathize with Mr. Carter's call to Latin Americans to "combat abuses of individual freedom" and with his warning that our own concern with human rights "will naturally influence our relations with the countries of this hemisphere."

Yet the function of foreign policy is not to provide outlets for moral indignation but to produce real changes in a real world. One must wonder whether public preaching is really the best way to get the results Mr. Carter seeks.

A foreign diplomat of the democratic left, recently returned from Latin America, found an air of "joyous defiance" among Latin American dictators in face of the Carter campaign. Instead of being knocked back on their heels by human rights rockets from Washington, they welcome an issue—the defense of their coun-

try against foreign intervention—that legitimates them among their people. In Brazil even opponents of the military dictatorship joined in the criticism of the State Department for rendering a report on the condition of human rights in their country.

This is not an argument against the human rights campaign. It is an argument against pressing the campaign in a public and preachy way. It is an argument for thinking through what we are attempting to do. For the campaign is filled with anomaly.

How, for example, do we reconcile our human rights crusade with the normalization of relations with Castro's Cuba, a regime that has displayed no marked solicitude for the rights of political dissidents? How convincing in any case are our preachments? What is Latin America to make of our policy when Mr. Carter announces his unalterable devotion to the human rights standard and his Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, Terence Todman, tells Congress that of course the United States must continue to give military aid to Latin American countries with poor records on human rights?

Indeed, how convincing is our campaign against our own record? Fidel Castro has a little speech he gives to American visitors—most recently to Ben Bradlee of The Washington Post and to Senator George McGovern—when they bring up human rights.

Human Rights Retard

As Mr. Bradlee tells it, Castro says: "What does Cuba have to learn about human rights . . . from the country that mounted an invasion of Cuba and has relentlessly tried to assassinate Cuba's leader for almost 20 years? . . . from the country that waged a reckless war in Vietnam? . . . from a country where racial prejudice has existed for centuries, a country where businessmen regularly bribe the public officials of other countries and a country whose leaders produced Watergate? . . . from a country which has supported every totalitarian regime in Latin America?" (Except, Castro might have added, Cuba.)

We may be confident of our own nobility, but it is not impossible to understand why lesser breeds might have received a different impression.

Perhaps the best way to pursue the cause of human rights, especially in Latin America, is not at the top of our lungs but quietly, perseveringly and consistently over a long period. Discreet pressures very likely work better than sanctimonious exhortations.

And we should try to develop a Latin American policy. It is easy but misleading to sneer at the idea of a "single U.S. policy" for the hemisphere. For both the Good Neighbor Policy and the Alliance for Progress made ample allowance for the diversity of Latin American conditions. The point of giving a cluster of policies a single name was not to solve all problems the same way but to register a serious and specific United States commitment to the hemisphere.

That is what we need today. I doubt that we will get it until we have someone in the Executive Branch who can dramatize the problems of the Americas as effectively as Ambassador Young is dramatizing the far less consequential problems so far as the United States is concerned of Africa. Let us for heaven's sake get the Western Hemisphere back on the State Department's map.

Mr. Schlesinger is Albert Schweitzer Professor of the Humanities at the City University of New York, winner of Pulitzer Prizes in history and biography and a member of the Journal's Board of Contributors.

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