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among themselves, plus those we ourselves adopted without quite knowing what we were doing or dictated by our strategy for unification". A hint of a possibly more direct approach to the issue was made in the same preface with the statement, "...now is the time to develop our efforts for territorial unification, to move off from the stage of 'face-saving proposition' into 'practical proposition' and try to break the deadlock by making new approaches to the problem".

President Park, in his January 10, 1969 press conference, promised that a government unification body would be formed in early 1969. Government machinery subsequently moved quickly to create the Unification Research Board (URB) and to make it operative by March 1, 1969. Former Seoul National University President Sin Tae-hwan was appointed by the President to head the URB with rank of cabinet minister. The press realistically noted that the unification institute can hardly be expected to accomplish much overnight. Rather the founding of the URB is indicative that the ROKG is both confident and willing to explore new avenues of approach on the problem, which have been consciously restricted from public comment in recent years. The President's formula of "economic development first and then unification" seems to have brought the regime to a place in time where it can afford to give advance publicity to its more politically oriented unification effort. It is not inconceivable, however, that the ROKG has been motivated not by any significant shift in policy, but rather the desire to give foreign observers the impression that it was actively seeking a means of unification and thus forestall any possible initiative for a settlement imposed by outside powers. The appointment of a former academician to head the new unification organization may well indicate its role essentially as a research organization with limited policy implications.

There has been little indication over recent years that the question of unification can become a point of eventual dialogue between North and South Korea in the foreseeable future. Any optimism generated in the Western World that North Korea's wary and slowly expanding entrance into international commerce and diplomacy seems to be quickly dispelled by its sporadic aggressive actions against the ROK, and the renewed call for a "people's war of revolution and liberation in the South."

Outside the Korean peninsula, North and South Korea are gradually intensifying competition on both diplomatic and economic fronts. Although North Korea has made some significant advances in the past two years in neutralist African-Asian countries, an informal tally would place the ROKG substantially ahead in establishing new diplomatic and trade relations with selected nations in this area. Relations with Japan in the economic-commercial sphere remain the most vital for both countries. The ROKG has found that the ROK-Japan normalization of 1965 has not led to the exclusion of Japan's economic interests in North Korea. Though the ROKs will continue to resist officially any expanded NK-GOJ commercial dealings, they are now faced with the reality that they will not be able to pressure Japan

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into withdrawing or restricting private commercial trading with North Korea. The sensitive issue of drawing Japan into an Asian military security commitment is only now coming to the forefront for possible discussions between the ROKG and GOJ. Widely divergent national interests and objectives, will preclude an agreement in their total interest designed to alleviate the ROK defense burden on the developing economy.

E.4 Other Communist Countries

South Korea's view of Russia and China is based on traditional fear and antipathy for her great neighbors as well as on anti-Communist feelings; although the latter are apparently the stronger factor. Russia's World War II occupation of Korea left a bad taste in many people's mouths because of the boorish conduct of the troops, even though they came as liberators, and even though Russia as a Communist power then enjoyed some esteem because the Communists had worked for liberation from Japan. Since that time, Soviet support of North Korea has reinforced South Korean fears, as have years of anti-Communist indoctrination. In the case of China, millennia of cultural influence have not eliminated general antipathy for the Chinese people; in any event, Communist China represents the antithesis of the traditional cultural values still revered in Korea. The Koreans saw large numbers of Chinese troops in combat supporting the North during the Korean War; this experience, plus Chinese aggressiveness and growing power, make China the most feared of any country after the Soviet Union.

Except for the Korean fear of war or invasion, or the spread of Communism, neither the Russians nor the Chinese Communists now have any appreciable influence in South Korea. Their chief effect is through their connection with North Korea. However, over a long period under changed circumstances, some influence might develop. The Koreans have a principle which they deprecate but acknowledge, called sadaejui, "respect for greatness," which underlay their ministers' signature of the Japanese annexation treaty in 1910 and which probably facilitated the Soviet hegemony in the North after liberation. The Koreans are stubbornly independent-minded; yet they are realistic about their capacities when faced with overwhelming odds.

The Koreans are not unreasoning in their fear of the Soviet Union. In a 1965 USIA survey of Seoul public opinion, 11 percent had "neither good nor bad" feelings about the USSR; 22 percent of those 18 to 24 were in this category, and 15 percent of those with secondary or higher education. Seventy percent had "bad" or "very bad" feelings (only 59 percent of the younger group.) Thirty-seven percent thought the USSR is Korea's greatest enemy, and 43 percent had an unfavorable impression of Soviet international conduct. But 22 percent thought the USSR was doing all it should to prevent a new world war, against 32 percent who thought not, and 47 percent who didn't know. (In comparison, 50 percent thought the US was doing all it should, 10 percent thought not, and 40 percent didn't know.) No less than 38

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percent had "great" or "considerable" confidence in the ability of the USSR to deal wisely with present world problems, against 19 who had "not much" or "very little", and 43 percent who didn't know. Among those with secondary or higher education, almost half had "very great" or "considerable" confidence. Asked which would be the most powerful country in the world 25 years from now, more Koreans answered "Communist China" than "Soviet Union," although more chose the US than the other two combined.

In the same survey, as might be expected, people were more negative toward Communist China than toward the Soviet Union in all respects noted above.

Apart from the USSR and China, other Communist countries figure hardly at all in Korean calculations. Poland and Czechoslovakia have representatives on the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, but since the Commission has only token significance and spends most of its time in the Demilitarized Zone, the Communist members have little identity for the Koreans apart from the general opprobrium for Communists - intensified perhaps because of the stand taken by the Poles and Czechs in automatic support of the North against the South.

E.5 Japan

The influence of Japan in Korea results from a balance of positive and negative factors.

On the negative side

Deep Korean antipathy for Japan, resulting from centuries of hostile encounters and forty years of occupation, aggravated and kept alive by Japanese superciliousness. Additionally, the Koreans are suspicious that the Japanese will regain hegemony by economic penetration. Both feelings were cultivated by energetic anti-Japanese indoctrination for over ten years.

