TABLE G-10

ROKAF ORDNANCE STATUS (30 SEPT 68)

Item Description	Authorized War Reserve Level	Quantity on Hand	Deficiencies/ Overages
Fuel Tanks			
120/200 Gal. (F86D/F)	3683	2817	-866
150 Gal. (F4A/B)	1432	208	-1124
Bombs			
M117,750 lb Gp	1124	1209	+85
BLU-1C/B, 750 lb Fire (Includes M116)	1283	1283	--
Rockets			
2.75" HE (F86D)	6480	6489	+9
2.75" HE/Heat (F86F & F5A/B)	30100	27268	-2832
3.5" Heat (M28)	120	243	+123
Missiles			
AIM-9B	1194	646	-548
Launchers			
LAU-3A (F5A/B)	1800	1418	-382
MA-3 (F86F)	5003	3185	-1818
Flares			
MK-24 Para	3000	3895	+895
Surface Trip (M49)	3650	4350	+700

APPENDIX H : NORTH KOREAN TARGET SUMMARY

H.1 North Korea Target Summary.

Over the last 15 years, North Korea has concentrated on developing a powerful military force in a hardened defensive environment. Industrial development has been comparatively slow and the country has depended on external support for refined oil and other manufactured products. These two factors combine to present a difficult target system with relatively few highly-lucrative, lightly-defended, target complexes.

In Table H-1 below, a summary is presented which includes general priority by type of target and rough numbers of sorties required if we attack all the targets. A detailed listing of target information by individual location is attached to this summary section.

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would be collateral damage (in some degree) but are computed on damage to structures and facilities.

H.2 Recuperability

Sortie data does not consider recuperability which will vary substantially between targets. There will be required re-strikes depending on targets and priority of the enemy to restore a particular target system to operation. Experience in the Korean action in 1953 and recently in North Vietnam indicates a remarkable capability to make minimum repairs necessary to resume limited operation in a relatively short time. In the case of airfields, it is probable that (in order to keep an airfield out of operation) re-strike sorties will be required within 24 to 48 hours. The following table provide a detailed target listing by type, location and sorties required:

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

ANNEX IV

CHAPTER IV: NAVAL REQUIREMENTS FOR KOREA

APPENDIX A: US NAVAL MINE DEFENSE LABORATORY EXAMINATION OF THE EFFECT OF NORTH KOREAN MINING OPERATIONS AGAINST ROK PORTS

A.1 Introduction

In the light of past history, particularly the very effective use of mines at Inchon during the Korean War, the North Koreans can be expected to use defensive minefields to delay or cripple amphibious attacks or raids directed against them. The North Koreans could also, either on their own or with materiel and technical help from Russia or Red China, conduct offensive mining operations against ROK ports and coastal waterways. This could take the form of (a) various levels of harassing operations, or (b) interdiction operations designed to close ROK ports and to limit the rate at which supplies are brought into Korea in time of war.

The study examines the physical characteristics of ROK ports, based on assumptions regarding the amount and type of traffic through these ports, and determines the reduction of traffic casualties which could be achieved by various amounts of mine countermeasures. The techniques and computer models developed for the CNO Study, "A Study of U.S. Mine Countermeasures 1972 (U)," were used.

A.2 Threat: Harassing Operations

In this situation the North Koreans mine some or all of the ports and coastal waterways of the ROK. Their objective is to inflict casualties on ROK military and commercial traffic, to force the use of substantial mine counter-measures, and to disrupt and impede the normal flow of traffic by forcing convoying, rigid traffic control, and extensive surveillance and examination of traffic. MSC requirements are considered for all ports, although it is not clear that the North Koreans would so use harassment tactics.

a. Number and Type of Mines Available. The North Koreans are known to have stocks of the Russian AMD-1000 magnetic induction bottom mine, the MKB-3 moored contact mine, and the M-08 and M-26 moored contact mines. The study assumes that they also have available the MAD-II-1000 bottom influence mine and a limited number of pressure mines similar to those assumed in the CNO Report MCM 72. The AMD-1000 and AMD-II-1000 mines can be laid from surface craft, from W-Class and other submarines, and para-dropped from aircraft. The moored mines are laid by surface craft.

