


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DISCUSSION PAPER FOR
NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON
COUNTERING GENOCIDE IN THE GREAT LAKES (S)



BACKGROUND

The Threat of Resurgent Genocide Persists: Thousands of soldiers of the former Rwandan Army (ex-FAR) and their extremist *Interahamwe* militia allies who carried out the 1994 genocide continue to sow terror in the Great Lakes region. They retain their genocidal ideology and aim to exterminate Tutsis and target moderate Hutus. In recent months, the *genocidaires* have intensified their attacks against Tutsi and selected Hutu civilians and expanded their area of operation. Their destabilizing activities undermine reconstruction and reconciliation efforts. Since mid-1997, the *genocidaires* are conducting larger, better-coordinated operations aimed at schools, hospitals and other undefended targets. Over 1,000 Tutsis and dozens of Hutu moderates have been killed in the last six months alone. Analysts do not believe these forces represent a direct threat to the Rwandan Government (GOR). Despite efforts to mobilize along ethnic lines, the *genocidaires* have not been successful in generating mass popular support.

Rwandan Government Response: As the force which stopped the genocide, the GOR held the moral high ground upon taking power in 1994. But a number of its actions have eroded that position. Its counter-insurgency campaign has contributed to hundreds of civilian deaths, and there are continuing reports of collateral civilian damage. GOR leaders acknowledge human rights abuses and say they do not condone reprisal acts and are taking steps to improve less-than-effective and non-transparent military justice mechanisms.

U.S. Policy: U.S. efforts to support reconstruction and democratic transitions in Rwanda and the wider Great Lakes region are threatened by the *genocidaires* and their cooperation with other armed insurgents in DROC, Uganda and Burundi, as well as with the regime in Sudan. In order to fulfill the President's commitment to do everything possible to prevent a recurrence of genocide or mass killing in the Great Lakes, we are pursuing several elements of an effective strategy, including: implementing the Great Lakes Justice Initiative to help break the cycle of impunity; dispatching two highly

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qualified American lawyers to help accelerate and bring due process to the genocide trials in Rwanda; supporting local elections in Rwanda scheduled for later this year, which will expand opportunities for participation for the Hutu majority; exploring possible avenues for expanding dialogue between the GOR and untainted elements of the former government and opposition that might credibly represent other constituencies within Rwanda; discussing with the GOR the establishment of regional development offices patterned after those in DROC; working to enhance reconciliation radio programming in Rwanda and the GOR's efforts to counter hate propaganda; consulting in the region about the possible establishment of an international Coalition Against Genocide; and revitalizing the UN Arms Flow Commission. This Deputies meeting will address military elements of an enhanced strategy. (S)

ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION

Deputies will consider whether we are prepared to deepen our security engagement as one element of a broader genocide prevention strategy. A separate discussion later will identify specific funding sources, if necessary. (S)

ISSUE ONE: What should be the policy objective and scope of additional U.S. military aid and training for Rwanda?

Given the expanded activity of the *genocidaires*, **Deputies are asked to review** whether the objective of our military assistance should be to expand our current efforts to help professionalize the Rwandan military and make it a more stable institution, or to directly contribute to the GOR's efforts to militarily deter, contain or neutralize the *genocidaires*. A decision is necessary to provide the parameters for a DOD assessment team to determine the appropriate mix of activities. We do not expect that either option would spark demands from other regional states for similar aid. On the contrary, more serious engagement would be positively received by most East and Central African states.

(S)

OPTION A: EXPAND EFFORTS TO PROFESSIONALIZE THE RWANDAN ARMY

This option would expand our current efforts to enable the Rwandan army to professionalize its senior and junior operational leadership, strengthen its military justice institutions and facilitate its transition to a national military, without introducing lethality into our assistance. The DOD assessment team would examine how to expand our efforts

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at leader development through command and staff training. Illustrative activities might include: training of officers and staff in planning, command and control, management systems and military justice; supporting an NCO and officer academy; expanding human rights training in the rules of war; developing the command and staff of their nascent air force; and providing further equipment such as uniforms, communication and load-bearing equipment. This could require additional IMET resources, dispatching U.S. personnel for enhanced training activities and making additional slots open to Rwandans for the Command General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth. (S)

PROS: This option would strengthen a critical GOR institution and assist in the long-term goal of facilitating a transition to a more professional military. Supporting the creation of and training trainers for a training academy would assist the GOR to lower costs, integrate disparate efforts and enhance sustainability of inputs. This option would increase our leverage to promote reforms of and the rule of law within the Rwandan military. The Ministry of Defense recently finished its own assessment of military justice and we could build on the window of opportunity to ensure greater internal accountability and protection of civilians. (S)

CONS: This option will not in the short run contribute greatly to the GOR's ability to deter or prevent a resurgence of mass killings or to defeat the *genocidaires* because it would not involve operational and tactical training. It only addresses long-term improvements in the Rwandan army's capabilities, not lethal aid to deal with the immediate threat. (S)

OPTION B: SUPPORT GOR EFFORTS TO CONTAIN THE GENOCIDAIRES

This option would establish our policy objective to more directly contribute to Rwanda's military efforts to deter, contain or neutralize the *genocidaires*. We would commit to enhancing the GOR's internal defensive or offensive capabilities through the provision of lethal and non-lethal training and equipment. The DOD assessment team would consider a scope of activities that would build on Option A but also include counterinsurgency training, intelligence sharing and logistical support to internal defense. (S)