Korean disapproval of Japanese dealings with the Communists, particularly the North Koreans, and of Japanese toleration of Communist activities among the large Korean minority in Japan.

Korean resentment at the prosperity of their erstwhile enemies and occupiers, much of which they believe was gained through profits on the Korean war.

On the positive side

The economic size and power of Japan, and its contribution (actual and potential) to urgently desired Korean economic development. Japan ranks with the United States as a principal trading partner of Korea, through whose international trading connections much of Korea's export moves to other parts of the world, and which is committed under the 1965 normalization

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treaty to provide \$800 million in capital and goods over a ten-year period.

Japan's status as a world power, coupled with proximity to Korea.

The occupation heritage. The Japanese ruled Korea effectively for forty years, and on the eve of World War II were well on the way toward realizing the total economic and political integration they were seeking. Despite continuing Korean resentment, there was growing acquiescence in a fait accompli.^{*} The Economy until 1945 was wholly complementary with that of Japan, and almost totally controlled by the Japanese. Thus, with the normalization of relations in 1965, the Japanese had a base of former power and influence, knowledge of the Korean economy and psychology, and even personal connections to build on, notwithstanding Korean antipathy and distrust.

The support of Japan in international relations - e. g., Japanese support of the Korean cause in the United Nations.

Language and cultural ties - a weak but not negligible factor. It is probable that Japanese economic influence will grow stronger with time, but will not result in a decisive voice in Korean politics for some time to come. The Koreans are more likely to accept Japanese economic ties if they are certain of a continuing American role as counterweight; otherwise, there could be an emotional anti-Japanese reaction, as there was during the treaty negotiations in 1964.

Japanese Attitudes

The Japanese, for their part, are willing to assist Korea economically, and to a limited extent in international politics. The annual ROK-Japan Economic Ministerial Conference provides a public forum for both governments to consult on implementing the terms of the 1965 treaty. In these meetings and through other private channels between the two governments, Korean officials are finding the Japanese to be increasingly restrained in extending new assistance for many of Korea's ambitious development projects. Japanese attitudes are forcing the Koreans to be more selective in their own priorities in attracting future Japanese cooperation. Except for a right-wing minority, the Japanese do not attach strong importance to the preservation of a non-Communist regime in South Korea as a buffer for their own defense. It is highly unlikely that they would make any substantial military contribution to the defense of Korea. Their primary motives for helping the Koreans are economic self-interest (Korea was Japan's second largest export market in 1967), and willingness, to a limited degree, to oblige the United States.

* C.I. Eugene Kim, commenting on this point, cites a confidential 1936 Japanese gendarmerie survey. It found that the Korean majority saw little chance for Korean independence and perceived the need for compliance with the Japanese administration, while wanting reforms. Those who did look for independence were mainly the religious leaders and intellectuals.

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ROK relations with Japan, though on a generally stable course, will continue to be plagued with the thorny issue of GOJ-North Korean relations and commercial ties during the next several years. The GOJ has already made it clear to ROKG leaders that while they will restrict official government backing for significant commercial export sales to North Korea, they will not exercise restrictions over solely private Japanese commercial undertakings in non-strategic categories.

E.6 Other Non-Communist Countries

The United Kingdom, France and Germany have had interests in Korea since the nineteenth century. Nationalist China can also claim traditional interests. These older ties, however, are of peripheral current significance; the present measures of a country's influence in Korea are its economic or technical contribution, its role in Korea's defense, its support of Korea's international position, and its interest in Korean problems as demonstrated by a resident mission. By these standards, no country has individual importance comparable with that of the United States or Japan. Added together, however, the countries friendly to Korea do exert significant influence in the sense that Korean policy is somewhat constrained by the need to maintain their favor, and that in a small degree they offset the weight of the two primary partners. The following table summarizes the contribution of these countries:

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B.7 International and Regional Affiliations

United Nations family. In 1965, the National Policy Paper on Korea noted, "From the Korean viewpoint, the United Nations relationship is important because it is the ROK's original source of international legitimacy and respectability, because the UN has been a valuable channel for maintaining diplomatic contacts and promoting the ROK international image, and because the UN is the principal means through which the ROK can safely argue for unification." (NPP, Korea, II, p. 28) These statements are still valid; however, as Korean national power and confidence grows, as the early vicissitudes of the Republic fade into history, and as Korean disillusionment with the UN increases with experience on the international scene, the UN's importance to Korea is unquestionably diminishing. To the NPP evaluation should be added two other interrelated considerations: that the UN provides a sugar coating to the pill of dependence on U.S. military support; and that UN agencies have played, and are playing, a significant role in Korean economic development which is more acceptable to the Koreans in many areas than bilateral U.S. aid.*

Although Korea has probably been more intimately related with the UN than any other country (except perhaps the Congo), it is not a UN member because of Soviet objection to its admission without North Korea. The Republic of Korea, acquiescing to U.S. advice, has not recently pushed this issue, but if Communist China should be admitted, the question would have to be reconsidered. The ROK has been admitted to all the UN specialized agencies except the ILO, in which it somewhat desultorily seeks membership. The Koreans also claim membership in over a hundred international organizations; have participated in a number of international conferences, such as UNCTAD, and have hosted a few small ones; and maintain observer missions at UN Headquarters in New York and Geneva.

Up until now, there has been a debate on Korea, centered on the unification issue, in each UN General Assembly session since 1947. In 1968, the "automatic inscription" arrangement, stemming from the annual report of the UN commission resident in Korea (the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, established by General Assembly Resolution in 1950), was dropped by giving UNCURK the option of reporting to the UN Secretary General. However, concern with the Korean issue in the UN is still strong enough so that in March, 1969, the Foreign Ministry was planning as usual for debate in the next General Assembly.

UN economic contributions to Korea began with the wartime and post-war reconstruction operations of the UN Korea Reconstruction Agency, which assumed primary responsibility for several important sectors of the Korean economy until its phase-out in 1958-19. Since then, several UN agencies have provided important technical assistance.

