
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DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL, E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2013-040, document no. 49 DECLASSIFICATION DATE: March 18, 2014



RECOMMENDATIONS

Burundi and Rwanda:

Appoint a distinguished, high-profile individual as the President's "Special Envoy to Burundi" to help end genocidal violence and help build a democratic and stable government in Burundi. It may be useful to expand his or her duties to cover Rwanda, namely to facilitate the return of Hutu refugees to Rwanda peacefully, the resettlement of Rwanda in a manner conducive to a peaceful and stable society, and the administration of justice within Rwanda fairly and efficiently. The Special Envoy must have direct access to government leaders and freedom to move among competing factions. He or she also must deal directly and frequently with international and non-governmental organizations operating in the region. The Special Envoy's personal safety probably would be at risk much of the time, and the measure of success largely not within our control. But he or she would serve as the catalyst for peace and reconciliation that is now lacking.

Burundi:

• Encourage President Chirac during his forthcoming visit to coordinate with us for a more activist role in Burundi, including what diplomatic and military steps may be required to prevent genocide.

• Use diplomatic intervention to convene a roundtable of key political and military leaders, moderates and extremists, in Burundi, to discuss means to resolve differences and restore peace and security within the country.

• Launch a major planning effort with the United Nations to prepare for, and hopefully deter, accelerated genocide in Burundi:

(1) Two contingencies should be immediately addressed by Pentagon and State planners: deployment of an international force (perhaps stationed in Zaire) to intervene in Burundi and stop genocidal violence; deployment of a U.N. peacekeeping operation with the consent of the Government of Burundi to create safety zones or otherwise establish a more peaceful environment. (The Pentagon has already undertaken some of this contingency planning.)

(2) With our own plans informing our request, we should press hard to activate the U.N.'s "Standby Arrangements for Peacekeeping Operations" which the United States has been instrumental in supporting pursuant to PDD-25. This is a

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data base of forces and logistical support that 47 nations have voluntarily notified the United Nations could be made available for peacekeeping operations. For example, the United States has identified a range of logistical resources that could be tapped to support U.N.-mandated operations.

(3) Determine which type of deployment, if any, should and can be undertaken and within what time frame.

(4) Demarche potential contributors and move within the Security Council to create such a military presence near or in Burundi.

• Take necessary action to silence Radio Democracy (located in Zaire) if we confirm that its broadcasts are aimed at violence and genocide within Burundi.

 Increase our diplomatic presence at Embassy Bujumbura, including the immediate assignment of a "hands-on" ambassador.

As proposed by the Burundian Prime Minister, send a special envoy (of the type described above) for an extended assessment of the situation throughout the country.
Arrange for assignment of additional U.N. Human Rights

Monitors to Burundi, including adequate funding. • Follow through on the Burundi Government's willingness to permit U.N. security guards for members of the International Commission of Inquiry examining the 1993 massacres.

• Condition provision of humanitarian aid on Burundi Government approval of adequate U.N. or other international security for aid workers.

• Use Burundi as a test case for active implementation of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative.

Rwanda:

• Establish a post-UNAMIR presence in Rwanda (after March 8) that maintains U.N. humanitarian, judicial, and development operations with adequate transportation and security. Explore funding through regular (not peacekeeping) U.N. assessemnts.

• Use diplomatic intervention to resolve apparent differences between the U.N. High Commissioner of Refugees and the Government of Rwanda on strategy for repatriation of refugees.

• Respond to Rwanda's appeal for expert assistance on administration of justice and assign Department of Justice and legal experts to work closely with the Government of Rwanda to establish a "Special Tribunal(s)" to adjudicate expeditiously (and with due process) the tens of thousands of Rwandan citizens (about 64,000) jailed in Rwandan prisons.

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• Urgently assist the Government of Rwanda to find a solution to the prison problem at all of the prison facilities in Rwanda.

• Fulfill our pledge to contribute up to \$1 million to the U.N. Human Rights Field Operation before the end of 1996.

• Provide further personnel and logistical assistance to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

Liberia:

• Issue a Presidential statement or letter praising the peace process but emphasizing the need for all parties to adhere strictly to the Abuja Peace Accord.

• Initiate a new and more stable funding scheme for ECOMOG, the Nigerian-led and dominated regional

peacekeeping force in Liberia and currently funded entirely by voluntary contributions. Consider funding at least some of ECOMOG on an assessed basis at the United Nations, either on the regular or peacekeeping budget.

• Help create more incentives for soldiers to disarm and demobilize.

• Use U.S. expertise to formulate job-training and public works programs for soldiers being demobilized under the Abuja Peace Accord.

• Explore urgently a strategy to forgive Liberia's U.N. arrears, which are hampering access to international financing.

• Explore how to assist in re-opening Roberts International Airport. (Senator Kassebaum has expressed her interest in this project.)

Angola:

• Press Savimbi directly to fulfill his pledge to me at Bailundo to quarter 16,500 UNITA soldiers by February 8. (Though it may not be realistic now to expect such a large number by Feb. 8, we should keep the heat on Savimbi to perform.)

• Press Savimbi on his other commitments, including cessation of propaganda broadcasts, release of prisoners, ending cease-fire violations, submission of names of officials pursuant to the Lusaka Peace Agreement, permit free circulation of goods and people, and end the harassment of UNAVEM troops.

• Plan for contingency of Savimbi reneging on quartering pledge.

• Discuss UNITA violations of arms embargo in the U.N. Sanctions Committee.

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• Press the Government of Angola to take more affirmative steps to integrate UNITA politically into political institutions and militarily into the Angolan Army. Press Government to follow through generally on its commitments under the Lusaka Peace Agreement and commitments President Dos Santos made in Washington in December. Also engage in private discussions with Angolan officials about continued arms flows into the country.

• Follow through on U.S. commitments at the Brussels Donors Conference (\$190 million of reconstruction and humanitarian aid), and press other governments to do their share.

• Assist UNAVEM and the Government of Angola to provide transitional training to UNITA soldiers in the quartering areas, and means to integrate into civilian life those not joining the Angolan Army.

• Undertake high-visibility U.S. missions to bolster the quartering process, such as a U.S. medical mission into a quartering site, and a JCET (Joint Combined Exercise Training) to help build a quartering camp (including medical facility).

• Send in more medical supplies for local hospitals, and more tents for quartering areas.

Provide more U.S. de-mining expertise and equipment.

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