PROS: This option would help enable the GOR to more effectively counter the activities of the *genocidaires* and provide it with adequate capacity to deter, prevent or neutralize a resurgence of mass killing. Critical to countering genocidal activity is a

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more efficient, targeted and professional GOR counter-insurgency operation. Demonstrating our direct support for an anti-genocide campaign would improve our leverage to increase GOR commitment to political liberalization and respect for human rights. Specific performance criteria resulting from consultations with human rights groups would be attached to this option, such as a code of conduct to ensure that aid and training are not used against innocent civilians. (S)

CONS: Because of publicized human rights abuses within the context of its counter-insurgency operation, providing lethal military aid to the RPA would be highly controversial with human rights groups and certain Members of Congress. This approach would require a change in policy to support lethality and would require a concerted public affairs campaign and consultation effort in Congress. It also requires additional resources. Opposition to lethal support for the Rwandan military might obstruct our efforts to make non-military policy enhancements. (S)

ISSUE TWO: Should we also consider a regional strategy that might include military aid, training and contingency support to better prepare the region to counter future genocidal activity?

The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) in its current form is years away from creating a capacity for Africa to do peacekeeping operations by itself and does not address some of the particular requirements of peace enforcement operations. Regional states by themselves lack the current capacity to intervene successfully to stop a genocide or situation of mass killing. Some regional leaders have spoken about the possibility of intervening unilaterally or as a regional coalition against the *genocidaires* if the situation markedly deteriorates. We need to determine if and to what extent we are prepared to work with these states to increase quickly their capacity to respond to resurgent genocide. (S)

Deputies are asked to review whether the United States should task the IWG to analyze contingencies and options regarding potential U.S. support for building regional capacity for peace enforcement. The IWG would address the following questions: What do we need to do now to support regional capacities to undertake peace enforcement in strictly defined circumstances? What should we be prepared to do ourselves (unilaterally and to support an intervening force) in the event of an intervention to counter genocide? What should we do to develop an appropriate

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multilateral political framework for intervention contingencies?

(S)

The range of options could include the following:

- specialized training and/or equipment through additional JCETs, IMET, EDA, FMF or emergency drawdown to support regional logistical and peace enforcement capacities;
- modification of the Program of Instruction (POI) for some ACRI training and equipment transfers to address requirements unique to peace enforcement operations;
- modification of Frontline States equipment transfers;
- contingency planning for providing airlift and/or logistical support to intervening forces, such as the 1995 offer to provide airlift support for humanitarian operations in the event of an internationally sanctioned regional intervention in Burundi. (S)

PROS: It is possible that the only willing volunteers to counter a rapidly unfolding resurgence in genocide or mass killing would be neighboring states. Therefore, providing relevant training and equipment would enhance their ability to counter such activities. We don't want to find ourselves in a position of having to choose to either stand by and do nothing or intervene unilaterally in the face of another mass killing. We need a reliable alternative response system. This approach promotes regional solutions to regional problems. It may minimize Congressional concerns if presented as a way to both reduce future military or humanitarian commitments and promote regional solutions to regional problems. (S)

CONS: This option requires support for regional deterrent action and may be misinterpreted as endorsing regional intervention more broadly. Regional states deploying ACRI-trained units for a non-UN sanctioned operation would engender resistance from the Hill, UN and elsewhere. Assistance could be used for military purposes other than those we intend, given that regional states have been instrumental in revolutions in Zaire and Sudan. This option would require additional funding for participating countries. A commitment to provide airlift and logistical support might raise false expectations that the United States would back a regional intervention that would not be endorsed by the UNSC. We need to clarify the conditions under which we would be prepared to support such an intervention. (S)

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ISSUE THREE: Should the United States equip and train the Rwandan army to locate and suppress hate radio broadcasts?

The 1994 genocide demonstrated the potential hate radio broadcasts can have in feeding genocidal activity. Although most of the hate propaganda currently being disseminated is written, hate radio has the potential to reemerge as a tool of the *genocidaires*. **Deputies are asked to decide** what we are prepared to do to address the possibility of an intense hate propaganda campaign in a rapidly deteriorating crisis situation. We are already taking a number of steps to counter hate propaganda in the Great Lakes through the positive use of information. But countering a potential upsurge in inflammatory hate radio broadcasts would require training and equipping the Rwandan army to locate and suppress mobile radio transmitters. The GOR currently can monitor and sometimes jam broadcasts, but lacks the direction-finding capabilities which would be required to locate and suppress mobile transmitters. Providing this equipment and training to the GOR could be carried out either by U.S. military personnel or by contractors. **Deputies should also consider** whether to develop on-the-shelf plans for a worst-case contingency which might require use of USG assets to jam genocidal hate radio broadcasts. (S)

PROS: Providing equipment and training to the GOR will forestall future pressure on us to use our own assets to suppress such transmissions in a crisis situation. It will also provide those with the greatest incentive to halt such broadcasts with the means of doing so. (S)

CONS: On the other hand, once this equipment and training have been provided, it may be difficult for us to control how these capabilities might be used. Human rights groups and some Members of Congress may criticize any provision of this type of equipment to governments which themselves have imperfect human rights records. To counter such concerns, an agreement that provides for a monitoring regime on the use of the equipment should be negotiated as part of the package. (S)

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