* An incident tending to support this point was the initial landing of a Korean combat contingent in Vietnam carrying the United Nations flag, authorized for use by UN Command forces in Korea but not in Vietnam. Protests were made and the UN flag disappeared.

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The International Monetary Fund, of which Korea is a member, has influenced Korea toward economic stabilization and sound monetary policies. Perhaps the most important among current UN economic activities in Korea is the International Bank's role in the international consultative group which coordinates foreign investment support for Korea's economic development plan. Its importance is threefold: it maximizes foreign support for Korean investment requirements; it internationalizes to a certain extent the U.S. economic contribution; and it provides psychological reassurance against the Koreans' fear of Japanese economic domination.

Despite the diminution in the importance of the UN in Korea - reflected in somewhat equivocal though still favorable attitudes toward the UN among the Korean population - there is some continuing UN influence on the Korean domestic situation. The Koreans still consider UN involvement and a UN presence to be in their national interest from the standpoint of legitimation, national security, and international support, and probably regard it as a useful internationalization of the U.S. military presence. UNCURK accordingly remains in Korea without major problems of sovereignty thus far. Members and staff of the Commission (or its predecessor) have observed all Korean elections since 1948 - though not with any high degree of thoroughness - and UNCURK has reported annually to the General Assembly. These procedures, plus the annual General Assembly debate, have had some moderating effect on Korean politics, although there has been a significant element of Korean hypocrisy as well in its posture toward the UN. The economic influence of the IMF and the International Bank have already been mentioned.

Regional activities. Until recently, Korea's only regional interests were the Asian People's Anti-Communist League (with Nationalist China as co-sponsor) and the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, neither of which had much political significance. Under the present government, however, Korea has greatly expanded her regional contacts and role. This began with admission to the Colombo Plan in 1963, and reached a high point with the Korean initiative, with Thai and passive U.S. support, in forming the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) in mid-1966 (an initiative for which the Philippines managed to claim the credit). Another breakthrough for Korea was military participation in the war in Vietnam, which has given the country a considerable boost in prestige both internationally and at home. An informal council of the seven nations fighting in Vietnam first met in 1966, and has been utilized to a limited extent for consultations on broader problems of regional security. Korea was one of the principal sponsors of the Asian Development Bank, and has contributed more than her pro-rata share of capital in order to assure a significant voice in its policies.

Although this growth in Korean regional activity is both sign and source of growing national power and prestige, it is unlikely to produce a substitute for Korea's present security and economic arrangements in the near future, for three primary reasons. First, is the fact that the non-Communist nations of East and Southeast Asia would not offer significant

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military assistance to Korea rapidly enough, or in sufficient quantities, to add decisively to her security in the event of attack, even if they perceived an advantage to themselves in doing so, which is doubtful in many cases. The Nationalist Chinese, with an army almost as big as Korea's, might be able to spare more forces; but the bulk of Chinese forces, if Korea were under attack, would probably be held against the likelihood of a coordinated attack on Taiwan. Moreover, it is unlikely the ROK would want GRC troops because Nationalist Chinese participation on the Korean (ROK) side would increase the risk of Communist Chinese participation on the North Korean side, and might reduce the willingness of other potential contributors to participate. The Thai are participants in the UN Command, as are the Filipinos, but they probably would not provide very large or effective force increments. Australia and New Zealand, also UN Command members, would be the major potential sources of support after the Chinese; but there might be some question both of their capacity to assume a larger role in Korea in view of enlarged commitments in Southeast Asia, and of their willingness to fight under a regional command with, presumably, a Korean general in charge. Other nations of the region are too small, too politically uncommitted, too militarily committed, or too distant to be of significance. In all cases, there would be problems of regional availability of transport planes and ships, as well as of logistic support for combat.

The second problem with regional security arrangements is the role of Japan. It may be some time before the Japanese will plan for military participation beyond the home islands. Even if they did, however, there would be strong reluctance, for many years, to accept a substantial Japanese force contingent in Korea even in the heat of battle. Planning for such participation would also be resisted as possibly weakening the U.S. commitment to Korean defense. Furthermore, it is almost unthinkable that Japanese armed forces would be willing to accept Korean operational control.

The third problem relates to economics. Except for Japan, the non-Communist economies of East and Southeast Asia are complementary in only a quite restricted degree. All nations in the area are bent on rapid development and attainment of self-support. Thus, there will be an inevitable duplication of many types of industry until rational calculations of comparative national advantage outweigh the emotional considerations of national identity. Moreover, there are various political frictions among the countries of the region, although less involving Korea than others. To the extent that Korea outstrips the other nations in industrial development and is willing to accept the agricultural product of other countries to supplement her own, some growth of complementarity can be anticipated, but it will be slow. This consideration argues emphatically for increased emphasis on regional economic planning and coordination, but it also suggests that regional economic organization will be very limited in scope and significance for some time to come.

Korean participation in regional security arrangements elsewhere in East or Southeast Asia is not excluded by these considerations. If Korean

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forces were considered firm, then South Korean forces or advisory missions might play a role in dealing with security threats of a smaller scale.

The regional picture might change in ten years, particularly if general interest in regional organization and interdependence is stimulated and finds meaningful institutional expression. Subsidence of general Asian distrust of the Japanese, more sophisticated economics, increase in general affluence and stability, possible abatement of Chinese Communist aggressiveness, and above all the ultimate resolution of the Vietnam conflict, are the major environmental variables. There seems no firm basis at present, however, for predicting a substantial degree of regionalism in the security field within the period of this study.

E.8 Korean International Relations

The central and interrelated objectives of Korean foreign policy are (1) to promote domestic economic development; (2) to provide for national security; (3) to maximize international prestige and support, both for reasons of national pride and in competition with North Korea; (4) to work for reunification of the peninsula.