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For a given level of mine countermeasures protection provided and for a fixed amount of traffic through the ports, the number of traffic ships sunk or damaged by mines is directly proportional to the number of mines laid. The number of mines available is thus a very important factor in determining the mine countermeasures forces required for reasonable levels of protection.

b. Delivery Capability. A factor at least as important as the number of mines available is that of delivery capability. North Korea has a wide variety of ships and craft which could be employed for minelaying operations. Sampans and other fishing vessels were used for minelaying during the Korean War. The North Korean fishing fleet consists of about 30 medium size trawlers of 200 to 500 GRT each and some 9000 junks. A portion of this fleet could be used to deliver mines. Patrol craft such as torpedo boats, gunboats, and landing craft could also be used. The four W-Class submarines can each carry 28 AMD-1000 or AMD-II-1000 mines. The 80 IL-28 aircraft can carry three of these mines for parachute dropping.

c. Mining Tactics. During a harassing operation an attempt would be made to lay the mines surreptitiously. This would rule out aircraft laid mines entirely and probably eliminate or restrict mines laid by MTB's and PC's. 50X1,4
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

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

d. Mine Countermeasures Tactics. The best defense against a mine threat is to prevent the mines from being laid in the first place. For each of the ROK ports considered a line was drawn establishing an inner harbor segment or segments within which traffic would be rigidly controlled and inspected and where mining would be completely excluded. Appendix A indicates the portion of each port for which it was considered feasible to exclude mining.

Beyond these inner port segments there is typically one or more fan shaped areas through which traffic may move to deep water. In these segments as much surveillance of traffic as possible will be maintained but the enemy will be able to covertly mine them, probably with increasing ease as he moves toward deeper water and away from the port entrance.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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There is considerable flexibility possible as to the make-up of the mine countermeasures force with MSO's, MSC's, MSI's, MSB's, and MSC (0)'s offering adequate performance in most segments. Appendix B shows the equivalence relation of the various types of minecraft. Because of its high magnetic signature the MSC (0) is in substantially greater danger from mine explosions than the other minecraft.



FIGURE A-1

PORT1012 DATA ID 102968/102528 KI 3 KTI 3

Z	SN	CS	CL	PHU	Q	TAU	TP	SIG
1.5	6.	15000.	50.	0.950	0.020830	48.	16.00	100.

MA	P	M1	MBAR	M2	YBAR	VS	VH	EPSP
30	0.10	300.00	600.00	60.00	5.000	0.494	70.592	0.60

R = 1.0000 M1 = 4.

E	M2-1	RX	BETA	F	PS	RM2	CAS	CAS/MIN
185.00	30	30.0000	0.0074	0.0035	0.04356	1.0000	0.3418	0.0028
129.50	30	30.0000	0.0074	0.0036	0.05313	1.0000	0.3532	0.0029
92.50	30	30.0000	0.0074	0.0038	0.06158	1.0000	0.3615	0.0030
83.25	30	30.0000	0.0092	0.0042	0.07242	1.0000	0.4480	0.0037
74.00	30	30.0000	0.0092	0.0043	0.07592	1.0000	0.4514	0.0038
64.75	30	30.0000	0.0092	0.0044	0.07970	1.0000	0.4549	0.0038
55.50	30	30.0000	0.0092	0.0045	0.08379	1.0000	0.4586	0.0038
46.25	30	30.0000	0.0092	0.0047	0.08822	1.0000	0.4626	0.0039
37.00	30	30.0000	0.0115	0.0055	0.10824	1.0000	0.5774	0.0048
27.75	30	30.0000	0.0144	0.0066	0.13437	1.0000	0.7222	0.0060
18.50	30	30.0000	0.0180	0.0085	0.16991	1.0000	0.9062	0.0076
13.88	30	30.0000	0.0225	0.0107	0.20748	1.0000	1.1304	0.0094
9.25	30	30.0000	0.0352	0.0160	0.29207	1.0000	1.7415	0.0145
8.32	30	30.0000	0.0352	0.0171	0.29749	1.0000	1.7471	0.0146
7.40	30	30.0000	0.0440	0.0201	0.34266	1.0000	2.1573	0.0180
6.48	30	30.0000	0.0440	0.0219	0.35031	1.0000	2.1656	0.0180
5.55	30	30.0000	0.0550	0.0265	0.40141	1.0000	2.6712	0.0223
4.63	30	30.0000	0.0687	0.0327	0.45614	1.0000	3.2884	0.0274
3.70	30	30.0000	0.0859	0.0418	0.51439	1.0000	4.0395	0.0337
2.77	30	30.0000	0.1342	0.0596	0.61333	1.0000	5.9918	0.0499
1.85	30	30.0000	0.2097	0.0915	0.70593	1.0000	8.7159	0.0726
0.93	30	30.0000	0.4096	0.1700	0.81203	1.0000	14.3966	0.1200

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FIGURE A-2

50X4



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