In the early years of her existence, Korea focused her attention on maximizing support from the United States and the United Nations. Relations with other anti-Communist nations of the region and with certain European countries were of minor interest. Her attitude toward Japan was hostile. She had little use for neutralists. These attitudes began to shift in the mid-fifties, as interest in foreign investment capital increased and as Korea sought to maximize support in the annual UN debates. A push for international recognition was begun under the brief Democratic administration in 1960-61.

In recent years, Korean foreign policy has changed considerably, reflecting growing power, maturity, and confidence. Diplomatic representation abroad was tripled from 1961 to 1963, with U.S. encouragement, in order to reduce diplomatic dependence on the U.S. and close the gap with the "third world" countries of Asia and Africa. The Koreans are taking great pride in their emergence as an active participant, even a leader, in Asian regional affairs. Seeking greater economic self sufficiency and independence from foreign influence, they have accepted - even advocated - phased reduction of foreign grant or concessional assistance, after a period of seeking wider sources of assistance. They have normalized relations with Japan and are accepting large-scale Japanese trade and investment. They have made a strong push through diplomatic channels to maximize their export trade (which has grown phenomenally). They have begun a small program of technical assistance to other countries, chiefly physicians to Africa. In 1968, for the first time, the Koreans acquiesced in a proposal to eliminate the previous practice of "automatic inscription" of the perennial Korean item on the UN General Assembly agenda.

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In the area of national defense, however, Korea still seeks to maximize support from the U.S., both American combat forces and logistic support for her own forces. Thus, New Year's press reports on ROK diplomatic objectives for 1969 put "strengthen defense" first, and noted, "The ROK Government's major efforts will be directed at further strengthening the alliance with the U.S. as President-elect Nixon's administration takes over and at obtaining fulfillment of various U.S. commitments."

As one means of solidifying its security, Korea is promoting collective security arrangements in Asia, and seeks U.S. support, with hopes of getting its allies to respond automatically in case of a North Korean attack. The Koreans probably have two objectives in mind here. First, they may think that a U.S. regional security commitment would be an attractive alternative for the Americans, through which continuing U.S. support for Korea can be assured if all else fails. Second, they probably are following through on their lessons in long-range contingency planning, on the basis that some sort of collective security arrangement, in the absence of U.S. support, would be better than no arrangement at all. The Korean Prime Minister, in discussing the "Pacific Area Treaty Organization" concept with Ambassador Porter in November, 1968, commented that it would be "difficult to imagine American troops being used on the Asian mainland over the next few years..." Yet there are no indications, apart from contingency planning, that Korean leaders, let alone the population, have psychologically faced the prospect of dealing with the Asian Communist powers without the familiar American defense umbrella. On the contrary, American visitors to Seoul are constantly exposed to pleas from Koreans, both governmental and private, to maintain U.S. defense support.

One of the Korean reactions to the North Korean incursions of early 1968 was to send letters to all sixteen nations which provided troops in the Korean War (among which are some of their friends in the region), asking for reaffirmation of the 1953 "Declaration of the Sixteen" that they would be "prompt to resist" in the event of renewed hostilities. The response was far from encouraging. It would follow, in Korean eyes, that the U.S. is their chief source of support. The plea of their Ambassador for U.S. reaffirmation of the 1953 mutual defense treaty underlines this point.

A major departure in Korean policy was the dispatch of combat troops to Vietnam - about the same number as American troops in Korea. Various considerations of national interest entered into the decision. A major factor, however, was a sincere Korean feeling that the debt owed from 1950 was thus being repaid, coupled with Korean pride in justifying the support of her American mentors and making a significant international security contribution. The consequence has unquestionably been a great boost in general Korean confidence, as well as a beneficial effect on the morale of the military officers.

Underlying both Korean Government foreign policy and popular attitudes is the age-old recognition of Korea's weakness in comparison with the three surrounding great powers - China, the Soviet Union and Japan. As one student

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commented to a USIA officer, "You will understand, if you read history, that our nation has made great efforts to live between the powers." In past years, some Koreans have speculated about the possibility that Korea might become a Switzerland in Asia (interestingly enough, Switzerland was the country most admired in a USIA student opinion poll in 1966). Such a possibility is conceivable under more favorable international conditions if Korea should be unified; hardly otherwise. The nation's only other options in "living between the powers" are to play her powerful neighbors off against one another - an unlikely prospect; or to seek security in regional arrangements, which do not seem really promising in the near future except as a new camouflage for U.S. support; or to look to the U.S. for protection as in the past.

Foreign Office officials have taken keen interest in the heightening of the Sino-Soviet dispute. It is conceivable that long-term hostility between the Chinese and the Russians might appear to the Koreans as offering added security, since the prospect of outside participation in support of North Korean aggression would thereby be lessened. On the other hand, the Koreans have twice before been involved in conflicts between two neighboring powers (Sino-Japanese War, 1895; Russo-Japanese War, 1904) and might fear being involved again unless they had strong outside support. This is one fear which the North Koreans might well share.

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Indicators of Non-Communist Countries' Influence in Korea

Country (in rough order of importance)	Total Investment (thousands of US \$)*		Econ. & Technical Assistance Since 1953	Trade, 1967 (in thousands of US \$)		Korean War Contributions		Present Defense Contr.	Int'l support Korea	Dpl Relations
	Long term	Short term		To Korea	From Korea	Economic (000\$)	Defense: Troops Casualties			
United Kingdom										
Germany										
France										
Italy										

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* Including commitments not obligated: short-term means credit of five years or less.

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APPENDIX F

KOREAN ATTITUDES, CULTURE, AND SOCIALIZATION

1. Culture Content and Trends
2. Principal Issues and Attitudes
3. Education and Socialization

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APPENDIX F

KOREAN ATTITUDES, CULTURE, AND SOCIALIZATION

F.1 Culture Content and Trends

The traditional culture of Korea has many elements in common with those of other traditional agrarian societies, offering the same conflicts with modernity. Its distinctive characteristics are that it has long been heavily influenced from outside, the Chinese Confucian, Buddhist, and other traditions having both overlaid and displaced indigenous elements; that it has a strong literary tradition and a great emphasis on learning, as in China; and that although it emphasizes hierarchy and family, it does not stress rigid class distinctions. The examination system, borrowed from China, provided some achievement orientation and upward mobility.

The traditional culture stressed authority, hierarchy, social harmony among men and with the universe based on right relationships, and a settled, unchanging way of life in which government, learning, and agriculture were the honored occupations. Extended family community, and clan were the main frame of man's existence and the source of economic and psychic security. For all but the elite, government was almost as distant and immutable as the stars in their courses, but equally a part of the universal order. Entry into government through examination was recognized as possible, but popular participation and influence, except through occasional peasant revolts under extreme stress, was unthinkable. The villages lived largely self-contained and self-regulating lives, providing taxes and labor to the distant hierarchy and receiving little in return.

Despite the traditional values, however, there seems to have been a strong element of individualism, ambition, personal rivalry, and even anarchy in Korean society which weakened the central government, promoted factional contention for power, and -- in combination with high ethnic homogeneity -- encouraged the movement of men from the circles of the petty village gentry to the central political arena in Seoul and sometimes back again. These tensions and strivings -- which still characterize Korean political and social life -- may have reinforced or facilitated the absorption of foreign ideas.

The collapse of China before the Western assault in the nineteenth century also affected Korea; but there seems to have been less resistance to foreign ideas than in China. There was, however, great resistance to the Japanese, who carried out one of the relatively few non-Western exercises in imperialism in recent history. A favorable elite orientation toward Western ideas, and the desire to throw off Japanese domination resulted in a warm

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Korean welcome for American liberators in 1945, and to some extent for the Soviets as well. Since that time, Korean culture has been tossed by several conflicting currents. The body of tradition is still strong in the rural areas, and appeals to general feelings of ethnic identity. Ideas of modern political and economic organization were inherited, willy-nilly, from the Japanese periods. Liberal Western religious, philosophical, political, economic, and social ideas have been transmitted directly by missionaries, occupying authorities, economic assistance officials, diplomats, foreign mass media, and returning students, and indirectly through the Japanese. Marxist ideas from the Soviet Union, Europe, and China, were also received both directly and through Japanese intellectuals and before liberation was given support by Communist support for their independence.

The unsettling effect of these contending currents has been magnified in Korea by her high exposure to the international scene. The culturally-sanctioned traditional role of China as the Middle Kingdom, Chinese and Japanese incursions over the centuries, the Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese occupation, the Second World War, and the Korean War, plus the American and Soviet occupation, and above all the division of the country, have all combined to give the Koreans a feeling that they are a pawn in the game of the great powers surrounding them. At the same time, the Koreans have had intensive exposure to the higher living standards and greater freedoms of the West; the general aspiration for a better way of life, and the elite aspirations for Korean sovereign equality and status among nations, have augmented discontent and instability.

The secularization of Korean culture began even before the Japanese occupation, but the impact was limited to a comparative few until the later years under the Japanese, when industrialization and urbanization accelerated. Since liberation, change has been forced by the new national identity, universal compulsory education, urbanization, (the city of Seoul is now about five times its size in 1945), population migration, and war. "What the war was like in human suffering and degradation only those who went through it know, and those who went through it are left with bitterness toward life, toward themselves, and towards everything else." One Korean observer has described the result as the Korean "suffering and revolting self." There is a general search, by elite, intellectuals, and urban population, for new bases of national and personal identity, values, and stability.

Beginning at the turn of the century, but especially since 1945, there has been a sincere attempt to substitute democratic values for the discredited traditional ones. "The Korean intelligentsia were familiar with Western, democratic politics, and the victory of the 'democratic' coalitions in two world wars appeared to them to indicate that the democratic form of government

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represented freedom and enlightenment. At the same time, demonstrating that the new elite could establish democratic-constitutional forms of government would display Korea's cultural equality to the world powers...." But the full cultural infrastructure of a modern democratic society was not really understood even by most of the elite. "Most South Koreans in 1948 were primarily interested in a life free from political oppression and economic deprivation -- without having a clear notion of how these could be achieved." The consequence was the adoption of democratic forms foreign to the traditional culture, and the inauguration of a long and bitter process of change and adaptation between the two. Probably the low point of democracy in Korea, in spirit as well as in form, was the day in May, 1961, when the military, with hardly a shot and with virtually no protest from any quarter, put the quietus on the freest political regime the Koreans had ever had. In 1960, the students had sparked a revolt against a dictatorial regime; yet two years later, a survey indicated that 86 percent of university students believed that Western democracy was unsuited to Korea at present for various reasons.

The consequence of cultural confusion and the discrediting of Western democracy has been the search for a new style, springing from indigenous roots, to meet the new exigencies of national life. The search has coincided with a new and successful emphasis on economic development as a central theme, and a willingness to accept a partial return to a more traditional style of authoritarian government in the interests of progress and order. The present constitution and leadership are not yet accepted as legitimate in the cultural sense, but they are given a sort of provisional legitimacy by their proven accomplishment. Thus continued economic development and the present political regime are mutually reinforcing; each is necessary to the other.

It is probable that the democratic forms and practices of the past twenty years have left lasting influences on the Korean people, which are reinforced by traditional tendencies toward individual assertiveness and resistance to authoritarian excesses. It is likely that ten general elections and a referendum have made the election procedures a permanent part of Korean life. There have been indications during the current Third Republic, as well as in previous regimes, that authoritarian excesses produced a reaction. As secularization and economic progress proceed, and as popular demands become more complex, there will probably be growing demands for effective political participation, which will have to be met if evolutionary equilibrium is to be maintained.

The economic and social revolution is in full swing in the cities -- which continue to elect opposition representatives to the legislature. It has barely begun to affect the rural areas, and it is here that a delayed problem of political and social adjustment may very well arise as the crumbling of traditional culture proceeds and new ways replace the old. The

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crisis is somewhat postponed because it is the discontented who leave the farm for the city. Nevertheless, a sociologist has already noticed the beginnings: "There is some evidence (from a rural survey) that the Korean family is becoming more democratic as the society becomes more urbanized and as the family becomes more nuclearized. Joint (husband-wife) decision-making is increasing...Also women in Korea are increasingly demanding more authority in the political arena...."

Korean authorities themselves recognize the problems of modernization. A study by the Social Security Committee of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs in 1968 described it as follows: "Morals and social institutions have been undermined, because of the people's inability to integrate the two cultures, the traditional and the western. Institutions need to be reformed by the people, based on their own understanding and realization of new requirements and also of their traditions. Personal and social disorganization are typical manifestations of the emerging social order... Modernization of the country requires that the people be independent, creative, rational, cooperative, productive, and responsible."

A 1967 AID study commented as follows: "Like other traditional societies, associations in Korea are built on family, regional, school or personal relationships. This creates great difficulties in moving to effective cooperation, in more impersonal, corporate forms of organization whether for business, social or political purposes. The relatively strong individualistic and personal drives of Koreans for personal gain, and the historical factors that have until recently deprived themselves of confidence in themselves and each other, add to the difficulties of creating large-scale, impersonal types of non-authoritarian organizations to pursue group goals which are needed for simultaneous development of modernization and democracy. Reduction of these obstacles will take time, and can come about only as Koreans themselves through experience, recognize the need for and utility of, such organizations. Even so, such organizations as are developed will reflect Korean culture and tradition and may bear little resemblance to their Western counterparts."

The great accomplishment of the Koreans in the last few years is the recapture of hope and confidence in the future and in their own capacity to achieve goals of national and individual progress. Such hope and confidence have been lacking for at least a century, except for a brief period just before the start of the Korean War. They are probably not yet permanently established. A major setback could bring back the old doubts, confusions, and bitterness, which in turn would enhance the setback itself. On the other hand, a ten-year period of reasonably constant stability and progress might embed the new confidence firmly in the national psyche.

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F.2 Princial Issues and Attitudes

General. As of the beginning of 1968, USIS Seoul summarized Korean attitudes as follows: "...Despite the rise in national confidence and the widening of their national horizons, Koreans are deeply concerned about their political, economic and social development, their ability to deal effectively with an increasingly hostile North and with means of insuring the largest measure of support from the United States and other free world countries." As a summary statement, this remains true today. The specific issues on which Koreans focus their attention, the relative importance they attach to them, and their attitudes toward these issues and toward their environment, vary with time, social role, and socio-economic level. Issues and attitudes currently of greatest apparent importance to Koreans, or of greatest relevance for political analysis, are briefly discussed below, without any attempt at complete coverage.

Economic Issues. Economic development has been made the top national priority by President Park and his administration. Success in this field in recent years has responded to one of the nation's most universal and fundamental desires, has given the people a new confidence and buoyancy, has provided the regime an acceptance and legitimation it would otherwise lack, and has overshadowed other issues which were formerly uppermost, such as political freedom. A confidential USIA poll of Seoul residents in 1965 showed that the various aspects of economics were far and away the top problem in people's minds, regardless of education and socio-economic level, although different people saw it different ways: respondents in lower economic levels stressed "poverty," for example, while those in upper levels stressed "economic development," "economic stability," and the like. "Unemployment" and "better living standards" ranked rather low, indicating that economic successes even at that time had alleviated these areas.

However, inequities in resource distribution are of increasing concern. Nearly half of the 1965 respondents thought they were getting "much less than their fair share" of the good things in life - more than half in the lower socio-economic levels, and another quarter in both categories thought they were getting "a little less than their fair share." The AID 1970 Program Memorandum notes the growing discussion among Koreans of income disparities between urban and rural sectors.

In April 1968, a ROK Government survey of a nation-wide sample found that "the biggest concern in both Seoul and the provinces is focused on prices, living and domestic matters" and that "the biggest worry...is food, clothing, and housing...." However, over 82 percent of Seoul respondents and 74 percent of those in the provinces thought that the North Koreans' living conditions were worse than in South Korea. A plurality of respondents thought that North Korean industrial development was lagging behind South Korea, and a majority thought the same about agriculture. These views represent a material change from the pessimistic contrasts of a decade ago.

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As for the future outlook, 53 percent of the respondents in the 1965 USIA study of Seoul opinion thought that economic conditions would improve in the next five years. Optimism was conspicuously higher among those with more education, those of higher socio-economic status, and the young. However, expectations are rising, which could augment the sense of deprivation in the future, despite continued progress.

Unification. In the 1965 Seoul opinion survey, unification was the second most important problem mentioned. In a student opinion survey the following year, unification outranked economic problems. The respondents' reasons were not given. They presumably derived from a number of factors: emotional reasons - family ties and feelings of patriotism; considerations of national progress, since unification is generally regarded as the ultimate basis for future Korean political and economic well-being; indoctrination, since the goal of unification has been drilled into Korean heads ever since 1948 by education and (until 1960) by government propaganda. Still another reason - security - is indicated by the Korean Government's 1968 poll: asked which of seven issues should have top priority for solution, 29.9 percent chose, "To eliminate threats from the puppet North Korea." (For comparison, 45.8 percent chose, "to stabilize daily living," "economic development," or "to promote people's welfare.")

Nevertheless, the Koreans are fairly pragmatic in estimating unification prospects. In the 1968 survey, 41 percent of the sample held that unification was possible, 18 percent that it was impossible; 41 percent answered, "Don't know," or "Unclear." As to time frame, 58 percent said simply that it would come "some time in the future"; 15.5 percent said it would come within ten years; 8.4 percent, in 20 years; 6.3 percent, within five years. Major obstacles to unification were seen as "dictatorial regime of Kim Il-song" (29.8 percent), "people's indifference" (17.8 percent), and "interference by Communist China and Soviet Union" or "international situation" (15 percent). A slight majority of those expressing opinions thought that work should begin now to prepare for unification; almost as many thought that debates on unification should await achievement of "a self-sustaining economy and political stability." Over a quarter of the respondents supported the UN formula for unification; 16 percent supported negotiation between North and South; 11 percent advocated reunification by military force. Over a third responded, "don't know."

The American Embassy in mid-1967 reported that the government's position, that Korea must achieve greater political stability and economic strength before it can consider unification, was generally accepted by the people. The government's view that in the meantime there should be no contact at all with North Korea or its people was not so enthusiastically endorsed. The establishment of a Cabinet-level office for research on unification in early 1969 may be in part a response to this attitude. It would appear that popular concern with the whole subject of unification has diminished since the 1965 and 1966 polls cited above, as a result of continued economic progress and increased confidence.

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Security. In the 1965 poll, the security issue was not singled out at all, so far was it from the public's conscious concerns. In the ROK Government's 1968 poll, the "war menace (invasion from the North)" was selected as "biggest worry of this year" by 14 percent of the Seoul respondents from among 18 suggested topics (ranking third after "food, clothing, housing" and "children"), and by 8 percent of respondents in the provinces (after the above two items and "family affairs"). In a similar question, "biggest worry of last year," the "war threat" received almost no mention. It is quite clear, therefore, that the incidents of January, 1968, aroused Korean concerns for security where there had been little active worry before.

Two factors suggest that apparent Korean insouciance prior to 1968 is due, not to lack of concern with security, but to complete trust in U.S. protection. The first is the character of Korean opinions on the reliability and friendship of the U.S. (see below), and Korean willingness to accept foreign troops on their soil. The other is the high preoccupation of the Korean elite with U.S. policy on Korean security. Koreans constantly raise this subject in talks with Americans. The Korean Government went to unusual lengths in 1968 to get additional assurances of U.S. intentions to respect the mutual defense treaty. Ambassador Kim told the Secretary of State that this was a "controversial issue in the National Assembly, and an exchange of notes would alleviate the controversy." Again, in December, 1968, the Chairman of the Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff publicly and erroneously hailed a routine port call by the USS Hancock as "one of the effective measures to deter continuing provocation of the puppet regime...." The American Embassy commented on the "often noted tendency of ROK Government officials to embroider facts for maximum public impact." Recently, the Koreans have been endeavoring to promote regional security arrangements, and their plans are beginning to take into account the possibility of U.S. military withdrawal or unwillingness to fight in Korea in the event of a North Korean invasion. Despite growing confidence in Korean military capacity, and rising nationalist feelings, there is nonetheless no real indication that even the elite are yet psychologically ready to abandon their dependence on the U.S. to guarantee their international security.

The importance of the security issue is recognized in the Social Security Committee's 1968 report on Social Development, which notes, "The Committee was one in its conviction that the social development of the country depends first of all on the security of the nation. Without national security no economic or social development is possible of either achievement or enjoyment."

Political Issues. To anyone familiar with Korean affairs of eight to ten years ago, there is a strange current quiescence about domestic political problems, as though the issue were in suspense. Political news and political issues continue to be voluminously reported in the press

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(within the limits of government tolerance) and debated in the Assembly, but do not seem to arouse the public as they once did. Even the students, the leading force in 1960 and again in 1964 and 1965, are not currently excited about political problems, although these seem to bulk larger in their minds than in those of the general public. Part of the quiescence is due to effective CIA surveillance. However, it seems clear that after all the difficulties of past years, the people are willing to let the present regime run things while it does a good job of it and does not overstep the bounds of toleration in its political controls.*

"Political problems" were nonetheless the category cited the third largest number of times by the 1965 Seoul respondents as the "second most important problem" facing the country. Koreans undoubtedly remain very political animals. A major test of popular political concern will be the question of whether the Constitution should be amended to permit the President to stand for an additional term of office in 1971. That the Government is apprehensive about public sentiment on the subject is clear from the careful soundings being made through the security agencies and the ruling political party.

Concern with welfare and the distribution of economic benefits may currently be more important to the public than more philosophical or long-range considerations like freedom and democracy. Two-thirds of the respondents in the 1965 Seoul survey believed that basic social and economic reforms were needed to see that people got their fair share of "the good things in life." (A negligible proportion believed that the reforms would have to be accomplished by force.) Reference has already been made to concern with income disparities between social classes and between the urban and rural sectors of the country. Middle-class urban elements are becoming increasingly perturbed about lack of funds, credit, or medical insurance for medical care. Housing shortages are also of increasing concern in urban areas. These problems will undoubtedly be aggravated before they are solved by continued economic progress, and can be expected to engender strong demands for political action.

Attitudes Toward the United States. The 1965 USIA survey of Seoul opinion found that no fewer than 83 percent of the respondents said the United States was Korea's best friend; the percentage was higher among

*An interesting historical indication that the Koreans will acquiesce in firm political control is a 1936 Japanese gendarmerie survey, found by a Korean scholar in the Japanese army archives. According to the survey (which admittedly may not have been wholly unbiased), the Korean majority then saw little chance for Korean independence, and perceived the need for compliance with the Japanese administration, while wanting reforms. Those who did look for independence at that time were mainly the religious leaders and intellectuals.

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young people and those of higher education and socio-economic level. Half the respondents thought that "the basic interest of our country and those of the United States are fairly well in agreement"; another ten percent thought they were "very much in agreement"; 29 percent did not express an opinion. Insofar as interests were seen to differ, the principal factors listed were U.S. desire for power and interference in other countries' affairs, U.S. money and material interests, differences in the economic system, controversy regarding U.S. aid, and the status of forces agreement (then being actively negotiated). Half the respondents thought the U.S. was doing all it could to prevent a new world war; ten percent thought not; 40 percent had no opinion. More than half had a "very favorable" or "somewhat favorable" impression of "what the U.S. Government has been doing in international affairs recently," the five main reasons being economic aid, peace efforts, opposition to Communism, protection of small nations, and aid to Korea. Sixty-five percent had "very great confidence" or "considerable confidence" in the ability of the U.S. to "deal wisely with present world problems." Three-quarters thought the U.S. is the strongest world power, but there was some division of opinion as to which would be strongest in 25 years, although more voted for the U.S. than for any other country (Communist China was second, West Germany was third).

The Korean Government's April, 1968 poll inquired whether people were satisfied with measures taken by the U.S. Government after the attempted North Korean assassination of the President and the seizure of the Pueblo. About a quarter of the Seoul respondents and a third of those in the provinces were "very satisfied" or "somewhat satisfied" (chiefly the latter); somewhat over a quarter in each category felt "just so and so" about it, and the percentage unsatisfied was a mirror image of the satisfied. These figures were somewhat more favorable to the U.S. than was anticipated at the time.

The level of Korean interest in U.S. affairs is very high, as demonstrated by the survey of the Korean press (see below). Adverse as well as favorable trends in the U.S. are publicized and known among Koreans -- race problems, for example. Yet the image of the U.S. as a paradise of democracy and prosperity does not seem to be dimmed, and more Koreans want to travel to the U.S. than to any other country. As Korean national experience increases, and as Korean confidence grows, there is less inclination to accept American political and social institutions as a model for themselves. As much as ten years ago, returning leader grantees while expressing their admiration for the U.S. often added that such a way of life would be impossible in Korea. "One hears expressions of doubt that really national institutions or even democracy can be achieved until the Great Powers (including the U.S.) go home." Yet at the same time American views on Korean political problems are often sought.

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The Korean sense of being a pawn of the Great Powers leads to a tendency to place responsibility for the nation's difficulties on the shoulders of the U.S. as the dominant foreign power. The view is frequently expressed that the U.S. acquiesced in the Japanese annexation of Korea, refused to see the Korean representatives at Versailles, collaborated with the Soviet Union in the division of the country, invited the North Koreans to attack by withdrawing American troops and publicly putting Korea outside the perimeter of primary U.S. interest, and failed thereafter to settle the problem of unification, although in their view it could have been done at hardly greater cost than the armistice agreement. Though grateful for American assistance, Koreans nonetheless feel that American motives and determination to defend them are not beyond question. Koreans are realists; they wonder why the U.S. supports them, and are quick to believe that there must be some catch in it, or that it can't last, at the same time that their historical conditioning leads them to put their trust in it.

On the other hand, Korean trust for the U.S. derives in part from the very fact that while powerful it is also distant and has no real reason for an imperialist interest. For this reason, the Koreans regard the U.S. as a reliable counterweight to Japan.

Relations with Japan. This problem was fourth-ranking in the 1965 survey. Responses to another question in the same survey -- "Do you favor or oppose Korea having closer relations with Japan?" -- indicated that of the Seoul respondents, 30 percent favored closer relations; 27 percent opposed; 13 percent were neutral; 29 percent did not express opinions. (Korean relations with Japan were normalized in the year of the survey, after considerable political turmoil, which probably magnified the issue beyond its long-run significance). Although further details of opinion are not given, it is revealing that among objections expressed to U.S. policies were such responses as, "U.S. puts pressure on President Park during his visit there for normalization of relations with Japan," and, "Regarding our negotiation with Japan, U.S. takes advantage of our weakness."

The Koreans are ambivalent toward Japan, in that they fear and dislike the Japanese at the same time they envy and admire Japanese national prosperity and power, which they experienced at first hand during the annexation period. Japanese lack of respect for Koreans enhances the difficulty of relations. Yet the Koreans are reluctant to enter into closer relations with Japan because they fear that neither Korea's economy nor its nascent culture could preserve its independence and identity against unrestrained Japanese penetration. In the 1965 survey of Seoul residents, more people at all levels had a bad opinion of Japan than a good one, but the intensity of feeling was divided; 11 percent had a "good opinion" of Japan, and 29 percent had "neither good nor bad" opinion. Nine percent thought

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Japan was Korea's greatest enemy (but the U.S.S.R., Communist China, and North Korea considerably outpolled Japan for this honor).

Attitudes Toward Communism and the Communist Countries. Overwhelming Korean anti-Communism, and fear of the Communist nations, is well-established and needs no discussion here, except to note that all available data are in agreement. There is little indication of any large amount of intellectual sympathy for the Communists. Although there may well be some continuing support for Marxist solutions to national problems, or for a more neutralist position in international affairs -- such sentiments were frequently expressed during the brief period of total freedom in 1960-61 -- there is scant overt evidence for it. The ruling political party has a few left-inclined members, and there have been men close to the President and to Kim Chong-p'il in the past who had leftist views, but such elements have not greatly influenced national policy in recent years, although they may have contributed to some of the radical and ill-advised internal policies of the early years of the military regime. Some of the military leaders in the early days of the junta may have envisioned a pooling of forces with the military in the North, who would be encouraged to rise up by the South's example, as a means of achieving unification; no such idea seems to be in anyone's mind at present. As noted above, the South Koreans no longer think the North Koreans are making faster progress, nor -- if the ROK Government poll is to be believed -- do they think the North Koreans are better off.

Attitudes toward the United Nations. There has been widespread interest in Korea for many years in the United Nations, largely because of the UN role in the unification problem, but also because of UN assistance programs. UN observation of each domestic Korean election since 1948 is historically unique. Korean faith in the UN as a means of solving the unification problem, once quite strong, is diminishing. Nevertheless, the Korean Government opinion survey in 1968 found that the UN formula for unification through free elections was still favored over other solutions (by 24 percent of Seoul respondents and 27 percent in the provinces), as favored by Government policy. "Negotiation between the South and North" (19 and 16 percent) and "unification by means of military force" (18 and 11 percent) were not far behind. (Thirty percent in Seoul and 34 percent in the provinces expressed no view.) Knowledge of the UN is fairly widespread. In the 1965 USIS survey of Seoul residents, 58 percent said they had read "a lot" or "a little" about the UN, while 22 percent said they had read nothing at all, and 21 percent had no response or "didn't know." Of those who had read at least a little about the UN, 39 percent thought it would become stronger in the next few years; 28 percent thought it would become weaker; 15 percent thought it would stay the same.

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